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Editorial on the Research Topic
Leeway to Operate With Plant Genetic Resources
Different legal frameworks are applicable to the use of genetic resources (GR). These can broadly
be categorized into (1) access and benefit-sharing (ABS), (2) biosafety aspects related to the
technologies for improving the geneticmaterial, and (3) intellectual property (IP) systems including
plant variety rights (PVR) and patents specific to the plant innovation sector. With scientific
and technical progress in research and breeding, as well as expanding internationalization, legal
frameworks have become increasingly complex in the past few decades. In this context, the Research
Topic “Leeway to operate with plant genetic resources” addresses the latest andmost pertinent legal
issues related to the use of GR in plant research and breeding. The contributions are summarized
here and put into the larger societal and legal context that modern-day plant geneticists are facing.
ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING
ABS is a framework that aims to distribute fairly the benefits arising from the utilization of GR
between users and providers. The basic principles are drawn in the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) and its supplementary protocol, the Nagoya Protocol (https://cbd.int/abs/). The
access to GR also considers the related traditional knowledge and is based on prior informed
consent and mutually agreed terms.
There is a wide disparity in how the Nagoya Protocol is implemented in different countries,
which is challenging for users. Sirakaya et al. reviews the ABS framework across 20 provider
countries, identifying common regulatory elements and follows up with stakeholder interviews.
These show that opinions on the benefits of various ABS regulatory mechanisms differ between
provider countries and industrial users, though there are some common grounds. One significant
detail is that most users oppose the inclusion of digital sequence information (DSI) within the
subject matter, contrary to most provider countries. We note that FAO acknowledges that DSI
increases the understanding ofmolecular biology and evolution as well as taxonomy and identifying
species, thus facilitating GR conservation and use. Aubry et al. elaborates further on the ongoing
debate about the sharing and mining of freely accessible sequencing data. In his view, DSI of
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) should be under an “efficient, resilient,
decentralized” and reasonable governance model that ensures its fair use.
Brink and van Hintum address the perspective of collection holders, showing the challenges
faced by gene banks for acquiring and sharing GR while complying with the various international
and national regulations. They argue that gene banks must set up appropriate protocols for
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documenting every accession’s origin and the condition for its
use and further distribution, while countering complexity to
avoid a decrease in access to PGRFA. Overall, it is important to
ensure fair and equitable ABS negotiations between providers
and users. Deplazes-Zemp et al. brings an ethical perspective,
arguing that there are five types of justice related to this
subject: distributive, commentative, recognitive, reparative, and
procedural. According to the author, it is important that both
users and providers are aware of these justice types and the way
the use of GR poses particular challenges.
BIOSAFETY
The products of gene technologies, such as genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) are subject to a specific biosafety legislation,
in most jurisdictions. building on principles established by the
Cartagena Protocol to the CBD (https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/).
The legal status of the products of new breeding techniques
(NBTs) has been subject to many discussions, as the resulting
products may or may not be encompassed by the GMO
definition, depending on the jurisdiction.
A landmark judgment from the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) in July 2018 (case C-528/16) means
that the products of site-directed mutagenesis will be subject
to the same legal provisions as genetically modified organisms
(GMOs). There are however discussions on the applicability of
the CJEU judgment to the variety of NBT products. Vives-Vallés
and Collonnier provide a legal interpretation of the judgment,
relating it to relevant scientific papers published in the aftermath.
Their article concludes that certain products of NBTs may
be exempted from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC, despite
the CJEU judgment being commonly interpreted otherwise,
and sketches a limited legislative proposal to achieve certainty
and suggesting which NBT products could be exempted and
under what circumstances. Holme et al. argues that the CJEU
assumption that targeted mutagenesis “makes it possible to
produce GM varieties at a rate and in quantities unlike those
resulting from random mutagenesis,” is incorrect. Technical
developments including TILLING has led to a convergence
between the two types of mutagenesis in terms of output, with
the main differences being the precision of mutation site and the
number of off-target mutations.
Turning to the economics of regulating NBT products,
Wesseler et al. compares theoretical advantages and
disadvantages with different regulatory approaches. A survey
among Dutch plant breeding companies show that these are
optimistic the prospect that a more relaxed legislation will be
implemented in the EU, despite having experienced a negative
impact on competitiveness and on investments due to the CJEU
judgment on mutagenesis. Jin et al. present an example of
costs in delaying technology adoption. By assessing the impact
caused by postponed authorization for the use of Bt rice in
China, the authors model the costs by filling an information
gap regarding foregone benefits of lower pesticide use and the
spill-over effect by delaying technology adoption. They conclude
that delaying Bt rice introduction has come at a substantial
economic cost (both direct as well as in terms of human health
and environmental costs).
The Green Revolution based on crop genetics along with
advanced agronomy led to miraculous harvests in Asia and
Latin America, but largely bypassed sub-Saharan Africa. The
ongoing gene revolution should therefore bring benefits to this
region. Komen et al. show how the authorization of transgenic
crops release is managed, drawing examples from five African
countries. They highlight challenges and lessons learnt and
propose policy recommendations facilitating the adoption of
emerging biotechnology for plant breeding in Africa. It has
however been recognized elsewhere in the literature that the
global influence of EU policies should be considered. The
overall process for risk assessment and risk management of
GMOs in the EU has been criticized as being unnecessary
politicized and, though the part with the science-based system
for risk assessment is overall sound, certain improvements are
envisaged by Chatzopoulou et al.. The authors compare the
procedure in the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) with
that of the European Medicines Agency (EMA), and suggest
that a more balanced geographical distribution of experts in
the EFSA GMO panel may minimize overall politicization of
decision-making.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Current technical developments are posing challenges to the
IP/PVR systems in plant breeding. Definitions need to be re-
established and the impact of the evolution of systems for
patents and for plant breeders’ rights need to be analyzed in
terms of market structure and competition. One example is the
concept of Essentially Derived Variety (EDV), for which UPOV is
currently revisiting their explanatory note. Krieger et al. explore
the concept and assess whether the use of NBTs invariably leads to
an EDV. The authors deliver a legal interpretation of two related
notions, namely, the “breeder’s exemption” and EDV, considering
the wording of the provisions, the historical background and the
evolution, including also assertions from case law from several
UPOVmembers. Several elements are discussed, concluding that
the EDV concept should encompass cultivars obtained through
the application of NBT only, when no further significant breeding
steps have been taken.
In terms of market structure and innovation, Wozniak et al.
analyse the current situation and prospects of rapeseed in the
EU taking Poland and Germany as benchmarks. The study
considers several IP as well as agronomic factors and analyses
their evolution overtime, describing patterns regarding the
opportunities of rapeseed. Though an analysis of IP shows an
innovation potential, the authors are concerned that the CJEU
judgment on mutagenesis may have a negative impact on the
expansion of rapeseed cultivation.
Following concerns about the increasing impact of patenting
and of concentration in the seed sector, an Open Source Seed
(OSS) model has been proposed in recent years. Louwaars et al.
investigates this model and its impact on the breeder’s exemption
specifically and on the open innovation character of the PVR
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system in general. Focusing on two examples from Germany
and USA, the author suggests that OSS models add additional
pressure on the breeder’s exemption, which may already be
restrained by patents and biodiversity schemes, thus concluding
that the breeder’s exemption is an appropriate solution to ensure
the access to genetic material.
Altogether, these articles illustrate the complexity of legal
frameworks that plant researchers and breeders need to be
aware of and comply with. Scientific and technological progress
is enhancing our capacity to work with GR and causes
restructuring of markets and competition and re-definitions of
established concepts. We hope this Research Topic will provide a
valuable resource for all stakeholders, including scientists, legal
researchers, and practitioners that wish to stay up to date in
this field.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
All authors listed have made a substantial, direct and intellectual
contribution to the work, and approved it for publication.
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2020 Eriksson, Ortiz, Visser, Vives-Vallés and Prieto. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 3 July 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 9116
1 August 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1046
POLICY AND PRACTICE REVIEWS
doi: 10.3389/fpls.2019.01046
published: 30 August 2019
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org
The Future of Digital Sequence 
Information for Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture
Sylvain Aubry 1,2*
1 Department of Plant and Microbial Science, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland, 2 Section Genetic Resources and 
Technology, Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture, Bern, Switzerland
The recent debates on the legal status of “digital sequence information” (DSI) at the 
international level could have extensive consequences for the future of agriculture and 
food security. A large majority of recent advances in biology, medicine, or agriculture 
were achieved by sharing and mining of freely accessible sequencing data. It is most 
probably because of the tremendous success of modern genomics and advances of 
synthetic biology that concerns were raised about possible fair and equitable ways of 
sharing data. The DSI concept is relatively new, and all concerned parties agreed upon 
the need for a clear definition. For example, the extent to which DSI understanding is 
limited only to genetic sequence data has to be clarified. In this paper, I focus on a subset 
of DSI essential to humankind: the DSI originating from plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture (PGRFA). Two international agreements shape the conservation and use 
of plant genetic resources: the Convention on Biodiversity and the International Treaty 
for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. In an attempt to mobilize DSI 
users and producers involved in research, breeding, and conservation, I describe here 
how the increasing amount of genomic data, information, and studies interact with the 
existing legal framework at the global level. Using possible scenarios, I will emphasize the 
complexity of the issues surrounding DSI for PGRFA and propose potential ways forward 
for developing an inclusive governance and fair use of these genetic resources.
Keywords: plant genetic resources, digital sequence information, International Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture of the Food and Agriculture Organisation, digitization, plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture
INTRODUCTION
In his Discourse of Inequality, Rousseau states: “You’re lost, if you forget that the fruits of Earth belong 
equally to all of us, and Earth itself to nobody” (Rousseau, 1755). Similar thoughts were surely some of 
the underlying motivations of negotiators during the development of the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGRFA) in the early 2000, later referred here as the “Seed 
Treaty” (Esquinas-Alcazar et al., 2013; ITPGRFA, 2004). Since more than a century, the concept of 
genetic resources frames breeding and conservation into a genocentric perspective that is intertwined 
with their own erosion and the danger of losing biodiversity (Bonneuil, 2019; Harlan, 1975). As “fruits 
of the Earth” are becoming scarce in quantity and quality (Esquinas-Alcázar, 2005; Khoury et al., 
2014), there is more than ever a need for fair and equitable governance of genetic resources, especially 
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those relevant for breeding new crops and food security (Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture, GRFA).
Two international agreements shape the conservation and 
use of PGRFA: the Convention of Biodiversity (CBD) that rules 
any terrestrial genetic resources and the Seed Treaty, which 
apply only on a subset of species relevant to agriculture and 
food security. Both are the main elements of the access and 
benefit sharing framework (Figure 1). The main objectives of 
ABS framework are summed up in the Article 2 of the CBD: to 
insure “conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use 
of its components and the equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from the utilization of genetic resources” (CBD, 1992). The 
Seed Treaty has been designed as a sector-specific reply to the 
CBD (Esquinas-Alcazar et al., 2013; Manzella, 2013) taking into 
consideration the need of a global commons to counteract loss 
of agricultural biodiversity and insure food security. It was also 
perceived as a global effort to counteract the trend in privatization 
of PGRFA, including the challenge associated with recognition of 
the State sovereignty over genetic resources highlighted by the 
CBD (Halewood et al, 2013). The Seed Treaty remains one of the 
most remarkable attempts to create a global commons around 
phytogenetic resources that recognize farmers as essential for 
their conservation and sustainable use (FAO, 2010; Halewood, 
2013). It also aims at facilitating access to plant genetic resources 
for farmers, conservationists, breeders, scientists, and teachers. It 
is a result of a multi-decade process of international negotiations 
that constrained its design (Halewood et al., 2013). For example, 
the boundaries of the common are strictly limited. The core of 
the Seed Treaty’s common, the multilateral system, comprises 
a pool covering 64 of some of the most important species for 
agriculture. These 64 species, listed in the annex 1 of the treaty, 
contribute to an estimated 90% of calories, fat, protein, and 
weight consumed worldwide (ITPGRFA, 2004; Khoury et al., 
2014). The multilateral system is often referred to as an example 
of global management system of the global common pool of 
resources (Halewood et al., 2013). Noteworthy, as a result of 
difficult and protracted negotiations, it only represents a fraction 
of the entire PGRFA (Manzella, 2013; Khoury et al., 2014). In fact, 
species listed in annex 1 are only part for the multilateral system 
when exclusively used for food or feed purposes and when those 
resources are under the “national governments management and 
control systems” (ITPGRFA, 2004). Some voluntary inclusions 
to the multilateral system are also possible. In addition, the 
multilateral system also excludes material that is declared “under 
development.” Some important key agricultural species are not in 
the annex 1 (like coffee, soybean, or sugarcane), leading to some 
future discussion about extension or suppression of the annex 1.
Any PGRFA falling out of the scope of the Seed Treaty and not 
ruled by any other intellectual property regime would then eventually 
be regulated by the CBD and its Nagoya Protocol. Under the Nagoya 
protocol, the sovereignty of the country of origin is prevalent, and 
each single resource exchange negotiated on a case-by-case basis. All 
species within the multilateral system are governed by a standard 
material transfer agreement (SMTA) whereas the Nagoya Protocol 
regulates access to the resources based on a system of bilateral 
agreements between countries, using prior informed consent and 
mutually agreed terms (PIC/MAT). The SMTA used in the Seed 
Treaty is a standardized contract that allows a facilitated exchange 
of resources between signatories. Also, being the result of complex 
negotiations (Esquinas-Alcazar, 2013), it allows coordination 
between the global/international level and local stakeholders. One 
of its specificity is to set a default rate of benefits to be given to a third 
party, namely, a fiduciary fund managed by the FAO.
In a similar way to the CBD, the Seed Treaty by definition 
focuses on physical genetic resources: “any material of plant origin, 
including reproductive and vegetative propagating material, 
containing functional units of heredity” (ITPGRFA, 2004). 
However, it remains unclear to which extent the benefit sharing 
obligations included in the SMTA of the multilateral system do 
also concern obligations toward digitally derived data (often 
referred to as “digital sequence Information,” DSI) (CBD/COP/
DEC/XIII/16, 2016). Considering genetic resources exclusively 
as a material entity (mostly germplasm, seeds, seedlings…) may 
misjudge the modern practices related to GRFA and the exact 
nature of what is being “extracted” from these. This potentially 
precludes these instruments to adapt to today’s modalities of 
use of the genetic resources: entities that are primarily mined to 
generate large amounts of (digital) data resulting from the use 
of various “omics” approaches. Previous to the digitization of 
genetic resources, the material-centric definition of PGRFA has 
already been criticized by some scholars proposing an alternative 
governance framework of PGRFA, which would have valued 
natural information (Vogel, 2011; Ruiz Muller, 2015).
FIGURE 1 | The regime complex regulating Plant Genetic Resources for 
Agriculture (PGRFA). ITPGRFA, International Treaty for Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture; SMTA, Standard Material Agreement; MLS, Multi-
lateral System; UPOV, International Union for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants; BR, Breeder's right; CBD, Convention for Biodiversity; NP Nagoya 
Protocol; PIC/MAT, Prior Informed Consent/Mutually Agreed Terms; TRIPS, 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; ABS 
Access and Benefit Sharing. 
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A complex set of partially overlapping international legally 
binding instruments frame intellectual properties of PGRFA that 
have distinct underlying principles and aims (Figure 1, Roa-
Rodríguez and van Dooren, 2008). The main relevant instruments 
for PGRFA are trade secret protection, patents, breeder’s rights, 
copyright, and sovereign right over generic resources (for a 
comprehensive review, see Winter, 2013). Either one or both 
physical (seeds) and informational (genomic sequences) entities 
could in principle be privatized under those regimes (Winter, 
2013; Roa et al., 2016). As a consequence, a single PGRFA could 
in theory be privatized based on a whole range of criteria/
justifications (inventivity, genetic “potential,” country of origin…) 
depending whether their informational or physical (or both) 
aspects are being considered and which regime is considered. 
There is a large body of work commenting on advantages and 
limits of each of these instruments, especially on the extent to 
which the global trend to privatize genetic resources impact on 
the PGRFA common (Dedeurwaerdere, 2013; Winter, 2013). It 
appears therefore that negating the hybrid status of PGRFA: both 
a physical and informational commodity makes it hard to design a 
policy framework that could fit in this “regime complex” (Raustiala 
and Victor, 2004) in order to guarantee access and sharing of the 
potential benefits. At first, an appropriate PGRFA definition seems 
therefore necessary to adapt to the actual state of scientific progress.
Since 2016, debates about the status of DSI has gained 
prominence in several international circles, including the ABS 
framework: the Seed Treaty (ITPGRFA, 2015; Manzella, 2016), 
the CBD, but also the Convention on International Trade of 
Endangered Species, the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Framework of the World Health Organization, and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This triggered a great 
deal of confusion and a subsequent surge of analyses and reports 
(CBD/COP/DEC/XIII/16, 2016; Marden, 2017; Welch et al., 
2017; Heinemann et al., 2018; Laird and Wynberg, 2018). The 
development of synthetic biology, in other words, our increasing 
abilities to read and write DNA (Chari and Church, 2017), has 
cast fear on the possibilities to overrun physical access. However, 
it is possible that the DSI issue only brought to light a pre-existing 
ontological weakness (or unresolved long-standing tension) 
of the genetic resources definition in international agreements 
(Deplazes-Zemp et al., 2018; Marden, 2018; Prathapan et al., 
2018). Here, I try to explain why a merely technical evolution that 
allowed a more exhaustive description of the PGRFA, namely, 
high-throughput sequencing of genetic information (and other 
“omics” data), has led to challenge the very basic fundaments of 
PGRFA governance and describe some possible ways forward.
DIGITAL SEQUENCE INFORMATION: 
ANOTHER FACE OF “BIG DATA”
Until recently, the terminology “DSI” was mostly unknown to a 
majority of scientists (Heinemann et al., 2018). In addition, it still 
remains largely unclear whether DSI should be only restricted 
to nucleotide sequences (“genomic information”) or should also 
integrate other omics data like other nucleic acids, methylation 
status, metabolites, or even phenotypic data (Halewood et al., 
2018a). Independently of the unavailability of any internationally 
agreed definition, genomics alone generates petabases (1015) of 
data (i.e., nucleotide sequences) every year (www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/sra) and is predicted to soon exceed other “big data” science 
in size and complexity (Stephens et al., 2015; Heinemann et al., 
2018). The quick rate of DSI generation emphasizes the potential 
need for a global standardized infrastructure to ensure long-
term data preservation (Leonelli et al., 2013). Independently 
of the speed of knowledge and data generation, the “digitality” 
of genomic data seems trivial in practice, and DSI could well 
be considered as presenting most of the attributes of other 
“digital artifact” produced in other domains, where alternative 
governance models have already been implemented successfully 
(Kallinikos et al., 2013). Research on PGRFA also leads many 
initiatives to open possibilities of DSI management globally, like 
DivSeek for crop genomics data (www.divseek.org) or GODAN 
for phenotypic data (www.godan.info). Similarly, conservation 
of PGRFA tends to include increasing amounts of DSI, like in 
the DNA barcoding of life initiative (http://www.boldsystems.
org/), “local” initiatives like the sequencing of genomes of an 
entire botanical garden (Liu et al., 2019), or major efforts from 
the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers 
(CGIAR) to “digitally curate” their collections (Halewood et al., 
2018b). Ambitious projects of large-scale genome sequencing, 
like the “Earth BioGenome project” planning to sequence not less 
than 10 million eukaryotic species, will also bring new insights 
likely to be relevant for food and agriculture (Lewin et al., 2018).
The prominence of big “omics” data in biological science 
has not only challenged the way science is done and shared 
but also its underpinning philosophy (Leonelli, 2014). At odds 
with the increasing complexity of the instruments ruling on 
intellectual property over the last 30 years, biology has gradually 
favored opening access to the public research data and results 
(Strasser, 2011; Sullivan, 2004). This has recently crystallized 
in various policy guidelines worldwide (Wilkinson et al., 2016) 
that are also widely advocated in synthetic biology [OpenPlant 
(BioBricks Foundation), 2015]. In this context, promoting open 
data is essential, but the “digital divide” inherent to modern 
use of information and communication technologies still must 
be considered (Bastow and Leonelli, 2010; Bezuidenhout et al., 
2017). Inequalities in data access, infrastructures and experts 
should not stretch the already relatively libertarian design of the 
Seed Treaty (Thomas, 2014). Bezuidenhout and colleagues suggest 
that inequalities amongst various stakeholders (farmers, breeders, 
researchers, consumers) should be better integrated when it comes 
to build an effectively open data framework, in a very similar way 
to Sen’s approach to capability of human wellbeing (Sen, 1999). 
Open science (and open data) has been critically considered as 
shared between various owners that have a common monopoly 
on investments and on use of the openly accessible knowledge 
(Callon, 1994; Stengel et al., 2009). In other words, “open science” 
does not necessarily mean “fair science,” and “access to” can differ 
greatly from “utility of ” DSI (Bezuidenhout et al., 2017).
A similar debate exists in synthetic biology about digital-only 
information originating from genomics datasets. Alternative IP 
models emerged to regulate exchange of DNA “parts” [OpenPlant 
(BioBricks Foundation), 2015; Welch et al., 2017]. There, a 
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two-tier model distinguishing non-commercial technology 
from high-potential output was designed to maximize sharing 
of biomaterials and associated data. This approach was designed 
to answer the needs of this very specific research community 
(SynBio), and more work is needed to show to which extent that 
it might be transferable to PGRFA and breeding context at large.
The ambitious goal of the Seed Treaty is to allow “conservation 
and sustainable use of PGRFA, the fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising from their use (…) for sustainable 
agriculture and food security” (Art. 1, ITPGRFA, 2004). These 
goals can be achieved, however, only with a more comprehensive 
and a better understanding of the way digitization has changed 
practices. When designing PGRFA governance, care should 
be taken to provide not only clear modalities of access and 
exchange of data, but also to the capabilities of each stakeholder 
involved. This would in turn allow an actual share of benefits 
(being monetary or not) from the global biodiversity for food 
and agriculture.
SPECIFICITIES OF DSI-PGRFA USE IN 
PLANT BREEDING
Plant research and crop improvement are largely dependent 
on access to DSI, being genotypic or phenotypic data (Spindel 
and McCouch, 2016; Halewood et al., 2018a). The Seed Treaty 
recognizes that exchange of information is a “non-monetary” 
benefit. However, given that the treaty’s design largely preceded 
most of the genomics’ developments, it remains unclear, to which 
extent this information exchange is considered in daily practice 
(Welch et al., 2017; Marden, 2018). Interestingly, some unique 
facets of the PGRFA are often overlooked when it comes to 
using DSI for modern breeding. PGRFA is a multifaced concept, 
involving many actors and being attached to a vast diversity of 
socio-economical values, and could be considered as a unique 
type of cultural commons (Ostrom and Hess, 2007; Madison et 
al., 2010; Halewood, 2013). Indeed, usage of PGRFA in a breeding 
program does not usually exhaust the resource (non-rivalry), but 
rather improves its intrinsic value and can even renew interest for 
its conservation. In addition, DSI originating from PGRFA will be 
open to all (non-exclusionary), even though this largely depends 
on who is able to perform the actual sequencing/phenotyping 
or which intellectual property regime may apply (Winter, 2013). 
Therefore, DSI originating from PGRFA need a tailored “new 
commons” concept to be adjusted to their particular hybrid 
status, and an extension of the ITPGRFA-framework seems the 
most pragmatic way to allow such a change of paradigm. DSI 
from PGRFA differs from the classic views on natural resources 
or cultural commodities by at least two main aspects:
• An optimal breeding value will be achieved, for example, 
during genomic selection, by merging pre-breeding data 
of multiple accessions. There is a necessary mixing and 
computing of large amounts of diverse accessions and lines 
in order to provide the targeted genetic progress or improved 
breeding values (Spindel and McCouch, 2016). This, in 
turn, will make the exact contribution of every single used 
“accession” hardly tractable. Indeed, one of the triggers of the 
onset of the multilateral system was the widely recognized 
spread of most of the plants used for food and feed worldwide 
(ITPGRFA, 2004). DSI add one degree of complexity to this 
pre-existing issue.
• The raise of synthetic biology, or more precisely the foreseen 
capacities of de novo synthesizing very large DNA fragments, 
even though not extensively used in breeding so far (Heinemann 
et al., 2018; Aubry and Eigenmann, 2019) disrupted the link 
between the material (germplasm) and its derived products. 
Despite being a very efficient system for describing and 
protecting DNA sequences for patents, it remains unclear 
how diverse and how pervasive any given intellectual property 
system should apply to DSI from PGRFA. For example, how 
easily could a codon-optimized resistance gene originating 
from a cryptogamic mushroom that is transformed into a 
modern variety of wheat be traced back to the organism it was 
first identified? Could intellectual property systems protect 
complex multi-gene networks that are essential for crop stress 
or pathogen resistance (Hickman et al., 2017)? How relevant 
is the protection or retention of data from crop pathogens that 
are constantly evolving and often represent global threats on 
agriculture (Sánchez-Vallet et al., 2018)?
The existing policy framework accommodates badly with the 
non-static, widely spread, non-rivalrous, and often non-exclusionary 
characters of DSI from PGRFA. There are fundamental differences 
between resources (to be extracted), natural genetic resources (to be 
extracted and valued), and PGRFA (to be primarily mixed/crossed 
to increase variability and selected in the process of breeding). These 
specificities need to be acknowledged when trying to improve 
coherence over the global governance of DSI-PGRFA.
Characterization/sequencing of PGRFA is regularly performed 
on cultivars, landraces, farmer’s breeds, or even crop wild relatives. 
This aims at linking phenotype and genotype and generally 
produces large amounts of (digital) data. Ultimately, the goal is to 
enable prediction of phenotypes based on genome-wide variability. 
This technique is referred to as “genomic selection” (Hamblin et al., 
2011; Spindel and McCouch, 2016). Pan-genomes, genomes, 
transcriptomes, metabolomics, and phenotypic data can be used 
in genome-wide association studies (GWAS) to identify relevant 
traits, being a single allelic variant that is linked to an agronomic 
trait or to gene networks (Lipka et al., 2015; Halewood et al., 
2018b). Genotyping-by-sequencing and GWAS frameworks 
were applied based on genome variability in a diverse array of 
crops like maize (Yano et al., 2016), sorghum (Morris et al., 2013), 
pearl millet (Varshney et al., 2017), chickpea (Basu et al., 2018), 
peanut (Zhang et al., 2017), banana (Sardos et al., 2016), cassava 
(Kayondo et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018), and cowpea (Burridge 
et al., 2017). Metabolite-based GWAS was also reported as an 
important tool to improve genomics-assisted selection for crop 
improvement (Fernie and Schauer, 2009; Luo, 2015). Increasing 
amounts of research programs are mining the genetic diversity 
already collected and readily available from gene banks. 
Successful attempts allowed to identify the genetic basis of traits 
responsible for fragrance in rice (Daygon et al., 2017), underlying 
genetics responsible for pearl millet drought resistance (Varshney 
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et al., 2017), or loci encoding morphological diversity in barley 
(Milner et al., 2018). All of these genomic techniques allowed a 
better description (high-resolution fingerprinting) of the overall 
genetic diversity existing in each germplasm that, in turn, improve 
identification of relevant traits and allow a better breeding 
prediction and efficiency (Varshney et al., 2012). This ultimately 
helps ensuring a sustainable use of the PGRFA to provide crops 
that are locally adapted, resilient to various biotic and abiotic 
stresses, and necessary to maintain high levels of food security.
Noteworthy, identification and characterization of novel 
traits have been possible by merging several hundreds of 
accessions globally. The modalities of genomic data (DSI) use 
make traceability irrelevant: the value lies in the amounts of data 
analyzed, rarely in a single accession. However, exploiting the 
existing diversity collected in gene banks does not necessarily 
acknowledge the previous work of breeders and farmers 
during the course of agricultural history, and taking into 
consideration these resources as mere data-providing artifacts 
(“bulk of genes”) may also exclude central socio-economical 
relationship of farmers to their crops (Thomas, 2014; Bonneuil, 
2019). Continuous exchange of genetic material has shaped 
a large majority of the breeding programs and follows self-
established decentralized rules specific to every crop. However, 
it is unclear how the raise and diffusion of genomic data may 
integrate with these already existing structures, as well as 
their influence on the relationship between large and small 
breeders, and finally how an increasing amount of freely 
available data might influence practices. Several initiatives, 
like DivSeek (McCouch et al., 2013), have tried to provide a 
global accessible infrastructure to catalogue the world’s seed 
and derived genomic data collections.
ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS: 
GOVERNING THE FUTURE OF PGRFA
I have shown here actual modalities and challenges in considering 
some aspects of PGRFA as big data and try to evaluate the impact 
of digitization of PGRFA on the existing international policy 
framework. The various models described below extend on 
ongoing negotiations and by far are not meant to be exhaustive. I 
will evaluate ex ante their practicality and potential consequences 
(Table 1).
Ignoring DSI: De Facto Open Access for 
Any Digital Information
Technically, the easiest solution is to ignore the DSI issue and 
to defend a status quo: keep the billions of sequenced DNA 
information away from the scope of any internationally binding 
treaty. A more holistic approach has been proposed, using 
the prominent situation of the CGIAR, to try inspiring new 
standards and soft norms to the field—for example, extension of 
the Global Information System (GLIS) infrastructure (Ker et al., 
2013), or association of open-access passport data or digital 
object identifier (DOI) systematically to each shared element 
from a PGRFA (Manzella, 2016; Roa et al., 2016; Halewood et al., 
2018a). For accessions not contained in the multilateral system, 
it has also been suggested to exclude non-commercial research 
from any data-access restriction (Biber-Klemm et al., 2010). 
Indeed, there are obvious contradictions when limiting access 
to data in conservation biology: this could possibly impair our 
understanding of the extent of biodiversity loss (also observed 
for cultivated plants and their relatives) and, therefore, limits our 
TABLE 1 | Overview of possible options to include DSI-GRFA into existing genetic resources regulatory regime and their possible advantages and limits.
DSI governance models Advantages Limits Challenges
Exclusion Easy implementation Do not reflect the actual state-of-the-art 
of the use of GRFA
Risk of obsolescence of the treaties on 
GR globally
Will or have been already criticized by 
providers and mega-diverse countries as 
having possible large consequences on 
the ITPGRFA and CBD
Extension of the SMTA to DSI Might make possible a better traceability 
and guarantee BS on DSI originating 
from specific GRFA
Practically almost impossible to set up
Practicability will limit or impair overall 
use of GR(FA) and the rate of crop 
improvement.
Very hard to be globally implemented even 
though protection of DNA sequences well 












Subscription model Relatively easy within ITPGRFA.
Might even be an incentive to extend the 
multilateral system
Limit already existing with the ITPGRFA. 
For example, limitation to the annex 1 
crops and low or no participation to the 
Fund
Extend the scope of the treaties to any DSI 
involved in agriculture
Reaching an international consensus
Bounded openness Simplify the access to GR(FA)
Transparency on the benefits
Might hurt principles of sovereignty
Large discretionary power of patent 
offices
Totally ignore potential socio-economical 
values of PGRFA and their associated DSI
Knowledge common Relative ease of use once running
Allow an easy assessment of the global 
fairness of the system
Might be difficult to convince all 
stakeholder to take part
Would require a global effort to normalize 
multilateral governance on GRFA
Common heritage of 
humankind
Inherently open access Have been shown in other fields not 
to be protecting fairness and taking 
into consideration capabilities of all 
stakeholders
Largely idealistic given the history of 
“common heritage” policy
This table provides a large panorama of the possible policies, from the easiest (exclusion of DSI) to the broadest (DSI as common heritage) models.
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option to counteract it (Deplazes-Zemp et al., 2018; Prathapan 
et al., 2018; FAO, 2019).
As described in the previous section, sustainable use and 
conservation of PGRFA will require maximizing the amount 
of data available. For example, the necessary conservation of 
crop wild relatives (CWR) and their description are essential 
for expanding the gene pools used in modern crop breeding 
(Brozynska et al., 2016; Gruber, 2016; Capistrano-Gossmann et al., 
2017; Dempewolf et al., 2017).
Ignoring the digitality of PGRFA might be the most pragmatic 
way of processing, in view of the quantity of already freely 
available data in public databases, but it also vastly ignores issues 
related to inequalities of access and capacities to value these data 
for a sustainable use in agriculture. Therefore, it remains to be 
evaluated what would be the exact consequences—for example, 
on global food security, of a purely libertarian stand on DSI-
PGRFA. Similarly, consequences of any regulation, or uncertainty 
about potential forthcoming regulations, on innovation are 
hardly predictable. Given the actual stand of the discussion, this 
option is unlikely to satisfy all parties, unless maybe guaranteeing 
a global access to any DSI from (any) PGRFA, including data 
from germplasm not necessarily outside the multilateral system 
of the Seed Treaty crops.
Extension of the Standard Material 
Agreements to DSI
As shown in the previous section, the specific modalities of 
DSI use in breeding make any restriction to the access to DSI 
particularly difficult and probably irrelevant: the potential value 
of a PGRFA results very often from its collective use and changes 
with time. In addition, issues related to the actual jurisdiction 
in which a PGRFA could originate, and how common any given 
trait, variant, or metabolite is to another PGRFA, make any 
possible tracing system elusive. For example, meta-studies of soil 
microorganisms would hardly trace back to actually described 
species, nor would a specific microbe strain be doubtlessly 
associated with any given country of origin. Despite these 
difficulties, some attempts to track DSI, or at least to improve 
DSI transparency, are under discussion at the database level 
(Scott and Berry, 2016) and on various policy fora such as the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources and the Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, 2018). 
Beyond the obvious political difficulties in amending a new 
SMTA that would satisfy all parties, practically, the underlying 
peculiarities of the biology and the genetics associated with 
DSI will make any enforcement impossible and potentially 
counterproductive. Alternatively, if DSI from PGRFA have to be 
“incorporated” as benefits as in the terms of Art 13.2.d of the 
Seed Treaty, downstream uses of these data would have to be 
understood and acknowledged to try keeping the initial intension 
of this instrument regarding their sustainable use. Concerning 
species outside the scope of the multilateral system, the issue 
regarding DSI is probably even more pronounced, and access to 
the data might only be a matter of voluntary contribution of the 
DSI producers to the public databases.
In any case, in view of the DSI specific properties (non-rivalry, 
enhanced value through their use and geographic “triviality”), it 
might become relevant in the next future to reconsider—at least 
concerning DSI—whether the access and the benefit sharing 
should remain coupled the way they are now.
Extending the Commons
During the 6th and 7th sessions of the Governing Body of the Seed 
Treaty, an extension of the multilateral system to a subscription 
model has been discussed (ITPGRFA, 2015; ITPGRFA, 2017). 
Despite being part of another discussion about possible general 
improvement of the instrument itself, this discussion indirectly 
revealed the multilateral system of the Seed Treaty prone to fit 
with the complexity of DSI, especially compared with other 
ABS instruments (Halewood et al., 2018a). However, the exact 
modalities to possibly integrate DSI to such a system could greatly 
influence the way PGRFA would be further used/shared, the 
behaviors of various stakeholders, and finally the relevance of the 
existing instruments. In view of the complexity of the regulation 
of genetic resources, whatever the next genetic resource-related 
governance design would be, this will necessarily have influences 
on other fields. For example, it is unclear how much the rather 
restricted commons designed by the World Health Organization 
as especially dedicated to the governance of the influenza virus 
(and includes DSI) might serve as a model for other treaties (Fidler 
and Gostin, 2011). To summarize, three alternative multilateral 
models could be envisaged to cope with DSI (Table 1):
• The subscription model as a “simple” way to consider DSI. 
Ongoing discussion to extend the multilateral system could 
represent a solution to integrate the “informational” component 
of PGRFA into the scope of the Seed Treaty while keeping 
administrative burden low. A front payment would allow 
access to a multilateral system DSI database of PGRFA (like 
GLIS). Given there would be no “parallel system” running (to 
avoid free-riding), this model could allow more transparency 
and fairness. However, some parties already announced 
they would not participate to any subscription system if DSI 
were to be taken into consideration (ITPGRFA, 2017). Such 
adaptation of the multilateral system to the modern modalities 
of DSI use should be taken as a unique chance to make the 
treaties closer to modern practice. A subscription model might 
also be able to uncouple the actual DSI use and the probable 
commercialization of the derived information. In any case, to 
have a chance to be globally accepted and implemented, this 
will require a high level of trust from all stakeholders.
• An alternative multilateral system, the “bounded openness” 
has been advocated as a way to integrate DSI as natural 
“intangible” information (Ruiz Muller, 2015; Vogel et al., 2018). 
One of the basic fundamental point of this model is the new 
definition of genetic resources as “any information, derived 
from nature, but not limited to, hereditary units, metabolites, 
proteins, enzymes, prions, phenotypic expression and non-
human cultures” (Ruiz Muller, 2015). In addition, this model 
proposes a shift of the disclosure of any information (including 
DSI) from a given resource, up to the point of its commercial 
use or patenting (when it happens) and following standardized 
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royalties rates (Ruiz Muller, 2015). The rationale of such a 
model is that local case-to-case deals (as in the current Nagoya 
Protocol framework) are probably less fair, or at least less 
transparent than a global governance. Arguably, this model 
might be practically extremely complicated and would provide 
a strong discretionary power to the patent offices that might not 
follow the same (ecological, cultural, scientific, educational…) 
goals as other instruments like the Seed Treaty or the CBD. 
Also, it is unclear to which extent such a “bounded openness” 
regime might interact with other intellectual property regimes 
like farmer’s or breeder’s right, or when PGRFA bulks are 
used collectively in gene bank genomics approaches. Another 
“flavor” of such model has recently been proposed for marine 
genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction, with 
default open access and an optional payable embargo period 
on data and samples (Vanagt et al., 2019). Concerning PGRFA, 
some stakeholders may find such models that consider natural 
information too reductionist and not embracing the socio-
economical relationship that could exist between PGRFA and 
the population or group they may originate from.
• Another possible way of dealing with the increasing 
complexity of PGRFA governance is to try building an 
extensive “knowledge commons,” that can include all possible 
aspects of PGRFA (Winter, 2013), i.e., a global tax associated 
with any value-generating object or activity based on PGRFA 
(Halewood et al., 2018a; Halewood et al., 2018b). This again 
may require an adjustment of PGRFA definition to move away 
from the material-centric view and take into consideration 
the informational nature of the PGRFA. The main advantage 
here is the uncoupling of the access and use of the PGRFA 
and derived DSI. Taxing users, institutions, companies, or 
even countries will provide a possibly simpler system but also 
requires political consensus via new multilateral agreements.
DSI as Common Heritage of Mankind?
The preamble of the Seed Treaty recognizes the PGRFA as a 
“common concern of all countries” (ITPGRFA, 2004). This precise 
formulation responded to the early days of multilateralism, 
where the Moon, the outer space, and the deep ocean were largely 
inaccessible and legally defined as common good of mankind. 
Despite the maybe quixotic goals that were initially aimed at, 
one can wonder to which extent any genetic resource and the 
information they hold could for example reasonably be managed 
under a protection similar to the cultural or natural heritages 
(UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972). However, it is clear that the 
actual inclusive governance of the genetic resources was designed 
in response to the earlier failures of multilateral approaches to 
protect biodiversity globally (Smouts, 2005; Blasiak et al., 2018). 
Preserving genetic resources is still a global priority, but this 
should not necessarily be taken as an argument to transform 
PGRFA as purely monetary commodity depleted of any ethical or 
sociological value. Proof is still to be made to which extent PGRFA 
and more globally genetic resource conservation actually benefited 
globally from the existing governance (Prathapan et al., 2018). 
This holds even more true when the commodity is a string of 
nucleotides freely accessible online originating from the other 
side of the globe in a changing environment. DSI as global “open 
access” common good would avoid the potential complications 
of any attempt to track and trace DSI at a global level (including 
possible mechanisms that might try maintaining compliance). 
Considering DSI as a common good of humankind would most 
probably raise major opposition related to the State’s sovereignties 
of each country on their genetic resources, as ruled in the CBD 
(Halewood, 2013). If considering genetic resources as a common 
heritage of mankind or more likely as a global public good, care 
should be taken to design a new inclusive form of governance 
that takes into consideration what exactly are these goods, how 
common they might be, and who exactly is the (hu)mankind.
ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
The DSI debates in various international fora have revealed pre-
existing weakness in the design of the Seed Treaty, as well as possibly 
in other treaties dealing with genetic resources. This has at least 
two main consequences: firstly, there is a need to coordinate efforts 
to embrace scientific progress in the genetic resource field (Laird 
and Wynberg, 2018). A non-reductionist and pragmatic definition 
of PGRFA is urgently needed. The “new” PGRFA definition 
would ideally become a more inclusive concept that would better 
acknowledge farmer’s role in diversity creation and conservation 
(Bonneuil, 2019). Secondly, in light of what the various ongoing 
debates about genetic resources from many different sectors, care 
should be taken to understand the specificities of the PGRFA: 
modern breeding considers DSI-PGRFA largely in a “big data” 
manner, which might not be true—for example, for conservation 
of specific endangered species or public health. Interesting parallels 
can help improving the PGRFA framework, like other genetic 
resources originating from animals or bacteria (Dedeurwaerdere, 
2013) or “classic” digital artifact governance (Stuermer et al., 2017). 
To allow a sustainable use of digital artifacts (DSI) originating from 
PGRFA (if totally uncoupled from the physical resource), some 
fundamental modifications of the digital infrastructure would be 
necessary: decentralization of the databases in modular structures 
and diversified funding are required to insure a resilient and fair 
system (Stuermer et al., 2017). Properly answering the challenges 
of dematerialization is a necessary condition to ensure that the 
ABS instruments stay relevant in the state of actual science and 
fulfill their objectives.
“Omics” has changed the precision and efficiency of breeding by 
an order of magnitude. Genomic selection and GWAS together with 
gene bank genomics approaches are becoming commonplace, even 
for some neglected and underused crops. For the Seed Treaty 
itself, DSI should be considered as a chance to embrace an extended 
multilateral approach by developing an updated and fair subscription 
system. However, such an approach should also carefully consider 
modalities of DSI generation, curation, storage, and dissemination. 
It will be essential to engage with various stakeholders to reduce 
disparities and encourage accessibility, transparency, and 
accountability (Bezuidenhout et al., 2017; Kaye et  al., 2018). 
This might, in turn, reduce the “breeding divide” between low- 
or middle- and high-income countries. Large-scale deployment 
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of genomics facilitated by a constant decrease of technology costs, 
democratization of open-source analytic pipelines, and capacity 
building may in the long term favor a major reshuffling of the way 
breeding is performed in various agroecosystems. Farmer-centric 
participatory breeding networks promote an integrative, bottom-up 
vision of plant breeding (Joly and Hervieu, 2003; Bonneuil and 
Thomas, 2009). However local-level PGRFA productions do 
not accommodate well with the Seed Treaty and the multilateral 
system (Halewood, 2013). Supporting wider use of genomic-based 
technologies for on-farm and community-based breeding may 
possibly allow emergence of new locally adapted diversity that is 
essential for crop improvement (Jarvis et al., 2008; Halewood et al., 
2018b). A recent large-scale study by CGIAR showed the potential 
of crowdsource citizen-science programs to adapt plant varieties to 
site-specific conditions, a challenge for smallholder farmers suffering 
climate change (van Etten et al., 2019).
To conclude, the management of PGRFA and more generally 
of genetic resources appear to be at a turning point in its history. 
The digitization is now an underlying parameter of negotiations 
over the treaty’s reforms. It questions again the fragility and the 
limits of the Seed Treaty boundaries and capacities to trace 
efficiently DSI and their resources. This debate should be used as 
an opportunity to improve of the actual instrument in order to 
1) think again what are the best possible ways to respond to the 
food security challenges, in other words, are any additional rule 
over DSI practicable? And 2) does the ABS framework, and the 
Seed Treaty in particular, focus on the wrong type of incentive? 
Alternative models of digital goods management are based on 
motivations to contribute to the commons pool without direct 
incentive from property rights. Reputation gain, learning effects 
or faster time to the market could be other alternative incentives 
to participate to the commons (Dedeurwaerdere, 2013; Stuermer 
et al., 2017). With the ongoing omics developments, if not correctly 
addressed, the “DSI issue” might threaten the stability of the Seed 
Treaty and the possibly the entire ABS framework. More work is 
needed to evaluate the relevance of the proposed models for each 
specific sector and the potential impact of digital “free-riding” 
on science, innovation, breeding, and ultimately food supply. 
Taking advantage of operational research methods, sustainability 
prediction of each particular model presented here is possible in 
a more quantitative way by applying robust decision-analytic tools 
used in other policy-making fields (Wohlfender-Bühler et al., 
2016; Zheng et al., 2016). Whatever the most appropriate model of 
treaty-based international regulatory regime for PGRFA and their 
commons may be (by a reform of the existing instruments or by a 
new overarching treaty that would specifically fit to digital genetic 
resources), it appears already clearly that an increased degree of 
multilateralism and harmonization is necessary to align to the 
current practices and unravel the formidable potentials originating 
from digitization of PGRFA.
This review aimed at providing DSI users and providers a 
glimpse of the complexity of the various intertwined policies 
ruling PGRFA. Integration of digital information in the PGRFA 
policy framework will greatly depend how these DSI actors 
become aware of the potential impact of their daily practice on the 
global debate. In parallel, this may also encourage experts having 
access to digital infrastructures to try helping empowerment of 
smallholder farmer communities and local cooperative networks 
to “omics” techniques applied to breeding. This could be a 
most efficient, resilient, and decentralized model for a modern 
governance of PGRFA. This is essential, not only to save existing 
crop biodiversity, but also to create new genetic diversity that will 
strongly be needed to tackle some of the major global challenges 
humanity currently faces like climate change and food security.
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The Open Source Seed Initiative was initiated in 2012. Following concerns about the 
concentration in the seed sector and the rise of patenting, the initiative is “dedicated 
to maintaining fair and open access to plant genetic resources worldwide in order to 
ensure the availability of germplasm to farmers, gardeners, breeders, and communities of 
this and future generations.” Inspired by the debate on the anti-commons and the open 
source software movement, the initiative wants to create a viral system to “free” genetic 
resources: the use of “freed” genetic resources is made conditional to any materials 
derived from them being made available under the same “open source” conditions. This 
would be achieved under a “pledge” (in the USA) or a license contract (in Germany). 
The objective of this paper is to analyze whether these open source seed initiatives 
may deliver their goals. We compare the concept with the open innovation character 
of the plant breeder’s rights system, exemplified by the breeder’s exemption, and the 
major other open source initiative in the sector, BiOS. We also present other ways to 
limit negative impact of the patent system on plant breeding. We conclude that national 
sovereign rights on genetic resources may challenge the open source goals and that 
the German initiative may contribute to legal complexities in the seed sector. The open 
source movement may even contribute to the trend that openness (through the breeder’s 
exemption) is challenged despite the intentions to the contrary. In fact, the initiatives not 
only free the genetic resource but also treat seeds as a common good. We question the 
sustainability of the business models for that approach and thus the societal benefits that 
can be expected from plant breeding, which may illustrate the tragedy of the commons.
Keywords: open source, Intellectual Property, Nagoya Protocol, seed system interventions, breeders rights
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights (IPR) systems have been developed in order to stimulate innovation that 
will serve society. Providing exclusive rights to inventors and authors provides both recognition and 
a basis for right holders to commercialize their intellectual assets, i.e., that users share benefits with 
them. The basic argument for society to grant such rather monopolistic rights is that society gets 
something in return. Patent applicants have to describe their invention in such a way that someone 
“skilled in the art” can rework it; the rights are time-bound, which means that the invention or works 
of art will be in the public domain at some stage. Similar to property rights at large, an important 
argument for such rights is the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, 1968), meaning that resources 
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are underutilized or insufficiently cared for when all have access 
to them and nobody takes responsibility.
Intellectual property rights were introduced in plant breeding 
quite recently. Apart from the Plant Patent in the USA, which 
is available to new varieties of many (not all) vegetatively 
propagated crops, such rights emerged in Europe only in the 
1960s when the concept of Plant breeder’s rights was introduced 
in a number of countries. This which spread around the world 
was supported by the TRIPS agreement of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Such rights relate to plant varieties only, 
the totality of characteristics of a certain well described group 
within a species. Patents on individual traits and biotechnologies 
entered the breeding sector only during the past three decades.
Since IPR systems should create a “quid pro quo”—a balance 
between the rights and the benefits for society, discussions are 
multiple about whether the systems (still) do that, especially 
when new technologies emerge such as information—and 
biotechnologies. The operation of IPR protection systems is 
under public scrutiny in various industries. Strong IPRs are 
claimed to cause high medicine prices, concentration of power 
in the Information Technology, and publishing sectors. This 
concern was dubbed “the tragedy of the anti-commons” (Heller, 
1998), i.e., that exclusive rights may reduce innovation, or that 
such innovations do not reach all parts of society in a balanced 
way. The concerns have reached politics with the establishment 
of “Pirate Parties” in 38 countries with the main (or only) goal to 
“reform copyrights and related rights” (https://pp-international.
net/about-ppi/, accessed July 2019).
Such debates may lead to either policy changes (adaptation 
of regulations or their implementation), or to novel uses of the 
rights. Open source strategies that have evolved to curb negative 
aspects of such exclusivity illustrate the latter approach.
This paper discusses an emerging open source movement 
in the plant breeding sector, dubbed “Open Source Seed.” We 
describe the two main “Open Source Seed” initiatives and discuss 
them on the basis of their primary call: to “free the plant genetic 
resources” from corporate controls. Will the initiatives indeed 
open the source further or will they create other bottlenecks, both 
for breeders not participating in the system. The second question 
is whether the initiatives will be able to curb the tragedy of the 
commons. Will OSSI provide for sufficient innovation for society 
at large that requires significant investments in plant breeding to 
contribute to societal goals, including through more robust plant 
varieties, consumption qualities, and reducing food waste.
We will then compare them to existing strategies and trends that 
either use IPR to avoid closing off of the source, the plant genetic 
resources, and others that aim at changing the regulatory systems.
OPEN SOURCE SEED INITIATIVES
The OSSI-Pledge in the USA
The Open Source Seed Initiative (OSSI) was initiated in 2012 by an 
interdisciplinary team in Wisconsin, United States, “dedicated 
to maintaining fair and open access to plant genetic resources 
worldwide in order to ensure the availability of germplasm to 
farmers, gardeners, breeders, and communities of this and future 
generations.” (OSSI, 2016). The initiative is based on the analysis 
that only a handful of companies account for most of the world’s 
commercial breeding and sales of seed, and that patenting is a 
crucial tool in support of this trend by enhancing the power and 
control of these companies over the seeds and the farmers that 
feed the world (Kloppenburg, 2010).
Inspired by the open source software movement, OSSI 
wants to create a system that can go viral: initial plant materials 
would be freely available to breeders under the condition that 
the further use of any genetic resources (varieties) derived from 
them would be made available under the same “open source” 
conditions. In this way, the system would go viral up until the 
point that actors who would want to patent their work would 
not have many genetic resources left to base their breeding on—
or at least that a strong parallel system would develop. OSSI 
specifically focuses on breeders, including farmer breeders. A 
difference with most open source initiatives in other sectors is 
these use the patent or copyright systems in order to increase 
openness. The holder of an IP right has the exclusive right on the 
commercialization of the invention (patent) or text (copyright). 
That right is conventionally used in a commercial setting where 
the IP portfolio can be a major asset of a company, but it can 
also serve to implement open source conditions down the chain: 
only users are admitted who follow the open source rules for the 
derivatives that they develop using the protected source material. 
The Intellectual Property thus allows the right holder to legally 
enforce such open source use. The OSS initiative in Wisconsin 
came to the conclusion that this would not be feasible for plant 
genetic resources and instead based its open source model on a 
non-legally-binding Pledge:
“You have the freedom to use these OSSI Pledged seeds in 
any way you choose. In return you pledge not to restrict others’ 
use of these seeds or their derivatives by patents or other means, 
and include this Pledge with any transfer of these seeds or their 
derivatives.” (https://osseeds.org/about/)
Even though this would not be legally enforceable, it creates 
a strong moral obligation. By doing that, it confirms with the 
opposition of the group against the increasing “juridification,” 
i.e., the increased influence of different laws, in breeding, and 
seed supply. It also wants to send out a strong message to society 
against the patenting trend in the seed sector.
In 2014, 37 varieties of 14 species were released by various 
public and private breeders under the OSSI-Pledge. Since the 
development of varieties takes several years, it is too early to 
judge whether the system is going viral on the basis of these first 
releases. Several plant breeders, notably those operating in the 
organic sector, and some in US universities, have followed suit.
The OSS License—Germany
An initiative in Germany that builds on the OSSI example in 
the USA is taking a different approach (Kotschi and Horneburg, 
2018). Where the Pledge is implemented on the basis of morality, 
the German initiative wants to rely on a legally enforceable bag-
tag contract attached to each seed bag saying that opening the 
bag implies agreement with the conditions of the contract. This 
kind of contracts is widely used on products (shrink wrap) and 
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websites (clickwrap), but their enforceability depends strongly 
on national laws. Several non-governmental organizations have 
argued in the past against the use of such contracts by large seed 
companies to restrict the use of the seeds by farmers (Organic 
Consumers Association, 2010). von Gierke (2016) analyzes bag-
tag licenses under German law and concludes that there are 
many uncertainties connected to their enforcement.
The German initiative expects to be able to identify infringements 
of these contracts using modern genomics techniques, and through 
the implementation of the Nagoya Protocol. DNA sequence data 
could give an indication that an open source plant has been used 
in the breeding process, but its predictive power likely depends 
on the crop and the breeding methods used. The implementation 
of the Nagoya Protocol in Europe obliges breeders to be able to 
confirm legality of the genetic resources they have used to create 
a new variety. Breeders thus have to keep track of their use of 
genetic resources and their contracts with countries from where 
they obtained such parent materials. The prospective use in 
identifying infringements of open source contracts is based on 
the assumption that such pedigree information will be publicly 
available, which is currently not the case. The OSS License 
was first implemented in 2017 on an existing tomato variety 
bred by a university, and a wheat variety bred by a biodynamic 
breeder. Whereas the OSSI in the USA is based on a moral call 
for openness, the German initiative adds additional contractual 
obligations for breeders and thus further contributes to the 
juridification processes in the seed sector.
SCOPE: OPEN SOURCE OR SEEDS AS A 
COMMON GOOD?
Open Source Seed claims to be an open source system for 
genetic resources. It does, however, not stop with making 
genetic resources (the source code) available for users to 
innovate further, but it also gives freedom to all to reproduce 
and sell seed of a particular variety that is available under 
the open source Pledge or License. Every farmer is free to 
reproduce a variety developed from open source germplasm 
and share/sell it to other growers; any seed supplier can offer 
the variety in the seed market. It is likely that such a seed 
producer can offer the same variety for a lower price than 
the original breeder, who has spent several years of work to 
develop the variety. The breeder will thus not likely recoup the 
years of investment needed to develop the new variety and has 
to have other resources to base his breeding work on. This goes 
beyond the concept of “freeing genetics” (Luby and Goldman, 
2016) but proclaims a commons approach to seed both with 
breeders and farmers Kloppenburg, 2014).
The originators of the OSSI recognize that in, such a market, 
it will be difficult to generate profits that allow for substantial 
investment in plant breeding. In the USA, breeding of most 
crops is currently done in the public sector (the Land-Grant 
Universities). Even though such universities welcome income 
from their breeding operations just like commercial breeders, 
they may have good reasons to make products of their 
research available for free. In addition, OSSI expects voluntary 
contributions from seed users to provide options for sustaining 
breeding programs. Such payments may not be related to the 
agronomic benefits of the seed, but rather to their socio-
political context. Luby et al. (2015) expect that contributions 
for “freed seed” would mirror willingness to pay higher prices 
for “fair trade” products. Osman et al. (2007) identify sharing 
responsibilities within the chain (supermarkets funding 
breeding) as a possible way to fund organic breeding (next to 
collaborating with commercial breeders). In Germany, where 
breeding is largely commercial, donations also—for example, 
through a “Saatgutfonds”1—support various local breeding 
initiatives. Such mechanisms have been developed quite 
recently. It remains to be seen whether they can sustain the 
long process of breeding.
HISTORY OF OPENNESS IN BREEDING
The Breeder’s Exemption
Openness has been an important point of discussion during 
the early decades of scientific plant breeding. Plant breeding 
was not included at the time that important concepts of the 
national patent systems were harmonized in Paris in 1883. 
Farmer breeding had been going on for millennia; commercial 
seed production had started a century before, but systematic 
breeding of field crops was a new development during the latter 
part of the 19th century. Only after 1900, with the rediscovery of 
Mendel’s laws on heredity, breeding developed into a science. The 
effects of protection of industrial inventions triggered debates by 
breeders especially after the first World War (Heitz, 1987). This 
led in the USA to the Plant Patent Act in 1930, which was only 
applicable to vegetatively propagated crops with the exception 
of edible roots and tubers. That solution for ornamentals and 
fruits was not considered useful in war-torn Europe where 
food production needed to be stimulated, and better varieties 
were broadly considered essential. Germany initially used the 
copyright system to give breeders a commercial advantage as they 
would be exclusively allowed to put a seal on seed bags to identify 
“original seed” (Heitz, 1987). All other seed producers could 
copy the seed, but not the seal. In the Netherlands, a small levy 
was charged on quantities of certified seed potatoes, which funds 
were distributed among the breeders according to the acreage of 
seed potatoes of their varieties produced (van Leeuwen, 1957). 
The mark-up could not be significant since such would deter the 
use of quality-controlled seed and as such increasing the risks of 
spreading potato diseases. Such levy systems have been used by 
producing marketing boards all over the world.
All these systems would now be considered “open source.” 
They did, however, not provide a reasonable income to the 
breeder, which resulted in breeding remaining a hobby rather 
than a significant job, and that for the most important crops, the 
government took important responsibilities in many countries. 
Openness was, however, a major prerequisite when the IPR were 
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emerged in Europe and that were harmonized in the UPOV 
Convention in 1961 (www.UPOV.int) explicitly avoid that the 
(genetic re-)source can be privatized. One of the basic concepts 
of plant breeder’s rights is the breeders’ exemption, the right of 
all to freely use protected varieties for further breeding. In very 
few countries, such as the USA, patents can be obtained on plant 
varieties. The patent system does not have this open innovation 
character. The use for breeding of a plant that falls within the 
scope of a patent falls under the rights of the patent holder and 
requires a license. Since patenting of varieties is common in the 
USA; it is therefore understandable that the first OSSI emerged 
in that country.
The plant breeder’s rights systems are open with respect to the 
source (the genetic resource), but it does provide exclusive rights 
at the level of multiplication and sales of seeds of the protected 
variety. That rule is essential for creating a business model for 
plant breeding. In Europe, an estimated 15% of the sales of seed is 
invested in breeding. This signifies a considerable societal benefit as 
breeding is focused mainly on i) disease resistance as major strategy 
to reduce crop losses and the use of crop protection chemicals; ii) 
stress tolerance, currently increasingly important at the time of 
climate change and its associated risks for farmers; and iii) product 
quality, including taste and shelf life, reducing food losses.
The OSSIs extend the openness to all who want to multiply the 
“open source seeds.” They do not only keep the source open but 
also give rights to those who do not innovate, but merely copy the 
variety. This creates additional competition in the seed market by 
those who have not invested in breeding similar to the situation 
in Europe before the variety protection systems.
Restricting Openness: Patents and 
Biodiversity Rights
With the developments in biotechnology, the patent system 
entered plant breeding. That system is rooted in the industrial 
business culture as opposed to the agri-cultural origins of plant 
breeder’s rights. Patents can be granted to breeding processes 
and products. In most countries, essentially biological processes 
are exempted based on the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO 
(https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm). 
Most countries, with the exception of the USA, also exempt plant 
varieties from patentability. However, plant traits are in most cases 
patentable when they meet the general patent criteria of novelty, 
non-obviousness/inventive step, and industrial use. The patent 
system does not have a breeder’s exemption. Doing experiments 
with the invention in order to create a new commercial product 
requires a license of the patent holder. The holder of a patent 
on one trait could thus stop a breeder from using that plant for 
further breeding. The patenting of plant traits and its impact on 
the breeder’s exemption worries breeders (see below).
Furthermore, countries have national sovereign rights 
over genetic resources as of 1993 (CBD, 1993) including 
crops. Countries, notably those in the so-called centers of 
origin (Vavilov, 1951) or centers of diversity (Hawkes, 1983) 
can make access to such genetic resources by breeders and 
researchers subject to “Prior Informed Consent” and “Mutually 
Agreed Terms.” The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
(https://www.cbd.int/convention/text/) charged countries to 
identify national competent authorities to manage such access 
negotiations. Terms of such contracts may affect not only the 
primary user but also downstream users of the genetic resource, 
depending on national law. The Nagoya Protocol under the CBD 
(CBD, 2011) describes user obligations and charges authorities in 
user countries to control adherence to the contracts. An awkward 
thing of that Protocol is that copying a genetic resource is allowed, 
but innovating with it is not. These rules are getting increasingly 
complex with time as more and more genetic resources that 
breeders want to use in their crossing programs would fall under 
the rules.
Open innovation is, thus, not only restricted by patents but it 
is also increasingly challenged by biodiversity rights.
OTHER OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVES
Open source initiatives are many. The most common are 
open source software and open source publishing. The former 
includes the Linux Community (https://www.linux.org/) and the 
Chromium Projects (https://www.chromium.org/) inviting all to 
study and contribute to software improvements based on publicly 
available source code. These were initiated as a response to the 
dominance of Microsoft. The open source software initiatives 
keep the source code open and stimulate software developers to 
create solutions for particular uses. Such programs may, however, 
be commercialized. Open source publishing aims at the freedom 
to copy materials, which is quickly gaining popularity in scientific 
publishing. It is not the reader (or the library) but the author who 
is charged to cover the cost of publishing.
The breeder’s rights system actually illustrates that model: 
the source is open and the user pays (through a mark-up on the 
seed price).
An initiative close to the OSSI was initiated in 1992 by the social 
enterprise CAMBIA (https://cambia.org/). This was an initiative 
by Richard Jefferson, one of the inventors of a critical component 
of biotechnology—the GUS-reporter system. He undertook 
several attempts to “democratize invention” in biotechnology, as 
it was considered stifled by the patent system that had grown so 
complex that—according to him—only few experts understand 
how it operates and how to decipher the treasures hidden in 
patents. CAMBIA developed the Patent Lens in order to increase 
transparency in patent landscapes (https://www.lens.org/) and 
worked on improving rice using new technologies. Inventions 
were patented and initially licensed out at very favorable 
terms to users working for the public good and at commercial 
terms to corporate users. Alternatives to the commonly used 
Agrobacterium transformation system were developed, thus 
bypassing the main genetic transformation patents (Broothaerts 
et al., 2005). BiOS, “Biology Open Source” (https://cambia.
org/bios-landing/), was  established as an initiative to make 
alternatives for every step in the modification process available 
under an open source license. However, this did not lead to a 
significant reduction in the use of commercial licenses on the 
Agrobacterium technologies. However, the initiatives did and still 
do impact debates on innovation in plant science.
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OTHER WAYS TO LIMIT NEGATIVE 
EFFECTS OF PATENTS
Reduce the Scope of Patents
The patenting of plants has been a concern of many stakeholders, 
including the plant breeding community itself. Breeders in 
Europe have argued for more than a decade that the lack of a 
breeder’s exemption in the patent system can cause serious 
limitations to breeders unless they are willing to spend significant 
resources in legal counsel by patent specialists. In 2009, the 
Dutch Seed Association Plantum called for an inclusion of a 
breeder’s exemption in patent law. This triggered debates both in 
the breeding community, in parliaments and among legislators. 
The European Union decided in 2014 to include a “limited 
breeder’s exemption” in the new Unitary Patent System. This 
means that breeders are free to use plant materials that contain 
patented traits, and only when the new variety that they develop 
contains that patented trait, they will need to have a license from 
the patent holder to commercialize the variety.
Limit Patentability
The same debate also yielded another change. The Council of EU 
Ministers unanimously voted in favor of a Commission Notice, 
interpreting the EU Directive 98/44 with the effect that patents 
on natural traits (“products of essentially biological processes”) 
should not be granted (EU, 2016). Implementation of that 
decision by the European Patent Office proves more complex 
than anticipated. An attempt by the Office to implement the 
wish of its Council using Rule 28, exceptions to patentability is 
challenged at the time of writing this paper.
Patent Pools
A way to soften major negative effects of patenting, patent pools 
can also be a strategy. An example is the “International Licensing 
Platform—vegetables” (www.ilp-vegetable.org), and initiative by 
major vegetable-breeding companies. The agreement under the 
ILP is that all requests for a license have to be honored, i.e., access 
to a patented invention cannot be withheld by the patent holder. A 
referee system was put in place to determine fair license conditions 
when the two parties cannot conclude a contract within a given 
time period. It is framed as “free access but not for free.” Whether 
this is a solution for all breeders remains to be seen.
ANALYSIS
The first important effect of the open source seed movements is 
that it contributes to the debate about innovation systems and 
the place of different types of intellectual property in search of 
maximizing societal benefits and minimizing monopolistic 
behavior. IPR have been developed in order to stimulate 
invention and intend to support the actual use of inventions in 
practical innovations that better our lives. Finding a balance 
between the rights and obligations of the inventor is complex in 
a society where quickly advancing technology increasingly puts 
the inventor at a distance from society at large.
An important question would therefore be whether doing away 
with such rights would result in more and better innovations. 
Could public funding provide the foundation for all plant breeding? 
Or could alternative funding mechanisms provide sufficient funds 
sustainably, which is required to develop better varieties of all 
different crops for the diversity of farming systems and for a quickly 
changing society? Lammerts van Bueren et al. (2018) and Kotschi 
and Wirz (2015) identify the challenge and suggest a combination of 
public and chain partner (through foundations) funding. Looking 
at the vast investments made in plant breeding—in the Netherlands 
vegetable-breeding sector alone, conservatively estimated at 300 
million Euro per year—it may be doubted that the same intensity 
of breeding could be sustainably supported through such funding 
mechanisms. Here, it is important to identify the difference between 
the concept of “open source,” which applies to the use of genetic 
resources, and “commons” which also relates to the use of seeds. 
The literature on the subject does not make that distinction. The 
OSS initiatives highlight the former but appear to pursue the latter.
Another effect of the open source license is likely, in which 
when it would operate side-by-side commercial breeding, it 
would add again to limiting the breeder’s exemption. A breeder 
who operates in the business models of the open innovation 
system created by breeder’s rights could not “touch” any material 
under the OSS license without challenging his freedom to protect 
the new varieties that he would produce. The trend created by 
patents and biodiversity rights of limiting access by breeders to 
the genetic diversity that they need to breed better varieties would 
be attacked from yet another side. Openness can thus limit access 
to genetic resources just like patents and biodiversity rights. 
Initiatives that simply do not apply for patents or breeder’s rights 
(Wirz et al., 2017) would not have such negative side effects. Such 
public domain approaches are not popular in the open source 
literature as it may invite others to appropriate “derivatives” (Luby 
et al., 2016).
Alternative ways to rebalance the rights with the benefits of 
society through regulatory change require significant time. This 
is likely less when implementing rules are changed compared to 
adapting the laws themselves. Rebalancing through voluntary 
measures by right holders themselves has the disadvantage that 
not all parties may join. From an open source perspective, the 
breeder’s rights system creates no issues.
CONCLUSION
“Open Source Seed” responds to an ongoing debate in society 
about the provision of IPR that, on the one hand, aim at 
supporting innovation or creative works, but that also risks to 
stifle the same through its exclusive rights.
It is understandable that the OSSI emerged in the United 
States, where patenting of plant varieties is common, and 
internationally agreed rights on biological diversity are not valid. 
The USA is unique in this legal position.
If the movement is also meant to oppose the “juridification” 
of plant breeding, then the OSSI-Pledge used in the USA is a 
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If it is the intent to create openness toward genetic resources, 
then the breeder’s exemption in the plant breeder’s rights 
system, which is the dominant protection system in almost all 
countries already, fulfils these needs. When, however, it is not 
only the intent to protect the (genetic re-) source but also to 
allow everybody to compete in the seed market with breeders, 
then the name “open source” is a misnomer. Then, the initiatives 
may be better framed under the concept of the Commons. But 
that term would contradict the effect that the OSS Initiative, at 
least the one operating through the license system, can reduce 
access to genetic resources by conventional plant breeders in 
their business model.
There are alternative ways to limit the impact of patent rights, 
i.e., by rebalancing the patent system itself and by avoiding 
strategic (monopolistic) use of the rights through patent-pool 
type of agreements. Neither these, nor the open source seed 
initiatives, can reduce the negative impact of biodiversity rights 
on the openness of genetic resources for plant breeding.
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The over-arching aim of the access and benefit-sharing (ABS) of genetic resources is to 
enable fair distribution of benefits between the users (such as universities and biotech 
companies) and providers (such as biodiversity rich countries) so as to both open the 
doors for innovation and create incentives for biodiversity conservation. Access to genetic 
resources is crucial for research related to conservation of plant genetic resources as well 
as R&D for agricultural products and evolved crops that can attain to the new weather 
conditions climate change brings. Therefore, access to genetic resources in general as 
well as benefit-sharing from that access is a key element for sustainable development in 
order to secure research as well as environmental sustainability and resource availability. 
ABS is currently a rapidly developing and evolving field that is shaped by each and every 
implementation of the Parties. This means that the national implementation of the Parties 
determine how ABS goals are realised and how ABS principles find form within regulatory 
mechanisms. These principles are found in international legal documents such as the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as well as Nagoya Protocol. Additionally, decisions 
and guidelines drafted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity shape these principles that are then to be fulfilled by the Parties when drafting 
their ABS laws by means of implementing regulatory mechanisms that comply with the 
international law. This article reviews 20 provider country’s ABS frameworks as well as one 
regional law with the aim of identifying the common regulatory mechanisms that find place 
in these legal texts. This descriptive approach is then followed by an empirical comparative 
analysis through semi-structured stakeholder interviews in order to identify the most 
beneficial regulatory mechanisms according to ABS experts that belong in four different 
stakeholder groups (provider countries, academic users, industrial users and collections)
Keywords: access and benefit-sharing, Nagoya protocol on access to genetic resources and the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits, genetic resource, natural product research, utilization
INTRODUCTION
Access and benefit-sharing (ABS) is a system under public international law that aims to fairly 
distribute benefits arising from genetic resources between the users of genetic resources (such as 
universities and biotech companies) and provider countries (regulatory authorities in biodiversity-
rich countries). It is a system that finds its basic principles within the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) (United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992). These principles are 
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further specified within the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising 
from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(Nagoya Protocol, 2011). The CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, 
together with the decisions of the Parties thereof, establish the 
international ABS goals. These goals have been explored in a 
previous study by the author (Sirakaya, 2019).
ABS is a rapidly evolving field that is shaped by the 
implementation of the Parties to the CBD and the Nagoya 
Protocol. This means that the national implementation of these 
countries determines how ABS goals are realized and how ABS 
principles find form within regulatory mechanisms. These 
principles have to be implemented by the Parties when drafting 
their ABS laws by means of putting regulatory mechanisms in 
place which are in line with the international ABS goals. In other 
words, how provider countries regulate ABS directly shapes the 
way ABS principles are implemented.
This article reviews 20 of these national ABS laws and 
a regional ABS law implemented by provider countries 
throughout the world with the aim of describing the different 
types of regulatory mechanisms that provider countries 
use and providing examples of some of the countries that 
utilize them. This descriptive approach is then followed by 
an empirical comparative analysis through semistructured 
stakeholder interviews to identify the approach toward various 
mechanisms on access, benefit-sharing, and compliance 
of ABS experts that belong to four different stakeholder 
groups (provider countries, academic users, industrial users, 
and collections).
METHODOLOGY
The methodology of this article consists of two stages. The first 
stage follows a descriptive approach in reviewing and explaining 
common regulatory mechanisms on ABS. Within this stage, a 
legal analysis of primary sources (national legislation, regulations, 
policies, and guidelines where applicable) within selected 
countries and regions is conducted to explore the commonalities 
and differences provider countries have in regulating ABS 
matters. Once identified, these regulatory mechanisms are 
briefly described and explained. The explanation is then followed 
by a comparative analysis of the selected countries’ and region’s 
related regulatory mechanisms regarding on access, benefit-
sharing, and compliance.
The second stage follows an empirical approach to discover 
and analyze the stakeholder perception on these previously 
identified common regulatory mechanisms on ABS. A qualitative 
analysis in the form of semistructured interviews is conducted 
for acquiring stakeholder perceptions on these mechanisms, as 
well as for demonstrating the qualitative data on stakeholder 
perceptions on them.
The purpose of this article is not to fully describe these 21 
legal documents in detail but rather identify common regulatory 
elements and subjects them to stakeholder interviews.
The choice of the countries subject to this review study is 
made based on the following criteria:
• Richness in biodiversity
• Diversity in terms of economic development
• Diversity in terms of maturity of the ABS framework
• Diversity in signatory status under the Nagoya Protocol1
The selection furthermore aims to demonstrate a worldwide 
approach as there is at least one country in each continent that 
has a state/region with an ABS framework. After applying these 
criteria, the following ABS frameworks have been selected for 
review: Andean Community, Australia, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, France, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Japan, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Namibia, Norway, Philippines, Republic of 
Korea, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam.
Looking into regulatory issues related to ABS, the author 
has identified four key stakeholders: the government (as the 
provider), collections, academic users, and industrial users. 
These have been identified in line with Freeman’s definition of 
stakeholder, which is “any group or individual who is affected 
by or can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives” 
(Freeman and Mcvea, 2001). These key stakeholders’ involvement 
in the regulatory processes is vital to form an ABS system that 
is effective and efficient and that attains the international ABS 
goals (Swiderska, 2001).
OPTIONS IN ACCESS AND 
BENEFIT-SHARING
With the aim of compiling the international ABS principles 
regulated under the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol with 
additions from various COP Decisions, the author has 
previously conducted the review of these international 
documents on ABS and compiled 11 ABS goals that are 
prescribed by these documents that are then to be fulfilled by 
the Parties through their national ABS frameworks. These goals 
found through the literature review conducted by Sirakaya 
(2019) are listed as follows:
1) Predictable conditions (Nagoya Protocol Preamble)
2) Legal certainty (Nagoya Protocol Article 6, COP Decision 
V/26, VII/19, VIII/4)
3) Transparency (Nagoya Protocol, COP Decision V/26)
4) Fairness and equity in negotiations (Nagoya Protocol, COP 
Decision V/26)
5) Sustainable use of biodiversity components (CBD Article 
1, Nagoya Protocol Preamble, Article 8, Article 9, COP 
Decisions V/26 and VII/19)
6) Cost-effective measures (Nagoya Protocol Article 6, COP 
Decisions VII/19, VIII/4)
7) Scientific research based on genetic resources (CBD Article 
15.6)
8) Strengthening the ability of indigenous people and local 
communities to benefit from the use of traditional knowledge 
1All of the selected countries are parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
yet some of them have not yet ratified the Nagoya Protocol.
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(Nagoya Protocol Articles 5, 6, 7, 12, 21, 22, COP Decision 
V/26, VI/24)
9) Tech transfer and cooperation to build research and innovation 
capacity in developing countries (Nagoya Protocol, COP 
Decisions VIII/4, VII/19, VI/24, V/26)
10) Creating incentives to conserve biodiversity (CBD Article 11, 
COP Decision VI/24, Nagoya Protocol Preamble)
11) Innovative solutions for transboundary situations (Nagoya 
Protocol Preamble and Article 11)
In principle, provider countries’ national ABS frameworks 
should aim to attain these goals by means of implementing 
regulatory mechanisms that aid these goals’ principles. However, 
provider countries can significantly differ in their approaches 
when enacting provisions related to ABS of genetic resources. 
Furthermore, there exists no consensus regarding the state 
practice at the regulatory level. This is because some countries 
choose to enact specific laws on ABS, whereas some regulate 
ABS-related issues under framework legislation related to the 
environment or biodiversity or modify existing legislation to 
include ABS obligations. Nevertheless, similarities can be found 
with regard to the regulatory options that provider countries 
implement within the field of ABS. After analyzing 20 provider 
country approaches as well as one regional approach toward 
ABS, this section compiles the most commonly used regulatory 
options within the ABS frameworks of the provider countries 
into categories of regulatory mechanisms, such as material scope 
(what type of genetic resources are regulated), temporal scope 
(when can the ABS obligations be triggered), activity scope 
(which activities are regulated), geographical scope (within 
national laws, this comes up when regional competence or 
competence based on the type of genetic resource is divided), 
and other types of mechanisms found through the review of 
primary sources (i.e., country legislation on ABS), such as the 
requirement for an access permit (3.1.), requirement for a benefit-
sharing agreement, standardized or negotiable conditions, types 
of monetary and non-monetary benefit-sharing found within 
the ABS frameworks (3.2.), and provisions on compliance and 
monitoring (3.3.) (Table 1).
Access
It should first be noted that neither the CBD nor the Nagoya 
Protocol defines access to genetic resources. Furthermore, the 
countries subject to this study either do not define access or define 
it in accordance with their understanding of access. Therefore, 
this study refrains from defining access and claiming either 
approach as the aim of this study is to point out the common 
elements in national regulatory options on ABS.
Options for Material Scope
• In situ access only: A permit or notification is only required 
when access happens within the geographical borders of the 
provider country. This is the classical access case foreseen 
by the CBD, where a researcher takes a sample of a genetic 
resource in a field/forest/nature reserve/public or private land 
(CBD.int, 2011).
• In situ and ex situ access: A permit or notification is required 
when access happens within the geographical borders of a 
provider country as well as through biodiversity biobanks, 
which are collections of biological samples that are held for 
preservation, research, and/or conservation purposes (e.g., 
genebanks, botanical gardens, natural history museums) 
(Shaw et al., 2014). Some frameworks (e.g., Brazil, 2015) 
enable the law to apply retroactively, by choosing to include 
the genetic resources accessed before their legislation came 
into force, within the scope of their ABS framework. This 
means that the material found in collections that were accessed 
before the enactment of the law would still require permit 
from the competent authority of the provider country. Other 
countries choose not to apply such retroactive provisions and 
only regulate the access that happens after the date of entry 
into force of their national ABS framework.
• In situ, ex situ, and access to digital sequence information 
(DSI): Both physical accesses, access through biobanks 
(i.e., collections) and access to DSI, are covered. DSI is 
not defined under the international legal sphere. It has 
been introduced to the Parties to the CBD and Nagoya 
Protocol during COP 13 UNEP (2016a, 2016b). Parties 
to the Convention are currently discussing the possible 
inclusion of access to or use of DSI within the scope of the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol (Laird and Wynberg, 2018). 
For instance, the Andean Community (1996) includes DSI 
within the scope of application.
Options for Mechanism to Trigger Access 
(Temporal Scope)
• Access for sampling: The access requirements are triggered 
before the material is sampled in situ or obtained from an ex 
situ source. In this case, the obligations come into place at the 
moment the user obtains the ability to perform R&D activities 
on the genetic resource. The obligations are triggered prior 
to performing these activities. Kenya (2006, 2013) follows 
this approach.
• Access for utilization: The access requirements are triggered 
after the user obtains the ability to perform R&D. The trigger 
here is not the physical access, which enables the user to 
conduct R&D activities, but rather the utilization activity 
itself. This is the approach taken by the Dominican Republic 
(2018) as it excludes the access of genetic resources by ex 
situ collections, solely for conservation purposes and not for 
utilization or third-party transfer. Brazil (2015) is another 
example of a country that does not place the trigger on access 
but rather on utilization.
• Access to a previously utilized genetic resource for new 
utilization: The requirements are triggered when a new 
utilization activity occurs to a genetic resource that was 
previously made available to the user. France (2016) explicitly 
mentions this in its legal framework.
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It is crucial to keep in mind that having utilization as trigger 
for access does not necessarily mean that all of the genetic 
resources accessed prior to the enactment of the national laws 
are within the scope of ABS obligations.
Options for Utilization Scope
• Research: Access for research activities only. The access is 
only permitted for activities that do not involve any product/
process development.
• Development: This refers to access for product/process 
development.
• Research and Development (R&D): Access for both research 
and development.
Here, it should be noted that the division between research 
and development is yet to be clarified. While the vast majority 
of the countries regulate R&D on genetic resources (e.g., Brazil, 
2015), some countries (such as Ethiopia and Thailand) do not 
include this distinction or define these differences.
Benefit-Sharing Agreement as a Condition of Access
• Mandatory benefit-sharing agreement: This stipulates that a 
benefit-sharing agreement is to be signed between the provider 
and the user prior to access. This is the approach taken by 
France (2016), Thailand (2011), and Vietnam (2017).
• No mandatory benefit-sharing agreement, which means that 
there is no obligation to enter into a benefit-sharing agreement 
prior to access, yet this obligation may arise during different 
stages of R&D. Japan and the Republic of Korea do not require 
a benefit-sharing agreement prior to access.
Options for Regulatory Mechanisms
• Notification-based access: The user is to provide information 
regarding the modalities of access (defining material and 























Access Scope Material scope In situ only








Pre-condition for access   Mandatory BSA
  Voluntary BSA















Research directed towards priority needs of the provider country





Renegotiability   Renegotiable when the user and/or the intent changes
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  Administrative fines for light breach, criminal sanctions for severe breach
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temporal scope, persons/entities involved, transfer, intent, 
access and/or utilization) to the competent authority. However, 
in this case, the user can proceed with the activity without 
waiting for a response. Here, the notification would not qualify 
as a permit because a permit requires the applicant to wait for 
the authorization of the competent authority to commence 
its activities. The Republic of Korea (2017, 2018) is one of 
the countries that only requires notification to the competent 
authority regarding access.
• Permit-based access: Users who want to access a genetic 
resource must apply for access and wait for authorization 
prior to proceeding with their activities. This is referred to 
as the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) under Article 6 of the 
Nagoya Protocol. The majority of the countries have this as a 
regulatory mechanism for access.
Granting Authority
• Centralized, single institution, a one-stop-shop to go for 
the applicant: This is the case where only one authority or 
institution (e.g., a ministry, a research institute, a university, or 
an independent institution) has the competence for the entirety 
of the country and all types of genetic resources. The majority 
of the countries subject to this study have a centralized, single 
institution mandated to grant access to genetic resources.
• Several institutions mandated either according to the types 
of genetic resources or due to regional competence regarding 
genetic resources: In some cases, several regions may have their 
competence on the issues related to genetic resources from that 
region. This is especially the case for federal states. In addition, 
some states choose to have multiple competent authorities 
based on different types of genetic resources. For instance, the 
Ministry of Environment may be mandated to deal with genetic 
resources accessed from national parks, whereas the Ministry 
of Agriculture may be mandated for plant and animal genetic 
resources. Thailand (Thailand, Office of Natural Resources, 
Environmental Policy and Planning, 2014) is one of the 
countries that have several competent authorities depending 
on the type of genetic resource, whereas Spain (2007) has 
numerous competent authorities due to regional competence.
Standardized or Case by Case
• Standardized access conditions prescribed by law, regulations, 
and/or polices: Some countries choose to have PIC as a 
standard contract with predefined terms and conditions for 
access, often accessible through the annexes of the ABS law, 
the regulation, or online. Some countries, such as India, 
(2014), Spain (2007), South Africa (2008), and the Philippines 
(2005), on the other hand, specify the minimum content of the 
PIC within their ABS frameworks.
• Case-by-case conditions depending on the type of access and 
type of genetic resource: Some countries choose to have general 
principles within their regulatory framework on ABS, yet draft 
a unique, bilateral PIC document for each case. In some cases, 
the information required from the applicant is prescribed by 
law; in other cases, the applicant has to contact the competent 
authority to find out what documents are necessary for the 
case in hand. The majority of the countries tend to favor case-
by-case negotiation in their national laws.
Mandatory Local Partner
• The user must apply for a permit with a local public or private 
partner, or the local partner has the responsibility to obtain 
and manage the permit. This local partner can be a university, 
a company, a nongovernmental organization, which, in theory, 
helps the user obtain legal certainty and takes part in the R&D 
activities on the genetic resources subject to the benefit-
sharing agreement. The Philippines, for instance, is one of the 
countries that require a local partner.
• The user can apply for a permit without a local partner. This is 
the approach taken by France and Spain.
Facilitated Access for Non-Commercial Research
• Yes, non-commercial research is subject to favorable access 
conditions compared to commercial research. Favorable access 
conditions can be exemplified as simplified ABS systems for 
non-commercial research, where fewer documents are required 
from the applicant, a permit is given in a shorter time frame, 
or where benefit-sharing is done on non-monetary and/or 
voluntary basis. Australia (2012a), Spain, South Africa, and 
Thailand are some of the countries that have favorable access 
conditions for non-commercial research. Ecuador (2011), on 
the other hand, provides the option of framework contracts for 
non-commercial research.
• No, both commercial and non-commercial research is subject 
to the same conditions. Kenya follows this approach.
Options to Renegotiate ABS Contracts
• Renegotiation when the user changes: In the cases where a 
user transfers the genetic material to a subsequent user who 
is not a party to the contract between the user and a provider 
country, nor it is mentioned in the PIC that third-party transfer 
is allowed, the new user must obtain a new PIC either before or 
after it receives the material from the previous user.
• Renegotiation when the intent changes: In the cases where a 
user’s scope of activity regarding the genetic resource accessed 
from the provider country shifts from non-commercial 
to commercial research and where the PIC does not allow 
such research activity, the user is to then renegotiate the 
PIC conditions with the provider country before or after the 
commercial research activity begins.
For instance, Vietnam explicitly specifies both of these options.
Benefit-Sharing
The explanation below categorizes benefit-sharing types as 
follows. Non-monetary and monetary: Based on whether the 
user pays benefits in monetary value or in actions.
• Mandatory and voluntary: Based on the government’s choice on 
making the benefit-sharing mandatory or voluntary for the user.
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Non-monetary Benefit-Sharing
• Raw data: This type of data could pertain to the core 
information on genetic resource related to its phenotypic 
characteristics. Ethiopia (2006) foresees this type of benefit-
sharing as a part of the obligations foreseen for the access 
permit holder.
• Sharing of research results: There is no indication on what 
research results mean. However, following the daily practice 
of research institutions, we could conclude that this would 
be the reports that describe the results of a research based 
on its methodology (Anderson, 2003). The user would then 
need to provide a report as part of the non-monetary benefit-
sharing obligation. Some countries, such as Australia (2012b), 
and India, further explain which research results would be of 
interest to them.
• Capacity building: At the international level, capacity building 
(or capacity development) is defined as “any intervention or 
activity purposely designed to contribute to the development 
or strengthening of the capabilities of people, institutions and 
systems’’ (CBD.int, 2019; UN.org, 2019). Article 22/4 of the 
Nagoya Protocol includes the following categories within the 
scope of capacity building:
 a) Capacity to implement, and to comply with the obligations 
of, this Protocol;
 b) Capacity to negotiate mutually agreed terms;
 c) Capacity to develop, implement, and enforce domestic 
legislative, administrative, or policy measures on access 
and benefit-sharing; and
 d) Capacity of countries to develop their endogenous research 
capabilities to add value to their own genetic resources.
In addition, Article 22/5 further explains which actions would 
fall within the scope of these categories.
While some countries only mention capacity building as part 
of the non-monetary benefits (e.g., Australia; France (2017); and 
Kenya), some countries, such as South Africa (2008) and Uganda 
(2005), follow a more specific approach by including some of the 
capacity-building activities mentioned under Article 22/5 of the 
Nagoya Protocol.
• Technology transfer: Referring to Articles 15, 16, 18, and 
19 of the CBD, Article 23 of the Nagoya Protocol obliges 
Parties to “undertake to promote and encourage access to 
technology by, and transfer of technology to, developing 
country Parties, in particular, the least developed countries 
and small island developing States among them, and 
Parties with economies in transition, in order to enable 
the development and strengthening of a sound and viable 
technological and scientific base for the attainment of the 
objectives of the Convention and this Protocol.” Some 
countries, such as Costa Rica (1998), take an approach where 
technology transfer is a state obligation embodied in the ABS 
framework, which means that when negotiating benefits, 
the state is obliged to seek out technology transfer options. 
Most countries, however, merely list technology transfer as a 
type of non-monetary benefit-sharing (e.g., Ethiopia, Kenya, 
and Vietnam). Some countries, like the Philippines (2005), 
include the terms and conditions of technology transfer in 
their standard ABS contracts. Ecuador’s ABS Framework 
obliges the parties to discuss technology transfer options 
during benefit-sharing negotiations.
• Research directed toward priority needs: The Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their 
Utilization (UNEP, 2002) includes this as a type of non-
monetary benefit-sharing and exemplifies them as research 
related to health and food, taking into account domestic 
uses of genetic resources in provider countries. Some 
countries, such as India and Namibia (2017), list this non-
monetary benefit-sharing option in their ABS frameworks. 
Australia refers to the Bonn Guidelines in their model 
benefit-sharing agreement.
• Food and livelihood security benefits: This category is also 
mentioned under the Bonn Guidelines. It is not defined what 
it covers nor what is entails. Yet, some countries (e.g., India, 
Uganda, and Vietnam) include this type of benefit within their 
list benefits.
Monetary Benefit-Sharing
• Joint Ventures: This Concept Is Not Defined Under the CBD 
or Its Nagoya Protocol, Yet the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1993) Provides Us 
With the Following Definition: “A Joint Venture Is an Association 
of Firms or Individuals Formed to Undertake a Specific Business 
Project.” Most of the Countries Subject to This Study (E.G., 
Kenya, Namibia, Brazil, and India) Refer to Joint Venture as an 
Option for Monetary Benefit-Sharing and Do Not Oblige Parties 
to Enter Into Such Agreements.
• Access fee/fee per sample: This type of benefit-sharing 
occurs when the access obligations are triggered more as an 
administrative fee either per applicant or per sample. Today, 
some countries (e.g., Kenya and Namibia) only mention such 
an option as a type of monetary benefit-sharing within their 
ABS frameworks, whereas some countries (such as Malaysia, 
2017; Vietnam) indicate the types of fees or sometimes the 
amount of fees (India; South Africa, 2012; the Philippines; 
Uganda, 2007) payable prior to access.
• Up-front payments: This concept was initiated in Costa Rica 
through the access-for-fee agreement between the National 
Biodiversity Institute (INBio) and the pharmaceutical 
company Merck (Sittenfeld and Gamez, 1993). The concept 
got furthermore enshrined in the Bonn Guidelines. This type 
of benefit-sharing occurs when the user pays not only for 
the access fee but also for the negotiated amount of benefit-
sharing before utilization. Some of the countries, such as 
India, Namibia, Kenya, and Uganda, list up-front payments as 
a monetary benefit option within their ABS frameworks.
• License fee: There is no unified definition of license fees 
within the field of ABS; however, this type of payment is 
rather common in the field of intellectual property law. 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization 
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(WIPO), a licensing agreement is a partnership between an 
intellectual property rights owner (licensor) and another 
who is authorized to use such rights (licensee) in exchange 
for an agreed payment, which either comes across as royalties 
or license fees. Royalties are usage-based payments, whereas 
license fees often occur periodically (World Intellectual 
Property Organization, 2004). License fees have been used 
within the field of ABS on several cases. Most of the countries 
(e.g., Uganda, India) mention this as a type of monetary 
benefit option within their frameworks.
• Royalties: Royalties are usage-based payments made by the 
user of a genetic resource to the provider country. They 
are often agreed to as percentages of gross or net revenue. 
Percentages of royalty payments are foreseen both in the 
Brazilian and Costa Rica (2003) ABS systems. The Dominican 
Republic is one of the countries that mention this as a 
monetary benefit-sharing option.
• Salaries and research funding: The majority of the provider 
countries’ ABS frameworks (e.g., Namibia, Kenya, Uganda, 
and Ethiopia) have this included as a benefit-sharing option. 
Although some of them include this under non-monetary 
benefit-sharing, the performance of this act only requires the 
transfer of a monetary amount and thus is suited better as a 
monetary benefit option.
• Trust-fund payment: This is a type of benefit-sharing 
payment made directly to a fund foreseen under the national 
ABS framework. The current ABS Framework in South 
Africa foresees compulsory payment to be made to the 
Bioprospecting Trust Fund after concluding the benefit-
sharing agreement.
Some countries, such as Vietnam, list various benefit-sharing 
options without differentiating between their monetary and 
non-monetary character. Here, it should also be noted that some 
of the benefit-sharing options that can be found under the Bonn 
Guidelines are not included here as they did not exist in the 
majority of the ABS frameworks within the countries that have 
been sampled in this study.
When Will Benefits be Transferred/Trigger for 
Benefit-Sharing
• At the point when access obligations have been triggered: This 
is the case for countries that oblige up-front payments, access 
fees, or fees per sample. The user is then to pay such fee prior to 
or within a specified period after the signing of the PIC.
• At the point of utilization: In this case, the user shares 
the negotiated or predetermined amount or performs the 
activity subject to the agreed non-monetary benefit during 
the R&D process.
India foresees both these options depending on the activity.
• At the point of commercialization: Most countries’ approach to 
benefit-sharing agreements is to negotiate a trigger that is tied 
to the commercialization of the product. Alternatively, some 
countries explicitly mention that they expect benefit-sharing 
at this stage. This option automatically comes across for 
countries that laid down obligations for users to pay license 
fees. Nevertheless, Brazil also follows this approach, despite 
having enacted the mechanism of royalty payments.
• At the point (or a specified period after) the user or provider 
receives first benefits from the utilization of genetic resources 
(GR): The user only benefits (in monetary terms) from 
the utilization only sometime after a product or a process 
developed through the utilization of genetic resources is 
finalized and released into the market. This fact is considered 
in Brazil as the Brazilian ABS Framework foresees the payment 
of 1% of annual net revenue.
• Payment tied to the application of or exploitation of intellectual 
property (IP) rights: This also comes across as milestone 
payments. Milestone payments are the type of payments in 
licensing agreements where the payment is triggered by an 
activity or occurrence of an event (Crama et al., 2009). In its 
model benefit-sharing agreement, Australia (2012), takes the 
exploitation of IP rights into account when establishing the 
trigger for benefit-sharing.
Exemption From Benefit-Sharing
• Exempting the user from benefit-sharing for certain types of use 
(e.g., no benefit-sharing needed when the utilization is directed 
at biodiversity conservation, food security): For example, India 
exempts collaborative research projects (subject to approval 
by the competent authority) as well as non-commercial 
utilization for publication purposes from benefit-sharing. In 
addition, Norway (2016) exempts private and non-commercial 
users from obtaining PIC and MAT for utilizing traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources.
Preset Conditions Versus Case-By-Case Negotiation
• Preset: Benefit-sharing conditions and triggers are set within 
the law, regulations, and/or policies. The user signs a standard 
contract drafted by the provider country. Australia’s ABS 
framework includes a model benefit-sharing agreement, 
whereas Indian ABS Guidelines specify the amount of 
monetary benefits to be shared in specific situations. On 
the other hand, the Brazilian ABS framework specifies the 
percentage of the benefit to be shared based on the annual net 
revenue obtained from a finished product or a process.
• Case-by-case negotiation: Benefit-sharing is subject to 
negotiation between the providers and users. The majority of 
the countries in this study (e.g., Kenya, South Africa, Thailand, 
France, Spain, and Costa Rica) have ABS frameworks that lead 
to case-by-case negotiation for access permits.
Compliance
Sanctions
• Administrative fines in any case of breach
• Criminal sanctions in any case of breach
The Philippines foresees both administrative fines and 
criminal sanctions.
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• Administrative fines for light breach, criminal sanctions for 
severe breach (misappropriation/intentional breach/repetitive 
noncompliance): This is the case for the Republic of Korea.
Other than sanctions, some countries have monitoring 
requirements to ensure compliance. For instance, Thailand 
obliges annual reporting throughout the R&D process, whereas 
Brazil requires notification prior to commercialization. However, 
since these options were not taken on by the majority of the 
countries subject to this comparative study, the options did not 
make it to the interviews.
INTERVIEWS
The stakeholder survey conducted in an initial study by the author 
(Sirakaya, 2019)2 included a question on the participant’s availability 
for an in-depth interview regarding ABS options. Fifty-three of 
the respondents demonstrated their interest, and 20 ended up 
participating to the interview. The distribution of the participants 
among the stakeholder groups has proven to be rather homogeneous 
as five experts represented provider countries, six experts 
represented (public) collections, five represented industrial users 
(from various sectors, such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and 
industrial biotechnology), whereas four represented academic users 
(postdoctoral researchers and professors associated with various 
universities). Written informed consent forms were obtained from 
all of these experts.
The stakeholder interview has been designed in a semistructured 
manner. The questions on access and compliance asked stakeholders 
to rank the preference per regulatory option (Table 2) on a scale of 1 
to 3, with 1 being the most favorable and 3 being the least favorable. 
The questions on benefit-sharing asked the stakeholders to rank 
the impact (from very positive to very negative) and burden (from 
burden to very heavy burden) of engaging in the given monetary or 
non-monetary option.
Perceptions on Access
Question 1 was regarding the contact information of the 
stakeholders. Except for one participant, all of the interviewees 
representing provider countries were a part of the regulating 
body. Two of the provider country representatives were based in 
Africa, and the rest were scattered around the world. Participants 
representing collections were mostly based in the policy division 
of the collections they represented. All of the interviewees 
representing industrial users and academic users were based in 
either Europe or North America.
Due to the confidentiality concerns of the majority of the 
participants, the names of the interviewees will not be published.
2The survey has been sent to over 600 stakeholders including all of the national 
competent authorities of parties to the CBD, all of the national focal points, 
academic institutions, collections, and industrial users worldwide. The selection 
of the stakeholders is based on their function in their institution as well as their 
demonstrated interest in ABS (published articles, their position and expertise, 
attendance to conferences, workshops, or discussions related to ABS). Two 
hundred twenty responses were obtained.
Question 2 asked stakeholders to rank material scope options. 
The majority of the stakeholders opted for ABS frameworks to cover 
in situ and ex situ access, whereas the least favorable option stated 
by the majority of the stakeholders was in situ and ex situ access and 
access to DSI. It should however be noted here that the majority 
of the stakeholders answering as provider countries selected the 
inclusion of DSI as the most favorable option. Nevertheless, three of 
them did not do so. While one of them gave a middle-low score, the 
other two gave inclusion of DSI the lowest score. According to one of 
the latter, the reason for this is that this stakeholder could see that it 
would be hampering research even in the stakeholder’s own country.
Apart from two academic users, all of the user stakeholders 
found the inclusion of DSI the least favorable. One of them stated 
that it would not matter what is included in the scope as long 
as the regulatory requirements are not burdensome for whatever 
is covered in the ABS framework. One of the stakeholders who 
was against the inclusion of DSI suggested this to be handled in 
contracts rather than at the international level. This stakeholder 
argued that it is extremely challenging to define the limits of DSI 
in a unified manner. Another stakeholder from the collections 
argued that at the moment there is no way to track and trace DSI 
and, therefore, regulating it would be “a nightmare.”
The responses of industrial users and collections varied regarding 
their choice of the most favorable option. A stakeholder from the 
collections opted for “in situ access only” as it would be easier for 
collections to provide genetic resources. One of the industrial users 
that chose “in situ and ex situ access” as the most favorable option 
stated that in the sector the stakeholder is familiar with (plant 
breeding), ex situ access would be much more favorable as that sector 
tends to access ex situ rather than in situ. Responses from industrial 
users in different sectors (e.g., pharma) as well as collections and 
academic users also demonstrated different tendencies toward in 
situ versus ex situ access.
Question 3 asked stakeholders to rank temporal scope options. 
The majority of the stakeholders opted for “access for utilization,” 
which meant that they would prefer ABS obligations to be triggered 
at the moment of utilization of the genetic resource. “Access for 
sampling” took second place, whereas “access to a previously 
utilized genetic resource for new utilization” was the least favorable 
option. The preferences of the stakeholders in this question do not 
depend on the stakeholder group they belong in. For instance, where 
some stakeholders from the collections prefer the obligations to be 
triggered at the point of sampling (for it would bring legal certainty), 
others from the collections preferred that these obligations would 
be triggered at the point of utilization (as they believe that it may 
exclude most of the activities of collections). On the other hand, one 
of the academic users claimed that sampling in itself has no value 
and therefore should not be subject to ABS obligations.
Question 4 asked the preference of the stakeholders on 
what constitutes utilization. None of the options (research, 
development, R&D) had a significantly high preference rate as 
the choice of the stakeholders was scattered among all three 
options. Nonetheless, the option of utilization covering “R&D” 
got slightly higher votes than the others.
The vast majority of the stakeholders from collections opted 
for the ABS obligations to be triggered at the stage of research. 
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The majority of the industrial users however found “development” 
to be the most favorable trigger. Neither the provider countries 
nor the academic users opted for an option more than the others.
Question 5 asked the stakeholders whether there should 
be a mandatory benefit-sharing agreement concluded prior 
to access. A slight majority (11 stakeholders or 61%) opted for 
mandatory benefit-sharing agreement rather than a no benefit-
sharing agreement or voluntary benefit-sharing agreement prior 
to access. While all of the stakeholders representing provider 
countries opted for the mandatory benefit-sharing, some of 
the stakeholders that represent users also opted for this option, 
stating that having an agreement prior to access would define 
user obligations and thus help secure legal certainty. Industrial 
users had a higher preference rate toward mandatory benefit-
sharing agreement compared to academic users or collections.
Question 6 on the choice between requiring a notification for 
access against permit for access received varied responses. The 
majority of the stakeholders representing provider countries 
opted for requiring a permit for access, stating it as the only way 
to ensure benefit-sharing. Some of the provider representatives 
however argued that notification could be accepted for either 
local researchers or non-commercial researchers as a whole. Some 
stakeholders representing users stated that permit is the only way 
to ensure legal certainty and to be certain that their access will 
not be challenged in the future. Some of the users, on the other 
hand, stated that the lengthy permit processes create burden for 
research and the bureaucracy that comes with the permit system 
in some cases can jeopardize public health in times of disease 
outbreaks. One of the collection representatives stated that 
notification is enough for monitoring the utilization of genetic 
resources, and the administrative burden that comes along with 
permit processes results in either missing out opportunities for 
research funding or no research at all.
Question 7 asked the stakeholders whether they would prefer 
one centralized competent authority or several authorities based 
on either regional competence or the type of genetic resource. 
The vast majority of the stakeholders stated that they would prefer 
a centralized, single authority for various reasons. First, for it 
would allow better monitoring of genetic resources; second, that 
it would ensure a standardized evaluation process; third, that it 
would minimize disputes and communication problems between 
the authorities; and last, it would bring down transaction costs 
for both parties (the costs for users to evaluate applications and/
or monitor genetic resources as well as costs for users to obtain 
access to genetic resources).
The preference on question 8, which asked stakeholders their 
thoughts on standardized or case-by-case conditions on access, 
had the highest score supporting case-by-case conditions by 
slight majority. Nevertheless, all of the stakeholders that opted for 
the case-by-case conditions stated that the ideal situation would 
be standardized terms that have the flexibility to be adapted to a 
specific case. Some of the stakeholders who chose standardized 
conditions also stated that they would prefer a model contract 
that can be tweaked to meet the needs of the case, type of genetic 
resource, and type of access.
Question 9 asked stakeholders to pick between an ABS framework 
requiring a local partner prior to access and an ABS framework 
that either does not require such a condition or encourages it on 
a voluntary basis. The majority of the stakeholders opted for the 
latter. Not all provider country representatives were supportive of 
mandatory local partners. One of the provider country stakeholders 
expressed the need for capacity development for nominating local 
partners who can successfully handle such a task. This stakeholder 
further argued that most providers do not have such capacity. One 
of the stakeholders representing industrial users stated that small 
companies would also not be able to handle such a mandatory 
requirement. A stakeholder from collections argued that local 
partners are only beneficial for long-term projects, and such long-
term partnerships can help develop capacity in provider countries, 
yet would only be a burden in short-term efforts.
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1There was no consensus among industrial users regarding this option.
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Question 10, which asked whether the stakeholders would 
prefer an ABS framework that provides facilitated access to 
non-commercial research as well as other types of research 
addressed under Article 8 of the Nagoya Protocol, the vast 
majority chose the provision of such access. A collections 
representative defined facilitated access as fewer, simpler 
conditions where the non-commercial user can agree to share 
useful information related to the genetic resource with the 
provider country. An academic user representative stated 
that facilitated access would entail clear information on when 
and with whom the provider will need renegotiation in case 
of commercial exploitation. One of the provider country 
representatives stated that such facilitated access should 
especially be given to foreign researchers as they require 
additional assistance in accessing genetic resources compared 
to their local colleagues.
Preferences on Benefit-Sharing
Questions 11–20 asked stakeholders how they perceive the 
impact and burden associated with several monetary and non-
monetary benefits. These questions furthermore gathered 
insights from stakeholders regarding their preferences on the 
triggers and timing for benefit-sharing and the format and the 
mandatory nature of the benefits.
Non-monetary Benefits
Sharing Raw Data
The majority of the industrial users found sharing of raw data to 
be rather an ambiguous benefit-sharing option and a burdensome 
one. The majority furthermore exclaimed that the definition of 
raw data and what it entails are not clear. A way to encourage this 
is by giving the industry the choice of sharing it versus sharing 
other types of benefits.
Almost all of the interviewees from the collections were in 
favor of sharing raw data. The majority stated that generating 
data on genetic resources and making such data publicly available 
are highly beneficial for the collections and research dedicated to 
conserving biodiversity.
The vast majority of the interviewees from the provider 
countries stated that receiving raw data has a very positive 
impact. They however stated that there is some level of burden 
associated with it. Some of them stated that this burden comes 
from ensuring confidentiality to the data, and some of them 
stated that finding the right institution to share the data with to 
comprehend and make use of it is often challenging.
All of the academic users stated that sharing raw data 
would have a positive impact as academic researchers are also 
appreciative if the amount of publicly available raw data would 
increase. Some of them also argued that the term is rather 
ambiguous, and it should be standardized, or at least defined.
Sharing Research Results
The industrial users found sharing of research results to be a 
better option than sharing raw data. Yet, they stated that some 
burden is derived from inserting the research results into a usable 
format that is reader-friendly and is easy to disseminate.
The interviewees from the collections were all in favor of 
sharing research results as a type of benefit. They found it to have 
a very high positive impact also for their sector and stated that 
dissemination does not have much burden associated with it as it 
is one of their core activities.
Interviewees from provider countries found this option to be also 
highly beneficial for them, yet they stated that making sense of the 
results and being able to utilize them bear equal amounts of burden.
Academic users also expressed that sharing of research results 
is highly beneficial for them, and since it is their regular activity, 
such a benefit-sharing option would not be burdensome.
Capacity Building
The majority of the industrial users stated that this would 
have a relatively high positive impact, and the burden of 
executing such a benefit-sharing activity would not outweigh 
its impacts, whereas the majority of the interviewees from the 
collections stated that building capacity in provider countries 
has a highly positive impact both for the country and for the 
collections. They stated that capacity building helps establish 
more sustainable relationships with provider countries and 
also helps collections to ease into access procedures as mutual 
trust gets built.
This type of benefit-sharing is perceived by the majority of 
provider country participants to have a high positive impact. 
Some of the stakeholders argued that this would be the most 
important type of benefit-sharing as it would allow provider 
countries to valorize their own genetic resources, which they 
saw as the true meaning of the international ABS framework. 
However, they admitted that it would bear some limited amount 
of burden in ensuring that these activities would be received by 
the people who can utilize them.
While academic users stated that capacity building has a 
positive impact, they also argued that it has an equal amount of 
burden as the execution of capacity-building activities requires a 
relatively high amount of resources.
Technology Transfer
The interviewees representing the industrial users stated that 
this type of benefit-sharing has a high positive impact for 
them. Some perceived this to also have a positive impact for the 
provider country. Some argued that their scope of activities in 
conducting R&D with genetic resources results in a product or 
process that is a technology transfer activity in itself. Most of 
them also stated that technology transfer involves a limited to 
high amount of burden.
Likewise, the vast majority of the interviewees representing 
the collections found this to have a very positive impact. They 
added that compared to capacity building, technology transfer is 
a bit more burdensome.
Provider country participants stated that technology transfer 
is rather beneficial for them. However, learning and teaching how 
to make use of technology can sometimes be rather burdensome. 
Furthermore, the majority stated that not all technology they 
received was useful for them.
The majority of the academic users found technology transfer 
to have a lower amount of positive impacts than capacity building, 
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stating that often they are not allowed by their research partners 
to engage in such an activity.
Research Directed Toward Priority Needs of the 
Provider Country
The vast majority of the industrial users were in favor of this 
benefit-sharing option. One of them underlined that this would 
be the best approach for his sector as benefits would directly 
return to the people who need them. Yet, the majority agreed on 
it as a heavy burden because making sure the research precisely 
helps the provider country would require a considerable amount 
of resources.
While the majority of the interviewees representing collections 
stated that this would generate positive impact, some of them 
expressed concerns for this option, stating that the collections are 
extremely constrained at the type of research they can engage in, 
and therefore, they would not always be able to secure funding 
for such benefit-sharing.
The majority of interviewees representing provider countries 
stipulated that this is rather a minimally burdensome type 
of benefit-sharing with a high positive impact. One of the 
interviewees stated that provider countries regularly look into 
research gaps, and identifying the ones that could be filled by 
benefit-sharing would constitute limited burden.
The vast majority of academic users stated that this benefit-
sharing option fits within their scope of activities, and therefore, 
they would be able to maximize the positive impacts of 
conducting such research.
Food and Livelihood Security Benefits
This option was perceived as beneficial by the majority of the 
industrial users. While acknowledging the positive impacts 
of food and livelihood security benefits, some interviewees 
stipulated that this type of benefit-sharing often does not have 
a connection with the utilization of genetic resource itself and 
that many industrial users engage in this type of benefit-sharing 
regardless of having accessed genetic resources from that country.
The responses from interviewees representing collections 
were rather varied. Some of them claimed that this type of 
benefit-sharing does not fit within their sector’s scope of work, 
while others claimed that they have engaged in benefit-sharing 
activities that would be considered as food and livelihood 
security benefits. However, the majority argued that the burden 
of engaging in this option would outweigh the positive impacts.
Interviewees representing provider countries found this 
option to be the least impactful in terms of its positive effects 
for them, among other non-monetary benefits. One of the 
interviewees stated the reason for this as not being applicable to 
all of the regions or all of the provider countries. Nevertheless, 
the majority stated that the burden of receiving such a benefit 
would be minimal.
The interviewees representing academic users were not in 
favor of this option for their sector. While admitting it would 
still generate a limited amount of positive impact for them, 
it would also result in a heavy burden as this type of benefit-




Almost all of the interviewees from industrial users stated that 
this would create a negative impact for their sector resulting 
also in very heavy burden. Some of the interviewees argued 
that, in some cases, a joint venture might work, but in any case, 
it should be a voluntary choice and not be imposed as a benefit-
sharing clause.
The majority of the collections representatives stated that this 
option would constitute a very negative impact and even heavier 
burden. Some of them claimed that this type of benefit-sharing 
would only be relevant for applied research,3 yet they stated 
that the burden of keeping that joint venture functional would 
outweigh any positive impact.
While the majority of the provider country representatives 
stated that there could be potential positive impacts deriving from 
a joint venture, they also stated that the cost of establishing and 
sustaining such an initiative would outweigh all potential benefits.
The majority of the academic users perceived this to have a 
positive impact. One of the interviewees claimed that this would 
give researchers a chance to work with local strains alongside 
local researchers that have knowledge on them.
Access Fee per Sample
Almost all of the interviewees from industrial users stated that 
such a benefit-sharing option would create negative impacts for 
their sector, arguing that it is not a realistic approach as most 
sectors work with thousands of genetic resources at the same 
time. Some claimed that this would be impossible for small and 
medium enterprises and start-ups as the cost of access would 
start impacting the R&D process from the first step of the value 
chain onward.
All of the interviewees representing collections stated that 
this option would result in very negative impact and very heavy 
burden, arguing that collections do not have the budget to pay 
such a fee for each access.
While the overall result points out to a positive impact for 
provider countries, some interviewees argued that this would not 
be a satisfactory approach as they stated that the price paid for a 
sample would not constitute benefit-sharing.
Even though the overall result is a positive impact for academic 
users, some remained skeptical about this option.
Up-Front Payments
For similar reasons to access fee per sample, the majority of 
industrial users found this option to have negative impacts and 
heavy burden for their sector. They argued that benefit-sharing 
at the beginning of the activity would be a huge drawback as it 
discourages R&D.
All of the interviewees representing collections stated that 
up-front payments would result in very negative impact and 
3 Upon receiving this response, these interviewees were asked to clarify the 
difference between basic/fundamental research and applied research. All of them 
agreed that there is no clear line between where one ends and the other begins. 
One of them stipulated that it is not possible to realistically talk about fundamental 
research today, since even for a single research funding, scientists need to talk 
about valorization, innovation, and end result.
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very heavy burden. While agreeing with others, one of the 
interviewees stated that it might be interesting to share benefits 
up front if track and trace requirements would be removed by it 
and that the users would not have to worry about benefit-sharing 
at later stages.
The majority of provider country representatives perceived 
up-front payments to have a very positive impact in terms of 
being able to secure benefits from the starting point and being 
able to have less burden regarding enforcement and compliance.
The academic user interviewees did not have detailed opinions 
on this option. However, one remained skeptical, arguing that 
sharing monetary benefits from the get-go would negatively 
affect academic research.
License Fee
The responses from industrial user interviewees range from 
negative to very negative impacts as well as from heavy burden 
to very heavy burden. One of the interviewees argued that it is 
currently ambiguous what triggers sharing benefits as license 
fee. Another interviewee argued that license fees create a lot of 
administrative burden, which far outweigh positive impacts.
On the other hand, the vast majority of collections stated 
that this would not apply to them as collections do not engage 
in commercial activities with genetic resources. However, they 
claimed that if this would be applicable, it would create very 
negative impact and burden.
The responses from provider country representatives 
ranged from positive to very positive impacts, while burden 
was perceived to be limited. However, one of the interviewees 
opposed to it, arguing that imposing license fees would result in 
a lot of track and trace activities that create a heavy burden.
Although the majority of academic users perceived this 
benefit-sharing option to result in positive impacts and 
limited burden, they also refrained from clearly elaborating on 
the reason.
Royalties
The industrial user interviewees’ responses did not create a 
consensus on the impact of royalties for their sector. One of the 
interviewees argued that royalties would be burdensome in terms 
of the administrative work it requires.
The collections mostly stated that this type of benefit-sharing 
does not have an impact nor a burden for their sector as they do 
not engage in commercial research.
The majority of provider countries were in favor of this 
option as they stated that it would create a very positive impact. 
Yet, most of them argued that the administrative burden of 
establishing a system to organize receiving this benefit type 
would constitute a heavy burden. One of the interviewees 
stipulated that royalties acknowledge the provider country’s 
efforts to conserve biodiversity and create a good return 
on investment.
The majority of the academic user representatives did not 
have strong opinions against royalty payments. Some claimed 
that universities are prepared to execute such payment. Another 
one stated that collections may require a different type of benefit-
sharing scheme, as this interviewee perceived collections’ work 
as already a type of non-monetary benefit-sharing in terms of 
biodiversity conservation.
Salaries and Research Funding
Among all of the other monetary benefit options, interviewees 
representing industrial users were in favor of this option the 
most. One of the interviewees argued that this type of benefit-
sharing would go to the people who really need them, and 
another argued that this is a very useful option for strengthening 
the sector’s relationship with the provider country as they would 
be directly able to see the benefit that flows through the R&D on 
genetic resources.
Although the interviewees stated that the collections would 
have the least amount of burden in performing this benefit-
sharing option, the majority still argued that collections do not 
have the capacity to provide such funding.
Provider countries did not favor this option as much as the 
latter two options. They stated that they would rather prefer 
funding for research, students, and capacity-building programs.
The majority of the academic users stated that they see this 
type of benefit-sharing (especially funding for PhD researchers) 
as one of their routine activities, and therefore, this would create 
minimal burden.
Trust Fund
The interviewees did not have a consensus on neither the impact 
nor the burden of this option. While some industrial users were 
indecisive about the effects it could have for their sector, some 
perceived it to be very beneficial.
Most of the interviewees from collections claimed that it 
would have no impact as they perceived that they would not be 
engaging in this type of benefit-sharing since they do not engage 
in commercial research. Some stated the benefit of a trust fund 
in terms of removing the burden of track and trace from both the 
user and the provider country.
Provider countries’ responses ranged from positive to very 
positive. According to one of the interviewees, a trust fund 
would help better organize benefit-sharing and transparency of 
transactions while enabling the provider country to reduce the 
cost of compliance checks.
Likewise, the majority of academic users were in favor of this 
option in terms of its potential to also simplify access for researchers.
Mandatory Versus Voluntary
Mandatory benefit-sharing was the dominant option for 
industrial users. One interviewee held that the industry would 
prefer mandatory benefit-sharing to ensure legal certainty. 
Another interviewee argued that the ideal option would be 
making benefit-sharing mandatory yet allowing users to pick 
between monetary and non-monetary.
For collections, the answers were two-fold. Half of the collections 
claimed that to ensure legal certainty, mandatory benefit-sharing is 
key while the other half argued that many of the benefits arising 
from collections work cannot be predicted in advance and may be 
delivered over decades; a flexible system is more suited.
All of the interviewees representing provider countries 
preferred mandatory benefit-sharing. However, one stated that 
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it should be voluntary for local researchers. One interviewee 
claimed that his experience suggests voluntary benefit-sharing 
amounts to no benefit-sharing.
Only one of the academic users showed a tendency toward 
favoring mandatory benefit-sharing, arguing that provider 
countries will not be satisfied with a voluntary structure. The rest 
claimed that voluntary benefit-sharing would enable academic 
research to proceed.
Preset Versus Negotiated Conditions
For industrial users, the responses were two-fold. While the one 
half argued that small/medium enterprises (SMEs) would not be 
able to have resources to negotiate benefit-sharing agreements, 
the other half argued that everybody, including SMEs, has 
the means in its R&D budget to negotiate, and sometimes the 
flexibility provided by negotiation serves SMEs better. The former 
group furthermore argued that negotiating benefit-sharing each 
time an access happens bears too many transaction costs for both 
the user and the provider.
All of the interviewees representing collections were in favor 
of preset conditions as long as they would have some level 
of flexibility.
Provider countries’ responses were not in unison. While some 
claimed that preset conditions would be very beneficial in terms 
of reducing transaction costs, some stated that not all cases would 
benefit from such an approach.
The majority of academic users also opted for preset 
conditions. Some stated that they should be flexible enough to be 
adapted to the case in hand and should not be hindering R&D.
Trigger for Benefit-Sharing
The majority of industrial users preferred sharing benefits some 
time after the user benefits from utilization of genetic resources 
(e.g., after the product has been in the market for a year).
While some interviewees stated that this should be access for 
collections as collections do not engage in commercialization 
activities, some claimed that it is better to have the trigger as late 
as possible.
The vast majority of provider countries were in favor of the 
trigger to be at the point of access, stating that this is the only way 
to secure benefits and arguing that track and trace for provider 
countries is almost impossible.
Most of the academic users preferred the trigger to be 
commercialization, stating that academic research should not 
be bound by benefit-sharing obligations if there is no applied 
research that follows after.
Perceptions on Compliance
Question 21 asked stakeholders their opinions on sanctions. The 
majority of the stakeholders preferred administrative fines for 
light breach, criminal sanctions for severe breach, while the least 
preferred option was criminal sanctions for all kinds of breach. 
Industrial users stated that they would prefer not to access genetic 
resources from countries that have criminal sanctions, especially for 
all kinds of breach. Academic users and collections stated the same 
regarding research activities. The majority of the provider countries 
emphasized the need to create proportionate sanctions.
CONCLUSION
This study identified common regulatory options implemented 
by provider countries when regulating their ABS matters. 
Regarding access, the author identified 25 options on access and 
6 non-monetary and 7 monetary benefit-sharing options that are 
common to the provider countries’ legislation subject to this study.
While describing the options, the research demonstrated 
some ambiguities regarding the definition and scope of 
some terms related to benefit-sharing. For instance, it 
was not possible to fully identify what constitutes sharing 
raw data, research results, or food and livelihood security 
benefits. Neither the international legal framework (CBD 
and the Nagoya Protocol) nor the COP Decisions prescribe 
what these benefit-sharing types exactly consist of. On the 
contrary, non-monetary benefit-sharing options, such as 
capacity building and technology transfer, are explained in 
detail at the international level. This comparative analysis 
furthermore noted that most of the ABS frameworks of the 
African countries subject to this study listed some benefit-
sharing options within their legislation or annexed to the legal 
document without further describing them. It was noted that 
the majority of these options were identical to the options listed 
in COP Decision VI/24, also known as the Bonn Guidelines, 
which is the most detailed ABS guideline at the international 
level that got drafted before the Nagoya Protocol came into 
force. Although this seems to be a beneficial approach in 
terms of the national ABS frameworks’ compatibility with the 
international ABS principles, the interview with stakeholders 
further demonstrated that neither the regulators nor the users 
exactly know what actions some of these benefit-sharing 
options entail.
Moreover, the comparative analysis demonstrates that, 
apart from some (such as Brazil, India, South Africa, and the 
Philippines), the provider countries’ laws often do not expressly 
mention the trigger for benefit-sharing, meaning that the users 
would not be able to directly comprehend when they would 
need to share benefits. When this information is analyzed 
together with the data gathered from the provider country 
representatives during the interviews, we may think that this is 
perhaps because the majority of the provider countries opt for 
benefit-sharing at the point of access and that they presuppose 
the benefit-sharing will anyhow happen right after the PIC is 
granted and the mutually agreed terms (MAT) negotiated. This 
perception however needs to be tested in further detail.
The data related to access gathered during the stakeholder 
interviews lead to several conclusions. First, while the majority 
of the users do not favor the inclusion of DSI within the 
material scope, the majority of the provider countries do. This 
of course does not come as a surprise; however, an interesting 
point noted during the discussions is that even some of the 
provider country representatives admit that the inclusion 
would likely hamper the research, also for the local researchers 
in provider countries.
Regarding the activity that is included in the material scope, 
the participants agreed that the definition of utilization and the 
activities covered are yet to be clarified.
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The Cost of Postponement of Bt Rice 
Commercialization in China
Yan Jin, Dus̆an Drabik, Nico Heerink and Justus Wesseler *
Wageningen University & Research, Wageningen, Netherlands
To maintain self-sufficiency in rice production and national food security, the Chinese 
government strongly supports research that aims at increasing the productivity of rice 
cultivation. Rice with genetic material from Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt rice) is transgenic 
rice that can reduce lepidopteran pest damage and the use of insecticides. It was 
developed in the 1990s and earned biosafety certificates in 2009. However, because of 
political reasons, its commercialization in China has been postponed, and, to date, Bt 
rice is not grown in China. We assess the opportunity cost of postponement of Bt rice 
commercialization in China between the years 2009 and 2019 and consider the external 
costs of pesticide use and potential technology spill-overs of Bt rice. We estimate the cost 
of postponement of Bt rice over the analyzed period to be 12 billion United States (US) 
dollars per year.
Keywords: Bt rice, cost of postponement, China, technology, trade
INTRODUCTION
With only 6% of the world’s fresh water and 7% of its arable land, China has to nurture nearly a fifth 
of the world’s population (Wong and Chan, 2016). The arable land per capita in China decreased 
from 0.11 ha in 1990 to 0.09 ha in 2016, well below the world average of 0.19 ha per capita (World 
Bank, 2017b). Although rice is the predominant staple food in the country, the land allocated to its 
production decreased from 33.1 million ha in 1990 to 30.7 million ha in 2017 [National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC), 2018]. On the other hand, the amount of imported rice increased from 
0.6 million metric tons in 2011 to 4.0 million tons in 2017, making China the biggest rice importer 
in the world (NBSC, 2018).
The United States (US) Census Bureau estimates that the Chinese population will reach 1.4 
billion around 2026, which will further reduce the arable land per capita and increase the demand 
for rice. To maintain self-sufficiency in rice production and national food security, the Chinese 
government strongly supports research that aims to increase the productivity of rice cultivation. 
One of the priorities has, therefore, been the development of insect-resistant rice, such as rice with 
genetic material from Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt rice).
Bt rice is transgenic rice in which genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis have been 
transferred into the rice genome to reduce lepidopteran pest damage and the necessity of using 
insecticides (Huang et al., 2005). The yield of Bt rice can be up to 60% higher than conventional rice 
when no pesticides are used (Wang et al., 2010).
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Chinese rice farmers apply more pesticides than farmers 
in most other countries (Huang et al., 2000). Huang et al. 
(2005) show, however, that Bt rice requires 80% less pesticide 
than conventional rice and reduces labor input (Rozelle et al., 
2005). The simultaneous increase in production and reduction 
of input both contribute to the absolute increase of the total 
factor productivity of Bt rice, which is about 15% higher than 
conventional rice (Rozelle et al., 2005).
The adoption of Bt rice can also improve farmers’ health 
due to lower exposure to pesticides (Huang et al., 2015). Bt 
rice is also compatible with biological control and soil health 
management, although it should be noted that, to the best of 
the authors’ knowledge, no study examines its environmental 
effects at a larger scale or for a longer period (Cohen 
et al., 2008).
The cultivation of Bt rice in China requires special approval 
(Jin et al., 2019). The biosafety regulation system in China 
consists of three phases: field trials, environmental release trials, 
and preproduction trials. Before applying for field trials, Chinese 
scientists had spent 20 years investigating the thermal stability, 
digestibility, toxicity, and nutrient composition of Bt rice as well 
as the allergenicity of the Cry proteins it produces (Li et al., 
2015). During various phases of the biosafety procedures, no 
food safety concern was raised. Bt rice is also found to be safe for 
aquatic ecosystems (e.g., Li et al., 2014) and has not shown any 
detrimental effects on non-target insect pests (Niu et al., 2017). 
It is expected to pose negligible risks to the non-target functional 
guilds in future large-scale Bt rice agroecosystems in China 
(Dang et al., 2017).
On October 22, 2009, China’s Ministry of Agriculture 
(MoA)1 issued biosafety certificates for two Bt rice lines 
(Cry1Ab/Ac Huahui No. 1 and Cry1Ab/Ac Bt Shanyou 63) 
(Chen et al., 2011). The issuance of the certificates indicates 
that the two lines are considered as safe as conventional rice, 
both to humans and the environment, and thus to be ready for 
commercialization. However, their official commercialization 
has been continuously postponed and is still pending. The 
biosafety certificates expired in 2014 but were renewed until 
the end of 2019.
The postponement of Bt rice commercialization is largely due 
to low public acceptance, like other genetically modified (GM) 
crops (e.g., Chen et al., 2014). Most Chinese business managers 
oppose food derived from GM crops because they fear lower 
profits (Deng et al., 2017). Although almost half of consumers 
know little about GM food, they believe it has adverse effects 
on human health and the environment (Qu et al., 2011). In 
addition, Chinese scientists do not show higher acceptance of 
GM food than non-scientists (Huang et al., 2017). Therefore, 
1The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) transformed into the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs (MARA) in early 2018. The main difference after 
the transformation is the integration of sections of agricultural investment and 
management from different ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Land and Resources, into MARA. More details (in Chinese) are 
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/18/content_2050371.
htm. The role of MARA in regulating genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has 
not changed significantly in comparison to the role of MoA.
the government is hesitant to let China step forward as the first 
country to commercialize Bt rice.
More recently, however, the Chinese government has taken 
actions in policy support of the GM rice. In 2016, the “13th Five-
Year Plan for Science and Technology Innovation” set an aim 
to push forward the commercialization of new domestic types 
of GM crops by 2020 (MoA, 2016).2 In the same year, the MoA 
revealed a roadmap for commercialization of transgenic crops, 
starting with cash crops “not for food use” (e.g., cotton) followed 
by crops for feed and industrial use (e.g., maize and soybeans), 
then non-staple food crops (e.g., sugar beets), and finally staple 
food crops (e.g., rice) [MoA, 2016; US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), 2016].
Xie et al., 2017 estimate that each 1-year postponement of 
commercializing insect-resistant GM maize in China leads to the 
opportunity costs in the range of 4–14 billion US dollars for the 
overall economy. Moreover, postponement of commercializing 
Bt rice has high opportunity costs because of its foregone 
potential economic and environmental benefits. In this respect, it 
is important to consider the foregone benefits of lower pesticide 
use associated with Bt rice as well as its technology spill-overs on 
the international rice price. These effects have been neglected so 
far in the relevant literature, and no economic analysis of the cost 
of postponement (CoP) of Bt rice commercialization in China 
is available. Our paper aims to bridge this gap in the literature.
To achieve our objective, we combine the Economic Surplus 
Model (ESM) with the Pesticide Environmental Accounting 
(PEA) Tool. The ESM has been widely used to assess the benefits 
and costs of technical changes in agriculture (Alston et al., 1998). 
A sample of previous uses of the ESM includes Wesseler et al. 
(2017), who estimated the foregone benefits of delayed approval 
of staple crops (bananas, cow peas, and maize) in Africa; Bayer 
et al. (2010), who quantified the regulatory costs of Bt rice, Bt 
eggplants, ringspot-virus-resistant papayas, and virus-resistant 
tomatoes in the Philippines; and Krishna and Qaim (2007), 
who investigated the welfare and distributional effects of the 
introduction of the Bt technology among eggplant farmers and 
consumers in India.
We estimate the external costs of individual chemicals in rice 
production using the PEA, which is considered an appropriate 
tool for estimating the benefits of technologies replacing pesticides 
(Leach and Mumford, 2008; Prannetvatakul et al., 2013).
We provide essential information for different groups of 
stakeholders, including domestic and foreign policymakers 
determining the commercialization of GM crops in general, 
particularly Bt rice, and for businesses interested in investing in 
new biotechnology.
MODEL FOR ASSESSMENT OF  
THE POLICY
The ESM (Alston et al., 1998) is a tool for ex-ante assessment of 
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to calculate the welfare change between the counterfactual state 
of affairs had China commercialized Bt rice and the actual state 
of affairs due to the postponement of its commercialization. We 
model China as a large, open economy in rice trade. We set 2009 
as the base year, since that is the year when Bt rice first received 
its biosafety certificate (MoA, 2009). Since then, Bt rice has been 
officially ready for commercialization.
The most important policy in China’s price intervention 
program is the minimum supporting price. Since 2004, the 
minimum supporting price has been implemented for rice 
to maintain national food security and increase farmers’ 
incomes.3 Because of the increased total supply of rice, the 
Chinese government has to continuously buy rice from farmers 
to prevent the price from falling, even when massive stores of 
it already exist (Huang and Yang, 2017). Figure 1 compares the 
minimum supporting price and domestic market price between 
2009 and 2018.
Apart from the price intervention program, the Chinese 
government also implements a direct subsidy program for rice 
(and other grains). However, because the impact of agricultural 
subsidies on grain production has been shown to be negligible 
(Huang et al., 2011), we do not include this direct subsidy in 
the ESM.
We divide the 10-year period in Figure 1 into two parts. Part 1 
consists of the periods when the minimum price was lower than 
the domestic price (2009 to 2012 and 2017 to 2018), in which 
case the minimum price did not take effect. Part 2 consists of 
the period when the minimum price exceeded the domestic price 
(2013 to 2016).
3For wheat in 2006 and maize in 2008.
We assume that the rest of the world (ROW) agrees to trade 
in Bt rice but that it does not locally cultivate it.4 The technology 
spill-over arises when the ROW follows China’s adoption of Bt 
rice by also locally cultivating it. When the ROW cultivates Bt 
rice, the ROW supply curve shifts to the right, although typically 
not as much as the domestic Chinese supply does (Alston et al., 
1998). The technology spill-over has an effect in China and the 
ROW by decreasing the world price. A lower world price benefits 
consumers in both China and the ROW, but producers in China 
lose due to the spill-over.
For the ESM to include the external costs of pesticide use that 
were introduced above, we assume there are no further research 
costs after 2009, since that was when the biosafety certificates 
of Bt rice were issued. Based on this assumption, the potential 
annual net benefits are the sum of foregone economic5 and 
environmental benefits. This means that the potential annual net 
benefits (ABt) after commercialization are equal to the sum of 
the change of annual welfare (∆TSt) and annual external costs of 
pesticides (TECpt):
4Recent developments support this assumption. For example, in January 2018, Bt 
rice was approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA, 2018) and 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This approval means that Bt rice can 
be consumed and imported to the United States but cannot be cultivated there.
5In the model, we use the annual total production of rice in the rice seasons (single 
or double-cropping rice) that have been taken into consideration. Therefore, 
different rice seasons in different regions in China will not influence the results. 
An important limitation of Bt rice is that it is developed to control lepidopteran 
pests but no other rice pests, such as plant hoppers. Herbicide is still needed for Bt 
rice to control weeds. Field trials of Bt rice revealed that pesticide is still needed 
(for non-lepidopteran pests) but that its amount could decrease significantly due 
to the resistance of Bt rice to lepidopteran pests.
FIGURE 1| Minimum supporting price and domestic market price (2009-2018).
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 AB TS TECt t pt= +∆ ,  
where t denotes the year (t = 0 corresponds to 2009).
We calculate the net present value of the potential annual 






















where μ denotes the discount rate of an infinite stream of annual 
benefits. The CoP is then given by the difference between NPV2009 
and NPV2019.
DATA SOURCES
The data come from both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary data are from the preproduction trial of Bt rice in China 
(R. Hu, private communication, 2017) and include the maximum 
adoption rate, yield, and input costs (Appendix 1). For the ESM, 
we calculate proportionate yield change and proportionate input 
cost change (per hectare) based on pesticide cost, labor cost, seed 
cost, fertilizer cost, and other costs. Because it takes time for 
farmers to adopt a new technology, we employ a logistic adoption 
function with a 55% ceiling.
All the secondary data come from official statistics and 
the literature (Table 1). The rice supply elasticity and the 
rice demand elasticity for China are based on Zhuang and 
Abbott (2007). The rice supply elasticity and rice demand 
elasticity for the ROW are based on Mohanty et al. (2017). The 
domestic price is from ChinaGrain (2018), and the minimum 
supporting price is from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs (MARA). Because we do not have data on rice stocks, 
we assume that, in both China and the ROW, the annual 
consumption and production of rice are equal after adjusting 
for trade. The data on domestic production are available for 
the period from 2009 to 2016 from the official website of the 
NBSC. The rice production quantity for the ROW is available 
for the period from 2009 to 2016 from the Rice Yearbook of 
the USDA. For the remaining 3 years for which data are not 
yet available, we assume the quantities are the same as in 2016 
(the same holds for prices after 2018).
Based on the data above, we calibrate the intercepts and slopes 
of supply curves and demand curves in China and the ROW. We 
use the calibrated parameters to simulate the new equilibrium price 
after commercializing Bt rice as well as new equilibrium quantities 
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Since the biosafety certificates of Bt rice were already issued in 
2009, we set the probability of success to 1, meaning that the new 
technology has already been successful in reality. For the same 
reason, we assume there are no further research costs after 2009. 
As for the discount rate, in our analysis, we apply both 3% and 
5% rates to see the implications for the stream of benefits and 
costs from 2009 to 2019 (Bayer et al., 2010).
Tabashnik (2015) notes that some of the environmental, 
health, and economic benefits of Bt crops fade over time due 
to the evolution of pest resistance. We take this effect into 
account by considering a technology depreciation factor. For 
lack of data, we adopt the depreciation factor for Bt eggplant 
(Bayer, 2007). The factor equals one in the first 4 years. 
Starting in the fifth year, it decreases by five percentage points 
annually until it reaches 65%; from then, it remains constant 
at that level.
To calculate the external costs of pesticide use, we choose 
the three most commonly used rice pesticides in China (China 
Agrochemical Industry Network, 2012): Imidacloprid, Cartap 
hydrochloride, and Chlorantraniliprole. The percentage of 
the active ingredient of a certain pesticide and its application 
rates come from the product instructions. The base value of 
the external cost is calculated by Leach and Mumford (2008), 
and we use the US Inflation Calculator6 to convert it to 2009 
US dollars. We use the Environmental Impact Quotient (EIQ) 
calculator7 to get the EIQ values for the three pesticides. 
We compare these values with the reference values for each 
category (Leach and Mumford, 2008) and determine whether 
a pesticide has a low, medium, or high level of toxicity. Based 
on the data from the World Bank (2018) and the NBSC (2009), 
we compare the ratio of China’s share of employment in 
agriculture to the average share of agricultural employment in 
Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US (weighted 
by gross domestic product [GDP]). We also compare the ratio 
of China’s GDP per capita to the weighted average GDP per 
capita in Germany, the UK, and the US. Appendix 2 contains 
the details of the calculations.
RESULTS
Base Model
Using the PEA tool, we estimate the annual external costs 
of the uses of Chlorantraniliprole, Imidacloprid, and Cartap 
hydrochloride in China to be 1.8 million US dollars (0.06 
dollars per hectare of agricultural land). (We calculated this 
amount using the equation and data presented in Appendix 2.) 
Considering that China banned a series of pesticides with a high 
level of toxicity in 2002,8 the current pesticides used for rice are 
relatively environmentally friendly, which is also reflected in the 




Considering China as a large, open economy, the CoP of 
commercializing Bt rice from 2009 to 2019 is 104 billion US 
dollars under the 3% discount rate and 94 billion US dollars 
under 5% discount rate. We use the capital recovery factor 
(CRF) to calculate the annual CoP, which considers the time 
value of money and converts the CoP into a stream of equal 
payments from 2009 to 2019 at both the 3% and 5% discount 
rates. Under both discount rates, China loses approximately the 
same amount (12 billion US dollars) annually from 2009 to 2019 
(Table 2).
Effect of the Technology Spill-Over
Different levels of technology spill-over in the ROW have 
implications for economic impacts on China (Table 3). We 
assume that the ROW’s proportionate reduction in price due to 
the spill-over changes by 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% compared 
to the base proportionate reduction in price. Figure 2 shows 
the results.
With the increase in technology spill-over, the world rice 
price decreases. The lower world price benefits consumers in 
both China and the ROW. During the 10 years under study, 
China was a net importer in all years except for 2009 and 2010. 
Figure 2 shows the effects of technology spill-over during this 
10-year period. The total and annual CoP both increase when 
the level of technology spill-over increases. The percentage 
change in CoP is small, however. For example, at both 3% and 
5% discount rates, the annual CoP increases by around 350 
million US dollars when the technology spill-over rises from 
0% to 100%: The relative change from the initial value is less 
than 3%.
Effects of the Maximum Adoption Rate 
and the Rate of Diffusion










1 t  
where ρmax denotes the maximum adoption rate, α represents 
a constant of integration, and the parameter β represents the 
rate of diffusion, which measures the rate at which adoption At 
increases with time t (Alston et al., 1998).
For the maximum adoption rate, no data are available, 
since Bt rice has not been approved for cultivation yet. 
The maximum adoption rate we use in the baseline is 55%, 
TABLE 2 | Results of base model simulation (billion US dollars).
Discount 
rate (r)




3% 372 360 104 0.117 12.22
5% 224 212 94 0.130 12.15
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TABLE 3 | Sensitivity analysis of technology spillover.
 unit 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
0% spillover             
Rice price US dollar/ton 280.10 323.17 366.15 416.11 419.80 440.29 438.95 406.40 415.46 397.36 397.82
CN rice consumption million tons 194.82 196.39 202.68 207.99 207.05 207.00 212.94 211.62 211.41 211.33 211.24
CN rice production million tons 195.98 201.03 210.92 214.30 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 214.74 214.23 213.72
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.60 675.14 702.39 700.34 715.61 715.70 704.89 717.41 716.83 716.60 716.36
ROW rice production million tons 655.44 670.50 694.15 694.03 708.84 709.19 699.89 713.03 713.50 713.69 713.88
25% spillover             
Rice price US dollar/ton 279.95 322.17 364.08 413.73 417.41 437.86 436.55 404.39 413.69 395.78 396.35
CN rice consumption million tons 194.85 196.60 203.08 208.39 207.46 207.40 213.34 211.97 211.72 211.61 211.51
CN rice production million tons 195.95 200.86 210.62 213.99 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 214.50 214.01 213.51
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.70 675.74 703.51 701.48 716.76 716.81 705.98 718.42 717.70 717.41 717.11
ROW rice production million tons 655.36 670.01 693.24 693.11 707.90 708.28 699.00 712.21 712.79 713.03 713.27
50% spillover             
Rice price US dollar/ton 279.81 321.16 362.01 411.34 415.01 435.42 434.15 402.38 411.92 394.20 394.88
CN rice consumption million tons 194.89 196.81 203.47 208.80 207.86 207.79 213.74 212.33 212.03 211.90 211.78
CN rice production million tons 195.92 200.70 210.32 213.68 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 214.27 213.79 213.31
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.80 676.34 704.64 702.61 717.91 717.93 707.07 719.42 718.57 718.22 717.87
ROW rice production million tons 655.28 669.52 692.33 692.18 706.97 707.37 698.11 711.39 712.09 712.37 712.66
75% spillover             
Rice price US dollar/ton 279.66 320.16 359.94 408.96 412.62 432.99 431.75 400.37 410.16 392.63 393.42
CN rice consumption million tons 194.93 197.02 203.86 209.21 208.26 208.18 214.13 212.69 212.34 212.19 212.05
CN rice production million tons 195.89 200.53 210.01 213.37 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 214.03 213.57 213.10
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.90 676.94 705.76 703.74 719.06 719.05 708.16 720.43 719.43 719.03 718.62
ROW rice production million tons 655.20 669.04 691.42 691.26 706.03 706.46 697.22 710.57 711.38 711.71 712.04
100% spillover             
Rice price US dollar/ton 279.51 319.15 357.87 406.58 410.22 430.55 429.35 398.36 408.39 391.05 391.95
CN rice consumption million tons 194.96 197.23 204.25 209.61 208.67 208.57 214.53 213.05 212.65 212.48 212.32
CN rice production million tons 195.86 200.37 209.71 213.06 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 213.79 213.35 212.90
ROW rice consumption million tons 657.00 677.55 706.88 704.87 720.22 720.17 709.25 721.44 720.30 719.84 719.38
ROW rice production million tons 655.11 668.55 690.51 690.34 705.09 705.55 696.34 709.75 710.67 711.05 711.43
2019* means that we use the value of the latest year to estimate the value in 2019.
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which corresponds to a preproduction trial (R. Hu, private 
communication, 2017). We assume the adoption rate for the 
first year is 5% (A1 = 0.05). Since it took 3 years for the adoption 
rate to reach 55% in the preproduction trial in the period 
from 2002 to 2004, we set A3 = 0.54 under the assumption 
that the adoption rate almost reached its maximum. Based on 
these assumptions, the calibrated parameters are α = −5.45 
and β = 3.15. In further sensitivity analyses (Figure 3 and 
Table 4), we set the maximum adoption rate to 0.45, 0.55, 
0.65, 0.75, 0.85, and 0.95 (and recalibrate the parameters α 
and β accordingly).
In another set of sensitivity analyses (Figure 4 and Table 5), 
we examine the effect of the rate of diffusion (β) on CoP (holding 
ρmax and α at their baseline levels) because the speed of adopting 
new technology is important when the cultivation area is large. 
We vary the parameter β between 1 and 6.
Both figures confirm that the economic benefits are larger 
the more farmers adopt Bt rice and the faster they adopt it. For 
example, when the maximum adoption rate increases by 10% 
(from 55% to 65%), the annual CoP increases by around 1.5 
billion dollars. When the rate of diffusion gets larger, the speed 
of the increase in both CoP and annual CoP gets smaller. At both 
FIGURE 2 | Cost of postponement and technology spillover.
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TABLE 4 | Sensitivity analysis of maximum adoption rate.
 unit 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
45% maximum adoption rate             
α unit free -5.01 -5.01 -5.01 -5.01 -5.01 -5.01 -5.01 -5.01 -5.01 -5.01 -5.01
β unit free 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93
Adoption rate unit free 0.05 0.32 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Rice price US dollar/ton 280.10 322.96 367.85 417.89 421.59 442.10 440.73 407.89 416.76 398.52 398.90
CN rice consumption million tons 194.82 196.43 202.36 207.68 206.75 206.71 212.65 211.35 211.18 211.11 211.04
CN rice production million tons 195.98 201.30 208.94 212.46 211.96 211.71 216.17 214.37 213.35 212.93 212.51
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.60 675.27 701.47 699.50 714.75 714.86 704.07 716.66 716.19 716.00 715.80
ROW rice production million tons 655.44 670.40 694.90 694.72 709.54 709.87 700.55 713.64 714.02 714.18 714.34
55% maximum adoption rate             
α unit free -5.45 -5.45 -5.45 -5.45 -5.45 -5.45 -5.45 -5.45 -5.45 -5.45 -5.45
β unit free 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15
Adoption rate unit free 0.05 0.38 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
Rice price US dollar/ton 280.10 322.03 366.30 416.12 419.80 440.29 438.95 406.40 415.46 397.36 397.82
CN rice consumption million tons 194.82 196.63 202.66 207.99 207.05 207.00 212.94 211.62 211.41 211.33 211.24
CN rice production million tons 195.98 202.51 210.74 214.30 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 214.74 214.23 213.72
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.60 675.83 702.31 700.34 715.61 715.70 704.89 717.41 716.83 716.60 716.36
ROW rice production million tons 655.44 669.94 694.22 694.03 708.84 709.19 699.89 713.03 713.50 713.69 713.88
65% maximum adoption rate             
α unit free -4.58 -4.58 -4.58 -4.58 -4.58 -4.58 -4.58 -4.58 -4.58 -4.58 -4.58
β unit free 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09
Adoption rate unit free 0.05 0.26 0.55 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Rice price US dollar/ton 280.10 323.68 366.15 414.59 418.05 438.48 437.17 404.91 414.15 396.19 396.73
CN rice consumption million tons 194.82 196.28 202.68 208.25 207.35 207.29 213.24 211.88 211.64 211.54 211.44
CN rice production million tons 195.98 200.37 210.92 215.87 215.64 215.31 219.71 217.62 216.13 215.53 214.93
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.60 674.84 702.39 701.07 716.45 716.53 705.70 718.16 717.47 717.19 716.92
ROW rice production million tons 655.44 670.75 694.15 693.44 708.15 708.51 699.23 712.42 712.98 713.20 713.43
75% maximum adoption rate             
α unit free -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46
β unit free 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83
Adoption rate unit free 0.05 0.23 0.55 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Rice price US dollar/ton 280.10 324.12 366.15 413.30 416.36 436.69 435.38 403.42 412.84 395.03 395.65
CN rice consumption million tons 194.82 196.19 202.68 208.47 207.63 207.58 213.53 212.15 211.87 211.75 211.64
CN rice production million tons 195.98 199.80 210.92 217.21 217.40 217.09 221.47 219.24 217.53 216.83 216.13
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.60 674.57 702.39 701.68 717.26 717.35 706.50 718.90 718.11 717.79 717.47
ROW rice production million tons 655.44 670.96 694.15 692.94 707.49 707.84 698.57 711.81 712.45 712.72 712.98
85% maximum adoption rate             
α unit free -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46 -4.46
β unit free 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69
Adoption rate unit free 0.05 0.21 0.55 0.77 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Rice price US dollar/ton 280.10 324.33 366.15 412.17 414.73 434.91 433.61 401.93 411.54 393.86 394.57
CN rice consumption million tons 194.82 196.14 202.68 208.66 207.91 207.87 213.83 212.41 212.10 211.97 211.84
CN rice production million tons 195.98 199.53 210.92 218.37 219.10 218.86 223.23 220.86 218.92 218.13 217.34
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.60 674.45 702.39 702.22 718.05 718.17 707.31 719.65 718.76 718.39 718.03
ROW rice production million tons 655.44 671.06 694.15 692.50 706.86 707.18 697.91 711.20 711.93 712.23 712.52
(Continued)
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3% and 5% discount rates, the annual COP doubles when the rate 
of diffusion changes from 1 to 6.
Actionable Recommendations
The results show that the continuous postponement of Bt rice 
introduction in China has come at a substantial economic cost 
that includes not only the direct economic losses of efficiency at 
higher prices of rice for consumers but also human health and 
environmental costs.
These costs have to be weighed against consumer concerns 
about Bt rice. Consumers, including those in China, tend to 
ignore the environmental benefits of crop production in their 
purchasing behavior. The introduction of Bt rice in combination 
with information about its environmental benefits, such as 
lower pesticide use and reduced greenhouse gas emission 
(Wesseler et al., 2011), may overcome some of the potential 
consumer resistance. Further, linking the introduction of 
Bt rice with a labelling policy might also increase consumer 
acceptance, as reported, for example, in the US (Kolodinsky 
and Lusk, 2018).
Our study suggests two main actionable policy 
recommendations. First, as further delays in the approval for Bt 
rice cultivation results in substantial costs, it should immediately 
be approved for cultivation. Second, for addressing potential 
consumer concerns, its introduction should be accompanied by a 
mandatory labelling of consumer products derived from Bt rice.
An additional policy recommendation is to link the approval 
of Bt rice cultivation with an information campaign about its 
environmental benefits. Further, Bt rice is just one example 
among several new crops developed using advances in plant 
breeding. The results presented for Bt rice carry over to many 
other crops, including Vitamin A-enriched rice (Wesseler 
and Zilberman, 2014), insect-resistant vegetables, such as 
eggplants and tomatoes (Groeneveld et al., 2011), and GMOs 
in general (Barrows et al., 2014). Studies show that delaying 
approval for the cultivation of these crops comes at substantial 
economic costs (see, for example, Zilberman et al., 2018). They 
not only directly benefit both farmers and consumers but also 
substantially benefit the environment, including, in some cases, 
substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (Smyth et 
al., 2011). Policymakers in China should take these implications 
more explicitly into consideration when determining the 
approval of Bt rice and other crops developed using advanced 
plant-breeding technologies.
DISCUSSION
So far, no study has reported any adverse side effects of 
consuming food products derived from GM crops anywhere 
in the world (Paarlberg, 2009). Many scientific studies, to 
the contrary, present evidence that GM crops can be safely 
used in food and feed and are nutritionally equivalent to 
their non-GM counterparts (Snell et al., 2012; Bawa and 
Anilakumar, 2013). This also holds for the case of Bt rice (Li 
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TABLE 5 | Sensitivity analysis of rate of diffusion.
 unit 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019*
β=1             
Rice price US dollar/ton 397.84 327.02 373.95 424.00 425.79 443.93 440.66 407.00 415.66 397.43 397.84
CN rice consumption million tons 211.24 195.58 201.21 206.64 206.05 206.42 212.66 211.51 211.37 211.31 211.24
CN rice production million tons 213.69 196.06 201.79 206.15 207.59 209.89 216.24 215.35 214.53 214.15 213.69
ROW rice consumption million tons 716.35 672.84 698.16 696.59 712.72 714.02 704.11 717.11 716.73 716.56 716.35
ROW rice production million tons 713.89 672.36 697.58 697.08 711.18 710.55 700.52 713.27 713.58 713.72 713.89
β=2             
Rice price US dollar/ton 280.49 325.83 369.25 416.81 419.91 440.31 438.95 406.40 415.46 397.36 397.82
CN rice consumption million tons 194.72 195.83 202.10 207.87 207.04 207.00 212.94 211.62 211.41 211.33 211.24
CN rice production million tons 195.40 197.60 207.30 213.58 213.71 213.50 217.94 215.99 214.74 214.23 213.72
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.33 673.55 700.71 700.01 715.56 715.69 704.88 717.41 716.83 716.60 716.36
ROW rice production million tons 655.66 671.78 695.51 694.30 708.88 709.19 699.89 713.03 713.50 713.69 713.88
β=3             
Rice price US dollar/ton 280.18 322.51 366.39 416.12 419.80 440.29 438.95 406.40 415.46 397.36 397.82
CN rice consumption million tons 194.80 196.53 202.64 207.99 207.05 207.00 212.94 211.62 211.41 211.33 211.24
CN rice production million tons 195.87 201.89 210.65 214.29 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 214.74 214.23 213.72
ROW rice consumption million tons 656.55 675.54 702.26 700.34 715.60 715.70 704.89 717.41 716.83 716.60 716.36
ROW rice production million tons 655.48 670.18 694.26 694.03 708.84 709.19 699.89 713.03 713.50 713.69 713.88
β=4             
Rice price US dollar/ton 279.46 320.32 366.16 416.11 419.80 440.29 438.95 406.40 415.46 397.36 397.82
CN rice consumption million tons 194.98 196.99 202.68 207.99 207.05 207.00 212.94 211.62 211.41 211.33 211.24
CN rice production million tons 196.93 204.72 210.91 214.30 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 214.74 214.23 213.72
ROW rice consumption million tons 657.04 676.85 702.39 700.34 715.61 715.70 704.89 717.41 716.83 716.60 716.36
ROW rice production million tons 655.08 669.11 694.16 694.03 708.84 709.19 699.89 713.03 713.50 713.69 713.88
β=5             
Rice price US dollar/ton 278.16 319.86 366.15 416.11 419.80 440.29 438.95 406.40 415.46 397.36 397.82
CN rice consumption million tons 195.29 197.08 202.68 207.99 207.05 207.00 212.94 211.62 211.41 211.33 211.24
CN rice production million tons 198.85 205.32 210.92 214.30 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 214.74 214.23 213.72
ROW rice consumption million tons 657.92 677.12 702.39 700.34 715.61 715.70 704.89 717.41 716.83 716.60 716.36
ROW rice production million tons 654.37 668.89 694.15 694.03 708.84 709.19 699.89 713.03 713.50 713.69 713.88
β=6             
Rice price US dollar/ton 276.57 319.79 366.15 416.11 419.80 440.29 438.95 406.40 415.46 397.36 397.82
CN rice consumption million tons 195.68 197.10 202.68 207.99 207.05 207.00 212.94 211.62 211.41 211.33 211.24
CN rice production million tons 201.20 205.40 210.92 214.30 213.82 213.51 217.94 216.00 214.74 214.23 213.72
ROW rice consumption million tons 659.00 677.16 702.39 700.34 715.61 715.70 704.89 717.41 716.83 716.60 716.36
ROW rice production million tons 653.49 668.86 694.15 694.03 708.84 709.19 699.89 713.03 713.50 713.69 713.88
2019* Means that we use the value of the latest year to estimate the value in 2019.
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As a major producer, consumer, and trader of rice, China 
issued biosafety certificates for Bt rice in October 2009, which 
were renewed in December 2014, until the end of 2019; however, 
the commercialization of Bt rice in China has been continuously 
postponed and is still pending. We estimate the forgone benefits 
due to this postponement to be around 12 billion US dollars per 
year in the studied period (2009 to 2019).
This postponement is largely due to the low level of understanding 
and acceptance of GM crops in China (Li et  al., 2016). Other 
challenges in commercializing Bt rice include resolving trade 
policy impediments and developing insect resistance management 
strategies (High et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2016). In January 2018, the 
US Food and Drug Administration and the US Environmental 
Protection Agency declared that Bt rice was not more dangerous 
than conventional rice and received legal clearance for import and 
consumption in the United States, indicating that Bt rice is likely to 
be approved in other countries in the future.
An important limitation of Bt rice is that it was developed 
to control lepidopteran pests but no other rice pests. Also, 
some lepidopteran pests are likely to increase their resistance 
to Bt rice after commercialization (Li et al., 2014); therefore, 
insect resistance management strategies are required before 
commercializing Bt rice. However, waiting for the identification of 
new genes to control non-lepidopteran pests or the development 
of new plant breeding technologies might result in sunk research 
and investment costs in Bt rice.
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FIGURE 4 | Cost of postponement and rate of diffusion.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 | Parametrization for the Economic Surplus Model.
Parameter Description Values and unit Source
E(Y) Proportionate yield change 0.045 (per hectare) Personal communication
E(C) Proportionate change in input cost −21.4% (per hectare) Personal communication
r Discount rate (ESM) discuss at 3% and 5% Bayer et al. (2010)
εa Domestic rice supply elasticity 0.273 Zhuang and Abbott (2007)
ηa Domestic rice demand elasticity −0.352 Zhuang and Abbott (2007)
εb ROW rice supply elasticity 0.236 Mohanty et al. (2017)
ηb ROW rice demand elasticity −0.291 Mohanty et al. (2017)









The depreciation factor of technology starts in the 5th year and drops by five percentage points annually until 65%. ESM, economic surplus model; ROW, the rest of the world.
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where ratep denotes the application rate of a pesticide p in 
kilograms of formulated product per hectare and activep denotes 
the percentage of active ingredient in the formulated product 
(Prannetvatakul et al., 2013).
The PEA uses the Environmental Impact Quotient (EIQ) 
calculator to adjust the base values of economic costs to 
differences between relative toxicities of pesticides. There 
are eight events within three large categories in the EIQ with 
472 active pesticide compounds in total: (i) farm workers,9 
(ii) consumers,10 and (iii) the environment.11 In the study, 
we aggregate eight events into three categories and convert 
EIQ values to external costs for the three categories with 
9The effects on applicators and pickers.
10The effects of pesticide residues on groundwater leaching and food consumption.
11The effects on aquatic life, bees, birds, and beneficial insects.
subscript c = 1, 2, or 3 representing the categories (i), (ii), or 
(iii), respectively. The PEA tool converts EIQ values for the 
three categories to external costs by multiplying the external 
cost base values with a factor Fc that has three levels: 0.5 if 
the pesticide has a relatively low toxicity level; 1.0 if it has a 
medium toxicity level; and 1.5 if it has a relatively high toxicity 
level. Leach and Mumford (2008) define the ranges of toxicity 
level for each category.
ECc is the base value of external costs calculated by Leach and 
Mumford (2008) converted to 2009 US dollars. The parameter 
Fagemp denotes the ratio of China’s share of employment in 
agriculture to the average share of agricultural employment in 
the Unites States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and Germany 
weighted by the gross domestic product (GDP). Fagemp takes 
into consideration that, in China, more people are engaged in 
agriculture than in the other three countries, thus having more 
direct contact with pesticides.
The parameter Fgdppc denotes the ratio of China’s GDP per 
capita to the average GDP per capita in the US, the UK, and 
Germany, weighted by the GDPs of those countries. Fgdppc 
considers that, due to lower labor costs in China, lower costs 
of monitoring and cleaning up lead to lower external costs 
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APPENDIX 2 | The Parametrization of the Pesticide Environmental Accounting (PEA) Tool. 
ratep activep EC1 EC2 EC3 F1 F2 F3 Fagemp  
(c = 1,2,3)
Fgdppc
Chlorantraniliprole 0.001 0.2 1.8 6.09 2.76 0.5 0.5 0.5 20.243 1 1 0.085
Imidacloprid 0.041 0.7 1.8 6.09 2.76 0.5 0.5 0.5 20.243 1 1 0.085
Cartap hydrochloride 0.003 0.98 1.8 6.09 2.76 0.5 0.5 0.5 20.243 1 1 0.085
Source Personal calculation 
based on data from www.
taobao.com
Cornell EIQ calculator: https://nysipm.cornell.
edu/eiq/calculator-field-use-eiq
Leach and Mumford (2008) Personal calculation based on data from World 
Bank (2018) and NBSC (2009)
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In this article, I discuss access and benefit-sharing (ABS) for plant genetic resources from 
an ethical perspective. This leads to the question of what types of justice actually play a role 
when more equity and fairness is demanded for plant genetic resources. Five dimensions of 
justice will be distinguished: classical distributive justice, which deals with a fair distribution of 
goods; commutative justice, which concerns a fair exchange of “give-and-receive”; justice 
as recognition, which relates to treating all involved parties with the same respect; reparative 
justice, which pertains to fair amendments for wrongful actions in the past; and procedural 
justice, which is concerned with just decision processes. Drawing on the discussion of 
ethical problems with biopiracy, the distribution of environmental burdens, and plant genetic 
resources in agriculture, I will illustrate that the use of genetic resources poses challenges 
across all five dimensions of justice. Because the combination of justice challenges is specific 
for each case of resource use, I will argue that it is important that users of genetic resources 
are aware of the complexity of justice problems to ensure fair and equitable ABS negotiations.
Keywords: access and benefit-sharing, commutative justice, Convention on Biological Diversity, distributive 
justice, environmental justice, genetic resources
“Justice” is a paramount ideal underlying the debates on how to regulate and use plant genetic resources. 
We discuss questions such as Who has rights to access and use these resources? How should benefits 
be shared? How should the use of genetic resources be regulated? Who should be involved in discussing 
these questions? All of these are questions concerning justice. They are asked and discussed with the 
aim of finding answers that take into account what is due to all those who have a stake in genetic 
resources. I have written this overview article from an understanding of justice in analytic philosophy.1 
Although there is wide agreement that justice is important, there may be different views on what it 
means to safeguard justice in the development of policy as well as in specific access and benefit sharing 
negotiations. One reason for such disagreement is that justice is a concept with different dimensions. I 
will distinguish between five such dimensions, which all play a role in dealing with genetic resources. 
The aim of this analysis is to contribute to the understanding of first, why the use of genetic resources 
generates so much attention and controversy, and second, what needs to be considered in regulating 
and handling them justly. By discussing these issues, I am addressing not only philosophers but also 
an interdisciplinary readership, hoping that the article provides an occasion for them to take a step 
back from the everyday occupation with genetic resources and to reflect on the ethical implications 
associated with their use. Ideally, this will contribute toward bringing more justice reflections into 
1 Even though justice in this sense requires considering other worldviews as part of doing justice to other communities, it 
cannot be denied that the approach itself is driven by a particular Western tradition of thought. It would be beyond the 
scope of this article to consider different cultural approaches to justice, but this work may serve as a starting point for a wider 
intercultural comparison. Moreover, I would like to clarify that this is not a work in legal theory, which interprets justice within 
a legal framework but rather in moral philosophy, reflecting on how the legal framework should be constructed in order to be 
able to respond and solve ethical challenges of justice. 
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the drafting or implementing of regulatory schemes. Moreover, 
these reflections may facilitate specific access and benefit-sharing 
(ABS) negotiations, which may be complicated by the fact that the 
different parties are prioritizing different dimensions of justice 
possibly without awareness of this source of disagreement.
After a brief introduction of the conception of justice underlying 
this article, each of the five dimensions of justice will be presented 
separately. For this purpose, I will start with a general introduction 
of the particularities of the respective justice dimension followed 
by a discussion of the role that it plays in the context of genetic 
resources. In doing so, I will draw on my own previous research 
and connect it to the philosophical work of other authors, for 
instance, Bram de Jonge and Doris Schroeder. Moreover, I will 
connect the literature on justice for genetic resources with parallel 
discourses on environmental justice or restorative justice. The 
presentation of the five dimensions of justice will be followed by 
the discussion of three practical justice challenges to illustrate 
how the justice dimensions meet: first, biopiracy; second, the 
distribution of environmental burdens; and third, plant genetic 
resources in agriculture. The article will close with two practical 
conclusions for a fair and equitable use of plant genetic resources.
FIVE DIMENSIONS OF JUSTICE IN 
DEALING WITH GENETIC RESOURCES
The three most influential international treaties that introduced 
ABS for genetic resources are the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD),2 the Nagoya Protocol (NP),3 and the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (ITPGRFA).4 These treaties have the explicit objective 
to ensure “fair and equitable sharing of benefits” from genetic 
resources. In spite of the prominence of the clause “fair and 
equitable,” for instance, in the full title of the Nagoya Protocol, 
and notwithstanding the long tradition that this clause has in 
investment treaties (Dolzer, 2005), its meaning remains undefined 
and vague (De Jonge, 2011; Vermeylen and Walker, 2011; 
Morgera, 2015). It is evident, however, that in one way or another 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing aims at introducing justice into 
the regulation and use of genetic resources. In that sense, Bram de 
Jonge discusses the question, What is fair and equitable benefit-
sharing? by analyzing different principles of justice (De Jonge, 
2011), and Morton Walloe Tvedt and Tomme Young also raise 
mainly justice topics in their analysis of the meaning of “fair and 
equitable” in ABS (Tvedt and Young, 2007: pp. 83–91).
For the purpose of this article, I assume that justice is a morally 
weighty demand, and I start from a very basic and general meaning 
of “justice” going back to the Roman law, where it was defined in 
the Institutes of Justinian as “the set and constant purpose which 
gives to every man his due” (Justinian, 1913: Book I, Title  I). 
2 The text of the Convention on Biological Diversity is available at: https://www.
cbd.int/convention/text/ (accessed May 2019).
3 The text of The Nagoya Protocol is available at: https://www.cbd.int/abs/ 
(accessed May 2019).
4 The text of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture is available at: http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/overview/texts-treaty/
en/ (accessed May 2019).
In a modern view, influenced by Enlightenment philosophy, 
this means that justice is based on the acknowledgment that 
all human beings have equal moral status and basic moral 
rights. I will distinguish between five different dimensions of 
justice: distributive justice, which deals with a fair distribution; 
commutative justice, which concerns a fair exchange of give-and-
receive; justice as recognition, which relates to treating all involved 
parties with the same respect; reparative justice, which pertains to 
fair amendments for wrongful actions in the past; and procedural 
justice, which is concerned with just decision processes (For an 
overview, see Table 1). Each of these justice dimensions takes 
up other aspects of what it means to give everybody their due. 
The aim of the following introduction of the five dimensions 
of justice is not to suggest what a just ABS system for genetic 
resources would look like. Instead, I attempt to contribute to a 
better understanding of the challenges at hand and the reasons 
why there is controversy surrounding how to solve them.5
Let me start now with the presentation of the five dimensions 
of justice, which refer to different aspects of what we owe to others.
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distributive justice is concerned with fair distribution of, for 
instance, material goods, such as natural resources. A large 
body of literature is dedicated to the question of who has rights 
to own, control, or benefit from natural resources (e.g., Nine, 
2012; Armstrong, 2017). Key questions in that discourse are 
to what extent nation states have exclusive rights to benefits 
from natural resources that are found on state territory, and 
whether or how all people around the globe should be able to 
benefit at least partially from those resources. Besides natural 
resources, the distribution of non-material goods, such as power 
or opportunities, has also received wide attention in political 
philosophy (Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 2000). Although distributive 
justice can be based on the idea that a just distribution provides 
an equal share of the distributed good to each party, there are also 
alternative views. John Rawls, for instance, famously suggested 
a “difference principle” which is based on a maximin criterion, 
meaning that unequal distribution of income or wealth can be 
just if this distribution still leads to advantages for the worst-off 
party compared with the available alternatives (Rawls, 1971).
In addition to the importance of a fair distribution of goods, 
more recently the demand for distributive justice has also 
5 The five dimensions of justice should be understood as heuristic groups, which 
serve the aim of facilitating the analysis of justice questions that arise. I am not 
aiming at developing a theory of justice, I do thus not rank the dimensions of justice; 
none of them is treated as having general priority over the other. Moreover, I do not 
take any position as to whether one justice dimension is generally primary to another 
one. Therefore, I do, for instance, not argue in favour of or against Axel Honneth’s 
position according to which unjust distribution is a result of misrecognition (Fraser 
and Honneth, 2003). I acknowledge, however, that the different dimensions of justice 
can overlap. An unjust situation can concern more than one justice dimension. In 
the context of environmental justice, Gordon Walker, for example, highlighted that 
different dimensions of justice are often closely linked, procedural injustice can be 
an explanation for distributive injustice (Walker, 2012: p.47); then again, unjust 
distribution of power and money or misrecognition of certain communities can be 
a cause for unjust procedures. 
54
Challenges of Justice in Plant Genetic ResourcesDeplazes-Zemp
3 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1266Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org
been expressed regarding global and local bads. Distributive 
justice in this sense is one central pillar of the concept 
of “environmental justice” that goes back to a grassroots 
movement in the 1990s in the United States. The movement 
pointed to the existing environmental injustice when 
environmental risks and burdens, such as waste dumpsites, 
toxic emissions or other contaminations, are unequally 
distributed. Some communities endure more environmental 
burdens than others, and often, it is previously disadvantaged, 
marginalized, or impoverished groups that, in addition to 
these social injustices, also suffer environmental injustice 
(Bullard, 1993; Schlossberg, 2007; Walker, 2012).
Distributive Justice for Genetic Resources
Distributive justice is one of the most widely discussed justice 
dimensions in the literature on genetic resources (e.g. De Jonge 
and Korthals, 2006; Korthals and De Jonge, 2009; Schroeder 
and Pogge, 2009; Schroeder and Pisupati, 2010; Vermeylen 
and Walker, 2011; Deplazes-Zemp, 2019). The term “genetic 
resources” suggests that they are a type of natural resource, a 
view also supported by the current regulatory framework in 
which genetic resources are placed under state sovereignty 
over natural resources. The understanding of genetic resources 
as a type of natural resource directly links this discussion 
to the literature on resource rights (Deplazes-Zemp, 2019). 
However, to treat genetic resources analogously to other natural 
resources may be problematic because genetic resources are a 
very particular type of natural resource. They can be described 
as atypical with respect to first, their non-tangible nature; 
second, the close connection between natural and cultural 
formation; as well as third, their connection to biodiversity and 
its vulnerability (Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b). These three features 
of genetic resources are relevant when it comes to distributive 
justice (Deplazes-Zemp, 2019), therefore, I will explain each of 
them in some more detail. It has been highlighted that genetic 
resources are non-tangible and that they carry information 
(Vogel, 1994; Millum, 2010; De Jonge, 2011; Tvedt and Schei, 
2013; Ruiz Muller, 2015; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b). I thus speak 
of the “informational” nature of these resources and suggest 
that this particular feature can best be illustrated by contrasting 
genetic resources with other biological resources such as timber 
or fish. While benefits from the latter are material and used 
as food or building material, it is the information in genetic 
resources that is of value among other things because it can lead 
to the generation of new material outside the provider country. 
According to such an interpretation of genetic resources it is thus 
the information that is exported from the country of origin and 
used and propagated, for instance in breeding processes or in 
biological or chemical procedures (Vogel, 1994; De Jonge, 2011; 
Ruiz Muller, 2015; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b).6 The informational 
nature implies that territorial claims of countries of origin are 
more difficult to legitimize for genetic resources than for material 
natural resources. While in the case of material resources a 
constant supply from the country of origin is required for their 
use, in the case of genetic resources, only a one-time extraction 
of a small material sample is needed. Therefore, the territorial 
connection of the latter type of resource is weaker.
Although the question of how to share material or financial 
benefits from genetic resources is central to the debate, the Annex 
of the NP also lists a variety of potential non-monetary benefits 
from genetic resources that could be shared and that could be 
understood as a distribution of opportunities. The list includes 
benefits such as research collaboration, admittance to databases, 
access to scientific information, capacity-building and training.7 
In addition, Bram de Jonge and Michiel Korthals suggest that 
“upstream benefit-sharing” should also be taken into account for 
distributive justice; by this, they mean opportunities and power 
to influence research and development agendas in the context 
of genetic resources (De Jonge and Korthals, 2006; Korthals 
and De Jonge, 2009). The authors suggest that this distributive 
aspect should be considered in decision making procedures for 
different uses of genetic resources, which directly relates to what 
I will discuss later in the sections on justice as recognition and 
procedural justice.
Finally, the third atypical feature of genetic resources is 
that they are related to biodiversity through the diversity of 
species that actually or potentially carry genetic resources. 
Biodiversity could also be the source of evolution of novel 
genetic resources in the future, and it is the condition 
for intact ecosystems in which current genetic resources 
prosper. This connection implies that genetic resources are 
vulnerable to decimation and extinction of biodiversity. In 
contrast to many other natural resources and because of their 
informational nature, genetic resources are not endangered 
by over-exploitation but by other environmentally destructive 
practices against which they must be actively protected. It can 
thus be argued that distributive justice for genetic resources 
concerns not only the distribution of benefits but also the 
6 Although many authors acknowledge the informational nature of genetic 
resources (e.g. Vogel, 1994; Millum, 2010; De Jonge, 2011; Tvedt and Schei, 2013; 
Ruiz Muller, 2015; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b), the definition of genetic resources in 
the CBD refers to „genetic material of actual or potential value“ and there is some 
controversy on how this should be interpreted (Tvedt and Schei, 2013).
7 Annex to the Nagoya Protocol (p. 24) available at: https://www.cbd.int/abs/ 
(accessed May 2019).
TABLE 1 | Comparing the different justice dimensions when justice in general 
means that everybody gets his or her due.
Justice dimension
Distributive justice To give everybody their due shares 
in benefits and costs. 
Commutative justice To give everybody the due 
compensation in exchange for a 
good or service that was provided.
Justice as recognition To give everybody their due respect.
Reparative justice To give due redress to those who 
suffered injustice and possibly 
due punishment to those who 
committed it. 
Procedural justice* To give everybody their due voice 
and participation in decision making 
processes. 
*Procedural justice is defined in the narrow sense used in the environmental justice 
discourse.
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costs for biodiversity protection. In other words, not only 
goods but also bads associated with genetic resources should 
be distributed fairly (Deplazes-Zemp, 2019).
COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE
Commutative justice is also called “justice in exchange” 
because it concerns a fair exchange of items or services 
with the goal of achieving equivalence between giving and 
receiving (Schroeder and Pogge, 2009; Schroeder and Pisupati, 
2010; De Jonge, 2011; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a). In situations 
where goods are not exchanged for other goods but where 
products or services are exchanged for money, this leads to 
the discussion of just prices or just compensation, and is thus 
an important principle in the economic context (Koslowski, 
2001). The “Fairtrade” label, for instance, symbolizes the 
aim of generating more commutative justice in economic 
exchange between farmers in low-income countries and 
companies in the industrialized world. One of the great 
challenges in this justice dimension is to determine under 
what conditions both sides contribute equivalents to the 
exchange if they are of a different nature. To deal with these 
substantial difficulties, commutative justice is sometimes also 
understood in a more procedural sense, according to which 
an exchange is considered just if both parties voluntarily 
consent to the transaction procedure employed (Schroeder 
and Pisupati, 2010). In this case, an overstated price could 
be considered to be just as long as the buying party pays it 
voluntarily. Such an interpretation of commutative justice 
overlaps with the dimension of procedural justice that this 
article addresses later.
Commutative Justice for Genetic 
Resources
An ABS system for genetic resources can be understood as a 
mechanism to deal with the demands of commutative justice. ABS 
regulates how benefits should be shared in exchange for access 
to genetic resources (Schroeder and Pogge, 2009; Schroeder 
and Pisupati, 2010; De Jonge, 2011; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a).8 
The existing focus on the commutative aspect in ABS has been 
criticized not only because it cannot account for the complexity 
of justice issues at stake but also because it introduces a clear 
separation between providers and users of genetic resources. 
Critics highlight that this does not reflect the real world, where 
genetic resources are also being used in so-called provider 
countries (particularly threshold countries) and where it is thus 
not possible to draw a clear line between the two categories 
(Korthals and De Jonge, 2009; Nijar et al., 2016). Moreover, it 
again seems to be the informational nature of genetic resources 
that complicates the application of commutative justice schemes, 
which have been developed for material goods. Although it 
may be relatively straightforward to determine the provider of a 
8 The “fair and equitable” clause could be read as another indication of a connection 
to commutative, since the term “equity” has been used to describe the aim of 
commutative justice (Adams, 1963; Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983).
material natural resource, such as a barrel of petrol, this is much 
more difficult in the case of genetic resources, which may have 
travelled a long distance in the form of a small material sample, 
an extract or even as a digital sequence before they are actually 
being used. This means that not only must resource access be 
controlled for actual users but any removal of minimal quantities 
of genetic resources, even for non-commercial purposes, must be 
monitored because they might be used as resources in the future 
(De Jonge, 2011). I suggested elsewhere that the informational 
nature of genetic resources is also responsible for another 
difficulty with ABS achieving commutative justice. We need to 
ask ourselves what it is that is actually being exchanged in ABS, 
who has claims on the exchanged goods, and how the claimant 
can be appropriately compensated (Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a). 
Does the provider state from the territory of which, for instance, 
a plant sample has been extracted, really have particular claims 
on this plant as a genetic resource? It is certainly true that the 
users of genetic resources gain from information in nature and 
it seems to be a legitimate request that they give something back 
in exchange for these free benefits. However, one may wonder 
whether provider states really are the appropriate recipients of 
such compensation or whether it should go, for example, directly 
to biodiversity protection projects, which preserved valuable 
genetic resources.9
Another interesting topic with regard to commutative 
justice is ABS for traditional knowledge associated with the 
use of genetic resources. If, for instance, a company uses the 
knowledge of an indigenous community about a particular 
health benefit of a plant, this knowledge is also subject to 
access and benefit-sharing negotiations. It can be argued 
that, from a commutative justice point of view, it makes a 
difference whether compensation is demanded in exchange 
for traditional knowledge or for providing access to a plant 
growing on state territory. Whereas in the latter case extensive 
claims on genetic resources might be difficult to legitimize, 
this is different for the case of traditional knowledge 
and likewise for domesticated plants. In these cases, the 
respective communities provide their intellectual good or the 
products of their work. This distinguishes their claims on this 
knowledge or plants from that of other communities. It can 
thus be reasoned that if communities provide such knowledge 
or breeding efforts, they have good reasons supported by 
commutative justice to demand compensation (Deplazes-
Zemp, 2018a).
9 The idea that those who use information in nature should pay compensation for 
the resulting benefits indicates that there is another justice aspect that could be 
considered in the context of plant genetic resources, namely ecological justice. 
Nicholas Low and Brendan Gleeson contrast ecological justice with environmental 
justice by explaining that the latter deals with “conflicts among humans over nature” 
whereas ecological justice deals with conflicts “between humans and nature” 
(Low and Gleeson, 1998: p. 49 emphasis in the original). Ecological justice is thus 
concerned with justice towards the non-human world (Schlossberg, 2007) which 
is beyond the scope of this article. Whereas on an ecological justice perspective, 
just compensation for information in nature would require giving something 
back to nature, I understand just compensation for natural information here as 
a compensation for those human communities who actively protect biodiversity.
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JUSTICE AS RECOGNITION
Justice as recognition is concerned with giving respect and 
recognition to every person.10 This means that each human being 
should be recognized for his or her equal moral status which at 
the same time implies that each person is respected for his or her 
individuality and differences to the norm (Taylor, 1992). Justice 
as recognition emphasizes that we owe recognition to others and 
that withholding recognition is a form of injustice. Feminists, 
racial movements, and multiculturalism are examples of political 
struggles for recognition. The importance of recognition has been 
supported by different philosophical arguments. For instance, 
Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor emphasize that recognition 
is a basic human need required for identity formation (Taylor, 
1992; Honneth, 1995; Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Nancy Fraser 
suggests that lack of recognition violates the moral principle of 
“participatory parity” and is, therefore, unjust (Fraser, 2000; 
Fraser, 2001; Fraser and Honneth, 2003).
Justice as recognition is, besides distributive justice, another 
focus in the discourse on environmental justice (Schlossberg, 
2007; Walker, 2012). As mentioned above, poor and minority 
communities often endure more environmental burdens such 
as waste dumpsites, toxic emissions, or other contaminations 
than privileged groups. In these cases unjust distribution usually 
occurs together with misrecognition of these groups who are 
being discriminated against and not given equal status in society. 
To achieve environmental justice, it is thus not enough to ensure 
fair distribution of risks and benefits; rather, it is also necessary 
to grant just recognition to members of different communities.
Justice as Recognition for Genetic 
Resources
Even though in the philosophical literature on genetic resources 
the term “recognition justice” rarely appears, this dimension of 
justice also plays an important role.11 The framing of ABS as a 
system that mediates between providers of genetic resources in 
the “Global South” and users in the “Global North” indicates that 
the addressed injustice has also to do with political, economic and 
cultural power relations at the global level. Although the division 
between users in the “North” and providers in the “South” is an 
oversimplification, it is often used in the literature to refer to an 
10 It might be objected that when I defined justice in general as meaning to 
“acknowledge that all human beings have equal moral status and basic moral 
rights” (see above) this already involves recognition, which thus is a precondition 
of all dimensions of justice. It is true that in order to be able to enter a justice 
relationship with someone and to identify injustices of any type I must recognise 
the other as having moral status and basic rights. However, there are cases of 
injustice, where none of the other justice dimensions have been violated but the 
injustice lies in a form of misrecognition, for instance cases where someone’s belief, 
culture or the like are not being respected. These cases where misrecognition per 
se is the injustice are discussed here under the heading of “justice as recognition.” 
The possibility that some form of basic misrecognition also underlies other types 
of injustice does not make it redundant to introduce a separate justice dimension 
of justice as recognition in order to account for the different types of injustice that 
can occur in practice. 
11 The following articles are exceptions in the sense that ABS is explicitly discussed 
in relation to environmental justice including recognition justice: (Vermeylen and 
Walker, 2011; Martin et al., 2013; Morgera, 2015; Martin et al., 2016).
unjust tendency. Industrialized countries often located in the 
“North” tend to profit from genetic resources, whereas biodiversity-
rich countries mostly in the “South” are expected to protect genetic 
resources as biodiversity. This situation is not only unjust from the 
point of view of distributive justice and commutative justice as 
discussed above but the North–South interactions in the context 
of genetic resources also concern justice as recognition. This 
justice dimension is violated when the “North” takes advantage of 
historical power relations associated with economic and political 
privileges. In such cases, users of genetic resources tend to decide 
when and how to access which genetic resources without respecting 
providers as equal partners nor considering their customs, 
culture, or values. This type of misrecognition not only occurs in 
North–South interactions but also within provider states, when 
governments do not respected cultures or rights of minority 
groups. To prevent such misrecognition at global and local level, 
CBD, NP, and ITPGRFA explicitly acknowledge rights and claims 
of indigenous and local communities. It has been argued that more 
attention should be paid to justice as recognition in the context of 
biodiversity conservation to consider cultural differences (Martin 
et al., 2016; Robinson and Forsyth, 2016). For instance, certain 
communities object to the idea of patenting life (Tauli-Corpuz, 2003; 
Robinson, 2010). To offer them a share in benefits associated with 
patents on genetic resources misrecognizes their values and world 
view. Bram De Jonge discusses these issues under the heading of 
“cognitive justice,” which he defines as concerning the “recognition 
of the plurality of knowledge systems” (De Jonge, 2011: p. 135). 
I decided to use the concept of “justice as recognition” rather than 
“cognitive justice” not only because of the former’s philosophical 
tradition and its use in the environmental justice literature but also 
because, in my view, to recognize the individuality of others goes 
beyond acknowledging the cognitive aspect of different world views. 
The notion of recognition justice emphasizes the importance of a 
respectful attitude by the more powerful. As mentioned above, 
a similar idea is found in the notion of upstream benefit-sharing, 
which Bram de Jonge and Michiel Korthals include in their broader 
conception of distributive justice (De Jonge and Korthals, 2006; 
Korthals and De Jonge, 2009).
REPARATIVE JUSTICE
I use the term “reparative justice” for the notion that redress is 
owed to those who suffered injustice in the past. In the literature, 
this dimension of justice is discussed under different related 
terms with sometimes overlapping and sometimes clearly distinct 
meanings (Daly and Proietti-Scifoni, 2011). Particularly in the legal 
context, the concept “retributive justice” is used for just punishment 
of those who committed injustice (Boersama, 2011; Daly and 
Proietti-Scifoni, 2011). This concept thus concentrates on the 
appropriate punishment of the offenders for the wrongs that they 
committed. In contrast, the term “corrective justice” usually refers 
to a conception of justice that focuses on the victims and on the just 
compensation that they should receive for suffered harms (Urban 
Walker, 2006). There are certain similarities between corrective 
justice and commutative justice. Both are linked to reciprocity, 
and both deal with just compensation. However, while the former 
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concerns simultaneous exchange procedures, the latter is backward-
looking and concerns compensation for something that happened 
in the past. “Restorative justice” is a third reparative justice concept 
besides “retributive justice” and “corrective justice.” Authors who 
use this concept highlights that righting injustice requires more 
than the remedy of harms: the important aim is to re-establish the 
relationship between victim and offender, usually in a relatively 
informal process, and to prevent that same type of injustice recurring 
in the future. Criminal trials are typically not seen as apt processes 
to establish restorative justice. Instead, reconciliation or mediation 
procedures are implemented in which offenders and victims meet, 
find the truth, and negotiate potential reparations (Johnstone and 
Van Ness, 2007; Marshall, 1999). Reparations in this sense are not 
necessarily material but can also consist of a formal apology (Urban 
Walker, 2006; Sharpe, 2007). A famous example of such a procedure 
was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was set up to 
address injustices committed during the apartheid era in South 
Africa. The importance that is given to establishing a relationship of 
mutual respect connects to “justice as recognition” described above. 
This illustrates once more how the different dimensions of justice 
overlap.
When I refer to “reparative justice,” I use it as an umbrella 
term to cover retributive justice, corrective justice, and 
restorative justice,12 with the idea that all of these aspects may 
play a role in righting injustice that took place in the past. In 
the environmental context, reparative justice, for instance, plays 
a role in climate justice, when it comes to the “polluter pays” 
principle (Caney, 2006; Caney, 2010). In Simon Caney’s words, 
this principle suggests that “those who caused a problem[ … ] 
should foot the bill” (Caney, 2006: p. 752). This can be understood 
as a demand for corrective justice, meaning that the polluters are 
responsible for repairing the damage that they caused. Maybe the 
“polluter pays” principle could also be interpreted as an example 
of retributive justice, particularly when one of the discussed 
objections to the principle is that the polluters were not aware 
of the effects of their actions and thus should not be the ones 
who pay (Caney, 2010). Based on that view, it would not be just 
to punish people for something that they caused unintentionally.
Reparative Justice for Genetic Resources
Reparative justice is not a predominant justice dimension 
behind the notion of ABS for genetic resources. Doris Schroeder 
and Balakrishna Pisupati suggest that while distributive and 
commutative justice are directly relevant for ABS, reparative 
justice only plays a role in cases of non-compliance with the 
protocol which would trigger punishment and repair measures 
(Schroeder and Pisupati, 2010). However, the reparative justice 
dimension may still be relevant to understand why and how ABS 
systems have been implemented. The aim and need to redress 
some of the historical wrongs that were perpetrated—generally 
speaking—by the “Global North” against the “South” could be 
12 Some conceptions of restorative justice seem not to be covered by my concept 
of “reparative justice”. For instance, what Johnstone and Van Ness call, the 
“encounter conception of restorative justice”, which emphasizes the importance 
of the encountering process rather than the aim of redressing those who suffered 
injustice (Johnstone and Van Ness, 2007).
an underlying political motivation for establishing ABS systems. 
During colonial times, citizens of many biodiversity-rich states in 
the “Global South” suffered exploitation, oppression, subordination 
and disrespect, which amounts to injustice at the distributive, 
commutative and recognition dimensions. It cannot be denied that 
today colonial-like power relations still persist when the “North” 
exerts its strong political, cultural, and economical influence on the 
“South” accompanied by the same type of justice violation known 
from colonial times. From such a perspective, acknowledging 
biodiversity-rich states’ sovereignty over genetic resources could 
be understood as an acknowledgment of past misconduct as well 
as a commitment to consider the interests of less affluent countries 
in the future. That ABS systems are related to historical injustice 
has also been described by Jorge Cabrera Medaglia when he wrote: 
“The roots of ABS can be traced to colonialism and efforts by 
colonial powers to gain control of the trade in key commodities 
such as rubber, tea, and cinchona for their own benefit, with little 
regard for the communities and economies from which these 
resources originated” (Medaglia, 2015: p. 196). Moreover, Elisa 
Morgera highlighted that reparative justice played a role in the 
negotiations of the NP, when the African group demanded that 
benefit sharing should be extended to genetic resources which are 
available in ex situ collections, i.e., ones that had been exported 
from the country of origin in the past (Morgera, 2015: pp. 11–12).
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The term “procedural justice” has been used in a wider and a 
narrower sense. According to the former, this dimension of 
justice is concerned with any type of procedure that leads to a 
just outcome judged by criteria of other (substantive) justice 
dimensions. The narrower sense of procedural justice plays 
an important role in environmental justice, where procedural 
justice is discussed as the third central justice dimension besides 
distributive justice and justice as recognition (Schlossberg, 
2007; Walker, 2012; Bell and Carrick, 2018). In this narrower 
sense, procedural justice concerns decision procedures and is 
achieved if the voice and interests of all involved parties are being 
considered. Because environmental justice was first the program 
of a social movement before it became a theoretical field of study, 
this procedural aspect has been particularly pivotal. One of the 
main aims of the movement was the empowerment of affected 
communities. Participatory approaches as a means for just 
procedures in decision making thus play an important role.
As for other justice dimensions different principles of justice have 
also been suggested for procedural justice. Derek Bell and Jayne 
Carrick distinguish three conceptions of procedural justice in the 
environmental justice discourse, which focus on three alternative 
principles (Bell and Carrick, 2018). The first principle is political 
equality according to which all affected parties should have an 
equal voice in the sense of equal power in environmental decision 
making (Bell and Carrick refer to: Shrader-Frechette, 2002). As 
an alternative, the principle of proportionality emphasizes that 
power in decision making should reflect the relative stake of the 
involved parties in the outcome of the decision (Bell and Carrick 
refer to: Bell and Rowe, 2012). The third conception of procedural 
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environmental justice introduced by Bell and Carrick is based 
on the principle of plurality. Advocates of this principle criticize 
procedural justice conceptions emphasizing equality because 
they suppress difference, but it is argued that just procedures 
should consider differences in perspectives or interests. This is 
the same argument that is invoked in the literature on justice as 
recognition. Although the three principles for just procedures are 
discussed as three alternative ideals in the theoretical discourse, 
in practical environmental decision making they are combined in 
participatory approaches (Bell and Carrick, 2018).
Procedural Justice for Genetic Resources
A focus on fair decision procedures is particularly relevant in 
the context of genetic resources because, as mentioned earlier, 
political and economic power between providers and users are 
often unequally distributed, which is a violation of recognition 
justice and/or distributive justice. Just decision procedures are 
thus not only an aim in themselves but also an approach to 
achieve more justice along other dimensions. The NP addresses 
some of these problems, for instance by highlighting rights of 
indigenous and local communities or by requesting scientific 
and technological collaboration (NP, Article 23). Moreover, one 
article of the NP is dedicated to capacity-building, it requires 
that all parties should cooperate in the endeavor of ensuring 
that also less affluent parties have the capacities to engage in 
the outlined ABS procedure (NP, article 22). Prior Informed 
Consent (PIC) and Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) are two 
procedural requirements in the NP. Users of genetic resources 
must obtain PIC from providers.13 In response, the providers can 
authorize access to the resource under the condition that MAT 
are negotiated. Besides the conditions for the access to genetic 
resources MAT also determine the benefits that will be shared 
(Greiber et al., 2012; Biber-Klemm and Martinez, 2016). From 
a procedural justice point of view, these two elements should be 
implemented with a focus on the principles of political equality, 
proportionality and/or plurality. To what extent the procedure 
is participatory and considers these principles, particularly also 
concerning involvement of indigenous and local communities, 
depends not only on the users but also the provider states. 
Therefore, there is a considerable leeway to consider more or less 
procedural justice within the legal framework.
JUSTICE CHALLENGES IN USING 
GENETIC RESOURCES
In the article so far, I have attempted to show that all of the 
introduced dimensions of justice play a role in the context of 
ABS for genetic resources. In the following, I will discuss three 
particular justice challenges that arise in the use of plant genetic 
resources: first, biopiracy; second, environmental burdens from 
biodiversity conservation; and third, plant genetic resources 
in agriculture. These examples should illustrate the role that 
13 PIC implies that before accessing the resource in question, the potential user 
must provide all the relevant information on the intended utilization project, 
including the conditions of access as well as the intended use.
different justice dimensions play in the discourse and how they 
are being addressed or overlooked. In the course of this analysis, 
it will become evident that justice challenges must be addressed at 
two different levels: on the one hand the institutional level, which 
is represented by national and international policy; and on the 
other hand, the individual project level, which concerns specific 
projects of resource use with their respective ABS negotiations.
CHALLENGE 1: BIOPIRACY
To explain which types of injustice the ABS scheme of the CBD 
addresses, authors frequently invoke the problem of biopiracy 
(e.g. Kamau et al., 2010; Millum, 2010). The term refers to 
unauthorized use of genetic resources or traditional knowledge 
in the development of a product. Those accused of biopiracy did 
not share any benefits, recognition or material profit with the 
community that provided the resources or knowledge in question. 
Particularly when traditional knowledge is involved, biopiracy is 
a violation of commutative justice because the providers of this 
knowledge made an essential contribution to the final product, for 
which they were not compensated. However, biopiracy is not only a 
violation of commutative justice. When traditional knowledge was 
used without the consent of the community, justice as recognition 
was also violated, because the members of the community were 
not respected as equal negotiation partners and their rights to 
their cultural heritage were not acknowledged. One of the aims of 
ABS in the CBD and NP was to address this type of commutative 
injustice and misrecognition by introducing just procedures with 
the requirement for PIC and MAT not only for the export of genetic 
resources but also for the use of traditional knowledge.
However, using the famous case of the Hoodia cactus, Saskia 
Vermeylen and Gordon Walker showed that the implementation of 
an ABS agreement alone does not automatically warrant recognition 
justice or procedural justice. The succulent plant Hoodia gordoniiwa 
was used as an appetite suppressant by the San, a hunter-gatherer 
community in southern Africa. In 1996, scientists of the South 
African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
isolated and patented the active compound of Hoodia, without 
involving the San or acknowledging their active contribution. 
Eventually, under external pressure, the CSIR eventually got in 
touch with the San, recognized their contribution, and in 2003 
the CSIR and the South African San Council signed a benefit-
sharing agreement (Beattie, 2005; Wynberg, 2005; Vermeylen and 
Walker, 2011). Even though the CSIR obtained PIC by the official 
representatives of the San, Vermeylen and Walker doubt that this 
was a case of procedural justice. In some places, the process was not 
really participatory because most group members were not aware 
of it. Moreover, the San did not receive enough legal and strategic 
assistance in the negotiation process and their opinion was not 
really taken into account. Vermeylen and Walker further cite the 
Hoodia Benefit-Sharing agreement as a case of violation of justice 
as recognition, which requires not only recognizing the other party 
as a partner with equal status and rights but also acknowledging 
and considering differences in culture and political tradition 
(Vermeylen and Walker, 2011). The San are known as an egalitarian 
community that functions without formal political institutions and 
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power hierarchies, but with decision making processes that involve 
consensus procedures. Even if the PIC and MAT procedures had 
been performed according to liberal democratic Western ideals, 
they would have been inflicted on this community against its 
own political tradition and values, because only a selection of 
representatives where involved in the negotiations.
Finally, in the Hoodia example, reparative justice also plays 
a role. As mentioned above, the CSIR originally patented the 
active compound in Hoodia without involving the San, and it 
acknowledged their contribution only under external pressure. 
The San thus had been wronged and the question is whether it 
is enough to ensure commutative, recognition and procedural 
justice in the future or whether, in addition, material or symbolic 
reparation would be appropriate.
CHALLENGE 2: ENVIRONMENTAL 
BURDENS FROM BIODIVERSITY 
CONSERVATION
The second justice challenge in the context of plant genetic 
resources concerns the background against which the ABS 
system has been developed in the CBD. The CBD has three 
main objectives, first, the conservation of biodiversity; second, 
the sustainable use of its components; and third, the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits from genetic resources. The first 
objective places high demands on biodiversity-rich countries, 
which at the same time are often low-income countries in 
the “South” that struggle with poverty. The second objective, 
too, addresses particularly this group of countries, because 
industrialized countries in the “North” already went through 
industrial development, albeit in a non-sustainable way. It thus 
seems that the “Global South” carries a disproportionate burden 
when it comes to biodiversity conservation, even if affluent 
countries cover some of the conservation costs. Biodiversity-rich 
countries are affected, for instance by opportunity costs resulting 
from the requirement to setup protection areas which implies that 
communities living on that land waive the right to cultivate it. 
Other burdens associated with conservation projects include the 
displacement of local communities to restrict human influence 
on the respective area (Agrawal and Redford, 2009). In that sense, 
the burden of biodiversity conservation is not distributed justly. 
What makes this distributive injustice more pronounced is that 
benefits from the use of genetic resources, directly attributable 
to the effort of conserving biodiversity, tend to flow into the 
“Global North”. The request to ensure that the “South” also gets a 
share in benefits could thus be understood as a means to achieve 
more distributive justice. I suggest elsewhere that mitigation of 
the unfair distribution of burdens and benefits from biodiversity 
could be linked through a global biodiversity fund, which would 
be supported by those who benefit from genetic resources and 
would be disbursed for biodiversity conservation projects 
(Deplazes-Zemp, 2019). Interestingly, the Multilateral System of 
the ITPGRFA has established a similar type of fund financed by 
benefits from genetic resources and is used to support projects 
in conservation or development of agriculture. However, as will 
be elaborated below, the fund of the Multilateral System was 
not primarily set up with the aim to ensure fair distribution 
of the burden of biodiversity conservation but to ensure food 
security. These distributive justice issues could be implemented 
at the institutional level, but when it comes to individual ABS 
negotiations, genetic resource users could also acknowledge this 
issue, for instance by contributing directly to justly designed 
biodiversity conservation projects in the provider country.
The idea that those who profit from biodiversity, for instance in 
bioprospecting projects, contribute to biodiversity conservation 
can also be understood as a requirement of commutative justice. 
Based on this view, the contribution would be understood as a 
form of compensation for the possibility to benefit from genetic 
resources, which persisted thanks to biodiversity conservation 
(Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a).
Justice as recognition is important in this context too. It is 
necessary to recognize and consider the differing values, norms 
and needs of the contracting parties to be able to understand 
burdens associated with biological conservation, as well as 
the benefits that could be shared. Being open to other world 
views may involve, for instance, calling into question our own 
understanding of biodiversity and nature as opposed to humanity 
(De Jonge, 2011; Martin et al., 2013).
Finally, at least at the institutional level the dimension of 
reparative justice also plays a role when it comes to the connection 
between ABS for genetic resources and environmental burdens. 
That biodiversity is threatened today is to a large degree a 
consequence of the lifestyle and unsustainable development 
in the “Global North”. With reference to reparative justice, one 
might thus reason for a “destroyer pays” principle analogous to 
the “polluter pays” principle in the context of climate justice. 
Moreover, biodiversity conservation may also have a colonial 
legacy, because important national parks were established for the 
benefit of colonial rulers without any consideration for traditional 
culture and lifestyle (Chan and Satterfield, 2013). Even if current 
ABS negotiations may not be the right occasion to repair these 
historical injustices, awareness and acknowledgment of the need 
for reparative justice may help to understand and respect the 
situation of communities and states in biodiversity-rich regions.
CHALLENGE 3: PLANT GENETIC 
RESOURCES IN AGRICULTURE
Plant genetic resources used in agriculture pose additional justice 
challenges to other types of genetic resources. In the following 
I will emphasize the role of the different dimensions of justice 
in these particular challenges. One of the differences between 
plant genetic resources in agriculture and, for instance, genetic 
resources of plants in the rainforest, is that agricultural plants 
are not purely natural (e.g., Halewood et al., 2013; Deplazes-
Zemp, 2018b). They are domesticated, meaning that they are the 
result of breeding processes in which humans shaped crops over 
centuries. In contrast to purely natural resources, domesticated 
plants were generated by certain communities, farmers, and 
breeders or more recently by scientists in companies, who thus 
have particular claims on these plants. In that sense, a demand 
to distribute benefits from these resources equally among 
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everybody (those who contributed to the plant and those who 
did not do so) seems to be more difficult to legitimize. Farmers or 
breeders who “improved” these plants can appeal to commutative 
justice and argue that if they make these plants available, their 
effort and creativity should be acknowledged and compensated 
(Deplazes-Zemp, 2018a; Deplazes-Zemp, 2018b). Intellectual 
property rights (IPR), such as patents and plant breeders’ rights, 
have been used as mechanisms to implement such compensation 
by ensuring that only the holders of these rights are entitled 
to commercially benefit from the plant in question. Although 
these property rights may be well suited to acknowledging the 
contribution of scientific innovation of commercial breeders in 
industrialized countries, they are unsuitable to account for the 
collective contributions of small-scale farmers in low-income 
countries, where the use and generation of novel varieties go 
hand in hand and cannot be assigned to individual breeders who 
put the crop on the market at one particular moment (Borowiak, 
2004; Correa, 2015; Oguamanam, 2018; Adebola, 2019). IPR 
over plant genetic resources, thus, raise a variety of justice issues. 
They fail to achieve commutative justice because farmers with 
particular claims on these resources cannot profit from the IPR 
system. Moreover, this is also a case of misrecognition. IPR fail to 
take into account agricultural practices of farmers in low-income 
countries. Consequently, not only the particular contributions 
of these farmers to valuable agricultural plants are being 
misrecognized but also the claims that these communities have on 
their products and their particular interests to be compensated if 
their products are being used. To correct these commutative and 
recognition injustices toward small-scale farmers, the concept of 
“farmers’ rights” was brought into the discourse to account for 
the generation of new varieties by farmers and grant them certain 
rights over these plant genetic resources (Borowiak, 2004). The 
ITPGRFA was the first international binding treaty that explicitly 
recognized farmers’ rights; in addition, the literature also 
discussed ABS as outlined in the CBD and NP as an approach 
that allows accounting for farmers’ contributions via PIC and 
MAT (Correa, 2015; Oguamanam, 2018; Adebola, 2019).
How different dimensions of justice come together and may 
lead to different expectations in case of plant genetic resources in 
agriculture can also be illustrated with the previously mentioned 
Multilateral System of the ITPGRFA. The Multilateral System 
provides facilitated access to 64 of the most important crops and 
requires that those who accessed genetic resources through this 
system will freely share resulting benefits or pay a percentage of 
their profits into a common fund.14 Agricultural plant genetic 
resources covered under the Multilateral System can be accessed 
without obtaining PIC and negotiating MAT but by using a 
standard template the “Standard Material Transfer Agreement” 
(SMTA) negotiated by the Parties to the ITPGRFA. However, 
since benefits from the use of these resources do not flow to the 
provider but to the Multilateral System as a third party, none of 
the contracting parties have a particular interest in monitoring 
compliance with the SMTA. To address this problem, the 
concept of the “Third-Party Beneficiary” has been introduced 
14 The Multilateral System: http://www.fao.org/plant-treaty/areas-of-work/the-
multilateral-system/overview/en/ (accessed May 2019).
into the SMTA. The parties to the SMTA agree that the Third-
Party Beneficiary has certain rights, for instance, to monitor 
compliance with the agreement (Manzella, 2013; Moore, 2013).
Analyzed from the stance of the different dimensions of 
justice, the problem of compliance with the SMTA arises because 
of the combination of two justice dimensions. An agreement 
between providers and users of genetic resources usually aims at 
implementing commutative justice by ensuring that the exchange 
is fair. In contrast, the Multilateral System supports distributive 
justice ensuring that the possibility to access and benefit from 
these resources is distributed fairly and recognition justice in the 
sense of recognizing basic rights to food. These aims can, however, 
not be secured by a procedure that involves only two “self-
interested” negotiation parties. The introduction of the Third-Party 
Beneficiary can thus be understood as a means ensure distributive 
or recognition justice in a commutative justice framework.
As just indicated, the Multilateral System points to another, 
more fundamental, ethical challenge raised by agricultural plant 
genetic resources, which has to do with the role of agriculture in 
the production of staple foods and in ensuring food security (De 
Jonge and Korthals, 2006). Safeguarding this role of agricultural 
genetic resources was the main motivation to provide facilitated 
access to the 64 crops covered under the Multilateral System. 
Food is a basic good that people need for health and well-being, 
therefore, an understanding of humans as beings with basic moral 
rights implies the duty of ensuring food security. This aim goes 
beyond what is demanded by a classical natural resource oriented 
understanding of distributive justice.15 While the latter demands 
fair distribution of existing goods, the basic moral right to food 
necessitates safeguarding that enough food is available. This can 
lead to a positive duty to ensure that food can be produced also, for 
instance, under changed climatic conditions.16
Recognition justice is also relevant in this context, when it 
is demanded that every person’s moral right to food must be 
acknowledged with consideration for varying needs and interests. 
Bram de Jonge pointedly describes how there is a certain type of 
tension between this basic moral requirement of ensuring food 
security17 and commutative justice (De Jonge, 2011). Although 
the first moral requirement suggests that farmers or breeders who 
develop new staple foods should make them available to everybody, 
the latter demands that they be compensated for their products. 
However, from the identification of such a tension it does not follow 
that one of the moral requirements must be prioritized. Instead, the 
situation can be understood as the challenge to find solutions to 
implement both moral demands. This challenge cannot only be 
addressed at the institutional level by drafting all-encompassing 
15 This may not apply to a less traditional conception of distributive justice 
associated with the notion of “upstream benefit-sharing” suggested by Bram de 
Jonge and Michiel Korthals. According to this understanding distributive justice 
needs to focus on a globally more just distribution of opportunities to set the 
research and innovation agenda. This could lead to a prioritization of the positive 
duty of ensuring that food resources are being generated where they are scarce (De 
Jonge and Korthals, 2006; Korthals and De Jonge, 2009).
16 An according duty could have been a motivation to facilitate, and thereby 
encourage, access to the 64 most important crops for farmers, breeders and 
researchers in the Multilateral System.
17 De Jonge speaks of a “principle of need and equity” (De Jonge, 2011: p137f).
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regulations; it must also be addressed at the individual project level, 
by acknowledging and rewarding contributions to agricultural 
plants even when this may not be explicitly required by the 
regulatory scheme.
The purpose of this section was to illustrate that usually more 
than one justice dimension is concerned in justice challenges 
involving plant genetic resources. This insight can be practically 
relevant for at least three reasons.
First, too narrow a focus on one dimension of justice may 
lead to unsatisfying results, because injustice at other dimensions 
persists, for instance, if biopiracy is seen exclusively as a violation of 
commutative justice and aspects of justice as recognition or reparative 
justice are being ignored. Although PIC and MAT may suffice to 
warrant commutative justice as defined in a Western context, justice 
as recognition requires considering potential conflicts of values 
between the involved parties. Consequently even our own principles 
of procedural justice may need reflection as described in the case of 
negotiations with the San above. The problems with benefit sharing 
as part of the Multilateral System also indicated that the focus on 
only one dimension of justice is not sufficient. A procedure that was 
constructed to deal with commutative justice needs adaptation to 
be able to address aims of distributive justice or recognition justice.
Second, tensions may arise between the different justice 
dimensions. For instance, certain parties highlight that plant 
genetic resources in agriculture are cultural products and those 
who developed them have special claims on benefits, which need to 
be considered by commutative justice. Others, however, highlight 
that as resources relevant for food security, plant genetic resources 
should be freely available and subject to distributive or recognition 
justice. The previously mentioned biopiracy case involving the San 
also reveals tensions between an ideal of procedural justice and 
justice as recognition. In certain cases, this type of tension may lead 
to difficult ethical dilemmas, for instance, when a community for 
traditional reasons does not agree to involve women or young people 
in decision procedures. Should their culture be respected or should 
the participatory ideals of procedural justice be implemented?18
Third, the focus on different justice dimensions may lead 
to different expectations in negotiation processes. In the 
discussed biopiracy case, the companies understood their task 
in the first place in the sense of commutative justice as providing 
compensation. However, the San also expected to be recognized. 
Although officially ABS systems are drafted to achieve 
commutative justice at the level of individual projects, certain 
stakeholders also seem to expect that such a system establishes 
distributive justice at a global and international level.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I introduced five dimensions of justice that play 
a role in dealing with plant genetic resources in “wild” nature 
18 Usually, it is held that recognition justice cannot justify the violation of basic 
human rights. In that sense, the United National Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) also requires that indigenous peoples’ institutional 
structures and their procedures need to be “in accordance with international 
human rights standards” (UNDRIP, article 34, available at https://www.un.org/esa/
socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (accessed August 2019)).
and agriculture, namely distributive justice, commutative justice, 
justice as recognition, reparative justice, and procedural justice. I 
then analyzed how these dimensions meet and overlap in some of 
the major justice challenges faced in the context of plant genetic 
resources. The article aims at giving some insight into why the 
use of genetic resources generates so much controversy and into 
what needs to be considered in regulating and handling them 
justly. I will respond to these aims with two conclusions for a just 
use of plant genetic resources.
First conclusion: Justice challenges posed by the use of plant 
genetic resources are multi-faceted and cannot be addressed by 
focusing exclusively on one dimension of justice. The analysis 
of the literature shows that different authors concentrate on 
different justice-related questions raised by genetic resources. 
I presented these different questions along the five introduced 
dimensions of justice. They often overlap, but to reduce the 
justice challenges to one or two of these dimensions would not 
do justice to the complexity of practical issues. Assuming that 
all of the justice dimensions are strong moral demands, we thus 
need to account for each dimension and consider how we can 
address them together when we work toward more fairness and 
equity in dealing with plant genetic resources.
Second conclusion: Because justice challenges are multi-
faceted, they cannot be met at the institutional level alone, 
but the challenges must be identified and addressed for each 
case individually. This overview article indicates that existing 
institutional ABS frameworks can be used to address several 
of the justice challenges, but at the same time these regulatory 
frameworks seem not sufficient to meet the challenges. 
Therefore, it is particularly important that the individual 
users of genetic resources, including researchers who work in 
non-commercial projects, are also aware of the issues at stake 
and find individualized solutions to address them. There is 
a risk that the increasing administrative burden associated 
with ABS obscures the actual justice issues at stake. However, 
losing sight of these issues at the project level would certainly 
work against the aim of increasing fairness and equity in ABS 
for plant genetic resources.
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Halewood, M., López Noriega, I., and Louafi, S. (2013). “The global crop commons 
and access and benefit-sharing laws: examining the limits of policy support 
for the collective pooling and management of plant genetic resources,” in 
Crop genetic resources as a global commons, challenges in international law and 
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Rapeseed is an essential crop which is used in many different areas as edible oil, biodiesel, 
lubricant, and feed. It is one of the most popular oil crops in Europe (63% of oilseeds 
production in 2017). The current study highlights the potential for further rapeseed 
development in European Union (EU), with special emphasis on Germany (19% of EU 
production) and Poland (12% of EU production). The study focused on three factors: 
cultivation area, volume of production and the numbers of Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR), particularly patents granted for rapeseed or rapeseed-related inventions and plant 
variety rights. Possible further obstacles to development, such as current legal framework, 
were also taken under consideration. The analyzed statistical data shows that both the 
cultivation area, as well as the volume of production of rapeseed fluctuated in the last 
decade in both examined countries, while the numbers for European patent publications 
and Community Plant Variety Rights showed a rising trend, indicating investments in the 
Research and Development (R&D) of the crop. The data analysis seems to confirm a 
hypothesis that there is a potential for the development of rapeseed as a versatile, multi-
use crop; however, the current EU GMO policies and a legal uncertainty as to the status 
of products of certain modern gene editing techniques may hamper making optimal use 
of this potential.
Keywords: agricultural innovation, new breeding techniques, patents, plant variety rights, rapeseed
INTRODUCTION
Rapeseed has multiple applications viz. human food, cattle feed, and for industrial purposes as a 
source of biodiesel or bioethanol. Research is being carried out to utilize not only seeds and oil 
cake (Negahdar et al., 2016; Kdidi et al., 2019) but also other by-products of oil production, such as 
straw (Wang et al., 2019). Rapeseed production may improve the sustainability of land use, which 
may also require advancements in the genetic diversity of the plants and hence the development in 
breeding itself, to achieve efficient use of genetic resources through biological progress. However, 
certain legal obstacles, in particular after the recent Court of Justice of the EU judgement in the 
C-528/16 “mutagenesis” case, which seems to limit the choice of breeding methods available to EU 
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breeders (see sec. 3.3), may hamper this developmental potential 
and put EU breeders at a disadvantage in comparison to their 
competitors from other countries.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations in 2017, the world production of oilseeds 
(rapeseed, sunflower seed, soybean, linseed) amounted to 479 
million tons, whereas consumption amounted to 492 million tons 
(FAOSTAT, 2018; OECD-FAO, 2018). Soybean had the largest 
share of oilseed production in the world in 2017 (73%), whereas 
rapeseed was classified in second place, with a share of 16%.
The European Union (EU) was the world leader in rapeseed 
production in 2017 (22 million tons). The next places were 
occupied by Canada (21 million tons), China (13 million tons), 
India (7.9 million tons), Australia (4.3 million tons), and Ukraine 
(2.1 million tons) (FAOSTAT, 2018). According to the statistics 
of the Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics - National 
Research Institute in Poland (2018), the greatest producers of 
rapeseed in the EU are the following: France, Germany, Poland, 
Romania, Great Britain, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Denmark, 
and Slovakia.
There are different common names of the Brassica napus that 
are well-known for high oil content: rapeseed, rape, canola. The 
name “canola” is derived from the words “Canada” and “oleo” 
(oil) and is used to describe rapeseed varieties with low erucic 
acid and low glucosinolate content in extracted edible oil (Canola 
Council, 2017). Rapeseed oil is commonly used for cooking, 
lighting, industrial uses, and feed, especially rapeseed meal and 
rapeseed cake, which are by-products of oil production. Rapeseed 
meal contains approximately 36–38% protein and 2–4% fat 
(Brzóska et al., 2010). Rapeseed cakes are moister than rapeseed 
meal and contain 10–14% fat. Moreover, rapeseed feeds contain 
more mineral ingredients than soybean meal (calcium, iron, 
manganese, phosphorus, magnesium, and selenium) (Woźniak 
and Twardowski, 2018).
Rapeseed meal is used as valuable feed; however, there are 
strict limitations concerning the amount used in animal feeding, 
due to its specific properties (Herkes, 2019). Rapeseed contains 
glucosinolates, which are the main antinutritional factor that 
hinders the animal nutrition by making chelates with minerals, 
which cause unavailability of essential minerals to animals during 
digestion (Kaczmarek et al., 2016). There is a chance of increasing 
the share of feed components derived from rapeseed. However, 
the high fiber content (up to 16%) that affects the digestibility of 
animals must be highlighted. The fiber content of the seeds and 
by-products of rapeseed can be reduced through breeding and 
development of new varieties (Ogrodowczyk and Bartkowiak-
Broda, 2013). Canola and rapeseed contain approximately 40% 
oil. Canola oil is high in oleic acid, which makes it competitive 
with other cooking oils. Moreover, the oil is also a high-grade 
lubricant and fuel additive; therefore, conversion to biodiesel is 
just one of its several potential final uses (Herkes, 2019).
An enterprise can strengthen its market position and gain 
a competitive advantage through utilization of Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR). Such exclusive rights provide a means for 
obtaining a return on investment in research and development 
(R&D), through licenses or the transfer of rights. IPR facilitate 
technology transfers and allow for access to new markets. The 
monopoly granted by exclusive rights provides owners with 
an ability to efficiently protect themselves against infringers 
(Andrews and Criscuolo, 2013). Hence, various forms of IPR are 
typically obtained by entrepreneurs working in innovative fields. 
An analysis of numbers of intellectual property rights granted 
can provide information on R&D investments in a given area of 
technology (Griliches, 1998).
One of the indicators of development of various industries, 
including agriculture, is the amount of granted and 
commercialized patents and the rate of change of this amount. A 
patent grants an exclusive right to commercially use, distribute, 
and license the protected invention. The granting of patents, 
licenses, and other proprietary rights facilitates and triggers 
company’s development; allows it to enter a higher, global level of 
operation; and can also become an important part of the entity’s 
revenues (European Commission, 2013). A broad patent portfolio 
may also contribute to the company’s market value (Coad and 
Rao, 2006). Patents are granted by specialized authorities, such as 
the European Patent Office (EPO) or national patent offices and 
are listed in publicly available databases, making them relatively 
easy to research and assess statistically.
In the field of plant breeding, there is also an alternative 
exclusive right in use, namely the plant variety right, 
which provides its owner with exclusivity when it comes to 
commercialization of their variety. Like patents, plant variety 
rights are granted by a specialized office (e.g., the Community 
Plant Variety Office—CPVO—in the EU) and are collected in 
publicly available databases.
The aim of the study was to analyze the potential for 
development of rapeseed in Europe, with an emphasis on 
Poland and Germany. The tested hypothesis was that there is 
indeed a potential for the development of rapeseed as a versatile, 
multi-use crop. Three indicators were used in the analysis: the 
overall cultivation area and its changes over time, the volume 
of production and its changes over time, and the numbers of 
IPR (patent publications concerning rapeseed and plant variety 
rights granted) and the changes of those numbers over the 
years. The choice of those indicators allows to see not only the 
utilization of the crop but also the dynamics of R&D investments 
in technologies surrounding it. Additional potentially limiting 
factors, such as legal obstacles, were also taken into account. 
Poland and Germany were singled out due to the similarities 
of their markets, comparable climatic conditions, their mutual 
co-dependency and strong commercial relations, and due to the 
fact that they account for over 30% of overall rapeseed production 
in the EU.
It was not the aim of this study to present IPR as means for 
increasing the rapeseed potential. The data on patent and plant 
variety rights were merely used as indicators of the condition 
and prospects for rapeseed development, alongside other factors, 
such as cultivation area and legal obstacles.
MATeRIALS AND MeTHODS
The study used research data published by Directorate-General 
for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI, 2019) 
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3
and Eurostat as well as data from the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO) of Poland in order to gather data about the land use and 
production volume of rapeseed and their changes in time.
Patent data can be used as indicators of technological 
development of multiple areas of technology, including 
biotechnology (Pilkington et al., 2002; OECD, 2005; OECD, 2008; 
Dubarić et al., 2011). In particular, there is a strong correlation 
between R&D investments and the number of patents (Griliches, 
1998). In order to determine the developmental prospects in the 
field of biotechnology of rapeseed, the databases of the German 
Patent Office (DEPATISnet), the Polish Patent Office (PPO), and 
the European Patent Office (EPO—Espacenet) were examined 
in this study. The numbers of patent publications regarding 
rapeseed year by year were examined and compared. The data 
relating to patents were collected based on International Patent 
Classification (IPC, 2019.01 version)1 codes and keywords.
Following the guidelines outlined in OECD (2005, 2008), 
a search encompassing the years between 1999 and 2017 was 
performed within the abovementioned databases. A presence of 
specific classification codes in a patent application (indicated by 
examiners of patent offices) means an affiliation with a specific 
industrial sector. Table 1 shows the IPC classes, in which the 
number of inventions involving oilseed rape is represented most 
frequently. A full text search (i.e. including the title, abstracts, 
description and patent claims) was performed for each year of 
the date range. IPC classes typical for the area of biotechnology 
(OECD, 2008) were included in the results. Consequently, 
classes outside the area of biotechnology (e.g. machinery) were 
excluded from the search. To properly understand the meaning 
of the IPC codes indicated in a patent, it is necessary to know that 
one invention usually has several IPC codes, e.g., invention—a 
method of producing fat for chocolate products has an IPC code 
for the C07 class—organic chemistry and A23—food, in general.
The numbers of inventions involving rapeseed plants or their 
products were identified for each year. The term “involving 
rapeseed” means inventions concerning the plant itself, as 
well as products thereof, used for achieving inventions in any 
process. Therefore, a broad spectrum of rapeseed applications 
was included in the research study. The patent data analysis does 
not distinguish between domestic and foreign applicants in a 
given patent office. For instance, the numbers obtained for the 
PPO include both Polish and foreign applicants. The term “Polish 
application” means an application filed with the PPO, “German 
application” means an application filed with the German Patent 
Office, etc. The study could render more precise results as to the 
specific uses of patented inventions, but this would require a 
detailed analysis of the contents of the thousands of identified 
patent documents and could not be carried out within the 
ramifications of this project.
Obtained data were gathered for each of the patent offices 
separately and plotted on the charts (Figures 3–8). Trends 
indicating prospects for development for each of the offices were 
1The IPC (established by the Strasbourg Agreement, 1971) provides a stratified 
system of language independent symbols for the classification of patents and utility 
models in line with the different areas of technology to which they pertain (see 
World Intellectual Property Organization - WIPO classification).
calculated using least squares regression analysis carried out in 
the Statistica software.
The sample of plant variety rights analyzed in this paper 
was derived from the Community Plant Variety Rights Office 
(CPVO) database. The search encompasses plant variety rights 
TABLe 1 | Definitions and contents of the most relevant IPC classes.
IPC symbol CONTeNT
A01 agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, hunting, trapping, 
fishing
 – soil working in agriculture or forestry
 – planting; sowing; fertilizing
 – harvesting
 – horticulture; cultivation of vegetables, flowers, rice, fruit, 
vines, hops, or seaweed; forestry; watering
 – new plants or processes for obtaining them; plant 
reproduction by tissue culture techniques
 – manufacture of dairy products
 – preservation of bodies of humans or animals or plants 
or parts thereof
 – biocides, e.g., as disinfectants, pesticides or herbicides
 – biocidal, pest repellant, pest attractant or plant 
growth regulatory activity of chemical compounds or 
preparations
A21 baking, for making or processing doughs, doughs for baking
 – handling baked articles made from dough
 – treatment, e.g., preservation of flour or dough for 
baking, e.g. by addition of materials; baking; bakery 
products; preservation thereof
A23 foods or foodstuffs
 – preserving, e.g., by canning, meat, fish, eggs, fruit, 
vegetables, edible seeds; chemical ripening of fruit or 
vegetables; the preserved, ripened, or canned products
 – dairy products, e.g., milk, butter, cheese; milk or cheese 
substitutes; making thereof
 – edible oils or fats, e.g., margarines, shortenings, 
cooking oils
 – coffee; tea; their substitutes; manufacture, preparation, 
or infusion thereof
 – protein compositions for foodstuffs; working-up proteins 
for foodstuffs
 – feeding stuffs specially adapted for animals; methods 
specially adapted for production thereof
 – foods, foodstuffs, or non-alcoholic beverages
 – preservation of foods or foodstuffs
A61 medical or veterinary science; hygiene
 – preparations for medical, dental, or toilet purposes
 – specific therapeutic activity of chemical compounds or 
medicinal preparations
C07 organic chemistry
 – general methods of organic chemistry
 – organic compounds
C08 organic macromolecular compounds; their preparation or 
chemical working-up; compositions based thereon
C09 dyes, paints; polishes; natural resins; adhesives; 
compositions not otherwise provided for; applications of 
materials not otherwise provided for
C10 petroleum, gas or coke industries; technical gases containing 
carbon monoxide; fuels; lubricants; peat
C11 animal or vegetable oils, fats, fatty substances or waxes; 
fatty acids therefrom; detergents; candles
C12 biochemistry, beer; spirits; wine; vinegar; microbiology; 
enzymology; mutation or genetic engineering
Source: based on WIPO classification (2019).
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granted for rapeseed between 1995 (the creation of the database) 
and 2018 (last full year of the study). Initially, 788 plant variety 
rights for rapeseed were identified within the examined period. 
Those were consequently matched with the year in which they 
were granted.
Standard least squares regression analysis was carried out for 
the gathered data set in order to plot the trend line within the 
analyzed period. The sample was also filtered by the nationality 
of subjects to whom rights were granted, in order to see the 
scope of innovative activity and the willingness to protect its 
effects in Poland and Germany, respectively. A company was 
treated as a company based in a particular country if its main 
seat is based in said country. Hence, the number of rights 
granted to, e.g., a German company, includes those granted to 
its subsidiaries in other countries. Conversely, rights granted 
to a German branch of a company based in a different country 
were rejected.
ReSULTS AND DISCUSSION
economic Aspects of Rapeseed 
Cultivation in the eU
According to the data from DG AGRI in the EU in 2017, the 
production of oilseeds (rapeseed, sunflower seed, soybean, 
linseed) amounted to 35 million tons, with rapeseed accounting 
for 22 million tons (63% of oilseeds). EU was the largest rapeseed 
producer (approximately 30% of world production) (FAOSTAT, 
2018). The highest rapeseed production, 24 million tons, was in 
2014 (see Figure 1).
The forecasted production (f) of oilseeds in 2019 is lower by 
approximately 2.2 million tons than in 2017 (Figure 1). However, 
according to the data (DG AGRI, 2019) the production of 
rapeseed is anticipated to increase by 18 000 tons in 2019.
The production of rapeseed in Poland in 2017 amounted to 
2.7 million tons, whereas production in Germany amounted to 
4.3 million tons (Figure 2). The volume of rapeseed production 
changed significantly from 2008 to 2017. The production 
of rapeseed in Germany is higher than in Poland; however, 
differences between the countries are decreasing year by year. 
Rapeseed can be the fastest developing crop in Poland, mainly 
because of its use in biodiesel production. However, data for 
the last decade show a slight decrease in the use of rapeseed as 
a source of biodiesel (USDA EU-28, 2019) concurrently with 
an increase in the overall use of biodiesel. Biodiesel is the most 
important among many types of biofuels produced and used in 
the EU (Sorda et al., 2010). Spain, Germany, and France lead 
among EU countries in biodiesel production (Eurostat, 2019). 
According to Eurostat (2019), in 2016, biodiesel production in 
EU countries reached approximately 21 million tons. In Poland, 
the production of biodiesels accounted for 1.15 million tons, 
whereas in Germany, it was 4.1 million tons.
In 2017, in EU countries, the area of rapeseed accounted for 6.7 
million hectares (Table 2). In Poland, it was 0.91 million hectares 
(14% of the area of rapeseed in EU), whereas, in Germany, it 
was 1.3 million hectares (19.4% of the area). Due to dry sowing 
conditions in some major rapeseed producing countries, rapeseed 
acreage has declined sharply, especially in France and Germany 
(USDA EU-28, 2019). The area of rapeseed cultivation in Poland 
and Germany was characterized by frequent changes resulting 
from decrease of planting and unfavorable weather conditions. 
In Poland, a 19% increase in cultivated area was observed in 2017 
compared to 2008. In Germany in 2017, the area of cultivation 
for this plant was decreased. Nevertheless, when looking from a 
longer time perspective, one can observe a steady upward trend 
in Poland since the 1950s combined with a sudden increase in 
the decade between 2005 and 2015 (from 0.55 million to 0.95 
million hectares) and a plateau in recent years (CSO, 2018). This 
finding may indicate that, for now, the demand for rapeseed has 
stabilized.
EU imported 3.6 million tons of rapeseed in 2013–2017, 
mainly from Australia (44%) and Ukraine (36%). It is worth 
to mention that in 2018–2019, import of rapeseed increased 
to 4.2 million tons (EU Oilseed Complex, 2019). A significant 
FIGURe 1 | Production of oilseeds in EU 2008–2019, (f – forecasted production; e – estimated production). Source: own study based on data from DG AGRI and Eurostat 2019.
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share of the EU oilseed plants import belongs to GM soybean. 
According to the EU Commission, between 2014 and 2016, the 
EU imported more than 30 million tons of GM soybean annually, 
including Poland, which imported 2 million tons (Rostoks et al., 
2019). Replacing imported GM soybean meal with domestically 
grown oilseed, such as rapeseed, in the feed industry is currently 
not an achievable and practical alternative because of technical 
and climatic limitations.
Patents and Plant variety Rights—Analysis 
and Comparisons
European Patents
The number of European patent publications was characterized 
by a steady increase between 1999 and 2017 (Figure 3). A look 
at different IPC classes, where none are dominating (Figure 4), 
shows a widespread research and use of rapeseed in different 
areas and may be seen as reflecting its industrial potential in 
FIGURe 2 | Production of rapeseed in Germany and Poland from 2008 to 2017. Source: own study based on data from DG AGRI and Eurostat 2019.
TABLe 2 | The area of rapeseed cultivation in the EU, Germany, and Poland in millions of hectares.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
eU-28 6.1736 6.5307 7.1056 6.7483 6.2091 6.7136 6.7144 6.4672 6.5347 6.7488
Germany 1.3707 1.4712 1.4612 1.3286 1.3062 1.4656 1.3942 1.2855 1.3257 1.3089
Poland 0.7711 0.8100 0.9461 0.8301 0.7203 0.9207 0.9511 0.9471 0.8226 0.9143
Source: own study based on data from DG AGRI and Eurostat 2019.
FIGURe 3 | Number of European patent publications filed to the EPO from 1999 to 2017 that use rapeseed or any product thereof and their trend (full text search). 
Source: own study based on data from Espacenet.
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agriculture, i.e., soil working, planting, harvesting, cultivating 
vegetables, developing new plants or the processes for obtaining 
them, and manufacturing dairy products, as well as in biocides, 
e.g., disinfectants, pesticides or herbicides, or plant growth 
regulators.
The numbers of patent publications per year are an order or 
in some years two orders of magnitude higher than for either of 
the national offices examined. This does not necessarily indicate 
the level of R&D investments in respective countries, but rather 
the popularity of each of the examined offices. A European patent 
can provide protection in multiple European countries, including 
Germany and Poland. Unlike in the case of the national offices, 
what stands out in the presented chart (Figure 3) is a continual 
growth of the number of patent publications each year. This in 
turn, coupled with the abovementioned correlation between 
patent data and the R&D investment levels can indicate R&D 
investments in rapeseed and rapeseed connected technologies. 
Since patents are granted for inventions that have to show 
improvements in comparison to previously patented ones, a 
growing trend indicates an acceleration of development of a 
given area year to year (even a horizontal trend line in this case 
would mean that new solutions are being developed each year 
and as such would show progress, not stagnation).
Polish Patents
The data on Polish patents show a frequent year to year changes 
with almost a horizontal trend line (Figure 5). The highest 
number of patents granted in the PPO are applications in the IPC 
FIGURe 4 | European patent publications (in %) filed to the EPO from 1999 to 2017 that use rapeseed itself or any product thereof in different industrial fields (full 
text search). See Table 1 for the explanation of the symbols. Source: own study based on data from Espacenet.
FIGURe 5 | Number of patent publications filed to the Polish Patent Office from 1999 to 2017 regarding inventions that use rapeseed or any product thereof, and 
their trend (full text search). Source: own study based on data from the  Polish Patent Office (2018).
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org November 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 142370
The Rapeseed PotentialWoźniak et al.
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class A01—24% (Figure 6). It was to be expected, as this is the 
broadest class covering agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, 
hunting, trapping, and fishing. Organic chemistry (class C07) 
is the second most common application—17% (Figure 6). It is 
important to note that, in Poland, many inventions (13%) cover 
the use of rapeseed in the petroleum or gas industries (IPC-C10).
The number of Polish patents for genetically modified (GM) 
rapeseed itself or involving any products thereof in genetic 
engineering was 22 from 1999 to 2017 (C12N15/82 of IPC).
German Patents
The number of patent publications changed in the period from 
1999 to 2006 and remained at a high level (Figure 7). The number 
of patent publications in Germany was characterized by frequent 
changes. After 2007, the number of patent publications of the 
German Patent Office decreased. There are clearly marked years of 
stable growth (1999–2007) and years of decline (2008–2017). This 
observation should be analyzed in detail in the future.
The largest proportion of patent publications filed in the 
German Patent Office came from agriculture (38%), organic 
chemistry (20%), and biochemistry (11%) (Figure 8). The 
number of German patent applications regarding GM rapeseed 
itself or involving any products thereof in genetic engineering 
was 186 between 1999 and 2017 (C12N15/82 of IPC).
Plant Variety Rights
Plant variety rights and patents exist simultaneously in Europe, 
sometimes protecting the same solutions. Although the 
FIGURe 6 | Polish patents (in %) filed to the Polish Patent Office from 1999 to 2017 that use rapeseed itself or any product thereof in different industrial fields (full 
text search). See Table 1 for the explanation of the symbols. Source: own study based on data from the Polish Patent Office (2018).
FIGURe 7 | Number of patent publications filed to the German Patent Office from 1999 to 2017 regarding inventions that use rapeseed or any product thereof and 
their trend (full text search). Source: own study based on data from DEPATISnet (2019).
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European Patent Convention (EPC) outright forbids granting 
of patents for plant varieties (art. 53b), it does not preclude 
granting patents to groupings broader than a variety, even if 
such a group encompasses varieties (see EPO, 2018a; EPO, 
2018b. Guidelines for Examination to the EPO part G.II.5.4.1). 
Hence, a patented invention can find its application within 
multiple protected varieties.
Steady progress in the breeding of rapeseed can be observed 
in the last decade, with the number of plant variety rights granted 
for new rapeseed varieties growing and clearly exceeding the 
numbers from before 2010 (Figure 9).
In the area of plant variety rights, a domination of large 
companies can be shown, with seven companies owning over 
80% of the rights (see Table 3). Out of all the rights granted from 
2000 to 2018, over half (396) belonged to German companies 
and only 2 to Polish companies. The numbers for the years 2017–
2018 may not fully represent the number of rights granted, due 
to a delay in the delivery of decisions. As of May 2019, there were 
still 6 applications active for 2017 and 32 for 2018. The number of 
active applications filed already in 2019 was 48.
The data on plant variety rights show that the level of 
innovativeness in breeding is currently higher than that in 
FIGURe 8 | Patent publications (in %) filed to the German Patent Office from 1999 to 2017 that use rapeseed itself or any product thereof in different industrial fields 
(full text search). See Table 1 for the explanation of the symbols. Source: own study based on data from DEPATISnet (2019).
FIGURe 9 | Number of applications for which exclusive plant variety rights were granted 1995–2018 and their trend. Source: own study based on data from 
CPVO (2019).
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the previous decade and, like in the case of European patents, 
the pace of progress seems to be increasing. Despite rapeseed 
being a widespread crop in Poland, Polish breeding companies 
do not seem to apply for EU plant variety rights. This finding 
may indicate either a low level of innovativeness or the low 
attractiveness of the rights themselves. In comparison, the 
number of rights possessed by German companies is higher by 
two orders of magnitude. Despite having rapeseed production at 
a comparable level, the Polish farming industry does not seem 
to contribute to its biological progress as much as the German 
industry. There may be various reasons for this fact, including the 
low collectability of royalties in Poland or farmers’ reluctance to 
grow newer varieties.
Legal Ramifications of Novel Methods of 
Breeding in the eU
No GM varieties of rapeseed are grown in the EU, since none 
were authorized for cultivation. In 2017, the share of GM 
rapeseed in the global area of biotech crops was 5% (50% of the 
area was occupied by GM soybean) (ISAAA, 2018). The global 
area of GM rapeseed increased by 19% from 8.6 million hectares 
in 2016 to 10.2 million hectares in 2017. This change occurred 
due to the adoption of new GM rapeseed varieties with nutritious 
oil content and different types of herbicide tolerant traits. 
Herbicide tolerant rapeseed is the fifth most important biotech 
plant trait commercialized since 1996; it has been adopted largely 
in Canada, the USA, and Australia (ISAAA, 2018). Moreover, the 
global area and adoption of rapeseed could increase significantly 
in the near term in response to the likely increased use of rapeseed 
for vegetable oil and biodiesel (ISAAA, 2018).
The use of GM products as food and feed in the EU is strongly 
limited due not only to the strictness of criteria but also to the 
length and uncertainty of the authorization process, which 
may work as a deterrent when choosing the breeding method 
(Zimny et al., 2019). A recent dispute regarding the legal status of 
products of certain new plant breeding techniques (NBTs) from 
the point of view of EU genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
legislation may lead to legal uncertainty and may work as another 
deterrent when choosing such breeding methods as Site Directed 
Nucleases or Oligonucleotide Directed Mutagenesis. In a recent 
judgment in the case C-528/16, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union ruled that only organisms obtained by “means of 
techniques/methods of mutagenesis, which have conventionally 
been used in a number of applications and have a long safety 
record,” are exempted from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC 
on the deliberate release of GMOs to the environment (Directive, 
2001). As noted by Smyth and Lassoued (2019), this judgment 
may have detrimental impacts on agricultural innovations, R&D 
funding, and international trade.
According to Eriksson et al. (2019a), it is a paradox related to 
GM food and feed that 62 different transformation events that 
have passed the risk assessment by the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) are entering the EU as food and feed, but only 
one can be planted in the EU (the MON 810 maize). The authors 
described two scenarios for implementing a national opt-in 
mechanism for the cultivation of GM plants under EU legislation 
and highlighted that if member states have the right to opt out 
of GM crop cultivation, they should also have a right to opt in 
(Eriksson et al., 2019a).
The legal disputes regarding novel methods of plant breeding, 
including those applied to rapeseed, may hamper the development 
of technologies that would allow for the optimal use of rapeseed 
as a food and industrial crop and its future potential.
CONCLUSIONS
Analyzed data on patent numbers and plant variety rights show 
potential of rapeseed use in the food and feed industries, as 
well as in industrial applications (as follows from the analysis 
of the IPC classes). What clearly results from this work is that 
rapeseed is a popular crop in both compared countries—Poland 
and Germany. After a dynamic growth, the acreage of rapeseed 
cultivation has been rather steady over the last few years and 
subject to periodical fluctuations. While used mostly as a source 
of food and feed, rapeseed also has industrial applications. Its 
use as a substrate for the production of biodiesel has not only 
stagnated in recent years but also shows a slight decrease.
The continuation of the development of new varieties is 
required to expand rapeseed cultivation. As indicated previously 
the EU, Poland and Germany are not self-sufficient in terms of 
demand for protein feedstuffs and for energy; for this reason, EU 
imported more than 30 million tons of GM soybean. If imported 
GM soybean can be replaced by additional oilseeds grown in EU 
countries, it would require additional area.
Taking advantage of the full potential of rapeseed would require 
the utilization of whole plants, and such research is already being 
carried out. Nevertheless, a multi-faceted utilization of rapeseed 
products requires not only progress in processing technologies 
TABLe 3 | Companies to whom plant variety rights were granted.













Saatzucht Donau GmbH & Co. KG 10
JTSD 4
Selgen 4
Knold & Top 3
W. von Borries-Eckendorf GmbH & Co. KG 3
Saatbau Linz eGen 2




Source: based on CPVO (2019).
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but also in breeding (Campbell et al., 2016). It is through breeding 
that the genetic diversity of rapeseed could be increased so that it 
could be used as a sustainable product with multiple applications. 
Countries such as Poland and Germany are particularly suitable 
for making use of that potential. The comparison of the IPR 
management policies of those countries’ breeders shows that 
Germany has a very significant advantage in this respect over 
Poland. Despite showing comparable demand for rapeseed, 
both countries differ significantly in regard to the protection of 
new varieties. It is difficult to explain this phenomenon without 
analyzing company policies, and such an examination was beyond 
the scope of the study and may also be hampered by a particular 
company’s unwillingness to share such policies.
The seed market in EU is highly concentrated, and the majority 
of rights are held by several companies (a large proportion of 
them—German), who can show rather broad plant variety 
rights and patent portfolios. It seems then that these companies 
will likely indicate the directions for crop development in the 
foreseeable future. However, all breeders are currently limited in 
their choice of breeding methods with regard to the introduction 
of new products to the EU market. These limitations stem from 
a practical inability to introduce GM products for cultivation 
in the EU. Another obstacle is the legal uncertainty regarding 
the status of the products of NBTs, which may work as a 
deterring factor in choosing a breeding method, since treating 
its products as GMOs reguiring authorization effectively renders 
them unsuitable for the development of new varieties for the 
EU market. These factors may strongly contribute to the sub-
optimal usage of rapeseed’s potential, particularly in comparison 
to countries with clearer or more liberal policies towards NBTs. 
This uncertainty and legal obstacles are not encountered by 
entrepreneurs from other parts of the world (e. g. Argentina 
or the USA (Eriksson et al., 2019b) and might put European 
entrepreneurs at a competitive disadvantage.
The analysis of exclusive rights granted for rapeseed-
connected inventions and rapeseed varieties shows that 
there is a growing trend in regard to the numbers of those 
rights granted. This trend may indicate prospects for the 
development of the analyzed crop and possibly – its new 
applications. The growing trend in the number of patent 
applications can be observed in the case of applications 
filed with the EPO (counted in thousands), while data from 
the national patent offices (applications counted in tens or 
hundreds) show the opposite phenomenon. This fact is rather 
a symptom of the dwindling popularity of national offices 
than of the lack of development of rapeseed itself. Trends in 
the numbers of plant variety rights granted seem concurrent 
with those of patent applications filed with EPO, showing a 
significant increase in the last decade. The data on European 
patents and plant variety rights seem to support the assumed 
hypothesis that rapeseed has potential to be further developed 
as a versatile, multi-use crop.
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New Breeding Techniques (NBTs) include several new technologies for introduction of 
new variation into crop plants for plant breeding, in particular the methods that aim to 
make targeted mutagenesis at specific sites in the plant genome (NBT mutagenesis). 
However, following that the French highest legislative body for administrative justice, the 
Conseil d’État, has sought advice from The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
in interpreting the scope of the genetically modified organisms (GMO) Directive, CJEU in 
a decision from 2018, stated that organisms modified by these new techniques are not 
exempted from the current EU GMO legislation. The decision was based in a context of 
conventional plant breeding using mutagenesis of crop plants by physical or chemical 
treatments. These plants are explicitly exempted from the EU GMO legislation, based on 
the long-termed use of mutagenesis. Following its decision, the EU Court considers that 
the NBTs operate “at a rate out of all proportion to those resulting from the application 
of conventional methods of mutagenesis.” In this paper, we argue that in fact this is 
not the case anymore; instead, a convergence has taken place between conventional 
mutagenesis and NBTs, in particular due to the possibilities of TILLING methods that 
allow the fast detection of mutations in any gene of a genome. Thus, by both strategies 
mutations in any gene across the genome can be obtained at a rather high speed. 
However, the differences between the strategies are 1) the precision of the exact site 
of mutation in a target gene, and 2) the number of off-target mutations affecting other 
genes than the target gene. Both aspects favour the NBT methods, which provide more 
precision and fewer off-target mutations. This is in stark contrast to the different status of 
the two technologies with respect to EU GMO legislation. In the future, this situation is not 
sustainable for the European plant breeding industry, since it is expected that restrictions 
on the use of NBTs will be weaker outside Europe. This calls for reconsiderations of the 
EU legislation of plants generated via NBT mutagenesis.
Keywords: conventional mutagenesis, EU legislation, New Breeding Techniques (NBT), NBT mutagenesis, 
precision breeding, off-target mutations
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INTRODUCTION
Plant breeding is a discipline for targeted and continuous 
development of new plant varieties. It utilizes the genetic 
variation between individuals within a plant species and 
combines the desired properties into new and improved varieties. 
Plant breeding is dependent on genetic variation, and new 
variation is fundamentally important for introduction of new 
traits in breeding programs. However, in cases where a specific 
genetic trait is not immediately available to be crossed into 
breeding materials, the genetic variation in a crop species can be 
expanded by other means. For decades this has been achieved 
by, e.g., chemical or physical treatments, translocation breeding, 
synthetic hexaploids, etc; techniques that involve comprehensive 
changes of the plant’s genome. Due to its long safety record, 
organisms obtained by physical and chemical mutagenesis are 
exempt from the provisions of the GMO legislation in the EU. 
Nevertheless, the methods incite hundreds or even thousands of 
random mutations with unknown effects and consequences.
New Breeding Techniques (NBT) include several new 
technologies for introduction of variation into crop plants. NBT 
comprises a number of technologies that have emerged since the 
current Directive 2001/18/EC on GM plants was implemented. 
At the request of the member states, the European Commission 
set up a working group in 2007 to assess whether or not a 
number of new breeding techniques should fall within the scope 
of GMO legislation. The working group prepared a list of seven 
new plant breeding techniques: zinc finger nuclease (ZFN) 
technology, oligonucleotide-directed mutagenesis (ODM), 
cisgenesis and intragenesis, grafting on GM-rootstock, RNA-
dependent DNAmethylation, agro-infiltration “sensu stricto,” 
and reverse breeding. The ZFN technique is a site-directed 
nuclease (SDN) tool that can be designed to produce a mutation 
at a predetermined position in the plant genome. Since 2007, a 
number of new SDN tools have emerged, such as the TALEN and 
CRISPR/Cas techniques, of which, in particular, the latter is now 
widely used. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe all the 
different NBTs in detail. Here we will focus on the two techniques 
involved in the generation of mutations at pre-determined sites 
in a plant genome, i.e., ODM and especially the SDN-tools. We 
will refer to these as NBT mutations and use the term precision 
breeding to describe the use of NBT mutations in plant breeding. 
The other NBTs are described in detail in (Lusser et al., 2012) and 
(Schaart et al., 2016). Common to almost all these techniques 
are, however, that the final plants, which are exposed to the open 
environment, are without foreign DNA as the vector constructs 
are either never integrated into the plant genome or are out-
segregated in the next generation. Exceptions are cisgenesis/
intragenesis, and the use of the SDN-tools to insert longer DNA 
fragments into pre-selected sites in the plant genome. Both of 
these techniques require that the transferred DNA is permanently 
integrated into the plant genome.
Early after their emergence, the SDN technologies were 
adopted to improve mutations already available from traditional 
mutagenesis. For example, in order to improve the quality of 
soy oil and avoid non-ideal mutations induced by traditional 
mutation, two target genes FAD2-1A and FAD2-1B were 
simultaneously mutated using TALENs (Haun et al., 2014). 
Functional mutations down to the deletion of two nucleotides 
were identified. In contrast, traditional induced mutations of 
FAD2-1A by x-ray are up to 164-kb deletions that may remove 
other desirable genes in addition to FAD2-1A (Bolon et al., 
2011). In another early example, fragrant rice was generated by a 
SDN directed toward 1-bp deletion in the gene encoding betaine 
aldehyde dehydrogenase (BADH2). Traditionally induced 
mutations in the gene mutation are up to 803-bp deletions plus 
a range of unknown side mutations (Shan et al., 2015). Placed 
in the context of traditional mutagenesis methodologies in 
crops, the examples demonstrate how SDN technology improves 
precision and reduces the extent of mutations in a crop where a 
specific trait is pursued.
Only a few crops have been improved through the use of 
ODM, whereas the SDN tools are widely used. Without doubt, 
NBT mutations represents a significant progress for the breeding 
of crops for a challenging future. Speed and precision are often 
mentioned as key beneficial properties of the NBT mutations. 
However, on July 25, 2018, The Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) ruled that organisms obtained by these new 
mutagenesis technologies are not exempted from the current 
EU GMO legislation. (Court-of-Justice-of-the-European-Union, 
2018) In order for precision bred crops to be exempted, the GMO 
Directive needs to be revised to reflect scientific progress in 
biotechnology. In the discussion of this, parallels must be drawn 
to the use of conventional mutation breeding as a way of inducing 
genetic variation in breeding material. Hence, it is worthwhile as 
a first step to look more closely into this approach; how it has 
been used and developed in plant breeding; and how it compares 
to the new targeted genome editing techniques, in particular 
the CRISPR/Cas9-based techniques. What are the differences 
and are there significant convergence between the old methods 
exempted from GM legislation and NBT mutations. In order to 
place NBT mutations in the context of today’s breeding, we will 
in the current paper uncover major similarities and differences 
between NBT mutations and mutations obtained by conventional 
mutagenesis with respect to precision and off-target mutations.
Conventional Mutation Breeding in the 
Context of New Breeding Technologies
Mutation breeding has been used by plant breeders world-
wide since the discovery in the 1920s that heritable mutations 
could be induced in plants by means of irradiation or chemical 
treatments (Stadler, 1928). The expectations to this method for 
improvements of crop varieties were big in the 1950s to 1960s, 
and indeed a considerable number of varieties was released, 
e.g. from Scandinavian barley breeding (Lundqvist, 2014). The 
mutated genes from these old mutant varieties are still part of 
the gene pool used for modern barley breeding. Since the 1980s, 
the interest among plant breeders in using mutation breeding 
has declined, probably due to expectations to the new genetic 
modification technologies (GM traits), but also due to difficulties 
in dealing with the load of accompanying bad mutations in 
selected lines, which hampered development of high-yielding 
varieties based on mutations (Mba, 2013). Nevertheless, even with 
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the harsh treatments of plants in the mutation breeding process 
aimed to induce genetic modifications, the plants coming out of 
it were explicitly exempted from the EU GMO legislation on GM 
crops, implemented almost 30 years ago (Directive 90/220/EEC 
and Directive 2001/18/EC), due to their long safety record.
Irradiation and treatment with chemical mutagens are the two 
major methods used to induce mutations in plants (Leitao, 2011; 
Mba et al., 2011). X-rays and gamma radiation cause a mixture 
of bigger chromosome deletions and point mutations, i.e., single 
base substitutions or deletions, whereas the most commonly used 
chemical mutagens (e.g. NaN3, EMS, MNU) almost exclusively 
cause single base substitutions (transitive, i.e. from G/C to A/T; 
see Table 1). The advantage of the chemical mutagens is that they 
can be used to prepare mutant populations with high densities of 
mutations, making it easier to screen for specific mutations in a 
population (Szarejko et al., 2017).
By the turn of the century, a big change with respect to 
utilization of mutants took place following development 
of efficient TILLING (Targeting Induced Local Lesions in 
Genomes) techniques (Mccallum et al., 2000). Previously, 
mutation breeding was exclusively based on forward genetics, 
i.e. on phenotype screening for favorable traits in mutant 
populations. TILLING made reverse genetics approaches 
applicable, since this technique is aimed at the detection of 
mutations in specific, known genes. The use of TILLING has 
accompanied the general development of molecular insight into 
the genetic base for crop traits and development of efficient new 
generation DNA sequencing techniques. In principle, this now 
makes it possible to find mutations in any pre-selected gene 
across the genome of crop plants, if the DNA sequence of the 
gene is known and if a suitable mutant population is available 
(Jankowicz-Cieslak et al., 2017).
For the major European crops, barley and wheat, good 
TILLING population resources are already existing (Krasileva 
et al., 2017; Szurman-Zubrzycka et al., 2018), and for most 
seed propagated species TILLING populations can in principle 
be generated, if not available. In addition, new generation 
sequencing techniques (Burkart-Waco et al., 2017; Krasileva 
et al., 2017) and efficient methods to detect DNA heteroduplexes 
(Szurman-Zubrzycka et al., 2017) have made it easier than 
previously to screen the populations for mutations in selected 
target genes. Since the alkylating chemical mutagens mainly 
cause transitions in the chromosomal DNA, specific mutations 
can to a certain degree be predicted and searched for during 
screening of a mutant population. Hence, mutagenesis is not 
just a random tool to discover mutations, but can be partially 
directed. Furthermore, DNA marker-assisted backcrossing can 
make the transfer of mutations into elite varieties much more 
efficient than previously (Hasan et al., 2015).
Overall, the development of TILLING, stable mutant 
populations, and efficient backcrossing in principle now makes 
the acquisition of mutations in specific genes very efficient 
and fast for seed propagated crop species. This contrasts with 
the statement that were made by the CJEU in its 2018 decision 
on NBTs, namely that the new breeding “techniques make it 
possible to produce genetically modified varieties at a rate out 
of all proportion to those resulting from the application of 
conventional methods of mutagenesis” (https://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-07/cp180111en.pdf). 
The situation now is that mutations can be acquired at a high 
rate as well with the conventional techniques. This sets a new 
scene for comparing the new precision breeding techniques, in 
particular those based on CRISPR/Cas9, with the conventional 
mutation breeding techniques. Hence, with this development 
there has been a convergence between the new breeding 
techniques and the efficient use of TILLING principles in 
reverse genetics approaches. This applies to the general ability to 
achieve mutations in any gene of interest, but also to the speed 
of the process.
Despite the convergence between targeted genome editing 
and TILLING approaches there are still two main differences, 
which count in favor of NBT genome editing techniques: 1) 
precision – genome editing has only few constraints with respect 
to selection of the exact site of mutation in a gene, whereas 
TILLING is based on random mutations across the entire 
genome; 2) off-target mutations – genome editing can result 
in a few off-target mutations, whereas a high load of off-target 
mutations is an intrinsic property of conventional mutagenesis 
that has to be dealt with in plant breeding via extensive 
backcrossing strategies.
TABLE 1 | Mutagens commonly used in mutation breeding and in generation of TILLING mutant populations (Leitao, 2011; Mba et al., 2011; Sikora et al., 2011).
Category Mutagen Mutation type Genotype
Physical treatment X-rays Dependent of dose: mixture of gene 
mutations and chromosomal mutations/
rearrangements
Point mutations.
Gamma irradiation Deletions/inversions of varying sizes. 
Translocations.




Gene mutations Alkylated base mispairing, typically leading 
to G/C→A/T transitions
Few InDels
NaN3 Gene mutations Both G/C→A/T og A/T→G/C transitions
Few InDels
EMS, ethyl methanesulphonate; MNU, N-methyl-N-nitrosourea; ENU, 1-ethyl-1-nitrosourea; NaN3, natriumazide, InDel, insertion/deletion.
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Mutations Induced by the NBT 
Mutation Tools
As previously mentioned, the most widely used NBT mutation 
tool in plants is CRISPR/Cas9. This is mainly because it is 
highly efficient and easy to design and because it is possible 
by multiplexing to make more than one targeted mutation at a 
time (e.g. Bortesi and Fisher, 2015). However, ZNF, TALENs, 
and ODM are also currently used. ZFN was developed in 2003 
(Bibikova et al., 2003), TALENs in 2011 (Bogdanove and Voytas, 
2011) and CRISPR/Cas9 in 2012 (Jinek et al., 2012), so the 
SDN-tools are less than 20 years old. ODM, on the other hand, 
is a tool that has been used for a long time across mammalian, 
microbial, and plant systems to induce mutations at a specific site 
in the genome and ODM started to be successfully used in plants 
around 20 years ago (Breyer et al., 2009). Thus, NBT mutagenesis 
is almost 80 years younger than conventional mutagenesis.
Mechanism Behind the NBT Mutation Tools
The mechanism behind the precision of the ODM and 
SDN mutation tools are very different. ODM makes use of 
oligonucleotides (between 20 to 100 nucleotides in length) 
designed to be identical to a corresponding sequence in the 
plant genome except for one or a few altered nucleotides 
corresponding to the intended mutation (Breyer et al., 2009). The 
oligonucleotides bind to the complementary DNA sequence in 
the genome, thereby generating mismatches, which are repaired 
by the DNA repair system of the cell. As a result, a desired change 
is achieved at a specific site in the genome. The efficiency of this 
technique is, however, very low, and site-directed nucleases, 
especially the CRISPR/Cas tool, are therefore currently the 
preferred tool for creating NBT mutations.
SDNs are tools that can be designed to recognize and cleave at 
specific sites within a genome and thereby create a double strand 
break (DSB) at the targeted site. Mutations can then, prone to 
some error rate, be generated in the subsequent repair of the DSB 
performed by the cell’s own DNA repair systems (Voytas, 2013). 
The DSB enables the creation of different types of mutations by 
harnessing the DSB repair pathways of the cell. The different 
types of mutations obtained by the two primary repair pathways, 
non-homologous end-joining and homologous recombination, 
are often referred to as SDN1 and SDN2, respectively.
The most commonly used repair pathway of DSBs is non-
homologous end-joining (NHEJ) in which the broken DNA 
strands are just simply rejoined. When the rejoining is imprecise, 
deletions or insertions are introduced at the site of the DSB. If 
the SDN-tool is designed to make a DSB in a gene sequence, 
imprecise rejoining can inactivate the gene by changing the 
amino acid sequence reading frame.
The other main repair system of DSBs in cells is homologous 
recombination (HR). This repair requires the presence of a DNA 
fragment with sequence homology to either site of the DSB which 
can be used as a template for the HR repair. Specific nucleotide 
changes in the genomic sequence at the site of the DSB can then 
be achieved through HR by designing a DNA repair template with 
homologous sequences to either side of the DSB, but with the 
desired nucleotide changes at the site of the DSB. When the DNA 
repair template is delivered to the cell along with the SDN-tool, the 
template can be used for HR repair of the DSB and the template with 
the nucleotide changes will be incorporated into the chromosome, 
thereby specifically replacing one or a few nucleotides to other 
desired nucleotides. In this way, the genetic code of an amino 
acid can be changed to the code of another amino acid. Replacing 
a single amino acid in an enzyme often can alter the activity or 
specificity of the enzyme. Therefore, if already known which amino 
acid that has to be replace to achieve an improvement, SDN2 can be 
used to induce the corresponding specific nucleotide change.
Changing a single or a few nucleotides using SDN2 is, however, 
difficult as the delivery of the SDN-tool to the cell must be 
coordinated with the delivery of the DNA repair template. Thus, 
new approaches to overcome this hurdle are currently developed. 
Two base editing systems based on the CRISPR/Cas9 tool have 
recently been developed which can alter a particular nucleotide in a 
DNA sequence without the use of a DNA repair template (reviewed 
by (Shan and Voytas, 2018). One system can change cytosine (C·G) 
to thymine (T·A) (Zong et al., 2017) and the other adenine (A·T) to 
guanine (G·C) (Li et al., 2018). These systems have been shown to 
work effectively in important crop plants, such as tomato, canola, 
corn, rice, and wheat (Shan and Voytas, 2018).
Constrains of NBT Mutations With Respect to 
Target Site and Traceability
As compared to conventional mutagenesis, there are only few 
constraints when selecting the exact site for NBT mutations. 
Although only few there are some constrains, in particular for 
the CRISPR/Cas system. It consists of a Cas nuclease inducing 
the DSB and a chimeric RNA (gRNA) where the first 20 
nucleotides (the guide sequence) can be made complementary 
to a 20-nucleotide genomic sequence located where the mutation 
is intended (Jinek et al., 2012). The gRNA strand and the Cas 
nuclease forms the RNP complex, and together they will find 
and bind to the complementary nucleotides in the genome. Here 
the Cas nuclease will cleave the DNA double strand but only 
if a protospacer adjacent motif (PAM sequence) is present just 
in front of the 20 bp targeted DNA sequence in the genomic 
sequence. The most commonly used Cas nuclease is spCas9 
which originates from Streptococcus pyogenes. The PAM sequence 
for spCas9 is NGG. Although the NGG sequence is abundant in 
plant genomes, the requirement for a particular PAM sequence 
represents a restriction on where in the genome a DSB can be 
induced. However, to overcome this, new engineered spCas9 
nucleases or CRISPR/Cas systems identified in other bacteria 
requiring other PAM sequences are now available and can be 
used in the absence of a wild type spCas9 PAM sequence at sites 
where a DSB is desired (Kleinstiver et al., 2015; Ran et al., 2015; 
Kleinstiver et al., 2016b; Kim et al., 2017; Amrani et al., 2018).
A key difference between conventional mutation breeding 
and NBT mutations is that the NBT mutation tools have to be 
delivered into the cells. For ODM, the oligonucleotides are 
transiently delivered to the cell and are degraded in the cells 
after induction of the specific mutation. The SDN-tools can be 
delivered to the plant cells as DNA constructs either using stable or 
transient transformation techniques. Although mutated primary 
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transformants generated by stable transformation contains the 
SDN DNA-construct there is most frequently no linkage between 
the site of insertion of the construct and the site of the mutation. 
Mutants without the DNA construct can therefore be selected in 
the subsequent generation after segregation. For CRISPR/Cas, it 
is also possible to deliver the CRISPR and the Cas as mRNA and 
guide RNA, respectively (Zhang et al., 2016) or to deliver a pre-
assembled ribonucleoprotein (RNP-complex) (Woo et al., 2015). 
RNA and RNP delivery completely exclude any introduction and 
integration of foreign DNA into the plant.
The lack of foreign DNA in the NBT mutated plants complicates 
the traceability, which is required when NBT mutations are 
regulated as GMOs. Traditional GM plants normally holds a large 
piece of foreign DNA inserted randomly in the plant genome. 
Today, GM plants are detected by standard or real-time PCR 
that, depending on the primers used, can identify specific gene 
elements, gene constructs, and transformation events present in 
the plants. Knowledge about the sequences to be identified is a 
prerequisite for design of the primers. With respect to traceability 
of NBT mutations, it will not be possible to separate mutations 
resulting from SDN1, SDN2, or ODM from mutations induced 
spontaneously or by conventional mutagenesis even if information 
about the gene sequences is available. The same goes for base 
editing. This will complicate the control of crops imported from 
countries that do not regulate NBT mutated crops.
Off-Target Mutations Induced by 
NBT Tools
An often-mentioned concern about the ODM and SDN-tools 
is if mutations are generated at places in the genome where the 
tools were not intended to mutate. These so-called off-target 
mutations occur when the tool is capable of binding and inducing 
DSBs within sequences similar to the sequence which the tool was 
designed for (off-target sequences). Both ODM and all the SDN-
tools may induce off-target mutations but the frequency is higher 
with the CRISPR/Cas9 tool (Zischewski et al., 2017). The reason 
for this is a less specific binding capacity. For CRISPR/Cas9, the 
recognition sequence is a 20-nucleotide sequence complementary 
to a 20-nucleotide genomic sequence located where the mutation 
is intended. Although a 20-nucleotide gRNA recognition sequence 
is long enough to occur only once in the vast majority of plant 
genomes, the specific binding is highest for the 8 to 12 nucleotides 
of the gRNA following the PAM sequence. This means that the 
gRNA can bind to sequences where there are mismatches between 
the gRNA and the plant DNA in the last 8 to 12 nucleotides (Hsu 
et al., 2013; Pattanayak et al., 2013; Cho et al., 2014).
It is difficult to make a general estimate of the off-target 
mutation frequency induced by the CRISPR/Cas9 tool in plants. 
In most of the CRISPR/Cas9 mutated crops developed, no 
analyzes have been performed for off-targets. Out of 1328 studies 
using CRISPR/Cas, TALENs, base editing, ZFN, and ODM, 252 
of them investigated off-target mutations. In around 3% of the 
analyzed potential of-target sites, unintended mutations were 
detected (Modrzejewski et al., 2019).
Examples of studies where the CRISPR/Cas9 off-target 
mutation frequencies have been investigated by PCR amplification 
of the off-target sequences, restriction fragment analysis and/or 
sequencing and where off-target mutations have been identified 
are shown in Table 2. The studies included show off-target 
mutation frequencies at these sites ranging between 0% and 
67.5%, depending on the targeted sequence and show that off-
target mutations are often induced when there are mismatches at 
positions 8 to 20 from the PAM sequence.
Off-target mutation frequencies can also be estimated by 
whole-genome sequencing (WGS). In order to get maximum 
information from this method, the appropriate controls need 
to be included, revealing also the mutagenesis effect of tissue 
culture and CRISPR/Cas.
In a recent study in rice, such an approach was used to 
distinguish pre-existing mutations, spontaneous mutations, and 
mutations caused by tissue culture and Agrobacterium-mediated 
transformation from off-target mutations (Tang et al., 2018). No 
off-target mutations were found in plants edited by 11 out of 12 
different Cas9-gRNA. The off-target sequences of the one Cas9-
gRNA where off-target mutations were found also contained 
mismatches at positions 1 to 8 from the PAM sequence. This 
indicates that in order to avoid off-target mutations there should 
be at least two mismatches at positions 1 to 8 from the PAM 
sequence between the target sequence and any potential off-target 
sequences. However, the most surprising result of the study was 
that the highest frequency of mutations in the edited rice plants 
were created by the tissue culture process which caused 102 to 248 
single nucleotide variations and 32 to 83 indels per mutated plant.
Similarly a study in cotton demonstrated that the most 
variations following Cas9-editing are due either to somaclonal 
variation or/and pre-existing/inherent variation from maternal 
plants, but not off-target effects (Li et al., 2019).
Despite the off-target mutations caused by NBT mutagenesis, 
non-planned mutations are still generated at much lower 
frequencies by the SDN-tools than by conventional mutation 
breeding. Here thousands of mutations may co-occur in every 
plant of a mutant TILLING population screened for a desired 
mutation (e.g. (Krasileva et al., 2017; Szarejko et al., 2017).
Precautions Against CRISPR/Cas Off-Target 
Mutations
Regardless of the very low SDN-based off-target mutation rates 
when compared to conventional mutagenesis, various strategies 
have been developed to further avoid or minimize off-target 
mutations by CRISPR/Cas. For plant species where the whole 
genome sequence is available, the main strategy is to design a 
very specific guide RNA sequence and to check for the presence 
of off-target sequences in the genome to which the guide RNA 
sequence could bind more non-specifically. Different software 
platforms have been developed to design guide RNA sequences 
which will very specifically bind to the sequence where the 
desired mutation is intended.
For plants where the genome has not yet been fully sequenced 
various strategies can be used to reduce the risk of off-target 
mutations. The CRISPR/Cas9 specificity can be improved by 
increasing the number of nucleotides required to recognize 
corresponding nucleotides in the plant genome. This can be done 
using the Cas9 nickase or Cas9 FokI fusion proteins strategies, 
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which both greatly reduce the number of possible off-target 
sequences [reviewed by (Bortesi and Fischer, 2015)]. Another 
strategy is to use the newly developed spCas9-HF or the Cas12a 
nuclease, both possessing higher specificity (Kleinstiver et al., 
2016a; Strohkendl et al., 2018). The delivery method used for 
the CRISPR/Cas9 tool to the cells also greatly influences the 
frequency of off-target mutations. Studies have shown that 
delivery of the CRISPR/Cas9 tool as RNP complexes reduce the 
number of off-target mutations since RNP complexes degrade 
much faster in the cell than DNA constructs (Kim et al., 2014; 
Liang et al., 2017).
RNP delivery seems to be one of the most promising tools for 
reducing off-targets. The RNP delivery is, however, currently only 
possible by protoplast transfection or by particle bombardment 
(Woo et al., 2015; Liang et al., 2017). Currently, this puts some 
limitations on a broad use of RNP as regeneration of plants from 
protoplasts is only possible from rather few plant species and highly 
efficient protocols for particle bombardment and plant regeneration 
is limited to a few species. Future developments might increase the 
number of plant species where RNP delivery is possible and make 
RNPs the preferred way of CRISPR/Cas delivery. Moreover, the 
number of plant species with fully sequenced genomes is constantly 
increasing and expands the number of plant species where 
maximum specific guide RNA sequences can be designed.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The status of new breeding technologies (in particular SDN1 
tools) with respect to the EU GMO legislation is important for 
the possibilities to exploit the potentials of the technologies in 
future European plant breeding. The ruling of the EU Court of 
TABLE 2 | Examples of studies where off-target mutations induced by CRISPR/Cas9 were identified by PCR/RE and/or sequencing.
Reference Species Delivery method Potential off-target sites Homologous genes
(Xie and Yang, 2013) Rice Stabile CRISPR/Cas9 Off-target mutation in one of three 
potential off-target sites containing a 
mismatch at position 11 and 15 from 
the PAM with a mutation frequency 
of 1.6%
(Endo et al., 2015) Rice Stabile
CRISPR/Cas9
For one gRNA, off-target mutations were 
investigated in 3 homologous genes.
One gene contained mismatches at 
positions 7, 16, and 18 from the PAM 
and showed no off-target mutations in 
31 plants.
Another gene contained a mismatch at 
position 18 from the PAM and showed 
off-target mutations in 19 out of 31 
(61.3%) plants.
The third gene contained mismatches 
at positions 10 and 16 from the PAM 
and showed off-target mutations in 17 
(54.8%) out of 31 plants
(Zhang et al., 2016) Wheat Stable CRISPR/Cas9 or 
Transient DNA CRISPR/Cas9 
or Transient RNA CRISPR/
Cas9
For one gRNA the software predicted 
eight potential off-target sites 
containing different mismatches at 
positions within the 20 to 6 bp from 
the PAM. No off-target mutations 
were identified in a total of 67 
regenerated mutants generated by 
either delivery method.
For one gRNA, off-target mutations 
were investigated in one homeologues 
gene with a mismatch at position 9 from 
the PAM. For stabile delivery with DNA, 
transient delivery with DNA. and transient 
delivery with RNA, off target mutations 
were identified in 2.0%, 2.3% and 0.4% 
of the regenerated mutants, respectively.
For another gRNA the software 
predicted 24 potential off-target sites 
containing different mismatches at 
positions within 20 to 1 bp from the 
PAM. No off-target mutations were 
identified in a total of 101 regenerated 
mutants generated by transient DNA 
delivery.
(Li et al., 2016) Rice Stable CRISPR/Cas9 For four different gRNAs, two potential 
off-target sites were investigated. 
Within these eight sites, off-target 
mutations were identified at three 
sites containing mismatches at 
position 13, 14 + 16–20, and 8 from 
the PAM with mutation frequencies of 
67.5%, 2.5% and 47.5%, respectively.
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Justice in July 2018 stating that organisms obtained by the new 
mutation techniques are not exempt from the legislation on the 
deliberate release of GMOs, makes it difficult, if not impossible, 
for plant breeders to make use of the new techniques, due 
to heavy costs associated with the approval of GM varieties 
(Eriksson et al., 2018). Realistically, only big companies can 
afford the costs and, hence, only these companies can probably 
make commercial use of the new genome editing technologies. 
On short terms, the influence on the European plant breeding 
industry, in particular small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), 
might not be strong although quite a number of SMEs may have 
stopped their own SDN projects after this ruling. However, in the 
longer perspective, this industry will probably stand weak in the 
competition with countries outside EU, like the US where USDA 
APHIS has formulated a policy in which crops that contain single 
nucleotide changes or deletions of any size would no longer be a 
regulated article, and Argentina and Brazil which have installed a 
process that results in that certain SDN plants are not subject to 
the provisions of their GMO legislation.
Paradoxically, mutant plants can now be achieved with 
mutagenesis methods exempted from the GM legislation just as 
fast as with the SDN1 techniques. Hence, with respect to targeting 
and speed a convergence between conventional mutagenesis and 
the SDN1 techniques has occurred. The two major differences 
are the precision and the number of off-target mutations, both of 
which favour the SDN1 methods.
With the current status of the EU legislation of plants with 
NBT mutations, reluctance by private industry to embark on 
projects implementing these techniques in generation of new 
varieties will probably persist. Already now, Europe falls behind 
with respect to patenting within the area of CRISPR-based 
plant biotechnology (Martin-Laffon et al., 2019). However, the 
techniques could still be used with success in research projects 
that address the molecular genetics of crop traits. Hand-in-hand 
with the use of classical mutation techniques through screening 
of TILLING populations NBT mutations could be utilized 
indirectly, although not optimally, in the modulation of crop 
traits. First, the precision and specificity of the NBT mutations 
could be used to clearly define strong mutation targets, without 
the genetic noise that would be present in classical mutation 
strategies. Subsequently, the defined efficient mutations could 
be re-constructed/re-gained by the use of classical mutation 
techniques. This is a cumbersome process, but still applicable, in 
particular due to the development of efficient methods to build 
mutant (TILLING) populations and efficient methods to screen 
them for mutations of specific target genes (Jankowicz-Cieslak 
et al., 2017).
The development of crop varieties usually takes many years 
and, thus, the effects on the market and in agriculture will 
have an equivalent lag. For proper exploitation, it is therefore 
important that implementation of the new precision breeding 
techniques is started now, maybe in strategies in combination 
with TILLING approaches as outlined above. The fear, however, 
could be that the decision by the EU court will still make the 
industry reluctant to go into research and development directed 
toward the use of the new techniques. This would only aggravate 
the long term weakening of the European breeding industry in 
the global competition.
For some crops and traits, in particular ornamentals 
and garden/vegetable seeds, new cultivars have a short 
developmental horizon, e.g., when it comes to developing new 
flower colours. Since the market of these is global, the impact of 
the new techniques on Europe can come on rather short terms, if 
restrictions on their use, as expected, will be limited in Asia, South 
America, Canada, and the US. This raises the issues of detection 
of genetic modifications introduced by the new techniques. In 
Europe, they are regulated according to the current EU GMO 
legislation and, hence, subject to strict approval, but it is close 
to impossible to make unambiguous tests for the introduced 
mutations, since there are no marks distinguishing them from 
natural mutations/variants. This situation will get even worse 
on longer terms, when varieties of major European crops with 
new NBT mutation induced traits can enter the European 
market from the surrounding world and be crossed with locally 
developed varieties. From the regulatory aspect, this situation 
will not be sustainable and thus unacceptable for the European 
plant breeding industry. Long-term stability in this area calls for 
clarifications at the political level of EU legislation.
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New plant breeding technologies (NPBTs) are increasingly used for developing new plants 
with novel traits. The science tells us that those plants in general are as safe as than those 
once developed using “conventional” plant breeding methods. The knowledge about the 
induced changes and properties of the new plants by using NPBTs is more precise. 
This should lead to the conclusion that plants developed using NPBTs should not be 
regulated differently than those developed using “conventional” plant breeding methods. 
This contribution discusses the economics of regulating new plant breeding technologies. 
We first develop the theoretical model and elaborate on the different regulatory 
approaches being used and compare their advantages and disadvantages. Then we 
provide a perspectives on EU regulation around mutagenesis-based New Plant Breeding 
Techniques (NPBT), formed by new insights from a survey among Dutch plant breeding 
companies. The survey measures the attitude of breeding companies towards the ruling 
of the EU Court of Justice that subjected the use of CRISPR-Cas in the development of 
new plant varieties under the general EU regulations around GMOs. The results show that 
plant breeders experience a financial barrier because of the ruling, with perceived negative 
impact on competitiveness and investments in CRISPR-Cas as a result. The degree of 
negative impact differs however significantly among seed-sectors and company sizes. 
One of the most striking results was the relative optimism of companies in the sector 
about more lenient legislation in the next five years, despite the stated negative effects.
Keywords: CRISPR-Cas, regulation, plant breeding sector, impact, Dutch plant breeders, Court of Justice of the 
European Union, genetically modified organism, new plant breeding technologies
INTRODUCTION
The design of a regulatory regime for new plant breeding technologies (NPBTs) is under discussion 
in the European Union (EU), the United States (US), Canada, and many other parts of the world. 
In particular, it is being discussed whether or not they should be regulated similarly to genetically 
modified organisms (GMOS) or non-GMOs, or whether they need special regulations (Eriksson 
et al., 2019). In the case of the EU, since NPBTs include a wide range of methods, some applications 
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will result in crops to be considered a GMO under the EU 
regulatory system, and others not (see Sprink et al., 2016 for an 
overview). Even if they are considered to be a GMO, simplified 
approval processes might be possible (Purnhagen et al., 2018).
The EU policies on NPBTs will have implications for 
international trade and regulatory systems in other countries 
(Wesseler et al., 2017), and vice versa. Further, regulatory 
approaches affect the duration and cost of the approval 
process with related implications for investments in plant 
breeding (Kalaitzandonakes et al., 2007; Smart et al., 2017; 
Smyth et al., 2017).
Stringent regulations of GMOs have impacts expanding 
beyond agriculture. It is often presumed that the stringent 
regulations of GMOs in the EU only affect the agriculture 
and food sector, but not the medical sector and other parts 
of the bioeconomy. While this line of reasoning may apply to 
consumer attitudes toward biotechnology, it is misleading in 
a broader context. There is some evidence of negative spill-
overs of the presumed stringent regulations on clusters of 
regularly interspaced short palindromic repeat (CRISPR)-
based technologies in the EU to the medical as well as other 
sectors. A recently published survey (Martin-Laffon, 2019) on 
the CRISPR-patent landscape shows patent applications in the 
EU are substantially lacking behind other regions in the world, 
and not only in agriculture but also in the fields of medical, 
industrial, and technical applications (Table 1).
In this contribution the economics of regulating NPBTs 
and their implications are presented and discussed. First, a 
general economic model of regulation and its implications for 
investment in NPBTs is introduced, followed by a presentation of 
the potential implications based on a recent survey of the Dutch 
plant breeding sector.
The Economics of Regulating New Plant 
Breeding Technologies
The demand for regulating NPBTs originates from concerns 
about potential negative implications for human health and the 
environment. There are two strategies for regulation that can 
be combined. One is imposing ex-ante regulatory standards 
for prior approval before commercialization. Second is ex-post 
liability rules to compensate for damages and to penalize non-
compliance with ex-ante regulations. Economic research analyzes 
the mixture of these two regulatory approaches (see e.g., Kolstad 
et al., 1990).
The advantage of ex-ante regulatory standards is that potential 
damage can be reduced before damage actually happens. The 
disadvantage is that those standards apply uniformly without 
recognizing heterogeneity among applications as well as 
applicants. Some applications and/or applicants might be over-
regulated while others might be under-regulated (e.g., Shavell, 
1984). The main problem for ex-ante regulatory standards is 
caused by information asymmetries between the regulator and 
the firm. The firm has more detailed knowledge about the product 
than the regulator. Firms in general are required to provide a 
set of standard regulatory information, but regulators have the 
option to seek additional case-specific information. This option 
can increase the cost and delay approval. The approval process 
may entail performance standards that have to be followed, 
which can in some cases be prohibitively high, such as in the case 
of some GMO coexistence regulations (Beckmann et al., 2010).
Ex-post liability applies when companies face legal challenges 
from externalities of e.g., NPBTs, such as health or environmental 
claims. Those threats provide incentives for companies to take 
ex-ante voluntary precautions to address potential health and 
environmental safety issues. Shleifer (2010) notes that perfect 
ex-post liability regulations would be sufficient to ensure that 
users of NPBTs do not expose themselves to liability greater than 
the damage costs they would face. If the penalties correspond to 
social costs, then its outcomes are optimal, which is consistent 
with Coase (1960). However, a perfect system requires that 
the damage and the liable party can be correctly identified and 
that juries are not corrupt or biased. When this is not the case, 
because of imperfect information and financial considerations, 
a policy combining ex-ante regulatory standards and ex-post 
liability systems can improve social welfare (Kolstad et al., 1990). 
The challenge is to identify the right combination of ex-ante 
regulatory standards and ex-post liability rules.
The incentive for firms to invest in NPBTs largely depends 
on the net benefits of the investment, which are influenced by 
ex-ante regulatory standards and ex-post liability. In making 
an investment decision, the product life can be divided in four 
important phases: research and development (R&D); approval 
(A); marketing (M); post-marketing liability (L). All these 
phases are characterized by uncertainty over the benefits and 
costs as well as by their time length (see e.g., Purnhagen and 
Wesseler, 2019).
The R&D phase includes multiple uncertainties including the 
probability of success and the time taken to obtain it, the costs 
of testing new ideas, as well as upscaling them. These costs are 
affected by regulation, as compliance with regulations may extend 
the duration of research in the lab and the field, and increase the 
costs. Some countries even have strict field trial requirements 
that are often technically infeasible and economically unviable 
(Kuntz, 2012). The requirement to publicize the location of field 
trials in some EU member states, e.g., has resulted in public 
protests making it almost impossible for companies to conduct 
those trials.
The approval process can also add substantial costs. Research 
shows that the direct costs of the approval process varies 
substantially, from a few thousand USD to several millions 
(Smyth et al., 2017), depending on the regulatory environment, 
TABlE 1 | Number of CRISPR Patent Families by Technical Fields and EU Share.
Technical field Total number European Union
No. %
Agricultural 374 18 4.8
Industrial 192 23 12.0
Medical 614 19 3.1
Technical improvement 1,052 76 7.7
Source: based on data published in Martin-Laffon et al. (2019). Regional 
identification of patent applications has been done by first priority date.
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while the time length of the approval process also varies widely 
(Jin et al., 2019). The time length of the approval process adds 
additional costs for plant breeders as it delays market access, 
but also for other participants in the food and feed supply 
chain, caused by the asynchronicity in approval at country level 
affecting international trade (European Commission, 2007; 
Backus et al., 2009).
The production and marketing of approved products also 
faces regulations. The coexistence regulations in the EU may 
severely limit where GMO traits can be produced and thus 
increase production costs. Food and feed products derived 
from the use of NPBTs also need to comply, as other food and 
feed products, with the EU laws on food and feed (Purnhagen, 
2019). Furthermore, many countries have implemented labeling 
policies for GMOs that make GMOs differentiated products from 
non-GMOs (Castellari et al., 2018). This poses an additional 
challenge when there is no detectable difference between NPBTs 
and “conventional” products for international trade, product 
differentiation via labeling, and coexistence.
In summary, the regulatory environment effects the costs and 
benefits of investments in NPBTs. As the regulatory environment 
differs by country and region, this provides different incentives 
for plant breeders for their choice of investments.
Economic Implications of Regulation and 
Delayed Approvals for Plant Breeding: The 
Case of the European Union
In the summer of 2018, the Court of Justice of the EU ruled 
that on CRISPR-based plant breeding technologies are not 
immediately exempted from existing EU regulation of GMOs 
(Purnhagen et al., 2018). The ruling frustrated many in the 
field of biotechnology and led experts to speculate about its 
potential effects on EU-based plant breeders. These concerns 
relate to the cost of approval procedures and their potential 
negative impact on competitiveness and firms’ investments in 
CRISPR-based technologies (Callaway, 2018). They include 
wider implications for food security (Zaidi et al., 2019) and 
the development of the bioeconomy, particularly in Europe 
(Wesseler and von Braun, 2017).
In the EU, cultivation of genetically modified plants is 
nearly negligible due to procedures required for bringing plants 
classified as GMOs to market. In 2017, only 131,535 (James, 
2017) of the 11.9 million total hectares for permanent crops 
(Eurostat, 2018) were planted with the one genetically modified 
crop approved for cultivation, an insect-resistant maize. It 
was expected that the introduction of new more precise and 
nature-like plant breeding techniques, especially CRISPR-Cas, 
would overcome the resistance to the application of modern 
biotechnology in plant breeding and unleash the potential of 
improved plant varieties (Eriksson, 2019). The recent ruling by 
the EU’s highest court that requires plants developed by these 
mutagenesis-based modification methods to follow the approval 
process for GMOs, therefore came as a blow (Purnhagen et 
al., 2019). First of all, the theoretical model suggests the EU 
GMO approval procedure to be a major barrier for the use of 
CRISPR-Cas in plant breeding. Besides that, it is expected that 
the nature of the approval procedure has negative consequences 
for the investments in CRISPR-Cas technique. Furthermore, 
one can expect the decision to lead to competitive disadvantage 
for plant breeding companies. A recent survey of Dutch plant 
breeding companies gives a first empirical insight on the impact 
of the ruling.
Among the EU-members, the Netherlands has an especially 
strong position in the development, propagation and trade 
of reproduction materials. Around 40% of all globally traded 
vegetable seeds and 60% of traded seed potatoes are of Dutch 
origin. The Dutch seed sector also contributes 60% of applications 
for plant breeder rights (Government of the Netherlands, 
2017), making it a core location for the development of plant 
reproduction materials in the EU. These characteristics make 
the sector a sensible object of study for a first assessment of the 
expected effects and implications of the ruling.
MATERIAlS AND METHODS
The population we consider consists of companies that are 
affiliated with PLANTUM, the association that serves the 
interests of around 350 companies in the plant breeding sector in 
the Netherlands. In 2011, of the then 400 Dutch companies active 
in the plant breeding sector, 385 were affiliated with PLANTUM 
(Kokcis et al., 2013). The high coverage of the PLANTUM 
database shows that this population includes 87.5 per cent of 
Dutch plant breeding companies.
To judge the representativeness of the sample, usually a 
description of the population should be sketched. Unfortunately, 
no quantitative overview exists of the Dutch plant breeding 
sector, categorized by seed sector. However, considering the 
former high coverage ratio of the PLANTUM company database, 
the population we consider can be assumed to cover a vast 
majority of the population. Within the online company database 
the companies which are categorized under “agriculture” (31 
units), “fruit trees” (1 unit), “in vitro laboratoria” (9 units), 
“vegetable seeds” (25 units), and a selection of the relevant actors 
(9 out of 22) within “other services” have been considered to be 
part of the population we consider. This led to a population of 75 
units. Due to the absence of contact details, three units had to be 
removed (all in “agriculture”) resulting in a sampling population 
of 72 (Table 2).
The online survey was distributed by e-mail to the general 
contact address of the company. The guiding text asked to 
forward the survey to the relevant R&D manager within the 
company. Whenever the address was available, the survey was 
directly sent to the relevant R&D manager or department. The 
survey was open for response from 7th to 20th February 2019. 
During the course of the survey, two reminders were sent to the 
units in the sample.
The survey starts with four questions on the profile of the 
company in terms of size, seed sector, country of headquarter and 
main market. The number of employees was chosen as the measure 
of company size, since it is expected to lead to more reliable data 
than sales. The European Commission (EC) definition of company 
size, defined in EU Recommendation 2003/361, was followed. 
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The respondents were also requested to state their understanding 
of the impact of regulation on the company. This way, any severe 
bias due to a respondent’s lack of knowledge could be identified 
and possibly corrected, ex post. The body of the survey consisted of 
eight questions about: 1) the respondents overview on the impact 
of regulatory policies on the company; 2) the role of CRISPR-Cas 
within the company; 3) the effects of the structure of the current 
GMO regulatory framework on investment in CRISPR-Cas; 
the impact of the recent court ruling on 4) the investments and 
5) the competitiveness of the company; 6) the use of alternative 
technologies; 7) the prospects of changes in EU legislation and 
8) its effects on the Dutch plant breeding sector. These questions 
were answered on a five-point Likert-scaled range of response 
possibilities, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. For 
some questions a not relevant-option was provided. Lastly, there 
was room for additional comments. The Likert-scale is one of the 
most used and reliable scales to measure opinions and underlying 
motives of behavior (Burns and Bush, 2008). Nevertheless, the 
correct way to deal with the data resulting from surveys with 
a Likert-type scale has often been debated. Specifically, the 
disagreement addresses whether resulting data should be dealt 
with as ordinal or cardinal measurements. This has implications 
for the statistical methods that need to be used in the analysis of 
the data. Although it is rather customary to deal with such data as 
being cardinal, the intervals cannot be assumed to be equal from 
a theoretical perspective (Sullivan and Artino, 2013). Considering 
this, and further assumptions on the structure of the data (e.g., 
sample size and normality), in this research it seems better justified 
to regard the data as being ordinal for statistical analysis. Therefore, 
non-parametric tests will be applied. However, it should be noted 
that averages will be used in the graphical presentation of the data 
(Figure 1). Averages are preferred in the graphical presentation, 
because they pose less risk for extreme (i.e., misleading) results 
compared to other central tendencies (e.g., modus). One should, 
however, consider the ordinal character of the data when directly 
comparing means of subgroups. An overview of the complete 
survey and the data is provided in the Supplementary Materials.
SURvEy RESUlTS
As the sample is based on the subjective view of representatives 
of the firm, it is important to consider the capability of the 
respondent to form a well-founded opinion on the statements. 
Therefore, the respondents have been asked to self-assess their 
knowledge on the impact of regulatory policies on the company. 
The majority (72.8%) of the respondents agree or strongly agree 
with the statement of having a good overview on the impact of 
regulatory policies on their company. Only four (12.1%) of the 
respondents disagree with this statement. This gives confidence 
for a high validity of the answers on the core measurements of 
the survey. Furthermore, the importance of the CRISPR-Cas 
technology for the companies responding is of interest. About 
45% of the respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement 
“The use of CRISPR-Cas technology plays an important role within 
the development of the products of our company.” In general, the 
results show no clear tendency in the current importance of use 
within the companies across the different seed sectors. Also, no 
significant differences were found when testing on differences 
across company sizes.
The main results of the survey are provided in Figure 1, 
showing the average scores, differentiated by seed sector in 
Figure 1A and by company size in Figure 1B.
Figure 1 shows the perception of negative effects of the ruling 
on investments and competitiveness. Micro-sized companies 
expect significantly milder effects on competition than larger-
sized companies. The relatively technology-intensive sector of 
vegetable seeds development (Kokcis et al., 2013) expects the 
strongest negative effects on competitiveness and investments 
in CRISPR-Cas applications. Companies in the relatively 
technology-extensive seed-potato development have diverse 
expectations (Q6). While they most strongly believe regulatory 
costs outweigh the benefits of CRISPR-Cas (b), on average they 
disagree that the ruling will negatively affect competitiveness. 
This contrasts with expectations of experts in the field (Van ‘t 
Hoog, 2019). CRISPR-Cas has especially high potential in 
speeding up seed-potato development times (Andersson et al., 
2018), but breeding companies still expect the bureaucratic 
hurdle to be too costly. For the potato production in particular 
this is disappointing as CRISPR-Cas applications are expected to 
control major diseases that would allow to substantially reduce 
fungicide use with related benefits for the environment such as 
reduced environmental and emission of greenhouse gases.
In the survey, Q8 measures the effect of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) ruling on investments in CRISPR-
Cas technology among Dutch plant breeding companies. The 
TABlE 2 | Distribution of the population (sample) across the defined categories of seed sectors and company sizes.
Seed 
potato
vegetables Agriculture Fruit trees In vitro 
labs
Other Multi Total Share 
(%)
Micro (<10 empl.) 2 (3) 3 (1) 1 (0) 2 (0) 1 (1) 9 (5) 13 (15)
Small (10 to 49 empl.) 3 (1) 10 (4) 4 (2) 1 (0) 5 (0) 3 (2) 1 (0) 27 (9) 38 (27)
Medium (50 to 249 empl.) 1 (1) 4 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2) 3 (0) 0 (2) 12 (9) 17 (27)
Large (250+ empl.) 4 (2) 8 (5) 8 (3) 2 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 24 (10) 33 (30)
Total 10 (7) 25 (12) 15 (7) 1 (0) 9 (2) 9 (2) 3 (3) 72 (33)
Share (%) 14 (21) 35 (36) 21 (21) 1 (0) 13 (6) 13 (6) 4 (9) 100 (100)
Categorization is based on company profile as publicly provided by the companies. Company-size categories as defined in EU recommendation 2003/361. 
Differences in company sizes are the result of the categorization by companies themselves, as reported in brackets, as opposed to the categorization based on 
publicly available information.
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vast majority of the respondents agree or strongly agree (30.3% 
and 39.4%, respectively) with the statement in Q8: “The 
decision of the EU Court of Justice has a negative impact on the 
investments in CRISPR-Cas technology within the company.” 
There appears to be a strong negative effect of the decision 
of the CJEU on the investments in CRISPR-Cas technology. 
Looking at Figure 1A, the mean responses to statement Q8 
appear to differ across company size. The micro- and small-
sized companies agree the most on average and experience 
the least negative impact on investments. The Mann-Whitney 
U test statistically confirms this difference. The two-tailed 
(exact) significance is 0.013, which shows that micro-sized 
companies agree significantly less with the proposed statement 
in Q8. This is not surprising, as it is intuitively less likely for 
micro-sized companies to be able to invest in CRISPR-Cas 
technology anyway. The differentiation in the responses among 
company sizes is confirmed by the results of the corresponding 
Kruskal-Wallis test (see Supplementary Material for details). 
Looking at the differences in responses across sectors, mainly 
the vegetable sector indicates strong negative effects on 
investments in CRISPR-Cas because of the CJEU ruling. The 
vegetable sector appeared to agree significantly more with 
statement Q8 than companies in other sectors. This result has 
been denoted with letter c in Figure 1B.
The third hypothesized effect of the CJEU judgment relates 
to the comparative disadvantage that plant breeding companies 
in the Dutch plant breeding sector may be confronted with. 
This hypothesis was primarily tested by the statement Q9: 
“The decision of the EU Court of Justice has a negative impact 
on the competitiveness of our company.” A majority of 60.6% of 
the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, 
whereas 24.2% disagreed. Testing any differences between 
company size and the (negative) effects on competition by means 
of a Kruskal-Wallis test, provides no significant differences. 
However, the boxplot diagram in the Supplementary Material 
shows a large difference between the modus of the results on 
statement Q9 of micro-sized companies compared to other-sized 
companies, while the Mann-Whitney U test does not confirm 
significant differences and the result therefore needs to be 
regarded with care.
Nevertheless, the different effect in competitiveness for the 
micro-sized companies as compared to larger sized companies 
FIGURE 1 | Overview of average results of the survey statements on a five-point Likert-scale, excluding not relevant (0) responses ranging from (1) strongly disagree 
to (5) strongly agree. Graph panel (A) gives the results differentiated by company size, whereas panel (B) differentiates the results on seed sector. Statistical 
results graph panel (A): a* = two-sided significant difference micro from rest (P < 0.05) and two-sided significant different distributions among all groups (P < 0.05). 
Statistical results graph panel (B): b = two-sided significant difference potato from all (P < 0.05). c = two-sided significant difference vegetable from all (P < 0.05). 
d = two-sided significant different potato from all (P < 0.05).
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might, as suggested by one respondent, be due to the initial 
accessibility of CRISPR-Cas technique. Smaller, less capital-
intensive companies are expected to have lower accessibility 
to this technique. Therefore, these companies might enjoy 
some benefit from the ruling of the CJEU, as it equalizes the 
playing field in terms of use of technology. In the additional 
comments, a respondent from a micro-sized (<10 employees) 
remarked: “We have no possibilities to use these new techniques 
and therefore can profit slightly from the EU ban on these 
techniques.” This level playing field has also been pointed out 
by an EU market-oriented, large (>250 employees) company 
as well. One respondent commented for example: “Only a level 
playing field in the EU is crucial. End customers will get the 
products they want. If that is food without mutations, we’re fine 
with that.” This would, however, only be true for companies 
who compete within the EU-market. For EU-based companies 
who primarily compete on non-EU markets, the limiting 
factors of the CJEU ruling might lead to larger negative effects 
in competitiveness. Note that two of the three respondents who 
indicated that they are moving their research outside the EU, 
had a non-EU main market. This relation between main-market 
and (negative) effect on competitiveness could, however, not 
be confirmed statistically. Based on the Kruskal-Wallis test, no 
significant difference between the effects on competitiveness 
across the main market (two-sided asymptotic sig.: 0.170) 
could be seen. Also, no significant result was found when 
differentiating between companies with main market within 
the EU or non-EU (2-sided asymptotic sig, 0.865). Although 
the latter result was likely to have low significance due to the 
small number (N = 5) of respondents having a non-EU main 
market. Besides the strong tendency toward agreement with 
the statement in results of Q9, three respondents specifically 
expressed their concerns about the competitiveness for the 
EU. Most striking is that the companies in the potato sector 
on average disagree with the statement Q9, and therefore differ 
from all other sectors. This can also be statistically confirmed by 
a Mann-Whitney U test. Further analysis among the company 
characteristics shows that, with one exemption (Africa), all 
companies in the potato sector appeared to have their main 
market within the EU. Moreover, the two respondents who 
pointed out the importance of a level-playing field (over 
the importance of the use of CRISPR-Cas), were both in the 
potato sector.
Besides testing the hypothesized negative effects of the CJEU 
Ruling, the results of the survey allow insights in two more 
factors that are related to the impact of the hypothesized effects 
of the ruling of the CJEU. First of all, the effects of the decision 
depend on the existence of equally important alternatives. When 
the substitutability of CRISPR-Cas technique is high, any limiting 
factors of the EU GMO procedure might be diminished. The 
response to the statement (Q10): “There are equally important 
alternatives to CRISPR-Cas technology that are now being adopted 
within the company,” indicates that the substitutability of CRISPR-
Cas appears to be rather low. Only 15.2% of the respondents 
agreed on having equally important technologies adopted within 
the company. Especially in vitro labs and companies who operate 
in multiple sectors (including operations as in vitro lab) appear to 
disagree with statement Q10.
Surprisingly, there appears to be a relatively positive attitude 
of the respondents toward the prospects of the strictness of the 
EU legislation around mutagenesis-based NPBTs. A majority 
of 60.6% of the respondents agreed to some degree with the 
statement in Q11: “I believe precise mutagenetic technologies like 
CRISPR-Cas will be less stringently regulated within the EU in 
the near future (next 5 years).” When looking at the differences 
in company sizes (Figure 1A), large companies appear to have 
a relative more pessimistic view, compared to smaller-sized 
companies. However, no significant differences were found. 
Among the seed sectors (Figure 1B), companies operating in the 
potato sector are relatively pessimistic, as compared to the other 
sectors. However, also no significant difference was found.
This general positivism about the development of legislation 
in the near future (within the next 5 years), is somewhat contrary 
to the pessimism when asking about the position of the Dutch 
plant breeding sector as a world leader in the development of 
seeds for food production. The majority of 63.6% agreed with 
the statement (Q12) that the Dutch plant breeding sector will 
lose its leading position in the development of seeds for food 
production. There seems to be a strong consensus independent of 
company size (Figure 1A). The same applies when differentiating 
the results by seed sector (Figure 1B), although companies in the 
potato sector appear to be relatively less pessimistic.
DISCUSSION AND CONClUSIONS
The decision of the CJEU currently places plants produced 
by NPBTs under the regulations for GMOs. This includes 
approval and marketing costs, and may result in disincentives 
for investment in NPBTs in particular in the EU. The survey of 
Dutch plant breeding companies largely confirms this intuition. 
The survey also shows that companies with markets outside the 
EU intend to reallocate their research. Companies that mainly 
serve the European market and are smaller in size expect their 
competitiveness to be less affected by the ruling. Nevertheless, the 
companies agree that the decision will have negative implications 
for the competitiveness of the Dutch plant breeding sector. 
Surprisingly, the companies are very optimistic that mutagenetic 
plant breeding technologies like CRISPR-Cas will be less strongly 
regulated in the near future.
There is some support for this optimism. A number of 
stakeholder groups have urged the European Commission to 
update the approval process for GMOs. A citizens initiative 
launched by students (https://eci.ec.europa.eu/011/public/#/
screen/home) asks for the development of a list of plant breeding 
technologies that will be exempted from the Directive 2001/18 and 
would not be considered as GMOs. This is a sensible approach, 
as it would also avoid the need for labeling products and related 
problems derived from plants developed by exempted NPBTs. 
The process for changing the Directive 2001/18 will be difficult. 
EU member states hold deeply entrenched and diverging views 
on GMOs (Smart et al., 2015), and finding a qualified majority for 
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a change will remain a challenge for the European Commission. 
The results of the survey presented and the results on the patent 
landscape for CRISPR illustrate the importance and urgency for 
a change if the EU does not want to fall any further behind in 
the development and use of the technology. They also suggest 
negative implications for African development and adaptation to 
climate change (Wesseler et al., 2017).
Regulating NPBTs similar to “conventional” breeding 
technologies does not imply that food products will not be 
regulated. In the EU, food products will still be regulated under 
the EU food law (Purnhagen, 2019). The same can be observed 
for other countries (Eriksson et al., 2019). If NPBTs do not fall 
under the GMO regulation, labeling for food products will be 
simplified and it reduces costs. A voluntary market for negative 
labeling in the form of “does not contain…” may emerge 
similarly to what has been observed in the case of GMOs in 
the US and the EU (e.g., Castellari et al., 2018; Venus et al., 
2018). The advantage of such a labeling scheme is that it is a 
market-driven response to a demand among some consumers, 
and similar to products sold under an organic label. Companies 
participating in such a labeling scheme do this at their own 
risk and can even differentiate their products according to the 
labeling schemes.
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Since the 1990s, the exchange of genetic resources has been increasingly regulated. The
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) and the Nagoya Protocol recognize that
countries have sovereign rights over their genetic resources and provide a framework for
domestic legislations on Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS). However, within the rules of
these international agreements, countries can follow their own interpretations and
establish their own rules and regulations, resulting in restricted access to genetic
resources and limited benefit-sharing, effects that are contrary to the objectives of
these agreements. Although the ITPGRFA’s Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-
Sharing provides opportunities for easier access to plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture (PGRFA), plant genebanks face increasing complexity in their operation.
Adding material to genebank collections has become more difficult, not only because
collecting missions need to be negotiated with national and local authorities, but also
because acquiring material from other collections is only possible if the origin of the
material is properly documented and is done in compliance with regulations. Genebanks
may only provide access to their own collections if the material that is to be released is
distributed in compliance with a) the conditions under which the material was received and
b) the national laws of the country where the genebank is located. The only way
genebanks can deal with this new complexity, apart from ceasing to add or distribute
material, is by setting up proper procedures to document the origin of every accession
and the conditions for their use and further distribution. To prevent a further decrease in
access to PGRFA, complexity must be fought. Applying the ITPGRFA’s Standard Material
Transfer Agreement (SMTA) only, even for material that does not fall under the ITPGRFA,
would simplify matters. The scope of the ITPGRFA could be expanded to include all crops.
Furthermore, certain ambiguities (e.g. regarding in situmaterial and wild species) could be
resolved. Finally, compliance with the ITPGRFA should be improved and better monitored.
Keywords: genetic diversity, conservation, genebanks, Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS), Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA),
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Plant genetic resources (PGR) include cultivated varieties,
obsolete varieties, landraces, wild species (including crop wild
relatives), breeders’ lines, research populations and mutants.
Only a small proportion of all the available PGR are used, and
humans depend on a very limited number of crops, in particular
wheat, rice and maize, for the largest part of their caloric intake
(McCouch et al, 2013; Khoury et al., 2014). The development and
expanding cultivation of modern crop cultivars has led to
decreased genetic diversity within crops (Langridge et al, 2006;
Feuillet et al, 2008; Rufo et al., 2019). This loss of genetic diversity
could make adaptation of crops to changing environmental
conditions more difficult. Increased temperatures and changing
rainfall patterns will cause geographic shifts in suitable cropping
areas, and currently well-adapted crops or cultivars may become
less adapted or even unsuitable for cultivation. Diversity is
needed for crossing and selection, and diversity between and
within crops (e.g. by using landraces and crop wild relatives in
crop breeding programs) will need to be exploited in order to
respond to climate change and to meet future food security
challenges (Jump et al., 2009; Ramirez-Villegas et al., 2013; Lopes
et al., 2015; Dempewolf et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2017).
With regard to the conservation of PGR diversity, in situ and
ex situ conservation can be distinguished. Ex situ conservation is
defined as: “the conservation of components of biological
diversity outside their natural habitats” , and in situ
conservation as: “the conservation of ecosystems and natural
habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations
of species in their natural surroundings and, in the case of
domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where
they have developed their distinctive properties” (UNEP, 1992).
In ex situ conservation, the diversity in stored material is fixed
because the material is not subject to further natural selection or
selection by farmers. (Obviously, while every regeneration of the
material will result in slight changes in the genetic composition,
maintaining the ‘genetic integrity’ of the accessions is the goal of
ex situ conservation.) In situ conservation, on the other hand, is
more dynamic, but is threatened by climate change and the
resulting genetic erosion that can be expected to occur (e.g.
Peñuelas et al, 2018). Therefore, the two types of conservation are
viewed as complementary.
Genebanks conserve PGR under ex situ conditions, make
them available for current use and keep them available for future
use. As PGR diversity is the foundation of food security and
climate resilience, genebanks play an important role in
addressing the effects of climate change and other challenges to
food security (Pellegrini and Balatti, 2016; Fu, 2017; Westengen
et al., 2018). While genebanks previously catered above all to the
demands of plant breeders, they have become more involved in
long-term conservation and the distribution of PGRmaterial to a
wider range of users (Westengen et al., 2018). Some genebanks,
such as the Centre for Genetic Resources, the Netherlands
(CGN), have evolved into genetic resource centers. They carry
out not only ex situ conservation but also in situ conservation
as well as providing services to support PGR users in finding,
selecting, obtaining and using PGR.Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 294Users of PGR from genebanks often look for specific traits,
such as drought tolerance, resistance to diseases or pests, yield
potential, or levels of nutrients or other compounds, e.g. for use
in a breeding program. They may also seek diversity for one or
more traits for use in a scientific study of a particular trait.
Genebanks or plant genetic resources centers help the user to
identify the most suitable material and obtain it. Because of ease
of access, the primary source of this material often is the
collection of the national genebank, followed by other
genebanks or ex situ sources, and finally in situ sources,
including natural habitats for crop wild relatives and land of
farmers or hobby growers for cultivated material.
However, since the 1990s, obtaining PGR for inclusion in
genebanks and further distribution to breeders and other users
has become increasingly difficult. Awareness of the actual or
potential value of PGR has grown, and as a result an increasing
number of countries are asserting their rights to genetic
resources. The concept of Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS)
was introduced, with ABS being defined as the regulation of
access to and utilization of genetic resources and the sharing of
the benefits arising from this utilization among users and
providers. International ABS agreements were negotiated
establishing that states can exercise rights over their genetic
resources. This awareness and the resulting agreements have
translated into well-structured regulation of access to PGR
through domestic legislation in a number of countries. In other
countries, however, it has resulted in confusion regarding access
to PGR pending the legislative process, or confusion because of
the complexity of the regulations.
This article describes the main international ABS agreements
concerning PGR (International Access and Benefit-Sharing
Agreements Relevant for PGR), the implications of these
agreements (Implications) and the ways genebanks cope with
these implications (How Genebanks Cope). In the final section
(Recommendations and Conclusions) the authors outline some
recommendations and conclusions.INTERNATIONAL ACCESS AND
BENEFIT-SHARING AGREEMENTS
RELEVANT FOR PGR
The Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD)
The three objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD, www.cbd.int/convention/), which came into force on 29
December 1993, are the conservation of biological diversity, the
sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic
resources (UNEP, 1992). In the text of the CBD, genetic
resources are defined as: “genetic material of actual or potential
value”, while genetic material is defined as: “any material of
plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional
units of heredity” (UNEP, 1992).
Prior to the CBD, PGR were generally seen as a common
heritage of mankind; PGR were usually freely collected, used, andJanuary 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1712
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that states can exercise control over the genetic resources in their
territories. According to the CBD, prior informed consent of the
party providing the resources is needed for access to genetic
resources (unless that party has decided otherwise) and use and
benefit-sharing must be done according to mutually
agreed terms.
Although the CBD is primarily focused on wild biodiversity, it
also affects the exchange of plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture (PGRFA). The special role of PGRFA was recognized
at the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the
CBD, held in Nairobi in 1992, when a resolution was adopted
stating that solutions were to be sought for matters concerning
PGR. This would in due time result in the establishment of the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (ITPGRFA).The International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture
(ITPGRFA)
To address PGRFA in the post-CBD era, the FAO drafted and
adopted the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA, www.fao.org/plant-treaty),
which came into force on 29 June 2004 (FAO, 2002). The
objectives of the ITPGRFA are very similar to those of the
CBD but focus on PGRFA: the conservation and sustainable
use of PGRFA and the sharing of the benefits arising from their
use (FAO, 2002). PGRFA are defined as: “any genetic material of
plant origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture”
(FAO, 2002). The ITPGRFA confirms the sovereign rights of
countries over their genetic resources but aims to facilitate the
exchange of PGRFA by the establishment of a Multilateral
System of Access and Benefit-Sharing (MLS) in which PGRFA
are exchanged under a Standard Material Transfer Agreement
(SMTA), instead of under the prior informed consent and
mutually agreed terms prescribed by the CBD.
The MLS is a global pool of PGRFA, meant to facilitate access
to these PGRFA as well as to achieve fair and equitable sharing of
the benefits arising from their utilization. PGRFA may be added
to this pool by countries and the institutions under their control,
by natural and legal persons in the contracting parties and by
international institutes (Manzella, 2013). The MLS does not
extend to all PGRFA but covers a set of 35 food crops and 29
forages, which are listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA. The
selection of this set of crops and forages was based on criteria
of food security and interdependence and was a negotiated
compromise between countries favoring the inclusion of all
PGRFA and countries favoring the inclusion of only a limited
number of crops (Visser, 2013). According to Article 11 of the
ITPGRFA, the MLS is to include all PGRFA of the food crops
and forages listed in Annex I that are “under the management
and control of the Contracting Parties and in the public domain”
(FAO, 2002). PGRFA that belong to the food crops and forages
listed in Annex I but do not fulfil the other conditions are not
automatically included in the MLS but can be included on a
voluntary basis by natural and legal persons holding theseFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 395PGRFA. Access to materials in the MLS under the SMTA is
granted only for their use in research, breeding and training for
food and agriculture; other uses are explicitly excluded
(FAO, 2002).
With regard to benefit sharing, the Contracting Parties to the
ITPGRFA recognize that facilitated access itself is an important
benefit, but also underline the importance of other forms of
benefit sharing, such as the exchange of information, technology
transfer, capacity building, and the sharing of commercial
benefits. If material received under an SMTA is used to create
PGRFA that are not freely available for research and breeding by
others, the recipients must pay 0.77% of the sales of those PGRFA
(or 0.5% of all sales of PGRFA belonging to the same crop) to
an international benefit-sharing fund (www.fao.org/plant-treaty/
areas-of-work/benefit-sharing-fund), which is used to support
conservation and sustainable utilization of PGRFA. While
information on the projects funded is available on the website,
other information, e.g. on financial contributions, is missing.
The Contracting Parties to the ITPGRFA undertake to
include in the MLS those PGR of the crops and forages in
Annex I that are in the public domain and under their
management. However, even if material is not part of the MLS,
providers of PGR can distribute their material under the SMTA.
The CGIAR centers make more than 750,000 accessions
available under the MLS (FAO, 2019).
The Nagoya Protocol
The “Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity” (UNEP,
2011, www.cbd.int/abs) entered into force on 12 October 2014.
The Nagoya Protocol is a supplement to the CBD and is intended
to improve the implementation of the benefit-sharing provisions
of the CBD. Its objective is similar to the third objective of the
CBD: the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from
the utilization of genetic resources. An Annex gives a long list of
possible benefits (monetary and non-monetary) that can
be shared.
The Nagoya Protocol not only applies to genetic resources as
defined by the CBD, but also contains provisions regarding
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. It
defines the utilization of genetic resources as: “research and
development on the genetic and/or biochemical composition of
genetic resources, including through the application of
biotechnology as defined in Article 2 of the Convention”. A
major element of the Protocol is that, when genetic resources are
used in their territories, Parties must monitor compliance with
the domestic ABS rules of provider countries. In addition, Parties
to the Protocol must provide rules and procedures for clear and
fair access. Each Party must designate a national focal point,
responsible for making information available, and a competent
national authority, responsible for granting access. An Access
and Benefit-Sharing Clearing-House (https://absch.cbd.int/) was
established as a means of sharing information related to ABS,
including contact details of national focal points and competent
national authorities, legislative, administrative and policy
measures, and issued permits.January 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1712
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other international agreements, Article 4 states that the Nagoya
Protocol is not applicable to genetic resources which are covered
by another, specialized international ABS instrument. However,
as of November 2019, discussions on the criteria for identifying
specialized international ABS instruments and on processes for
their recognition had not been concluded, and no specialized
instruments have yet been recognized officially under the
framework of the Nagoya Protocol. In practice, the ITPGRFA
is considered by many countries to be such an instrument,
implying that for these countries material exchanges covered
by the ITPGRFA are not subject to the rules of the
Nagoya Protocol.
More recently, discussion has arisen as to whether digital
sequence information (DSI) related to genetic resources should
also fall under the international ABS agreements. In general,
there is consensus that access to and use of DSI is extremely
important for conservation and sustainable development.
However, views diverge on whether access to DSI and the
sharing of benefits from its use are currently fair and equitable.
Countries have different opinions on whether and how access to
DSI and benefit-sharing from its utilization should be regulated,
and discussions are taking place under the framework of the
international agreements. In the meantime, some countries have
included DSI in their domestic PGR access legislation.IMPLICATIONS
After the CBD had come into force (1993), domestic ABS
legislation was established in various countries, including the
Philippines (1995), Costa Rica (1998) and Brazil (2001). Bilateral
agreements between providers and recipients of PGR became the
rule for gaining access to them (Carrizosa et al., 2004). However,
each country was allowed to have its own interpretations and
make its own procedures, which resulted in a complex situation,
also due to the uncertainty on how to make access procedures,
the costs, and the sometimes insufficient capacity of countries to
do this properly. This complex situation sometimes discouraged
potential users from seeking access to genetic resources. So, while
domestic access and benefit-sharing policies were intended to
support, rather than hinder, the sharing of PGRFA (Wynberg
et al., 2012), this was often not the case. Adverse effects of CBD-
based domestic ABS regulations on biodiversity research and
international collaboration have been reported by various
authors (Jinnah and Jungcurt, 2009; Neumann et al., 2018;
Prathapan et al., 2018).
With regard to access to PGR, the ITPGRFA has been more
effective than the CBD, even though not all PGR are
incorporated in the MLS, and not all PGR in the MLS are
easily available. As of mid-July 2019, more than 5.4 million
samples had been distributed (of which 5.2 million from Annex I
crops) under about 75,000 SMTAs (FAO, 2019). However, most
of the MLS transfers (92%) concern distribution from the
collections of the CGIAR centers. Many Contracting Parties to
the ITPGRFA have not publicly confirmed which PGR materialsFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 496in their countries are in the MLS, making it hard for potential
users to know which PGR are available (Halewood et al., 2013a).
Also, there is much ambiguity about the status of PGR not
included in ex situ collections but occurring under in situ
conditions. Bjørnstad et al. (2013) tested the extent to which
facilitated access was functioning in practice by sending requests
for seeds to 121 countries which were Contracting Parties to the
ITPGRFA. They received seeds from 44 of these countries, with
54 countries not responding and contacts with the other 23
countries not resulting in obtaining the seeds requested.
Concerning benefit-sharing under the framework of the
ITPGRFA, significant non-monetary benefits have been shared
through exchanged material, collaborative research, capacity
building, information exchange, and knowledge creation.
However, the MLS has hardly been able to generate any
monetary benefits based on the use of the SMTA. This may be
due to the considerable time that elapses between access to
PGRFA and the commercialization of products based on these
PGRFA. Also, the SMTA only makes benefit-sharing payments
mandatory when the further use of improved material (based on
material from the MLS) for research and breeding purposes is
restricted (usually through patents). In practice, however, users of
material from theMLS do not generally restrict access for research
and breeding, and therefore are not subject to mandatory sharing
of monetary benefits. A third factor is that some important crops,
such as coffee, soya bean, sugarcane and tomato are not included
in the current MLS. Much research is done on theses crops, which
could have generated mandatory benefit-sharing. Consequently,
the benefit-sharing fund of the ITPGRFA has mainly been filled
by voluntary donor country contributions. The first mandatory
payment to the benefit-sharing fund of the ITPGRFA was only
made in 2018, when a Dutch plant breeding company (Nunhems,
at the time owned by Bayer) paid about USD 120,000 (0.77% of
the US sales revenues of seeds of ten vegetable cultivars developed
using material obtained under the SMTA from genebanks in
Germany and the Netherlands) (www.fao.org/plant-treaty/news/
news-detail/en/c/1143273/).
Discussions are presently being held among the Contracting
Parties of the ITPGRFA on proposals to create a subscription
system for the MLS to assure earlier and more monetary benefit-
sharing. In addition, the possibility of extending ITPGRFA’s
coverage from the food crops and forages currently mentioned in
Annex I to include all PGRFA is being discussed.
Because the Nagoya Protocol has only relatively recently
entered into force, it is too early to assess its implications for
access to and utilization of genetic resources. However,
widespread fear exists among users of genetic resources that
the Protocol will have negative consequences, which are likely to
include high transaction and administrative costs, reduced access
to genetic resources, reduced international collaboration and
negative impacts on scientific research and public health
(Watanabe, 2015; Comizzoli and Holt, 2016; Cressey, 2017;
Deplazes-Zemp et al., 2018; Neumann et al., 2018; Ribeiro
et al., 2018). Although all countries have national sovereignty
over genetic resources, some Parties to the Protocol have opted
not to exercise this national sovereignty and not to require prior
informed consent and mutually agreed terms for access to theirJanuary 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1712
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access legislation, have given PGRFA a special status, with
facilitated access.
When genetic resources are utilized in Parties to the Nagoya
Protocol, these Parties are obliged under the Protocol to monitor
compliance with ABS rules in the provider countries of these
genetic resources. In the EU countries, for instance, this
obligation is implemented though EU Regulation 511/2014
(the EU ABS Regulation) (European Commission, 2014). The
EU ABS Regulation applies to genetic resources accessed on or
after 12 October 2014 in a country that at the time of access was a
Party to the Nagoya Protocol and had established access
measures. To fall under the EU ABS Regulation, these genetic
resources must be used in the EU in basic research, applied
research and/or development on their genetic and/or
biochemical composition (European Commission, 2016).
Where the use of genetic resources falls under the EU ABS
Regulation, users must perform due diligence to ensure that the
genetic resources they utilize were acquired in compliance with
the domestic ABS legislation of the provider country.
Although no specialized international ABS instruments have
been recognized yet under the overall framework of the Nagoya
Protocol, the ITPGRFA has been explicitly recognized as such in
the EU ABS Regulation. This means that PGRFA included in the
MLS and acquired from Parties to the ITPGRFA do not fall
under the EU ABS Regulation. PGRFA transferred under an
SMTA from CGIAR centers do not fall under the EU ABS
Regulation either. If non-Annex I PGRFA were obtained under
an SMTA from a Party to the Nagoya Protocol that has officially
declared that non-Annex I PGRFA under its control can also be
transferred under an SMTA, the user of these PGRFA has
fulfilled the due diligence obligations of the EU ABS Regulation.HOW GENEBANKS COPE
Genebanks acquire most new PGR either through collecting
missions or through answered requests from other collections.
Both channels have become more difficult due to increased
regulation. Collecting material from in situ sources has become
very difficult in many countries. Collecting missions need to be
negotiated with national and local authorities, but the procedures
and responsibilities within provider countries are often unclear and
efforts to gain more clarity are often unsuccessful because those
responsible do not respond or are not prepared to make decisions.
Obtaining material from other collections is only possible if the
material is made available from these and if the origin of the
material is properly documented and complies with ABS rules.
With regard to the distribution of material from genebanks,
access to their collections can only be provided when distribution
complies with the conditions under which the material was
received and the domestic legislation of the country where the
genebank is located. For instance, if a genebank acquires material
under the condition that it can only be used for non-commercial
purposes, the genebank cannot make this material available for
commercial breeding.Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 597Genebanks are therefore faced with more and more
complexity in their operation. The only way genebanks can
deal with this, apart from stopping acquisition or distribution
of material, is by setting up procedures to properly document the
origin of every accession and the conditions for its use and
further distribution. This information needs to be made available
to potential users. Genebanks will also need to use and store
Material Transfer Agreements (MTAs) when material is
distributed from the genebank to users. As a result, the volume
of paperwork required in the material distribution process has
increased significantly.
Apart from the increased complexity of genebank
management and the associated costs, the decreased access to
PGR is also affecting collaboration between genebanks.
Genebanks will be less eager to rationalize their own
collections by reducing duplication with other genebanks since
they cannot be sure of access to other collections in the future.
Indeed, countries might see a need to stockpile PGR material to
ensure future access to it for their own research organizations
and breeders, resulting in redundancies and a further stress on
the already limited capacity of the PGR community.
On the positive side, as the large majority of the users of PGR
from genebanks are involved in research, breeding and training
for food and agriculture, PGR genebanks often can make use of
the MLS of the ITPGRFA, which provides opportunities for
facilitated access to PGRFA. This facilitated access involves the
use of a standardized contract (SMTA) and procedures, instead
of the bilateral, case-by-case contracts and procedures arising
from the CBD and Nagoya Protocol. Furthermore, the SMTA
can also be used for non-MLS material. The European
Cooperative Programme for Plant Genetic Resources (ECPGR)
stated in 2016 that “It is recommended that all ECPGR member
countries, as appropriate and in line with national legislation, use
the SMTA for distribution of both Annex I and non-Annex I
PGRFA accessions independently of whether material is
conserved in ex situ collections or held in situ.” (ECPGR,
2016). Various countries have already declared that PGR under
their management and control and in the public domain are
made available by them under the SMTA, irrespective of whether
these PGR are of a species contained in Annex I of the ITPGRFA.
In the EU, the ABS Regulation that implements the
compliance aspects of the Nagoya Protocol applies to the
utilization of genetic resources and not to their possession. The
Guidance published by the EU explicitly states that activities
such as the management of a collection for conservation
purposes are not considered to be utilization. However,
genebanks typically aim at making genetic resources available
for utilization in breeding and other research and development
activities. Therefore, it is good practice for genebanks to support
users through seeking, keeping and transferring all relevant
information, including access permits and contracts.
Furthermore, for genebanks to operate legally, acquisition of
PGR should be done in line with the access requirements of the
provider country.
The Centre for Genetic Resources, the Netherlands (CGN), a
genetic resource center managing the Dutch national plant
genebank, may serve as a specific example of how genebanksJanuary 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1712
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on two principles: follow the rules and be transparent. The aim is
that the origin of all PGR in the CGN collection and the legal
basis of their acquisition are traceable. CGN distinguishes three
categories of PGR germplasm in relation to its legal status (www.
wur.nl/en/show/Access-and-beneft-sharing-Status-of-CGN-
collections.htm):
1. Genetic resources of crops listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA
and forming part of the MLS. Access to these collections is
provided under the SMTA of the ITPGRFA;
2. Genetic resources not listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA
and acquired by CGN before the CBD entered into force.
In principle, CGN will provide this germplasm to the user
under the SMTA, unless contractual obligations agreed upon
during acquisition of the material by CGN require additional
conditions;
3. Genetic resources not listed in Annex I of the ITPGRFA and
acquired by CGN after the CBD entered into force. These are
subject to the national sovereignty of the country of origin.
Where possible, CGN provides access to these genetic
resources under the SMTA, but where needed, CGN adapts
the SMTA to incorporate additional conditions set by the
provider country or contractual obligations agreed upon
during acquisition of the material by CGN.
The “regular” CGN collection contains about 23,000
accessions of a range of agricultural and horticultural crops. In
addition to its regular collection, CGN also offers seed samples
from “special collections” that have been developed for a specific
purpose targeting specific user groups, such as a collection of 73
re-sequenced tomato lines and a collection of 470 single seed
descent (SSD) lines of Lactuca spp. CGN’s aim is to be able to
make its regular PGR collection available in perpetuity, with all
material being fully and freely available under SMTA (where it is
to be used for research, breeding, or training for food and
agriculture purposes), as the use of the SMTA reduces
complexity and the free availability reduces transaction costs.
To achieve this, CGN makes all possible efforts to acquire and
only include in its collection material that can be distributed in
this way. This means that collecting missions are undertaken
after signing an agreement in which the Competent National
Authority of the country where the collecting takes place agrees
with the subsequent distribution of collected material by CGN
under the terms and conditions of the SMTA. The modalities
are laid down in a Memorandum of Understanding between
CGN and the Competent National Authority of the country of
collection. The Memorandum of Understanding may cover a
single collection mission or various collection missions over an
extended period of time, as CGN strives to establish multiyear
collaborations with countries. With respect to the benefit-sharing
component of the agreements, CGN aims to include a substantial
capacity development component. This may, for instance,
include participation of representatives of the provider country
in international courses on the conservation and use of PGR or
the organization of tailor-made PGR courses in the provider
country itself by CGN staff.Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 698Unfortunately, not all countries or institutes from which CGN
would like to acquire material are willing to allow incorporation
of these PGR in the CGN genebank under the conditions of the
SMTA. Some countries, for instance, are not comfortable with
the associated multilateral character of monetary benefit-sharing
and prefer bilateral sharing of monetary benefits instead. In these
cases, the material cannot be acquired under the conditions of the
SMTA and will thus not be included in the regular CGN
collection. Since the material might still be valuable to some
users, the possibility of creating a special collection for that
material exists, but this is only done in exceptional cases. These
special collections with material that can only be distributed
under additional conditions are generally maintained on the
principle of cost recovery, and access may need to be negotiated
(possibly even with the donor of the material).
CGIAR genebanks too have been facing increasing difficulties
in their efforts to acquire and conserve PGR in the past decades,
for a large part due to ABS issues (Halewood et al., 2013b). The
collections of the CGIAR genebanks have been placed in the MLS
of the ITPGRFA, which means that the PGR included are
available under the SMTA. As such, their activities are mainly
governed by the ITPGRFA. However, when these genebanks
want to acquire materials that are not included in the MLS, they
have to comply with domestic access regulations based on the
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. Guidelines have been developed
for the CGIAR genebanks on how to comply (CGIAR Genebank
Platform, 2018).RECOMMENDATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS
Policy developments since the 1990s that were aimed at
regulating Access and Benefit-Sharing have so far resulted in
reduced access. This is felt by genebanks, which face increasing
difficulties in adding material to their collections, either through
collecting missions or by obtaining material from other
collections. As genebanks play a key role in conserving and
making available key resources to address climate change and
other challenges to food production and food security, this is an
undesirable and possibly even dangerous development. Given
climate change and the resulting genetic erosion that can be
expected to occur, collecting and subsequent conservation in
genebanks are essential for limiting losses of valuable PGR.
The national sovereignty of countries over their genetic
resources has been firmly established and genebanks have to
comply with the domestic access regulations in the countries
where they collect material. As illustrated above, genebanks
accept this and are fully committed to comply with domestic
ABS measures. They are ready to share benefits, especially
through capacity development in the countries where they
collect. However, genebanks struggle with the complexity and
unclarity of the way this sovereignty is exercised at the domestic
and international levels.
To prevent a further decrease in access to PGRFA, this
complexity must be fought. Although ABS issues are inherentlyJanuary 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1712
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possible. Acquisition and distribution of germplasm have to stay
workable for genebanks as these activities play an important role
in assuring the world’s food supply in the current times of
climate crisis and population growth.
The ITPGRFA and its SMTA could play a key role in reducing
complexity. The CBD and the Nagoya Protocol do not prescribe
in detail how ABS should be implemented through domestic
legislation and leave room for countries to decide for themselves
how to exercise their sovereignty over their PGR. Applying the
SMTA also to material not contained in Annex I to the ITPGRFA
(and thus not in the MLS), would simplify matters. Various
countries have already decided to do so for PGR under their
management and control and in the public domain.
It should also be made clearer for potential users which PGR
of Annex I crops and forages in ITPGRFA countries are available
in the MLS. More clarity should be created on the status of in situ
material in the context of the ITPGRFA. To achieve this,
compliance with the ITPGRFA should be improved and better
monitored. While the ITPGRFA has 145 member countries, only
54 national reports on the implementation of the ITPGRFA are
available on the ITPGRFA website (www.fao.org/plant-treaty/
areas-of-work/compliance/compliance-reports/en/). In
comparison, for the Nagoya Protocol, which had 120 member
countries as of 22 November 2019, 94 national implementation
reports were available on the ABS Clearing house website on that
date (absch.cbd.int/reports).
Contracting Parties to the ITPGRFA have been discussing
expansion of the scope of the MLS of the ITPGRFA from the 64Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 799food crops and forages mentioned in Annex I of the ITPGRFA to
include all PGRFA. In addition, they have been considering the
idea of creating a subscription system for the MLS to assure
earlier and more monetary benefit-sharing. Expansion of the
MLS would be a major development in the process of reducing
the complexity. As the lack of sharing of monetary benefits from
the utilization of materials provided through the MLS has
remained an issue affecting the readiness of provider countries
to allow access to their PGR through the MLS, the creation of a
subscription system may not only result in more benefit-sharing
but also in better access. Unfortunately, an agreement on the
expansion of the MLS and the creation of a subscription system
was not reached during the ITPGRFA Governing Board meeting
held in November 2019. This was mainly due to diverging views
as to whether access to DSI related to genetic resources from the
MLS and benefit-sharing from its utilization should be regulated
under the ITPGRFA.
In the end, it is in the interest of all countries that genebanks
continue to be able to play their role of conserving and making
available the key resources that are needed for meeting the
demands of a growing world population in a changing climate.AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
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The Judgment of 25 July 2018 of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
1
was optimistically awaited by breeders and supporters of agricultural biotechnology,
but shortly after the press release advancing the Judgment, hope turned into
frustration. Opinions on how to frame the New Breeding Techniques (NBT) in the
context of Directive 2001/18/EC were issued before the Judgment, while proposals to
assist the EU legislator to amend the regime driven by the Directive have been also
provided afterwards by scientists and institutional bodies around the EU. However,
they do not seem to have paid so much attention to the Judgment itself. This paper
focuses on the Judgment. It finds out that while the impacts of the Judgment on the
NBT might have been slightly overvalued, its potential negative effects on techniques of
random mutagenesis and varieties breed through them have been generally
underestimated if not absolutely overlooked. The analysis also shows that the
Judgment does not preempt the possibility to exempt certain applications of some
NBT from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC,
2
and, in fact, ODM, SDN1, and SDN2
might be, under certain conditions, easily exempted from its scope without the need of
a deep legislative revolution nor even the amendment of Directive 2001/18/EC. As
regards techniques of random mutagenesis and mutant varieties bred by means of
those techniques, until action is taken by Member States (if finally taken), no real
limitations upon them are to be feared. However, if Member States start to consider the
path opened by the CJEU, then their regulation at an EU level should be readily
explored in order to avoid further negative effects on plant breeding as well as on the
free movement inside the EU of those varieties and the products thereof.
Keywords: mutagenesis, gene editing, GMO, Directive 2001/18/EC, C-528/16, Court of Justice of the European
Union, plant breeding, plant biotechnology1Judgment of 25 July 2018, Confédération paysanne and Others, C-528/16, EU:C:2018:583.
2Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate release into the
environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC.
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After a fairly pro-biotech Opinion of Advocate General Bobek
3
[see, e.g., Purnhagen et al. (2018a; 2018b) and Callaway (2018)],
the Judgment of 25 July 2018, Confédération paysanne and Others,
C-528/16, EU:C:2018:583 of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) (from now on “the Judgment” or “Confédération
paysanne and Others”) deeply disappointed the scientific
community [see, e.g., Callaway (2018) or Urnov et al. (2018)],
because it “classifies genome-edited plants as genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) and thus subjects them to prohibitive
premarket risk evaluations” (Urnov et al., 2018: 800). After the
Judgment, scientists [see, e.g., Urnov et al. (2018)], advisory
bodies, such as the German Bioeconomy Council [see
Bioökonmierat (2018)] and the European Commission's Group
of Chief Scientific Advisors [see SAM (2018)], and more recently
even the European Commissioner for Health and Food Safety
(Michalopoulos, 2019) have urged to review Directive 2001/18/EC
in order to overcome the Judgment. However, a deeper analysis of
the Judgment and its impact on the EU legal regime on GMO
seems to be needed. This paper focuses on the Judgment, aiming
to debunk some myths around it and clarify its meaning, and to
present a proposal addressed to mitigate its potential negative
effects on plant breeding, the EU legal regime on GMO and the
internal market.MATERIALS AND METHODS
The paper is organized in three sections. The section
Interpretation of the Judgment of the CJEU of 25 July 2018
focuses on the interpretation of the Judgment; the section
Leeway to Operate Out of the Scope of Directive 2001/18/EC
Post Judgment analyzes the leeway to operate out of the scope of
Directive 2001/18/EC post Judgment by means of a legislative
proposal expressly designed with that purpose; and the section
Analysis of the Impact of the Judgment on the Breeding
Techniques focuses on the impact of the Judgment on the legal
status of breeding techniques, and assesses the feasibility and
potential usefulness of the legislative proposal outlined in the
section Leeway to Operate Out of the Scope of Directive 2001/18/
EC Post Judgment.
In the section Interpretation of the Judgment of the CJEU of 25
July 2018, the Judgment is analyzed by means of the application
of well-known principles and rules of legal interpretation in the
EU and taking leverage on the analysis of the relevant literature
on the EU legal regime on GMO [most remarkably Spranger
(2015) and Krämer (2015)]. This exercise has been enrichened
with the analysis of relevant reactions to the Judgment from the
industry, politicians, and scientific scholars (gathered from
websites, electronic newspapers, papers, and other electronic
sources found through searches on Google, Google Scholar,3Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 18 January 2018 on the case C-
528/16, Confédération paysanne and Others, C-528/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:20. Cited
in the text as the “Opinion of Advocate General Bobek”, the “Opinion of the
Advocate General”, or simply, the “Opinion”.
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 2102WoS, or from pgrip.org). Recourse has also been made to the




In the section Leeway to Operate Out of the Scope of Directive
2001/18/EC Post Judgment, trough legal reasoning and on the
basis of the analysis performed in the section Interpretation of the
Judgment of the CJEU of 25 July 2018, a prospective exercise on
the leeway to operate out of the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC
post Judgment has been conducted, and a legislative proposal has
been outlined.
In the section Analysis of the Impact of the Judgment on the
Breeding Techniques, legal interpretation is combined with
scientific/technical analysis to assess the impact of the
Judgment on the legal status of the existent breeding
techniques (on the basis of the analysis performed in the
section Interpretation of the Judgment of the CJEU of 25 July
2018 and a nonexhaustive literature review on breeding
techniques). The possibility to exempt the breeding techniques
assessed in this section by means of the legislative proposal
outlined in the section Leeway to Operate Out of the Scope of
Directive 2001/18/EC Post Judgment has been also evaluated.RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Interpretation of the Judgment
of the CJEU of 25 July 2018
A “Shocking” Decision
After the press release of the CJEU on its Judgment, “shocked”
(Michalopoulos, 2018; Science Media Centre, 2018) and
“disappointing” (Callaway, 2018: 16; Science Media Centre,
2018) were likely the words best summarizing the mood of the
industry and scientists. Since then, beyond some scarce exceptions
in which scholars have shown a greater awareness toward the
difficult task of the Court [see, e.g., Leyser (2018) and Purnhagen
et al. (2018a)], the Judgment and the EU legal regime on GMO
have been the target of a general criticism, not only from the
Academia and the industry [see, e.g., Michalopoulos (2018) and
Urnov et al. (2018)] but also from within EU institutions [see
SAM (2018) and Michalopoulos (2019)]. Indeed, after the positive
expectations created by the Opinion of Advocate General Bobek
(Callaway, 2018; Michalopoulos, 2018; Purnhagen et al., 2018a;
Science Media Centre, 2018; Marks and Livingstone, 2019), the
Judgment does not bring good news to plant breeders and the
agricultural sector (Michalopoulos, 2018; Purnhagen et al., 2018a;
Science Media Centre, 2018; Urnov et al., 2018). However, it needs
to be noted that the approach of the Court toward NBT, aligned
with “the Applicants [Confédération paysanne and Others]
together with the French Government” (Opinion of Advocate
General Bobek, para 87), is coherent with the European
understanding of the precautionary principle in this field as well
as with recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC [anticipated by legal
scholars like Krämer (2015) and Spranger (2015), and noticed4Conseil d'État, 3ème - 8ème chambres réunies, 03/10/2016, Confederation
Paysanne et autres, No. 388649, FR:CECHR:2016:388649.20161003.
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the role of recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC acknowledged by the
Court contradicts the approach of the Advocate General to recital
17 Directive 2001/18/EC based on historical interpretation (cf.
paras 90 ff of the Opinion of the Advocate General with paras 44,
51, 54 and the conclusion of the Judgment). However, historical
interpretation is far from being the usual approach of the CJEU
(Rösler, 2012; Scholz and Cunha, 2017; Purnhagen et al. 2018a).
That art 3(1) Directive 2001/18/EC is to be interpreted “strictly”
(para 41 of the Judgment) was already anticipated by Krämer
(2015) and Spranger (2015). Besides, the need to take into account
“the context [… ] and the objectives pursued by the rules of which
it is part” (Judgment, para 42) and the principle of narrow
interpretation of exemptions (Judgment, para 41), are well
known rules of legal interpretation in the EU [see, e.g., Scholz
(2012a; 2012b) and Beck (2012)] and was also anticipated by
Krämer (2015) and Spranger (2015). In fact, the conclusions and
reasoning of the Court were anticipated by Krämer (2015) and
Spranger (2015) to a large extent. In the light of the foregoing, the
Judgment, at least as regards its conclusions on NBT, can hardly
be deemed groundless from a legal perspective nor surprising.
From a rational and a scientific perspective though, as manifested
by some scholars [see, e.g., Leyser (2018) or Purnhagen et al.
(2018a)], the Judgment is just as objectionable as the EU legal
regime on GMO.F
Directive 2001/18/EC: Recital 17 and art 3(1)
• Recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC reads as follows: “(17) This Directive
should not apply to organisms obtained through certain techniques of
genetic modification which have conventionally been used in a number
of applications and have a long safety record.” This recital is connected
with the precautionary principle (Krämer, 2015; Spranger, 2015).
• Art 3(1) Directive 2001/18/EC: “This Directive shall not apply to orga-
nisms obtained through the techniques of genetic modification listed in
Annex I B.”ront5“Statement by the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors: A Scientific Perspective onThe precautionary principle
The precautionary principle has its roots in the German law (Andrew and
O'Riordan, 2004) and its recognized, although not defined, in art 191 of the
Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (European Union, 2016), but
it has been developed by the Communication from the Commission on the
precautionary principle (Brussels, 2.2.2000 COM(2000) 1 final) (Andrew and
O'Riordan, 2004). As understood by the Communication from the Commission,
“the precautionary principle which enables a rapid response to be given in the
face of a possible danger to human, animal or plant health, or to protect the
environment. In particular, where scientific data do not permit a complete
evaluation of the risk, recourse to this principle may, for example, be used to
stop distribution or order withdrawal from the market of products likely to be
hazardous” (European Union, 2016).the Regulatory Status of Products Derived from Gene Editing and the Implications
for the GMO Directive.”
6Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 2015 amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the
Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) in their territory.
7Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/321 of 3 March 2016 adjusting
the geographical scope of the authorisation for cultivation of genetically modifiedHistorical interpretation of law
As explained by Scholz and Cunha (2017): “Historical interpretation, in the
case of EU law, relies on the historical background, the content of travaux
preparatoires [preparatory work] or similar materials, which record the
legislators' intention and the purpose for which the provision was made.”iers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 3103Regulatory Changes “On the Way”
After the Judgment, the idea of a revision of the EU legal
framework on GMO as a reaction to interpretation of the
CJEU [see, e.g., Bioökonmierat (2018); Michalopoulos (2019)
and Urnov et al. (2018)] gained momentum, resulting in the
“Statement by the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors”
5
[see SAM
(2018)]. However, in the current European context as regards
GMO, defined by Directive (EU) 2015/412,
6
Commission
Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/321 of 3 March 2016,
7
and
by the Judgment itself, this headlong rush toward a new GMO
legal framework does not seem to have much chances of success
in the short term [see also Purnhagen et al. (2018b)]. In fact,
hastiness might contribute to further intensify polarization of
public opinion in Europe on this issue [see, e.g., in this respect
Gelinsky and Hilbeck (2018); Noisette (2019) and Antoniou
(2019)] “reducing the possibility of breaking deadlock” (Mandel,
2005: 168) in the short to medium term. Furthermore, it also
seems to have unintentionally prevented a sober analysis of some
aspects of the Judgment that might have relevant implications on
plant breeding and agriculture.
The Judgment on “NBT”
The application before the Conseil d'État (the French court that
referred the questions for preliminary ruling) requested to
“revoke Article D. 531-2 of the Environmental Code,
transposing Directive 2001/18, which excludes mutagenesis
from the definition of techniques giving rise to genetic
modification within the meaning of Article L. 531-1 of the
code, and ban the cultivation and marketing of herbicide-
tolerant rape varieties obtained by mutagenesis” (Judgment,
para 20). Therefore, the request was not focused on NBT but
on herbicide tolerant crops (Eriksson, 2018; Leyser, 2018) and on
mutagenesis (Purnhagen et al., 2018a; 2018b) in a broad sense.
Furthermore, as acknowledged by the Conseil d'État, “[t]he only
herbicide resistant seeds registered in the common catalogue of
varieties of agricultural plant species are the result of in vitro
random mutagenesis. [… ] no variety of herbicide resistant seed
resulting from the directed mutagenesis techniques has yet been
included in the common catalogue” (Opinion, para 25). Besides,
the Decision of the Conseil d'État, the Opinion of Advocate
General Bobek, and the Judgment itself have all of them a
broader scope than strictly NBT. Even the heading of the press
release of the CJEU on the Judgment [see CJEU (2018)] refers to
mutagenesis in a broad sense, not only to NBT. In fact, the
conclusions of the Court in its Judgment deal more on
mutagenesis lato sensu and even on the concept of GMO, than
on NBT. However, after the Judgment, most of the scientificmaize (Zea mays L.) MON 810 (MON-ØØ81Ø-6).
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(2018a)] and press publications [see, e.g., The Irish Times (2019);
Marks and Livingstone (2019) or Zimmere (2018)] focused
mainly on the impacts of the Judgment on NBT, not on
mutagenesis in a broad sense. In the end, the Judgment itself
has come to be known as the “ruling on new breeding
techniques” [see, e.g., Opoku Gakpo (2018) or Devuyst
(2018)]. As shown in the following paragraphs, this bias in the
interpretation of the Judgment might be involuntarily concealing
some relevant potential effects of the Judgment on plant breeding
and free trade in the EU that should be known and, where
appropriate, adequately addressed.
Varieties Bred Through Traditional Techniques
of Random Mutagenesis “Saved From the Purge”
of the Court
Due to the shift of attention toward NBT above described,
potential implications of the Judgment on traditional
techniques of random mutagenesis and varieties thereof have
been generally overlooked or misinterpreted [among the very few
exceptions see Martin in Science Media Centre (2018), Gelinsky
and Hilbeck (2018), CIOPORA (2018), Wanner et al. (2019), or
Jorasch (2019)].
The Conseil d'État, in its third question referred for a
preliminary ruling, asked the CJEU whether “[a]rticles 2 and 3
of [sic.] and Annex I B to Directive [2001/18] on the deliberate
release into the environment of [GMOs] constitute [ … ] a full
harmonization measure prohibiting Member States from
subjecting organisms obtained by mutagenesis to all or some of
the obligations laid down in the directive or to any other
obligation, or do the Member States, when transposing those
provisions, have a discretion to define the regime to be applied to
organisms obtained by mutagenesis” (para 25 of the Judgment).
The Judgment concludes that “[a]rticle 3(1) of Directive 2001/18
[ … ] does not have the effect of denying Member States the
option of subjecting such organisms [ … ] to the obligations laid
down in that directive or to other obligations” (para 82).F
Directive 2001/18/EC: Recital 17 and art 3(1)
• Art 2(2) Directive 2001/18/EC: “(2) “genetically modified organism
(GMO)” means an organism, with the exception of human beings, in
which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur
naturally by mating and/or natural recombination;Within the terms of this
definition:
a. genetic modification occurs at least through the use of the tech-
niques listed in Annex I A, part 1;
b. the techniques listed in Annex I A, part 2, are not considered to result
in genetic modification;”.8
• Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC:
“TECHNIQUES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 3
Techniques/methods of genetic modification yielding organisms to be
excluded from the Directive, on the condition that they do not involve the
use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules or genetically modified
organisms other than those produced by one or more of the techniques/
methods listed below are:
1. mutagenesis,
2. cell fusion (including protoplast fusion) of plant cells of organisms
which can exchange genetic material through traditional breeding
methods.”rontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 4104The Court justified its positioning by arguing that “to the extent
to which the EU legislature has not regulated those organisms,
Member States have the option of defining their legal regime” (para
79), with the only limitation of “compliance with EU law, in
particular the rules on the free movement of goods set out in
Articles34 to36TFEU” (para 79).This conclusionapparently stems
from art 5(3) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and art 2
(2) TFEU; i.e., from the principle of subsidiarity and the rules
applying to shared competences [see also Purnhagen et al. (2018b)].
Such interpretation has been already well described by the legal
literature in relation to the EU legal regime on GMO [see, e.g.,
Sadeleer (2014) and Weimer (2019)] and was implicitly
acknowledged by the Court in previous cases, like Pioneer Hi
Bred Italia.
8
However, in Pioneer Hi Bred Italia the Court, even if
bound by the same legal principles than inConfédération paysanne
and Others, decides just in the opposite direction. The main reason
motivating these diverging decisions seemingly derives from the
fact that in Pioneer Hi Bred Italia the Court appreciates the
“harmonized” (Pioneer Hi Bred Italia, para 5) nature of the
matter at issue, while in Confédération paysanne and Others it
does not (see Confédération paysanne and Others, para 79: “to the
extent towhich theEUlegislaturehasnot regulated thoseorganisms
[ … ]”). Be that as it may, the interpretation of the Court in
Confédération paysanne and Others was not the only possible
reading of Directive 2001/18/EC in relation to mutagenesis.Arts 5(3) TEU and 2(2) TFEU
• Art 5(3) TEU: “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not
fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and
local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the pro-
posed action, be better achieved at Union level.”
• Art 2(2) TFEU: “When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence
shared with the Member States in a specific area, the Union and the
Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area.
The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that
the Union has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall
again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has
decided to cease exercising its competence.”JudgThe Advocate General in its Opinion (see paras 115–117)
frames two scenarios that in his view might explain the legislative
positioning of the EU legislature in relation to mutagenesis: (a)
“the EU legislature made a legislative choice. It carried out an
evaluation, and on the basis of that evaluation came to the
conclusion that all the mutagenesis techniques are to be excluded
because they are safe” (Opinion, para 116); or, (b) “by inserting
the mutagenesis exemption, the EU legislature did not make any
statement about its safety” (para 117). The Advocate General
compares the role of the EU legislature in the first scenario with
that of “an architect that decided to have a room called
‘mutagenesis' in his house, but who also decided to keep that
room empty” (para 116); while in the second scenario, accordingment of 6 September 2012, Pioneer Hi Bred Italia, C−36/11, EU:C:2012:534.
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that space called ‘mutagenesis' outside his house” (para 117). The
first scenario amounts to full harmonization (see para 116 of the
Opinion), while the second scenario would represent a lack of
harmonization (see para 117 of the Opinion). Such scheme stems
from the legal reasoning formerly mentioned (deriving from arts 5
(3) TEU and 2(2) TFEU) on the basis of the equilibrium on which
the EU regime on GMO is built [i.e., the compromise between “[t]
he protection of human health and the environment” (recital 5
Directive 2001/18/EC) and the principles governing the internal
market in the EU (Salvi, 2016)]. However, the Court does not
follow any of the options framed by the Advocate General. Instead,
the Court decides to square the circle. Indeed, like the Advocate
General, the Court is of the opinion that “the EU legislature has
not regulated those organisms” (Judgment, para 79), but it
assumes a safety assessment of the EU legislature as regards
mutagenesis, manifested in recital 17 (see Judgment, paras 44,
45, 51, 54 and conclusion). In other words, the Court interprets art
3(1), Annex I B (1) and recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC as a
minimum threshold of harmonization (Purnhagen et al., 2018b),
and therefore, according to the logic set in art 2(2) TFEU:
“Member States shall again exercise their competence to the
extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its
competence.” Recouping the example of the Advocate General
in its Opinion, “the EU legislator would be like an architect that
decided to have a room called ‘mutagenesis' in his house”
(Opinion, para 116), but that instead of taking the decision “to
keep that room empty” [as framed by the Advocate General
(Opinion, para 116)], simply left it this way, and therefore,
implicitly allowed EU Member States to furnish it (see
Judgment, paras 44, 45, 51, 54, 79 and conclusion).
It could be argued that what the Court really has done is to
transform an implicit preemption of action of Member States
allegedly stemming from recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC
[equivalent to the above mentioned first scenario framed by the
Advocate General (Opinion, para 116)], in a renounce of the EU
legislature to regulate GMO obtained by means of traditional
techniques of random mutagenesis. This interpretation is
supported by the very late appearance of a case like Confédération
paysanne andOthers. In other words, if the possibility of traditional
mutagenesis being regulated at a national level needed the
pronunciation of the Court after so many years, then maybe the
scenario of the EU legislature fully harmonizing those techniques
should have been seriously considered by the Court as the most
plausible option. However, this line of reasoning is somehow
countered by the disharmonizing effect of Directive (EU) 2015/
412 on the EU legal regime on GMO [see the Opinion of the
Advocate General, para 122, Salvi (2016), Purnhagen et al. (2018b)
andWanner et al. (2019)], and, most importantly, this was not the
interpretative path taken by the Court.
From the Judgment onwards, three categories of organisms
matter in practice: (1) non-GMO; (2) GMO mentioned in art 3(1)
Directive 2001/18/EC obtained through traditional techniques of
random mutagenesis; (3) GMO falling within art 2(2) Directive
2001/18/EC [among which, according to the Court, organisms
obtained by means of NBT are included (Urnov et al., 2018)].Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 5105Before the Judgment, varieties obtained by means of traditional
techniques of random mutagenesis were claimed to be “an
independent third category due to aspects of risk evaluation”
(Spranger, 2015: 25), but that view is not clearly recognized in
Directive 2001/18/EC, and there was no legal certainty on this issue
until the Judgment. As observed by some scholars and breeders'
associations [see, eg, Martin in Science Media Centre (2018);
Gelinsky and Hilbeck (2018); CIOPORA (2018); Wanner et al.
(2019), or Jorasch (2019)], from now on, according to the
Judgement, GMO obtained by means of traditional mutagenesis
will be able to be subjected by EU Member States “to the
obligations laid down in that directive or to other obligations”
(para 82 and conclusion 3). The Court is silent on GMO obtained
through cell fusion (point (2) of Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC),
but it is foreseeable the interpretation of the Court extends to them.
This “reclassification” done by the Court might have in turn
important implications. Indeed, because of the reference of the
Court “to theobligations laiddown in thatdirective [Directive2001/
18/EC] or to otherobligations” (para 82 and conclusion 3),Member
States might regulate the risk assessment of such varieties or its
labelling at a national level, or subject them to other conditions and
limitations. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that, as a result of
the Judgment in connection to Directive (EU) 2015/412, the
cultivation of such varieties end restricted or even prohibited at a
national level in the same way as GM varieties within the scope of
Directive 2001/18/EC [on the analysis of Directive (EU) 2015/412
see, e.g., Salvi (2016)]. In fact, in the light of the Judgment, mutant
varieties bred through random mutagenesis might end being
subjected “to other [national] national obligations” (para 82 and
conclusion 3) potentially stricter andmore burdensome than those
stemming fromDirective 2001/18/EC. It is clear from the aforesaid
that the decisionof theCourt, in addition to further disharmonizing
GMO regulation in the EU (Wanner et al., 2019), might also result,
despite the condition introduced by theCourt [of “compliance with
EU law, in particular with the rules on the freemovement of goods”
(para 82)], in obstacles to the free movement of goods. If Member
States end eventually following the possibility set by the CJEU as
regards traditional mutant varieties, the free movement of goods
[see Wanner et al. (2019)], plant innovation and agriculture [see
Martin in Science Media Centre (2018)], and consumer choice in
the EU, might be severely affected. Therefore, in that case, action
should be taken at an EU level to reharmonize this area of the EU
legal regime on GMO in order to impede or minimize the
aforementioned potential negative impacts.
“Euphoria” in the Organic Sector
In a position paper issued before the Judgment, IFOAM stated that
techniques falling within the category of “mutagenesis” are not “[a]
cceptable for organic breeding” and “[t]o be phased out” (IFOAM
Organics International, 2017: 20); and, shortly after the press release
of the Judgment [see CJEU (2018)], showed its satisfaction with the
position adopted by the Court [see IFOAM EU Group (2018b)].
However, after the Judgment, references to traditional mutagenesis
(and to mutagenesis lato sensu) practically disappeared from
IFOAM's communications [see, e.g., IFOAM EU Group (2018b)
and IFOAM EU Group (2019)] despite IFOAM being apparentlyMarch 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1813
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EUGroup (2018a)]. In the light of it, it cannot be excluded that the
Court might have gone even further than some players of the
organic sector wished. It must not be forgotten that at a worldwide
level there are at least 3318 registered varieties obtained through
traditional mutagenesis, 55% of them breed before 1990 (IAEA).
The Concept of GMO After the Judgment: The
Mutagenesis Exemption
In Table 1, the concept of GMO under Directive 2001/18/EC as
interpreted by the Court is schematized through the criteria that
may end with an exemption from the scope of Directive 2001/18/
EC. Construed from the legal analysis of the Judgment carried
out in this paper, Table 1 systematizes the interpretative efforts
reflected in the literature [New Techniques Working Group
(2012); Krämer (2015); Spranger (2015); Krämer (2015);
Spranger (2015); Vives-Vallés (2016); Vives-Vallés (2018),
Purnhagen et al. (2018a; 2018b), Sprink et al. (2016); Eriksson
et al. (2018); Eriksson (2018); Wanner et al. (2019); Custers et al.
(2019), etc.] and adapts them either to the situation post
Judgment and/or to the purpose of the table. It is worth noting
that the reasoning portrayed in Table 1 is not new, but it was
already anticipated by Krämer (2015) and Spranger (2015) to aFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 6106great extent. Krämer (2015) and Spranger (2015) detected
already in 2015 that the key to understand the concept of
GMO of Directive 2001/18/EC are not as much the
descriptions contained in arts 2(2) and 3, but mainly the
logical scheme set in those articles plus their annexes (i.e.,
whether the lists they refer to/contain are open or closed)
interpreted in the light of the precautionary principle and
recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC. Some of these aspects have
been also pointed out, before and after the Judgment, by other
scholars [see, eg, New Techniques Working Group (2012);
Vives-Vallés (2016) or Purnhagen et al. (2018a; 2018b)].
Therefore, according to the Court, how natural those
techniques may be is not determinant (Custers et al., 2019)
and the techniques listed in Annex I A Part 1 do not exhaust the
notion of (nonexempted) GMO of art 2(2)(a) Directive 2001/18/
EC. It is instead the inability of those techniques to fit in Annex I
A Part 2 and Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC, that matters the
most (see Table 1). Certainly, the Court considered in its
assessment the definition in art 2(2) Directive 2001/18/EC,
mentioning in fact the three requirements it contains
[i.e., “alterations made to the genetic material of an organism”
(para 28 of the Judgment), “with the exception of human beings”
(para 27), and “in a way that does not occur naturally” (para 29)];TABLE 1 | Cumulative criteria that genetic engineering/breeding techniques must meet in order to be excluded from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC as interpreted




1) Does it result in “an organism [ … ] in which the genetic material
has been altered”?
Negative answer: Out of the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC.
Affirmative answer: Check requirement “2).”
2) Does it refer to an implementation on “human beings”?
(“exception” contained in art 2(2) 2001/18/EC)
Affirmative answer: Out of the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC.
Negative answer: Check requirement “3).”
3) Does it fit in any of the techniques listed in Annex I A Part 1
Directive 2001/18/EC?
Affirmative answer: Within the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC (i.e., art 2(2)(a) Directive
2001/18/EC).
Negative answer: Check requirement “4).”
4) Does it fit in any of the techniques listed in Annex I A Part 2
Directive 2001/18/EC?
Affirmative answer: Out of the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC.
Negative answer: Check requirement “5).”
5) Does it fit in the notion of “mutagenesis” or “cell fusion (including
protoplast fusion) of plant cells of organisms which can
exchange genetic material through traditional breeding
methods”?
Negative answer: Within the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC (i.e., art 2(2)(a) Directive 2001/
18/EC).
Affirmative answer: Check requirement “6).”
6) Does it “involve the use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules
or genetically modified organisms other than those produced by
one or more of the techniques/methods listed” in Annex I B
Directive 2001/18/EC?
Affirmative answer: Within the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC (i.e., art 2(2)(a) Directive
2001/18/EC).
Negative answer: Check requirement “7).”
7) Has it “conventionally been used in a number of applications”? Negative answer: Within the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC (i.e., art 2(2)(a) Directive 2001/
18/EC).
Affirmative answer: Check requirement “8).”
8) Has it “a long safety record”? Negative answer: Within the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC (i.e., art 2(2)(a) Directive 2001/
18/EC).
Affirmative answer: Exempted from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC (on the basis of art
3(1) Directive 2001/18/EC). It may still be subjected “to the obligations laid down in that
directive [Directive 2001/18/EC] or to other obligations” by EU Member States (Judgment,
para 82 and conclusion 3).“Order/Question”: Logical order in which the criteria must be assessed for a given technique. “Criteria”, Criteria, framed as a question to be answered, that a given technique must meet in
order to be excluded from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC. “Result”: Legal consequence or action to be taken depending of the fulfilment or not of the relevant criterion (i.e., depending
on the answer to the relevant question under the column “Criteria”).March 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1813
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prerequirements, and the importance of the third requirement
(in para 29) is somehow watered down by the reference of the
Court to “the general scheme of that directive [Directive 2001/
18/EC]” (para 31) developed in paras 31 to 37 of the Judgment.
The consequence of this interpretation is that, as anticipated by
Krämer (2015) and Spranger (2015), a technique will lead to a
nonexempted GMO (falling within art 2(2)(a) in connection to
Annex I A Part 1 Directive 2001/18/EC) if such technique cannot
be classified in Annex I A Part 2 nor in Annex I B Directive 2001/
18/EC (see Table 1). In other words, a dynamic interpretation of
the annexes as regards the techniques covered by them is
mandatory for Annex I A Part 1 and not possible for the other
annexes (Spranger, 2015). It is worth mentioning that, as
implicitly acknowledged by the Court (see Judgment, paras 27–
38, 40), what is to be understood by “mutagenesis” has nothing to
do with the use of “recombinant nucleic acids” (NA) or
“genetically modified organisms” (Annex I B Directive 2001/
18/EC). Besides, for a GMO produced by means of mutagenesis
to be excluded from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC, in
addition to the fulfilment of recital 17, the “condition that they
do not involve the use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules or
GMOs other than those produced by one or more of the
techniques/methods listed in that annex [Annex I B]”
(Judgment, para 40) must also be met (see Table 1). This was
also foreseen by Krämer (2015) and Spranger (2015) and
observed after the Judgment by Eriksson (2018). The Judgment
however, even if mentioning all these requirements from Annex I
B and recital 17, does not elaborate on any of them. Regarding
“the condition that they do not involve the use of recombinant
nucleic acid molecules” (Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC),
Krämer (2015) explains that Council Directive 90/220/EEC
does not contain it and that its inclusion in Directive 2001/18/
EC must be understood as “a supplementary requirement [ … ]
to enlarge the field of application of Directive 2001/18 and to
reduce the exemption of Article 3 and Annex I B” (Krämer, 2015:
12). As regards recital 17, Directive 2001/18/EC does not provide
any guidance on its interpretation (Krämer, 2015); but it makes
sense to interpret it as containing two different, but cumulative
(i.e., both of them must be fulfilled), requirements (Krämer,
2015). Fulfilling “a number of applications” only is not enough
[see Krämer (2015)]. Additionally, those applications must “have
a long safety record” [see Krämer (2015)]. Directive 2001/18/EC
does not explain either how recital 17 must be assessed Krämer
(2015). A reading of recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC coherent
with the Judgment [as well as with the position taken by Krämer
(2015) and Spranger (2015)] suggests that, somehow, the first
requirement in recital 17 (i.e., “a number of applications”) should
refer to the diversity of the applications, while the second
requirement in recital 17 (i.e., “a long safety record”) might be
connected to the number of records within each application as
well as to the proven degree of “safety” of each application. It also
must be noted that Annex I B refers to “the use of recombinant
nucleic acid molecules or genetically modified organisms” but
not to “[t]echniques of genetic modification” like Annex I A Part
1; therefore, those techniques of genetic modification that “doFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 7107not involve the use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules or
genetically modified organisms” (as mandated in Annex I B) and
fitting also within the scientific notion of “mutagenesis,” should
be deemed potentially coverable by Annex I B [see also
Purnhagen et al. (2018b)], subjected only to the fulfilment of
the requirements in recital 17. Besides, according to the
Judgment (see also Table 1), the techniques listed in Annex I
B must be deemed always included in art 2(2)(a) Directive 2001/
18/EC (see Judgment, paras 27–38), and only excluded from the
scope of Directive 2001/18/EC as long as they meet the
requirements stemming from recital 17 (paras 43–48) and
mentioned in Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC (para 40). The
Judgment though, does not provide any guidance on what is to
be understood by to “not involve the use of recombinant nucleic
acid molecules or genetically modified organisms other than
those produced by one or more of the techniques/methods
listed” in Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC; nor on how should
the requirements in recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC be assessed.
The term “mutagenesis” is not addressed in the Judgment either.Dynamic interpretation of law
The dynamic interpretation of law is an interpretative approach which
maintains that “the real meaning of a legal norm can be best disclosed at the
moment of its interpretation” (Harašić, 2015: 35). It therefore pays attention to
the “present societal, political, and legal context” of the legal texts under inter-
pretation (Eskridge, 1987: 1479).Annex I A Part 1 Directive 2001/18/EC
“TECHNIQUES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2(2)
PART 1
Techniques of genetic modification referred to in Article 2(2)(a) are inter alia:
1. recombinant nucleic acid techniques involving the formation of new
combinations of genetic material by the insertion of nucleic acid mole-
cules produced by whatever means outside an organism, into any virus,
bacterial plasmid or other vector system and their incorporation into a
host organism in which they do not naturally occur but in which they are
capable of continued propagation;
2. techniques involving the direct introduction into an organism of heritable
material prepared outside the organism including microinjection,
macroinjection, and microencapsulation;
3. cell fusion (including protoplast fusion) or hybridization techniques where
live cells with new combinations of heritable genetic material are formed
through the fusion of two or more cells by means of methods that do not
occur naturally.”Annex I A Part 2 Directive 2001/18/EC
“TECHNIQUES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2(2)
[…]
PART 2
Techniques referred to in Article 2(2)(b) which are not considered to result in
genetic modification, on condition that they do not involve the use of recom-
binant nucleic acid molecules or genetically modified organisms made by
techniques/methods other than those excluded by Annex I B:
1. in vitro fertilization,
2. natural processes such as: conjugation, transduction, transformation,
3. polyploidy induction.”March 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1813
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of Directive 2001/18/EC Post Judgment
Several additional teachings deduced from the Judgment might
be relevant to further clarify the situation of GMO and plant
breeding in the EU, and to assess the possibility to operate out of
the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC.
First, although it is indisputable that a dynamic interpretation
of Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC to include additional
techniques not listed in it is not possible [see Spranger (2015)
and Judgment, paras 40ff], this obstacle does not necessarily
apply to the interpretation of the techniques already present in
such annex nor to the requirements included or applying to the
annex. Certainly, the Court does not expressly take a position on
this issue (Wanner et al., 2019), but it does not close the door to a
dynamic interpretation of these later aspects either. Several issues
must be differentiated, particularly: flexibility as regards the
definition of the techniques cited in Annex I B (i.e., what is to
be understood by “mutagenesis” and “cell fusion [ … ]”);
flexibility applying to the requirements from recital 17 (i.e.,
what is to be understood by “a number of applications” and by
“a long safety record”); and flexibility in relation to the
requirements stemming from the very annex (i.e., (1) “do not
involve the use,” (2) “recombinant nucleic acid molecules,” and
(3) “genetically modified organisms other than those produced
by one or more of the techniques/methods listed” in Annex I B
Directive 2001/18/EC).
With respect to the concept of “mutagenesis,” it must be noted
that the Court recognizes the vagueness of Directive 2001/18/EC
(see Judgment, para 43: “by referring generally to mutagenesis, that
provision does not, on its own, provide any conclusive guidance as
to the types of techniques/methods [… ]”). Indeed, Directive 2001/
18/EC does not address the concept of “mutagenesis” (Krämer,
2015; Spranger, 2015; Purnhagen et al. 2018b; Eriksson, 2018;
Eriksson et al., 2018); but the Court implicitly admits that, at least
some applications of these NBT, might eventually fit within the
notion of “mutagenesis” from Directive 2001/18/EC (see the
references to “new techniques/methods of mutagenesis”
(Judgment, paras 48, 51, and 53) as well as the reasoning of the
Court in paras 28–38).
As for the requirements stemming from recital 17 Directive
2001/18/EC in relation to the exemption of “mutagenesis” by art
3(1) in relation to Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC, it must be
remarked that if the Court had chosen to interpret them in a
static way, it would rather have circumscribed its assessment to
the time period prior to the approval of the Directive, but it
decided instead to take into account later circumstances [see
Judgment, paras 47 (“[ … ] thus far [ … ]”), 48 (“[ … ] might
prove [… ]”), 51 (“In those circumstances, [… ]”), and 53 (“[…
] might be [ … ]”)]. Furthermore, as remarked by Purnhagen
et al. (2018a), the Court concludes by stating “that only
organisms obtained by means of techniques/methods of
mutagenesis which have conventionally been used in a number
of applications and have a long safety record are excluded from
the scope of that directive” (first conclusion, second para). Such
statement is also coherent with a choice of a dynamic approach
to the interpretation of Directive 2001/18/EC. If the Court hadFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 8108followed a static interpretation of the law, it would most likely
have expressly excluded techniques used before a certain date
(e.g., 2001 or 1990) or specific techniques or groups of techniques
(e.g., irradiation or chemical-induced mutagenesis techniques).
Furthermore, the wording used by the Court is not the result of
constraints stemming from the questions referred by the Conseil
d'État either (cf. Judgment, para 25 and conclusions). It must be
deduced from the foregoing that the Judgment does not prevent
the possibility of a dynamic interpretation of the techniques
within Annex I B as regards the requirements stemming from
recital 17.Static interpretation of law
Static legal interpretation may be defined as an interpretative approach
based on the idea of the “sense […] that the norm had at the time of its
adoption” as its true “sense” or meaning (Harašić, 2015: 35).Regarding the requirements contained in Annex I B
Directive 2001/18/EC, the Court only mentions them by
quoting the content of the annex (Judgment, para 40), and
therefore no specific guidance is provided, but flexibility is
neither preempted.
Second, it is clear from the aforesaid as well as from other
passages of the Judgment (see, e.g., paras 53, 54 and conclusion
3), that the critical motive founding the refusal of the Court to
exclude NBT from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC is the
alleged lack of “certainty” (Judgment, para 47) regarding the
requirements comprised in recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC (see
paras 45, 51, 53 and conclusion 3). Therefore, if at some point
those requirements imposed by recital 17 on “new techniques/
methods” fitting within Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC are
proven with a reasonable degree of “certainty”, according to the
teachings of the Judgment, those techniques might be excluded
from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC. However, in the light
of the Judgment (see paras 50ff), even in the case of an NBT or a
group of NBT eventually meeting all criteria [from recital 17
and the other applicable criteria from Directive 2001/18/EC
(see Table 1 and preceding section)], some action by the EU
legislature is needed for that exclusion be feasible. We propose
that a new EU directive or regulation is passed, ascertaining the
fulfilment of the criteria contained in Annex I B Directive 2001/
18/EC and in recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC (listed in Table 1)
by the relevant technique/s. This line of action is also
considered by experts to be the only, or at least, the most
feasible way of finding some leeway to operate with NBT out of
the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC post Judgment (Purnhagen,
personal com.). Such approach might be implemented within
the framework of Directive 2001/18/EC as interpreted by the
Judgment, without the need of a change of paradigm nor even
the amendment of the scheme of Directive 2001/18/EC.
Therefore, considering that a reform of Directive 2001/18/EC
would be probably a lengthy process (Eriksson et al., 2018), and
that such delay would have a negative impact on plant breeding
(Eriksson et al., 2018), this proposal could likely work as aMarch 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1813
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regime on GMO comes. In the absence of further guidance by
the CJEU on the concept of “mutagenesis” as well as of the
requirements contained in Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC,
choices among the different possible interpretations (Krämer,
2015; Spranger, 2015; Jorasch, 2016; Sprink et al., 2016;
Eriksson, 2018; Eriksson et al., 2018; Custers et al., 2019) will
have to be made by the EU legislature. Defining in detail these
choices falls completely out of the scope of the present paper;
but, in the following section, the status of the most well-known
breeding techniques (see Table 2) in the light of the
aforementioned criteria from Directive 2001/18/EC
interpreted according to the Judgment (see Table 1) is
shown, further illustrating the potential reach of a limited
legislative proposal like the one outlined.
Analysis of the Impact of the Judgment on
the Breeding Techniques
Provided that off-targeting effects and associated risks are
appropriately managed, ODM, SDN1, and SDN2 are the only
groups of techniques from Table 2 with the potential to render
certain applications exemptible from the scope of Directive 2001/
18/EC by means of a limited legislative proposal not altering the
EU GMO scheme. This conclusion has been reached through the
analysis of a nonexhaustive list of plant breeding techniques
mentioned in Directive 2001/18/EC, in SAM (2017) and in
other sources (see Table 2), on the basis of the following criteria
defining their status under Directive 2001/18/EC in the light of
the Judgment:
• “History of use in plant breeding”: approximate time when
the technique has started to be used for plant breeding
(indicative publication of the first application in plants, on
the basis of a search of the relevant literature on the topic). It
is not meant to substitute (nor it can substitute) the
assessment to be done by the EU legislature on the
fulfilment of the requirements contained in recital 17
Directive 2001/18/EC. Only proposed as a proxy of the
requirements stemming from recital 17 Directive 2001/18/
EC for indicative purposes in the strict framework of the
theoretical exercise carried out in this section. Related to
questions “7)” and “8)” from Table 1.
• “Annex I A Part 1 Directive 2001/18/EC?”: “Does it fit in any
of the techniques listed in Annex I A Part 1 Directive 2001/18/
EC?” (see Table 1): No, yes (expressly mentioned) [expressly
mentioned in Annex I A Part 1 Directive 2001/18/EC], yes
(recital 17 not ascertained) [recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC
not ascertained by the EU legislature or the Judgment], yes
(not in the other annexes) [it does not fit in the other annexes
from Directive 2001/18/EC (see reasoning in Table 1 and
related section)], or, yes (but exempted) [it is a GMO
technique according to Directive 2001/18/EC as interpreted
by the Judgment, but Directive 2001/18/EC expressly exempts
the technique by means of Annex I B)]. Related to question
“3)” from Table 1.Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 9109• “Annex I A Part 2 Directive 2001/18/EC?”: “Does it fit in any
of the techniques listed in Annex I A Part 2 Directive 2001/18/
EC” (see Table 1): Yes or no. Related to question “4)” from
Table 1.
• “‘[M]utagenesis' or ‘cell fusion [ … ]'?”: “Does it fit in the
notion of “mutagenesis” or “cell fusion (including protoplast
fusion) of plant cells of organisms which can exchange genetic
material through traditional breeding methods”?” (see Table
1): No, yes (“mutagenesis”), or yes (“cell fusion [ … ]”).
Related to question “5)” from Table 1.
• ”‘[I]nvolve [ … ] recombinant nucleic acid molecules'
(recNA)”: DNA or RNA sequences containing genetic
elements whose sequence and/or combination were not
originally present in the species genome. (Some authors
propose other definitions restricting the evaluation to the
genome of the individual (not the species) or allowing to
consider as nonrecombinant sequences declared as “near-
identical” (Eriksson, 2018: 387) based on a threshold
estimated according to the size of the genome [Eriksson,
2018)]: Yes, no, or no* (“no*” means that under a broader
interpretation of “recombinant nucleic acid molecules” (e.g.,
when the evaluation is restricted to the genome of the
individual itself), it could be a “yes”). Related to question
“6)” from Table 1.
• “‘[U]se’ lato sensu of recNA”: “use of recombinant nucleic
acid molecules” (lato sensu), i.e., introduction in the plant of
DNA or RNA sequences (but not insertion of heritable
recombinant DNA sequences into the genome). Related to
question “6)” from Table 1.
• “‘[U]se' stricto sensu of recNA”: “use of recombinant nucleic
acid molecules” (stricto sensu), i.e., stable insertion of
heritable DNA sequences into the genome. Related to
question “6)” from Table 1.
• “Classification according to Directive 2001/18/EC”:
classification of the techniques in Directive 2001/18/EC
interpreted according to the Judgment (see Table 1 and
preceding sections).
• “Out of the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC?”: status of the
techniques as regards the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC
interpreted according to the Judgment: yes (non-GMO), yes
(exempted GMO) [exempted GMO, although according to
the Judgment (conclusion 3) they may still be subjected “to
the obligations laid down in that directive [Directive 2001/18/
EC] or to other obligations”], or no (nonexempted GMO).
• “Potentially exemptible?”: Possibility to exclude a technique if
the requirements stemming from recital 17 Directive 2001/
18/EC are ascertained by the EU legislature according to the
legislative proposal outlined in the present paper (based on
the analysis of the Judgment, Directive 2001/18/EC and the
literature (see previous sections as well as Table 1): No, Yes,
Yes* (provided that a too broad interpretation of the
requirements contained in Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC
is not adopted), or – (it does not apply because already
exempted or non-GMO according to Directive 2001/18/EC
interpreted according to the Judgment).March 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1813
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aInitially, these techniques were developed to transfer “recombinant nucleic acid molecules”.
bProvided that a stable insertion is not carried out.
c
“No” provided that the allele sequence is already present in the species gene pool.
d
“No” in case of transitory transformation or null segregant.
Nonexhaustive list of plant breeding techniques mentioned in Directive 2001/18/EC, in SAM (2017) and new approaches currently being developed, the descriptions




Vives-Vallés and Collonnier The Judgment of the CJEU of 25 July 2018 on MutagenesisIt is worth noting that the exemption or deregulation of
ODM, SDN1, and SDN2 techniques (see Table 2) was already
proposed before the Judgment [see, e.g., Eriksson (2018) and
Purnhagen et al. (2018b)]. The current proposal is based on the
criteria extracted from Directive 2001/18/EC as interpreted by
the Judgment (see Table 1 and preceding sections), and therefore
is adapted to the current understanding of the EU legal scheme
on GMO. But, in order to that exemption may work in the
context of a limited legislative proposal like the one outlined, the
implementation of those techniques must be limited in a way
that the requirements contained in Annex I B Directive 2001/18/
EC are fulfilled. In other words, only those applications of ODM,
SDN1, and SDN2 that may be assimilated to mutagenesis, and
that “do not involve the use of recombinant nucleic acid
molecules or GMOs [ … ]” [see also Purnhagen et al. (2018b)]
would be exemptible in the framework of such limited legislative
proposal. It must be mentioned that, as the aforementioned
techniques are based on recombinant DNA (Zhu et al., 1999;
Shan et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2017), a broad interpretation of the
condition “do not involve the use of recombinant nucleic acidFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 1212molecules” (Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC) would preempt the
possibility of exempting any of the aforementioned techniques
(see Table 2) without an amendment of the scheme of Directive
2001/18/EC. However, as the EU legislature did not precise what
is to be understood by “not involve the use” and by “recombinant
nucleic acid molecules” [see, e.g., Krämer (2015); Spranger
(2015) and Eriksson (2018)], there is some margin of
maneuver left to further define the condition to “not involve
[ … ] recombinant nucleic acid molecules,” without being
compelled to alter the scheme of Directive 2001/18/EC. But to
achieve it, in addition to the requirements within Annex I B
Directive 2001/18/EC, those requirements coming from recital
17 Directive 2001/18/EC (i.e., “conventionally [ … ] used in a
number of applications and [ … ] a long safety record”) should
be also ascertained. The recent appearance of the techniques
[especially SDN1 and SDN2 (see Table 2)] might be perceived as
a complication. However, Directive 2001/18/EC does not define
how the requirements within recital 17 should be interpreted
(Spranger, 2015). This means that, as long as an optimum level of
“safety” is ensured, fixing the desirable threshold of thoseFIGURE 1 | Plant breeding techniques categorized according to their history of use and criteria potentially defining their legal status. For each category of breeding
techniques, criteria potentially defining their status are marked as colored bars (the sizes of which do not refer to their level of risk). Categories are arbitrarily positioned on
the x-axis according to the typology and cumulation of fulfilled criteria. Each plant breeding technique is placed on the graph according to the category it belongs to, and
to its history of use: black triangles and circles represent respectively techniques that are currently under the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC and exempted according to
the present study, while white triangles represent techniques which could be exempted by means of a limited legislative proposal (see Table 1 and preceding sections).
Legend of the x-axis: “New Combination”: creation of a genetic variation (sequence, location) that was not present initially in the genome (see Custers et al. (2019);
“Beyond nature”: genetic “[a]teration beyond what does occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination” (Custers et al., 2019);
“[U]se” lato sensu of recNA: “use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules” (lato sensu), i.e., introduction in the plant of DNA or RNA sequences, but not insertion of
heritable recombinant NA sequences into the genome (related to question “6)” from Table 1); “[U]se” stricto sensu of recNA: “use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules”
(stricto sensu), i.e., stable insertion of heritable DNA sequences into the genome (related to question “6)” from Table 1).March 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1813
Vives-Vallés and Collonnier The Judgment of the CJEU of 25 July 2018 on Mutagenesisrequirements is strictly a matter of legislative policy.
Furthermore, it must be noted that while random mutagenesis,
polyploidy and in vitro fertilization were rather old techniques in
the nineties when the EU legal regime on GMO was born, cell
fusion was just coming of age at that time (see Table 2 and
Figure 1). In other words, if time since the discovery and/or the
popularization of the (old) breeding techniques was not an issue
when the Directive was approved, it should not be a problem
now with the new techniques.
In summary, the analysis of the Judgment (in the section
Interpretation of the Judgment of the CJEU of 25 July 2018) and
the reasoning and justification of the limited legislative proposal
(in the section Leeway to Operate Out of the Scope of Directive
2001/18/EC Post Judgment) shows that such proposal, launched
as a transient solution until a reform arrives, is feasible from a
legal perspective. The analysis carried out in the section Analysis
of the Impact of the Judgment on the Breeding Techniques evinces
that, although fairly limited, the proposal might be also
meaningful for plant breeders, providing at least some leeway
to the industry.CONCLUSIONS
By considering targeted mutagenesis and varieties bred through
these techniques as not exempted from the scope of Directive 2001/
18/EC (Urnov et al., 2018), the Judgment will certainly have
implications on these techniques; but, as observed by some
scholars [see Martin in Science Media Centre (2018); Gelinsky
and Hilbeck (2018) and Wanner et al. (2019)] as well as by
CIOPORA (2018) and Jorasch (2019) from Euroseeds, it may also
have an impact on traditional techniques of random mutagenesis
and varieties thereof, as, from now on, varieties bred by means of
traditional techniques of random mutagenesis, no matter how long
they have been used, might be subjected “to the obligations laid
down in that directive [Directive 2001/18/EC] or to other
obligations” by EU Member States (Judgment, para 82 and
conclusion 3). Although the interpretation of Directive 2001/18/
EC provided by the Court is coherent with the principles governing
the EU legal regime on GMO [see, e.g., Purnhagen et al. (2018a) and
Eriksson (2018)], as shown by the Advocate General in its Opinion
(see paras 115-117), it was not the only possible interpretation of
Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC. From now on, almost any aspect
concerning those varieties (their risk assessment, labelling,
cultivation, etc.) might be regulated at a national level. Even the
application of Directive (EU) 2015/412 to those varieties, or stricter
rules created at a national level, might eventually be dictated by
Member States. Apparently though, since the Judgment came out,
Member States have not regulated in that sense, and the organic
sector does not seem to have urged them to proceed in that
way either.
As regards NBT, the EU might consider to exempt certain
techniques from the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC. In our opinion,
it is clear that the Court does not dispute the classification of certain
applications of NBT as a variant or species of “mutagenesis,” i.e.,Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 1313targeted mutagenesis; and that the reason leading to consider them
as not exempted is the nonfulfilment of the requirements stemming
from recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC. Therefore, if those techniques
are “used in a number of applications and [ … ] a long safety
record” is ascertained, they could be exempted from the scope of
Directive 2001/18/EC (provided that the specific applications of
those breeding techniques fit within the concept of “mutagenesis”
and comply with the requirements contained in Annex I B Directive
2001/18/EC). The analysis of the breeding techniques performed in
this study shows that certain applications of ODM, SDN1, and
SDN2 techniques potentially falling within the notion of
mutagenesis and that “do not involve the use of recombinant
nucleic acid molecules or GMOs [ … ]” could be exempted
without amending the scheme of Directive 2001/18/EC.
Approving a supplementary EU regulation or directive
ascertaining that those techniques comply with the conditions
stemming from recital 17 Directive 2001/18/EC would suffice.
Certainly, even if the proposal here outlined is eventually
approved, the minimum demands of the breeding sector would
not be appeased by its implementation. Furthermore, it must not be
forgotten that a narrow interpretation of the conditions laid down in
Annex I B Directive 2001/18/EC (particularly, “do not involve the
use of recombinant nucleic acid molecules”), would make the
proposal unfeasible. However, if it were successfully enforced,
considering that years might pass until a reform of EU legal
system on GMO succeeds (Eriksson et al., 2018), and that this
delay would aggravate the situation of plant breeding in the EU
(Eriksson et al., 2018), such limited legislative proposal might work
at least as a quick interim solution, and provide some temporary
leeway to operate outside the scope of Directive 2001/18/EC.DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
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Do new breeding techniques (NBT) lead to essentially derived varieties (EDV)? It depends! It
depends on the definition of EDV in the plant variety right (PVR) laws and their interpretation
by the courts. This paper aims at providing an overview of the EDV concept and an analysis
of the question whether NBT lead to EDV on the basis of the UPOV 1991 Act, the most
recent UPOV Explanatory Notes on EDV of 2017 as well as some selected PVR laws.
Almost 30 years ago, the concept of EDV has been incorporated into the UPOV 1991 Act.
In order to strengthen the rights of breeders, in particular to provide breeders of original
genotypes an additional source of remuneration, a system of “Plant Variety Right specific
dependency,” based on “essential derivation,” was developed. Only a very limited number
of court cases have been concerned with EDV. However, an escalation in EDV-related
conflicts can be expected in the future due to increased competition in the ornamental and
fruit breeding business as well as to the application of more sophisticated NBT.
Keywords: plant breeder’s right, essentially derived varieties, new breeding techniques, UPOV Convention,
mutants, fruits, ornamental plantsINTRODUCTION
Almost 30 years ago, the concept of essentially derived varieties has been incorporated into the
UPOV 1991 Act. In order to strengthen the rights of breeders [UPOV (1989), Introduction, chapter
B. 5. (i)], in particular to provide breeders of original genotypes an additional source of
remuneration [UPOV (1989), p. 12, No. 6. (iii)], a system of “Plant Variety Right specific
dependency (Leßmann, 2000),” based on “essential derivation,” was developed.
Incorporating the EDV concept meant a true extension of the breeder’s rights. The right of the
breeder to exclude others from specific acts such as producing, selling, exporting, and importing no
longer covers only the protected variety itself, but also varieties that are essentially derived from the
protected variety. Thus, the principle of EDV involves questions of the scope of the breeder’s rights
and its infringement. It is therefore left to the initiative of the breeders to enforce their rights
1
.
Until now, the EDV concept has been included in the Plant Variety Right laws of 65 UPOV
member states, 7 of them being party only to theUPOV1978Act
2
. Unfortunately, the Plant Patent Act1A different approach is—yet—followed by Australia. Australia is—as far as can be seen—the only UPOVmember state where
the PVR authorities play an active role in the declaration of a new variety to be or not to be an EDV.
2Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Italy, Nicaragua, and South Africa.
.org March 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 161211 6
Krieger et al. Are NBT in Plants EDV?of the United States, the basic and most widely used regulation for
the protection of intellectual property of ornamental and fruit
breeders in the U.S., does not yet contain a provision on EDV
3
.
Several publications about EDV have been issued
4
. Only a
very limited number of court cases have been concerned with
EDV
5
, apparently due to the fact that breeders are hesitant to
start court proceedings due to the complexity of the matter and
the ambiguous provisions of the applicable plant variety right
(PVR) laws. Additionally, breeders seem to be more careful in
their breeding programs in order to avoid possible EDV cases. At
least in the US (ASTA) and France (SEPROMA), for maize,
different zones (red, orange, green) have been agreed upon when
dealing with pairwise genetic distances between potential initial
and essentially derived varieties based on molecular marker
profiles. It has become part of the arbitration system but is also
used in practice to keep away from breeding too close to a
competitor’s genetic material (UPOV-BMT reports, available on
https://www.upov.int/portal/index.html.en).
However, an escalation inEDV-related conflicts canbe expected
in the future due to increased competition in the ornamental and
fruit breeding business as well as to the application of more
sophisticated “breeding” methods, the so-called new breeding
techniques (NBT). In ornamentals and fruits, one is typically
dealing with long breeding times that can reach up to 20 years.
However, mutations into these crops are easily detected when
propagated on larger scales and can immediately be introduced
into the market. By use of NBT, targeted development of
innovative EDV can become a very attractive and fast route to
new varieties. Different to seed propagated species where the owner
of a variety often also controls the propagation and final marketing
of the seeds, vegetative species are in away “free” andhave to rely on
a stronger IP protection system. The PBR system in Europe is seen
by the sector as one of themost performant systems, and this results
into a high number of applications in ornamental and fruit crops
(Figure 1) (CPVO, 2018).
In the United States, two main IP systems are used for the
protection of plant Fi varieties: Plant Patents for the asexually
reproduced plants (other than tuber-propagated) and Plant
Breeders´ Rights for the seed propagated crops
6
(Figure 2).
Over the past 5 years, twice as many applications were filed for
Plant Patents than Plant Breeders’ Rights in the U.S. (Figure 3)3Since 2018 the US Plant Variety Protection Act is open for vegetatively repro-
duced crops, too, so that the breeders of such crops can benefit from the EDV
Concept in the USA, too.
4See list of literature at the end of the article for Crespel et al. (2009), Hunter
(1999), Korzun and Heckenberger (2004), Lange (1993), Vosman et al. (2004) and
Zhang et al. (2001).
5The Court of Civil Law in The Hague, The Netherlands (File-No. 2003/1054) on
13 July 2005 has issued a decision in a case concerned with Gypsophila and denied
the existence of an EDV, the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court, Israel (File - No.002002/
05) on 21 September 2005 approved for the same variety the existence of an EDV.
See also Turin Trial Court, File-No GR No 28969/2009, Judgment No 3519/2015
published on 14/05/2015, Regional Court of Mannheim, decision 7 O 442/04.
6Since 2019 asexually reproduced crops can also be protected by Plant Breeders´
Rights—driven by the missing EDV concept in the Plant Patent Act. Additionally,
varieties can be protected by Utility Patents in the US, too, but this was not
common practice for asexually reproduced crops in the past.
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According to the High Level Group of Scientific Advisors
(2017), the term NBT describes a very diverse range of
techniques, some of which are substantially different from
established transgenic approaches in their way of introducing
traits to an organism (EASAC, 2015). Some are a refinement of
conventional breeding techniques and insert genetic material
that is derived from a sexually compatible species, while some
nevertheless are used in combination with established techniques
of genetic modification. Some of the NBT result in organisms
that contain only point mutations and are practically
indistinguishable from varieties bred through conventional
breeding methods or resulting from spontaneous mutations
(EASAC, 2015). In this paper we focus on NBTs (as listed by
the EU and in detail explained by the High Level Group of
Scientific Advisors, 2017), but explicitly not including “grafting”
and “agro-infiltration,” as the resulting products of these above
defined NBTs are most similar to conventional mutagenesis and
genetic modification.THE TEXT OF THE UPOV 1991 ACT
REGARDING EDV
The starting point of this discussion about EDV is the text of the
UPOV 1991 Act. However, it must first be noted that the UPOV
1991 Act, like any other UPOV Act, does not have a direct effect
in the UPOV member states. The UPOV Act only sets the
minimum requirements of PVR laws in the UPOV member
states. The legal basis for EDV are the specific PVR laws on
which the PVR title and the EDV-claim are based. In many cases,
the wording of the provisions dealing with EDV of such PVR laws
differs significantly from the wording of the UPOV 1991 Act
7
.
However, it is solely the provisions of the applicable PVR laws
that govern the legal relationship of those involved. Only when
there are incomplete or inconclusive provisions that give room for
interpretation, the UPOV text may be consulted. In this regard,
UPOV has since 2008 drafted two explanatory notes (EXN) on
EDV, which aim at providing guidance and assist members of
UPOV and relevant stakeholders in their consideration in matters
concerning EDV (UPOV, 1992; UPOV, 2017). The most recent
one is the EXN on EDV approved in April 2017. However, it
should be noted that the EXN is not binding for UPOV members
and must not be interpreted in a way that is inconsistent with the
relevant UPOV Act.
The sections regarding EDV can be found mainly in Article
14 (5) (a) (i), (b), and (c) of the UPOV 1991 Act. They have to be
read in the context of the complete Article 14 (Scope of the
Breeders´ Rights), in which the provisions have been
incorporated. Additionally, Article 15 (1) (iii) also contains an
important link to EDV.7The majority of the 65 member states of UPOV with an EDV provision have
strictly copied the UPOV text on EDV. A prominent example for a different
wording is the European PVR-Regulation 2100/94.
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Scope of the Breeder’s Right
(1) [Acts in respect of the propagating material]
(2) [Acts in respect of the harvested material]
(3) [Acts in respect of certain products]
(4) [Possible additional acts]
(5) [Essentially derived and certain other varieties]
(a) The provisions of paragraphs (1) to (4) shall also
apply in relation to
(i) varieties which are essentially derived from the
protected variety, where the protected variety is not
itself an essentially derived variety,
(ii) varieties which are not clearly distinguishable in
accordance with Article 7 from the protected
variety and
(iii) varieties whose production requires the repeated
use of the protected variety.
(b) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) (i), a variety
shall be deemed to be essentially derived from another
variety (“the initial variety”) when
(i) it is predominantly derived from the initial variety,
or from a variety that is itself predominantly derived
from the initial variety, while retaining the expression
of the essential characteristics that result from the
genotype or combination of genotypes of the
initial variety,
(ii) it is clearly distinguishable from the initial
variety and
(iii) except for the differences which result from the act
of derivation, it conforms to the initial variety in the
expression of the essential characteristics that result
from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the
initial variety.
(c) Essentially derived varieties may be obtained for
example by the selection of a natural or induced
mutant, or of a somaclonal variant, the selection of a
variant individual from plants of the initial variety,
backcrossing, or transformation by genetic engineering.ers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 3118Article 15
Exceptions to the Breeder’s Right
(1) [Compulsory exceptions] The breeder’s right shall
not extend to
(i) acts done privately and for non-commer-
cial purposes,
(ii) acts done for experimental purposes and
(iii) acts done for the purpose of breeding other vari-
eties, and, except where the provisions of Article 14 (5)
apply, acts referred to in Article 14 (1) to (4) in respect
of such other varieties.THE BASICS OF “BREEDER’S
EXEMPTION” AND “DEPENDENCY” AND
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
MOTIVES FOR INCORPORATING THE
EDV-CONCEPT INTO THE UPOV 1991 ACT
Free Access to Germplasm
From the very first day of the UPOV-system, starting with the
UPOV 1961 Act, the principle of free access of breeders to
existing breeding material (genotypes/germplasm) for the
purpose of breeding new varieties has been established. The
main reason for having included and maintained this principle
through the UPOV Acts is that any breeding is based on existing
living material and thus breeders have to depend on free access to
different genotypes to avoid a concentration on only a very
limited number of varieties (Leßmann, 2000). The majority of
breeders and their associations support this principle of free
access to germplasm (see CIOPORA).
This is a fundamental element of the UPOV system of plant
variety protection known as the “breeder’s exemption,” whereby
there are no restrictions on the use of protected varieties for the
purpose of breeding new plant varieties. The authorization of the
breeder for the use of protected varieties for breeding purposes isFIGURE 1 | Evolution of PBR-application numbers per crop sector (2009–2018) at the CPVO (2018).March 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1612
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Breeder’s Exemption also permits the application of NBT on
protected varieties.
There is no such concept of breeder’s exemption in the
patent system under the European Patent Convention (EPC)
although it has been implemented in some national patent
laws. Still breeders also take into account patent protection
because of the innovations involving technical solutions to
develop new varieties. Under the current European patent
protection, which is a stronger and more absolute protection
than PVR in respect of the strict substantial requirements
examination and its scope of exclusive rights, any use of the
patented products (e.g. genetic material) and processes
covered by the patent must obtain permission from the
patent owner. This blocks access to biological materials for
further breeding.
The Shortcomings of the Overly Broad
“Breeder’s Exemption” in the Past
Compared to the position of a patent holder as described before,
the position of breeders with regard to the scope of protection
was weak before the revision of the UPOV Act in 1991.
Additionally, too many loopholes where found in the
individual PVR laws. In particular the broad wording of the
“breeder’s exemption” combined with the absence of adequate
provisions on the control of varieties that are very similar
compared to a protected variety left the door wide open to so
called “cosmetic breeding” and plagiarism. In addition, the
situation regarding “mutants” was not satisfactorily covered by
the PVR laws, as the breeders of the original varieties were unable
to control said mutants. Even by way of license-agreements, an
adequate control could not be reached (decision of the European
Commission, 1985).Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 4119Mutants and New Bio-Technologies as the
Initial Point for the EDV-Concept
Therefore, it was mainly the breeders of vegetatively reproduced
crops, namely ornamental and fruit plants, who were dissatisfied
with the fact that third parties, due to the limited scope of protection
of the preceding UPOV Acts, were allowed to exploit and even
acquire PVR protection for mutants of protected varieties without
the original breeder being able to participate in the use and
exploitation of these mutants (Kiewiet, 2002). Mutants play a
significant role in many ornamental species. As estimated by
breeding companies, many of important ornamental varieties
are mutants:
In addition, it was the development of GMO technologies
which enables adding new characteristics to existing varieties by
way of biotechnological methods that led to the introduction of
the concept of dependent plant variety rights. Conventional
breeders were concerned that such new GMO varieties could
be used without them receiving any financial compensation for
the use of the germplasm they have created through conventional
breeding methods.
This discussion has gained momentum again in the recent
past with the advent of NBT. Conventional GMO have not been
applied in ornamentals and fruits a lot due to high costs of
regulatory issues and companies not willing to put their
reputation at risk. Mutagenesis on the contrary has yielded
more than 3,200 novelties, some of them well known like the
orange flesh grapefruit (Source FAO/IAEA Mutant Varieties
Database: https://mvd.iaea.org/). NBT also allow to develop a
trait in a parental line that can be quickly introgressed by
backcrossing into an existing variety. In species with a short
commercial life, like lettuce and other vegetables, this new
phenomenon might lead to even more closely related varieties.
Again, the fear is raised that an NBT variety could easily takeFIGURE 2 | Evolution of the U.S. Plant Variety Rights (PVP) vs. U.S. Plant Patents in force in each consecutive year (2013–2017). Source: UPOV, 2019.March 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1612
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conventionally bred variety.ANALYSIS OF THE EDV-CONCEPT
Systematic Framework
The EDV clause is included in Article 14 of the UPOV 1991 Act
(“Scope of the Breeder’s Right”). This shows that the EDV
concept is part of the scope of the right and not an exception
or limitation, like those provisions of Article 15 of the 1991 Act.
However, the EDV Concept is a limitation in another sense:
According to Article 15 (1) (iii) the breeder’s right shall not
extend to acts done for the purpose of breeding other varieties,
and, except where the provisions of Article 14 (5) apply, acts
referred to in Article 14 (1) to (4) in respect of such other varieties
(Breeder’s´ exemption). In other words: Acts for the purpose of
breeding a new variety are always allowed without the consent of
the breeder of the initial variety, but the exploitation of such a
new variety is allowed only as long as the new variety is not
considered to be an EDV. In that way the EDV Concept is indeed
a limitation of the breeders´ exemption, not in respect of the free
access to germplasm, but in respect of the commercialization of
the newly developed variety, if this is an EDV.
“Classical Breeding Work” in the
EDV Concept
The term “classical breeding work”
8
is one of the keywords in the
EDV concept. The term first leads to a discussion on the
contradiction between the definition of “breeder” in Article 1 (iv)
of the UPOV 1991 Act and the “classical breeding work” in the8Or “true breeding work” as used in UPOV (1989).
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 5120framework of the EDV concept. Whereas according to Article 1 (iv)
of the UPOV 1991 Act both, i.e., those who “cross and select” as well
as those who “discover and develop,” new varieties deserve the title
“breeder,” in the EDV-concept “classical breeding” only means the
crossing of parental varieties and the selection of the resulting
progenies with the aim to create new variations. The definition of a
“breeder”mainly results from the purpose of the UPOV 1991 Act to
be applied also to a variety originating from a mutation (see UPOV,
1991). However, although UPOV does not differentiate between
“classical breeding work” a “discovering and developing” on the
level of the definition of the term “breeder,”UPOV nevertheless sets
apart the “classical breeding work”, as only the results of such
“classical breeding work” shall benefit from the EDV concept and
from the extension of the scope of rights. The reason for this is that
huge personal and financial endeavors have to be made to create
new varieties by way of such “classical breeding”.
In many parts of the world, breeders are often small and
medium-sized companies. Until now they mostly breed
innovative varieties in a conventional way by crossing and
selection, which can take up to 20 years of hard work.
Breeding innovative varieties in a conventional way is one of
the backbones of the ornamental and fruit industries. It
requires significant human and financial investment to
develop such varieties. In order to guarantee a sustainable
continuation of such breeding there needs to be a sufficient
return on investment. Only varieties that are the result of
classical breeding work qualify for the extended protection
provided by the EDV concept.
The Conditions of an EDV
The Initial Variety (Article 14 (5) (a) (i) UPOV 1991 Act)
The initial variety forms the basis of any EDV claim. It derives from
the principle of dependency that the initial variety must enjoy PVRFIGURE 3 | Evolution of the U.S. Plant Variety Rights (PVP) vs. U.S. Plant Patent applications (2013–2017). Source: UPOV, 2019.March 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1612
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of the UPOV 1991 Act. Therefore, in general the dependency of an
essentially derived variety starts with the beginning of the
provisional protection of the initial variety and ends with the end
of protection of the initial variety (either by expiration or
cancellation). Additionally, the initial variety cannot itself be an
EDV. Although by introducing the EDV concept a certain degree of
dependency has been created, so called “dependency pyramids”
were to be avoided. The initial variety, therefore, must be the result
of “classical breeding work” [UPOV, Doc. IOM/IV/2, page 12, No. 6
(iv)]. As alreadymentioned before, essential derivation is a matter of
fact. Therefore, an EDV remains an EDV forever. Even if the
protection period of the initial variety is exhausted, all varieties
derived from this initial variety will still be essentially derived from
the initial variety, but not dependent of the initial variety which is no
longer protected. The reason for this is that the EDV-concept has
mainly been introduced to protect more efficiently the breeder of
the initial variety and not those who make derivations from his
work (see also International Seed Federation, 2005).
Clearly Distinguishable
The EDV has to be clearly distinguishable from the initial variety.
This requirement draws the line between an EDV and a variety
which is not clearly distinguishable from the protected variety in
the meaning of Article 14 (5) (a) (ii) in combination with
Article 7 UPOV 1991 Act (see UPOV, 2017). Whereas the
EDV is a discrete variety which is in principle eligible for PVR
protection
9
, a variety not clearly distinguishable from the
protected variety is not a discrete one and cannot enjoy9If it meets the additional criteria (novelty, uniformity and stability).
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 6121separate PBR protection but falls automatically within the
scope of the earlier protected variety.
Some claim that the EDV concept aims at preventing
plagiarism. However, in our view plagiarism is not a question
of derivation or dependency, but rather a question of Minimum
Distance/Distinctness and direct infringement. If a variety in its
phenotype very much resembles a protected variety, it is not
clearly distinguishable from the protected variety, and its
commercialization is a direct infringement, irrespective
whether the new variety is (essentially) derived from the
protected variety or not. Instead, the fact that an EDV needs to
be distinct from its Initial Variety makes it clear that a plagiaristic
variety can never be regarded as EDV, as a plagiaristic variety
already lacks the Distinctness. Declaring plagiaristic varieties as
EDV would have the strange consequence that PBR Offices would
be forced to grant Plant Breeders´ Rights titles to plagiaristic
varieties, because EDV in principle are eligible for PVR protection.
The application of NBT usually will result in varieties which
are clearly distinguishable from their Initial Variety. In fact, such
varieties usually would not aim at copying an existing variety but
adding an important or innovative trait to the initial variety.
NBT are in principle not plagiaristic.
Predominant Derivation
The second condition an EDV will have to fulfil as stipulated by
the UPOV 1991 Act is that it is predominantly derived from the
initial variety or, as the case may be, from a variety that itself is
predominantly derived from the initial variety. Predominant
derivation relates to the genetic origin of the variety.
The first and in the field of vegetatively reproduced ornamental
and fruit varieties by far the most important group of EDV are so
called mono-parental varieties, like mutations, that are not onlyFIGURE 4 | Market shares of color mutants in ornamentals as estimated by breeders, 2019.March 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1612
10In fact, there are voices which deny the existence of an EDV in such case, see the
citation of Kiewiet (2002) in: Plant Variety Rights in a community context, page 5,
Opposite to this, the case of a colour mutation is listed as one example of an EDV
in the brochure of the Japanese PVR office explaining the PVR system in Japan.
Krieger et al. Are NBT in Plants EDV?predominantly, but totally derived from their mother-variety. The
importance of this group of varieties is mirrored by the examples
given as acts of “derivation” in Article 14 (5) (c) UPOV 1991 Act.
Four of the examples listed in the UPOV Act, i.e., mutants,
somaclonal variants, variant individuals from plants of the initial
variety, and genetically modified plants (GMO) resulting from
transformation by genetic engineering, are mono-parental
varieties. A mono-parental variety has its basis in one genome
only (the genomeof the initial variety),whichwas alteredby the acts
of derivation mentioned before. The half-sentence “while retaining
the expression of the essential characteristics that result from the
genotype or combination of genotypes of the initial variety”
indicates that predominantly derived varieties essentially retain
the expressed characteristics of the initial protected variety but does
not stipulate an additional requirement for predominant
derivation. The meaning of this sentence is further limited by (iii):
“except for the differences which result from the act of derivation.”
For NBT varieties the condition of predominant derivation is
fulfilled, because NBT varieties—like mutants—are mono-parental
varieties, solely derived from their Initial Variety. Even if by way of
the NBT multiple changes are made to the genome of the initial
variety (stacking), the new variety is based solely on the genome
of the initial variety and the genetic conformity will be very high.
Conformity to the Initial Variety
The main dispute in regard to EDV is about the alleged
requirement of conformity of the EDV compared to its Initial
Variety. A judgment on the question on the degree of conformity
must be reached on the basis of the expression of characteristics
which result from the genotype of the initial variety. This
judgment has to assess the conformity to the description of the
initial variety apart from the specific differences which result
from such breeding methods and other minimal differences
which result incidentally from such breeding methods, such
differences being evidenced at the level of the genome, the
genotype or the phenotype. Article 14(5)(b)(iii) does not set a
limit to the amount of difference which may exist where a variety
is considered to be essentially derived. Differences, which result
from the act of derivation, shall not be taken into consideration
for the determination of an EDV.
Voices in literature are of the opinion that only varieties that
show one or, at the most, a very limited number of phenotypic
differences, can be considered as EDV (without reasoning,
van der Kooij (1997), Introduction to the EC Regulation on
Plant Variety Protection, Art. 13 (5) EC Regulation 2100/94,
page 32; Court of Civil Law in The Hague, footnote 8, which
based this opinion on its interpretation of the term “essentially
derived” in indent (i) of Article 14 (5) (b) UPOV 1991 Act and
UPOV document IOM/IV/2, page 12, No. 6 (ii), without
considering the later UPOV Doc IOM/6/2. In an even more
narrow interpretation, the UPOV EXN on EDV of 2017 states
that a variety cannot be predominantly derived if it does not
retain the essential characteristics of the initial variety [see
UPOV (2017)]. This sentence is interpreted in a way that a
variety can be considered to be an EDV only if it retains all
essential characteristics of its Initial Variety. The EXN follows the
very narrow Australian approach on EDV, where the AustralianFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 7122PBR Office declares a variety as EDV only if it differs in an
unessential characteristic from the Initial Variety (see
presentation of Australia in UPOV EDV Seminar 2013, https://
www.upov.int/edocs/mdocs/upov/en/upov_sem_ge_13/upov_
sem_ge_13_ppt_9.pdf).
We do not agree to this approach. Already the wording of Article
14 (5) (a) (ii) shows that this argument is not cogent. The condition
“clearlydistinguishable”according toArticle 7of theUPOV1991Act
requires at least one “clear”differencebetween theEDVandthe initial
variety, whereas in several cases even one difference is not enough to
consider one variety “clearly” distinguishable from another [see e.g.
Article 5.3.3.2.1 of the UPOV document TG 1/3 “General
Introduction to the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and
Stability and the Development of Harmonized Descriptions of new
Varieties of Plants” https://www.upov.int/tgp/en/introduction_
dus.html)].
The narrow interpretation of the EDV-concept in allowing
only one or fewer differences between the initial variety and its
EDV disregards the new tendencies in the development of new
varieties, because certain methods of developing new varieties,
applying chemicals and other mutagens or NBT, allow the
development of plants which differ considerably from the
mother plant without altering the genome of the plant
significantly. In fact, depending on the act of derivation the
number of differing phenotypic characteristics between the
initial variety and the variety derived thereof can differ
significantly, between one, a few or even numerous. For
example, mitotic polyploids express in general an increased
size in all plant organs and an intensification of physiological
characters. Such increases in plant organs can easily lead to
numerous different characteristics as described in the test
guidelines provided for by UPOV.
Additionally, requiring that an EDV must retain all essential
characteristics of the Initial Variety would make the EDV
Concept meaningless to a huge extent. A flower color-mutant
in an ornamental variety is one typical case of an EDV. The
characteristic “colour” can be regarded as one of the most if not
the most important characteristics in ornamental varieties
(Figure 4), presumably an essential characteristic. The colour-
mutant clearly does not retain the essential characteristic “colour”
of the initial variety and thus could not be considered an EDV,
although being a mutant, is the typical example of an EDV and has




Also varieties resulting from NBT do in principle not retain
all essential characteristics of their Initial Varieties, because the
NBT have been deliberately applied with the aim to change
essential characteristics of the initial variety, e.g. by introducing a
resistance into a susceptible variety or to limit the browning of
apples (“Arctic Apple”, https://www.arcticapples.com/).
According to the narrow UPOV EXN on EDV of 2017 and the
Australian approach (Government of Australia, 2002), such NBTMarch 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1612
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background that the NBT variety consists almost entirely of
the genome of the initial variety, it seems highly unfair to the
breeder of the initial variety to deprive him of any benefit from
the NBT. Additionally, if the New Breeding Technology is
protected by a Patent, the Patent holder can prevent the
breeder of the initial variety from commercializing his variety
or even to further breed with it. In order to prevent such
a situation (in 1991 with a focus on GMO), the EDV Concept
was established.
The narrow approach of the UPOV EXN on EDV is based on
the last half sentence of indent (i) of Article 14 (5) (b) of the
UPOV 1991 Act, which reads:
A variety shall be deemed to be essentially derived from
another variety (“the initial variety”) when
(i) it is predominantly derived from the initial variety, or from a
variety that is itself predominantly derived from the initial
variety, while retaining the expression of the essential char-
acteristics that result from the genotype or combination of
genotypes of the initial variety,.
This further requirement in indent (i) is inconsistent with
indent (iii) (Kiewiet, 2002). To avoid this inconsistency, the
Community Plant Variety Right Regulation 2100/94 of 27 July
1994
11
, which is based on the UPOV 1991 Act, contains a
definition of EDV that has not taken over the last part of
Article 14 (5) (b) (i) UPOV 1991 Act.
6. For the purposes of paragraph 5 (a), a variety shall be
deemed to be essentially derived from another variety, referred to
hereinafter as ‘the initial variety’ when:
a) it is predominantly derived from the initial variety, or from a
variety that is itself predominantly derived from the initial
variety;
b) it is distinct in accordance with the provisions of Article 7
from the initial variety; and
c) except for the differences which result from the act of deri-
vation, it conforms essentially to the initial variety in the
expression of the characteristics that results from the geno-
type or combination of genotypes of the initial variety.
By doing so, the Community PVR system, one of the largest
systems under the regime of UPOV, also has obviously put the
focus on the genetic conformity between an EDV and its initial
variety. This definition of EDV has also been incorporated in the
PVR laws of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France,
Germany, Romania and Slovenia
12
.
Therefore, the focus of the discussion should be on indent (iii)
of Article 14 (5) (b) of the UPOV 1991 Act. Indent (iii) stipulates
that the EDV shall conform to the initial variety in the expression
of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or
combination of genotypes of the initial variety, except for the
differences which result from the act of derivation. Indent (iii)
does not set a limit to the number of phenotypic differences11Published in all EC-languages under www.cpvo.eu.int.
12The English texts are published under www.upov.int.
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 8123between an EDV and the initial variety to one or a few [this is
explicitly pointed out in the UPOV (1989) Doc. IOM/6/2, page 4,
No. 12]. According to indent (iii) a variety shall be considered an
EDV as long as its differences with the initial variety result from
the act of derivation.
As far as vegetatively reproduced ornamental and fruit varieties
are concerned it can be taken for granted that all phenotypic
differences between a mutant and its mother variety result from
the act of derivation.
When dealing with the regulatory aspects of NBTs, the High
Level Group of Scientific Advisors (2017) dealt with
spontaneous mutation, induced mutagenesis and genome
editing technologies. In summary, they conclude: “The
spontaneous mutation rate is about 7 x 10-9 base
substitutions, per site, per generation. This results in one base
substitution per generation in a genome the size of Arabidopsis
thaliana (Ossowski et al., 2010). This means that unintended
effects can also accumulate in sexual crossing. Induced
mutagenesis, depending on intensity and concentration of the
mutagenic agent, can increase this mutation rate by a factor of
approximately 500 (Jander et al., 2003; Till et al., 2007; Cooper
et al., 2008). All mutations occurring in addition to the
mutations conferring the desired trait can be considered ‘off-
target’. There is a high probability that the random mutations
in some genes will also influence the expression of other genes.
Typically, however, the selected plants with the desired traits
will still contain a high number of undetected random
mutations, in particular if they do not cause disadvantageous
phenotypic traits (Acquaah, 2015; Popova et al., 2015).
Consequently, the breeder must undertake time consuming
downstream selection in order to identify the desired traits
essentially on the basis of the phenotype. This selection process
does not exclude the presence of unidentified mutations in the
new variety. The use of the new techniques involving ODM
(oligo-directed mutagenesis) and SDN (site-directed nucleases)
implies a different strategy. In this case the number of
mutations is greatly reduced by comparison with the above
and is limited to one or a few predefined mutations and possibly
some off-target mutations.”
Nevertheless, in general a mutant will also and always retain
several important characteristics of its mother variety, because it
was the very reason for the developer of the mutant to benefit from
these important characteristics of the mother variety – this was the
very reason why he had chosen this mother variety, and not e.g. a
free, older variety.CONCLUSION
After all, first generation varieties resulting from New
Breeding Techniques, are mutants and thus are solely
derived from their Initial Variety. This can have a direct
impact on vegetatively propagated plants like ornamentals
and fruits as existing varieties immediately can be improved
by NBT. Therefore, for these crops, direct NBT varieties
should always be considered EDV. However, applying NBT
in other cultivated crops breeding activities can result in moreMarch 2020 | Volume 10 | Article 1612
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valid for all crops already although the delineation in seed
crops is less straightforward than in vegetatively propagated
plants. The high genetic conformity, which is obvious for
mutants in fruits and ornamentals, needs then to be defined,
mostly by using conformity measures based on an agreed set
of molecular markers (in future this might become DNA
sequence homology). Agreements on thresholds for genetic
conformity have been made between breeders of certain
species already. At the moment it merely deals with
recurrent backcrossing and not too much with mutation
breeding or use of NBTs. However, it can be expected that
e.g. targeted mutagenesis by CRISPR/Cas and a short
recurrent backcrossing cycle might become a future strategy
in rapid cycling varieties e.g. vegetable breeding. If there
continues to be an imbalance between the breeder of the
initial variety that has created a new beneficial “mix” of
genetic diversity within a genotype and NBT breeders that
add selected improvements on existing varieties, an erosion
and narrowing of genetic diversity could be the result.
A too narrow interpretation of the EDV Concept, as
currently applied by the Australian Government, deprives
breeders of initial variety from effective protection and anFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 9124additional income. It fails to meet the aim of the EDV Concept
as implemented in the UPOV 1991 Act, but rather steps back
to the scope of the UPOV 1978 Act.AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
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While modern biotechnology and, specifically, genetic modification are subject of debate
in many parts of the world, an increasing number of countries in Sub-Sahara Africa are
making important strides towards authorizing general releases of genetically modified
(GM) crop varieties for use by farmers and agribusinesses. Obviously, the documented
economic and environmental benefits from planting GM crops—based on a track record
of over two decades—are a major driver in the decision-making process. Another key
factor is the increasing alignment of biosafety regulatory policies with progressive
agricultural and rural development policies in Africa, resulting in—compared to past
experiences—greater emphasis on anticipated benefits rather than risks in biosafety
regulatory reviews. In several cases, this has led to expedited reviews of GM crop release
applications, either for confined field trials or general environmental release, taking
experiences and data from other countries into account. Such regulatory approaches
hold promise as the pipeline of relevant, pro-poor GM crop applications is expanding as
are the opportunities provided by novel plant breeding techniques. This review article
analyses the shifting policy context in select African economies, resulting in adoption of
new agricultural technology, and novel regulatory approaches used in biosafety decision-
making. Case studies will be presented for Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and Uganda to
analyze challenges, distill lessons learned and to present general policy recommendations
for emerging economies.
Keywords: policy & institutional actions, biotechnology, biosafety analysis, regulation, genome editingCONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY: REGULATION–TECHNOLOGY
INTERACTIONS
As is the case generally when new technologies are introduced in society, there have been strong
claims about the benefits and perceived adverse effects of agricultural biotechnology, specifically
regarding genetically modified (GM) crops, and more recently regarding emerging techniques in
plant breeding such as genome editing. Early concerns regarding genetic modification stimulated,.org March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 1301126
Komen et al. Expediting Biosafety Regulatory Reviewsfrom the 1980s onward, the creation of regulatory systems for
food and feed safety and environmental risk assessment. In
Africa, governments generally started the development of their
national biosafety systems more recently and, as with other areas
of safety regulation, the task has been difficult in terms of defining
science-based regulations and enforcement. For most of them the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has set the starting point, as
adopted in 2003 as a supplement to the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), and which seeks to address environmental
impact from transboundary movement, management and safe
use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
The adoption of regulatory policies for biosafety and food/
feed safety should be seen as part of a broader emerging
international regime increasingly affecting the access and use
of genetic resources for food and agriculture. This international
regime affects scientific leeway and freedom-to-operate in a
major way: The development and deployment of new
agricultural technologies gets increasingly regulated, and often
impeded, as access to essential research inputs (such as genetic
resources, or protected technology) and the release of research
outputs such as new crop varieties, is slowed down or halted by
overly restrictive regulations. This phenomenon is described in
further detail in Komen (2012). Evidently, the existence of
sovereign rights over a country's natural resources, including
genetic resources, is now well established in international law.
Traditionally, genetic resources for agriculture were considered a
common heritage of humankind and generally there was free
transnational flow and access to all biological materials wherever
they were located. Over time this situation was perceived to cause
asymmetry between countries with rich genetic resources,
usually free providers of these resources, and countries without
extensive biological resources but who used them in R&D and
protecting research results as intellectual property. The CBD,
from which the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety originated,
changed this concept and reinforced sovereign rights to States
over their biological resources through “access and benefit
sharing” (ABS) regimes. Rourke (2018) analyses the increasing
legal obstacles to accessing genetic resources and concludes that:Fronti“The culmination of these barriers renders some
biological research untenable and can result in the
abandonment of research projects before they even
commence.” (Rourke, 2018)1Following World Bank (2011), this article uses a broad depiction of ‘innovation',
encompassing technological change and institutional change. Following World
Bank's agricultural innovation systems sourcebook (2011), components of
innovation include, in addition to a strong capacity in R&D, collective action
and coordination, the exchange of knowledge among diverse actors, the skills,
incentives and resources available to form partnerships and develop businesses,
and enabling conditions that make it possible for actors to innovate.The CBD's Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, originally aimed
at maximizing benefits of biotechnology for biodiversity
conservation while minimizing adverse effects, tends to add to
the complexity by emphasizing the “precautionary principle” in
biosafety decision making, while providing only limited guidance
on what constitutes a functional national regulatory framework.
Therefore, it is the responsibility of national governments to
come up with science-based and efficient biosafety policies. This
is becoming critical as new agricultural technologies are
emerging, such as those related to genome editing, for which
new regulatory approaches and instruments may be required.
According to Wiener (2004), technology and regulation are
generally regarded as adversaries, with regulation seen asers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 21 7inhibiting technological change. Particularly regarding GMOs,
calls for precautionary regulation have been frequent and
reflected in the Cartagena Protocol as well as in several
national and sub-regional regulatory frameworks. In the same
essay, Wiener (2004) emphasizes that technological change
impacts regulation as well. For example, by introducing
improved technologies and products, risk can be reduced
leading to decreasing need for regulatory oversight. In addition,
it is often argued that regulation may encourage innovation1
and competitiveness by promoting the introduction of cleaner
and more cost-effective technologies. In cases where the chosen
regulatory instrument is appropriate and well designed,
technological change will progress. A prerequisite, according to
Wiener, is the presence of “policy entrepreneurs” or “policy
innovators” who: “[W]ill develop and test new forms and
approaches to regulation for greater effectiveness, les cost, less
caustic side effects, and other describable attributes.” Wiener's
arguments are reaffirmed in OECD analyses on “regulatory
reform”, defined as “changes that improve regulatory quality,
that is, enhance the performance, cost-effectiveness, or legal quality
of regulations and related government formalities.” (OECD, 1997).
While the present article does not aim at providing an
academic analysis of biosafety regulation and regulatory
reforms, it is important to point to emerging regulatory
reforms, and factors driving those reforms, in several countries
in sub-Sahara Africa. First and foremost, recent reforms reflect a
growing body of literature regarding the actual benefits and
adverse impacts of GM crops. Over time, as actual experience
continues to grow in planting, processing and consuming GM
crops, much clearer analyses emerge regarding their real impacts,
which is in turn affecting regulatory approaches. For example, a
recent study by the US National Academies of Science (NAS,
2016) undertook a thorough review of available primary
literature. The study committee found little evidence to
connect GM crops and their associated technologies with
adverse agronomic or environmental problems. In addition,
the committee also found that—while impacts differed greatly
across different contexts—systematic reviews and formal meta-
analyses of the performance of GM crops have consistently
shown the following impacts:
• Reductions in yield damage by insects;
• Reductions in insecticide applications for target insect pests,
resulting in substantial environmental and health benefits;
• Decreases in management time and increases in flexibility
related to herbicide-resistant (HR) crops; and,
• Increases in gross (in some cases net) margins due to the
adoption of GM crops, or combinations of all the above.March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 130
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More specifically, Qaim (2019) concludes that, based on an
in-depth analysis of available literature: “Over the last 20 years, a
large number of studies have been conducted, analyzing the effects
of GM crop adoption on yield, pesticide use, farm profits, and
other outcomes in different parts of the world. A meta-analysis has
evaluated these existing studies, finding that GM crop adoption
benefits farmers in most situations (…). On average, GM
technology has increased crop yields by 22% and reduced
chemical pesticide use by 37% (…). GM seeds are usually more
expensive than conventional seeds, but the additional seed costs
are compensated through savings in chemical pest control and
higher revenues from crop sales. Average profit gains for adopting
farmers are 68%. (Qaim, 2019)
Analysis such as published by NAS (2016) increasingly play a
role in biosafety decision-making as regulators become better
able to weigh risks against benefits. This article takes a country
case-study approach to further explore this development, using
experiences from select countries in Africa. We will investigate
recent progress and lessons learned, drawing recommendations
for future policy reforms.EVOLVING POLICY CONTEXT FOR
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN
SUB-SAHARA AFRICA
Recognizing the important (potential) benefits of biotechnology
to improving food security and rural development, governments
across Africa have taken steps to establish an enabling policy
framework to support adoption of biotechnology including GM
crops and derived products. A more detailed analysis of relevant
policies and regulations is presented below. Examples of recent
policy decisions regarding GM crops include:
• Approvals for general release and commercial variety
registration for insect-resistant, GM cotton hybrids in
Ethiopia (2018), Kenya (2019), Malawi (2019) and Nigeria
(2018). While farmers in Ethiopia started planting GM cotton
at limited scale in 2019, GM seed distribution in Kenya,
Nigeria and Malawi will start in 2020;
• Approval for general release and submission for variety
registration for insect-resistant, GM cowpea in Nigeria (2018).
Next step in this process will involve the registration, by the
National Variety Release Committee, of GM cowpea as a new
commercial variety followed by seed distribution by local
companies.
In addition, with countries such as Ghana, Kenya and Uganda
moving steadily from confined field trials (CFTs) towards
general release applications, the setting for GM crop
production in sub-Sahara Africa is rapidly changing. Until
recently, only South Africa, Sudan and Burkina Faso had
approved commercial production of GM crops. Right now, the
regulatory pipeline is expanding and diversifying as illustrated by
Table 1.Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 3128This increasing emphasis on agricultural biotechnology as a
critical element in agricultural development policies is an
important factor driving the expanding GM crop pipeline in
Africa. Illustrative examples of such policies are presented below.
Agricultural Policies Increasingly
Supportive of Innovation
As noted in a recent analysis by AGRA, the Alliance for a Green
Revolution in Africa (2018), agriculture is key to Africa's future
considering that the continent has most of the world's arable
land, over half of the African population is employed in the
sector, and it is the largest contributor to total gross domestic
product (GDP). Yet, Africa is still producing too little food and
agricultural value-added products (AGRA, 2018). Productivity in
the agricultural sector has been broadly stagnant since the 1980s.
Similarly, government investments in agricultural R&D show a
slightly declining trend. However, recent successes in achieving
rapid agricultural growth (e.g., in Ethiopia) have encouraged
governments to adopt much more growth-orientated policies,
which are highlighted in this section.
Ghana's government in 2017 launched an ambitious initiative
to industrialize Ghana with the establishment of agro-processing
factories in each of the 216 districts in the country. This initiative
dubbed “one-district-one-factory” is to be implemented through
the private sector. The factories are expected to utilize raw
materials readily available in the district where the factory is
located. This program, coupled with another government
initiative, “Planting for Food and Jobs”, is expected to boost
agricultural production. This initiative has as its core: “[T]he
drive to motivate farmers to adopt improved, certified seeds and
fertilizers through a private-sector marketing framework, by
raising incentives and complimentary service provisions on the
usage of inputs, good agronomic practices, marketing of outputs.”
(MOFA, 2017). While implementation of such programs may be
slower than anticipated, together with supportive policies aimed
at a more market-orientated agricultural sector, they provide
clear guidance to technology developers testing and planning the
release of GM crops in Ghana.
Kenya's “Vision 2030”, an overarching development policy
aimed at becoming a middle-income country, focuses on
agriculture as a key sector, which should drive the economy to
an annual growth rate of around 10%. Agricultural policy in
Kenya prioritizes a sharp increase in productivity and income
growth, especially for smallholder farmers. More recently, the
country's President's “Big 4 Agenda” emphasizes food security as
the number one priority. This includes, among other elements,
enhancing availability of basic staples such as maize, rice and
potatoes, supporting agro-processing enterprises and enhancing
large-scale crop production including cotton as an industrial
crop. This Agenda acted as a boost to accelerating the
introduction of GM, insect-resistant cotton. Revival of cotton
production and local processing is among the Big 4 Agenda
priorities and includes the large-scale planting of GM cotton to
boost productivity.
For the past few decades, Malawi, like many other countries
has been a net importer of food. Considering the challenge to
become more self-sufficient and the important role agricultureMarch 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 130
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Product Trait Developer Collaborating Institutes Regulatory Status (year of approval)
GHANA
Rice Nitrogen use efficiency/water use efficiency/salt
tolerance
Arcadia Biosciences CSIR1—Crops Research
Institute
CFT2 (2013)




Maize Drought tolerance Bayer Crop Science KALRO5, AATF, CIMMYT6 Approved for NPT (2016)
Drought tolerance, insect resistance Bayer Crop Science KALRO, AATF, CIMMYT CFT (2012)
Stacked event of insect resistance and drought
tolerance
Bayer Crop Science KALRO, AATF, CIMMYT CFT (2015)
Cotton Insect resistance Mahyco KALRO NPT (2016)
Sorghum Biofortified sorghum with enhanced Vit A, Iron and Zinc Pioneer Hi-Bred KALRO, Africa Harvest CFT (2015)
Cassava Virus resistance (cassava brown streak disease) DDPSC7 KALRO CFT (2013)
Virus resistance (African Cassava Mosaic Virus (ACMV)




siRNA to sweet potato virus disease resistance DDPSC KALRO CFT (2014)
MALAWI
Cotton Insect resistance Mahyco DARS9 Commercial varieties registered (2019)
Cowpea Maruca pod borer resistance CSIRO, AATF LUANAR10 CFT (2015)
Banana Bunchy top virus resistance QUT11 DARS CFT (2016)
Plantain Bunchy top virus resistance QUT DARS CFT (2018)
NIGERIA
Cassava Virus resistance; improved nutritional quality DDPSC NRCRI12 CFT approved (2019)
Improved shelflife IITA13 CFT (2018)
Cotton Insect resistance Mahyco IAR14 Commercial varieties registered (2018)
Cowpea Maruca pod borer resistance CSIRO, AATF IAR General release approved (2018); submitted
for variety registration (2019)






Soybean Herbicide tolerance MSU16 NABDA, NCRI CFT approved (2019)
UGANDA
Banana Disease resistance AATF, IITA NARO17 Multi-location CFTs (2010)
Nematode resistance NARO CFT (2012)
Improved nutritional quality QUT NARO CFT (2011)
Cassava Virus resistance DDPSC NARO Multi-location CFTs (2010)
Maize Drought tolerance/insect resistance Bayer Crop Science,
AATF
NARO Multi-location CFTs (2015)
Potato Fungal resistance CIP18 NARO Multi-location CFTs (2015)






Soybean Herbicide tolerance MSU NARO Contained research (2016)Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 41291CSIR, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.
2CFT, Confined Field Trial.
3CSIRO, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Australia.
4AATF, African Agricultural Technology Foundation.
5KALRO, Kenya Agricultural and Livestock Research Organisation.
6CIMMYT, International Maize and Wheat Research Center.
7DDPSC, Donald Danforth Plant Science Center, USA.
8MMUST, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology.
9DARS, Department of Agricultural Research Services.
10LUANAR, Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
11QUT, Queensland University of Technology, Australia.
12NRCRI, National Root Crops Research Institute.
13IITA, International Institute for Tropical Agriculture.
14IAR, Institute for Agricultural Research.
15NCRI, National Cereals Research Institute.
16MSU, Michigan State University.
17NARO, National Agricultural Research Organisation.
18CIP, International Potato Center.March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 130
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defined a Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) in order
to enhance agricultural growth, alleviate poverty and improve
quality of life (Government of Malawi, 2017). The MGDS-III is a
medium-term strategy designed to contribute to the country's
long-term development goals. The current strategy covers a
period of five years, from 2017 to 2022, with the objective to
move Malawi to a productive, competitive and resilient nation
primarily through sustainable agriculture while addressing water,
climate change, and environmental management and population
challenges. In the implementation plan/operation matrix, under
agriculture sector, the Strategy identifies commercial application
of agricultural biotechnologies as one of the priority activities
which can contribute to increased agricultural production and
productivity. In line with the MGDS, Malawi has secured a loan
from the World Bank to transform Malawi's agricultural
productivity through irrigation for period of 2019 to 2022. The
objective of the project is to pull people out of poverty raising
income levels of beneficiaries by overcoming the main
production challenges of droughts and pests. These
government initiatives indicate strong positive political will,
which is critical to the sound regulation and adoption of any
technologies including GM crops.
Nigeria's Agriculture Promotion Policy (2016–2020)
document, titled, “The Green Alternative” aims to “build an
agribusiness economy capable of delivering sustained prosperity
by meeting domestic food security goals, generating exports, and
supporting sustainable income and job growth” (FMARD, 2016).
As the policy emphasizes, among other priorities, the need for
productivity enhancements and innovation in Nigerian
agriculture, and securing private sector investments, it has
encouraged recent decisions to authorize the commercial
release of GM crops such as insect-protected cotton and cowpea.
Agricultural policies in Uganda have been supportive towards
exploiting the potential of GM crops since the development of
the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (PMA), some 20 years
ago. The current overarching policy instrument, the Agriculture
Sector Strategic Plan (ASSP) recognizes the need to enhance
sustainable agricultural productivity and value addition using
well-coordinated technological and service interventions
(MAAIF, 2015). This policy further identifies the need to
develop and implement a specific policy and regulatory
framework for biotechnology in agriculture. In addition, the
National Agricultural Research Act, 2005 was formulated with a
key objective of transforming agricultural production into a
modern science-based market-oriented system that is efficient,
sustainable and profitable. The National Biotechnology and
Biosafety Policy (2008) further strengthens the Government's
commitment to utilize modern biotechnology tools for national
transformation. These policy statements continue to guide GM
research at the National Agricultural Research Organisation
(NARO) in priority commodities such as maize, banana, and
potato in line with the country's overall development policy
statement, the Vision 2040, that also articulates the various
sectors where biotechnology is seen as a strategic tool. These
include agriculture, healthcare, industrial development, and
environmental management.Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 5130Functional Regulatory Frameworks
Support Technological Change
In addition to the overall supportive policy initiatives sketched
above, it is important to note that these countries have invested
in establishing functional regulatory frameworks for GM crops,
allowing decision makers to weigh potential benefits against
potential adverse effects on the environment and human or
animal health. A science-based and practical regulatory
framework has become an important enabling factor for
countries researching and adopting GM crops. Table 2
provides an overview of regulatory frameworks for countries
covered in this article.
In countries that are selected as case studies for this article,
there has been progress in recent years in establishing functional
national biosafety frameworks and growing expertise in GMO
decision-making. An overview of key legal instruments and
institutional setups is provided in Table 2. Generally, while it
is very well possible to use existing legislation to regulate
biotechnology and GMOs, countries have opted to develop
new biosafety laws and centralized decision-making bodies –
such as national biosafety authorities. This has proven to be an
effective approach in most cases, while responding to the need
for clear legal authority, as evidenced by the number and range of
regulatory decisions made in recent years (presented in Table 1).
Clear legal authority through comprehensive biosafety laws
has still provided regulatory agencies with options to adopt
flexible and innovative approaches to GM decision making.
This has, for example, included decisions to (i) accept field
trial data from neighbouring countries to expedite reviews of
applications for confined field trials (CFTs); (ii) accept data from
local GM CFTs and multi-location trials to shorten procedures
for variety registration trials; (iii) accept food/feed safety dossiers
and assessments from trading partners for accelerated safety
decision-making. The following examples serve to illustrate
these points.
• In Ghana, the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) approved
multi-locational trials (MLTs) for insect-resistant GM cotton
in 2012 after accepting data from confined field trials (CFTs)
conducted previously in Burkina Faso. Considering the
similar agro-ecological zones for cotton production in the
two countries, the National Biosafety Committee (NBC)
decided to grant an exemption for local CFTs and move to
MLTs right away. These trials were put on hold in 2016 due to
Burkina Faso's decision to terminate the commercial
registration of GM cotton.
• Nigeria adopted the same principle—accepting data from
other countries—and authorized country-wide MLTs for
GM cotton prior to endorsing its general release and
commercial variety registration in 2018.
• Kenya adopted fast-tracked protocols for variety registration
trials involving GM crops that have gone through CFTs and
MLTs, shortening the time required for DUS/VCU2
performance trials from two planting seasons to one.March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 130
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Africa can adjust their regulatory decision-making processes
based on accrued scientific evidence.
Political Challenges Remain
While the above sketched progress in regulatory decision-
making is encouraging, it is important to note that, still, most
African countries are only slowly progressing in implementing
functional regulatory frameworks. And, even in countries where
recent progress has been achieved, there is considerable potential
for backsliding. Many governments experience political
opposition to GM crops and modern agriculture generally, and
proposed biosafety legislation and regulations are conveniently
associated with “opening the gateways” for the introduction of
GMOs. Political opposition is in most cases fuelled by anti-GM
activism, which has slowed down or halted the adoption of
biosafety legislation (see, for example, Afedraru, 2019). For a
continent that could benefit greatly from improved planting
material including GM crops, this progress is slow.
As analysed in detail by Komen and Koch (2017), despite
significant effort and donor-agency resources devoted to
biosafety capacity development, and despite progress in some
countries such as those presented above, many countries still doFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 6131not have adequate capacity to design and implement biosafety
regulations. This remains a significant barrier to the testing and
adoption of new crop varieties, including those developed by
genome editing and other plant breeding innovations, which
would open new opportunities to grow more food, enhance
incomes and reduce environmental impact of agriculture. An
uncertain regulatory environment discourages private and public
sector investment into development of the pro-poor crops and
traits that farmers need the most.
While many donor-funded support programmes have
attempted to build national capacity for the regulation of GM
crops, progress is uneven at best. An early analysis of this
situation was presented by Johnston et al. (2008) and is still
very relevant. Their report confirms that generally, countries
with existing capacity for biotechnology R&D, that already
receive applications for activities with GMOs, and that have
high-level political support for biotechnology and biosafety
capacity building, have made most advances and have
benefited most from technical assistance (Johnston et al.,
2008). This assessment found that a majority of developing
countries, including most countries of Africa, Central Asia,
Oceania and the Caribbean, were not yet able to manage
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3 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed introduction on NBTs.
For an excellent introduction, refer to the series of factsheets published by the
European Plant Science Organisation, EPSO (2016). URL: https://epsoweb.org/
epso/fact-sheets-on-new-breeding-technologies/2016/03/21/
Komen et al. Expediting Biosafety Regulatory Reviewsframeworks. This general situation was confirmed in an
independent evaluation commissioned by the CBD Secretariat
in 2012 (CBD, 2012), and only slow progress has been
made since then – with notable exceptions as indicated in
this article.
For countries making progress despite the general
challenges sketched above, important obstacles often occur
at advanced stages of the regulatory process, when general
release applications and commercial variety registration
decisions are considered. In such cases, again based on analysis
from countries that are focus for this article, the following
hurdles occurred:
1. Lack of inter-ministerial collaboration and harmonization:
As GM crops approach general release or market
authorizations, government agencies become involved with
responsibility for, e.g., food/feed safety, variety registration
or, in some cases, for Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA). This has led to delays, inconclusive “conditional”
release decisions and sometimes standstills in cases where
these agencies lack familiarity with the biosafety regulatory
review processes and tend to repeat safety reviews that were
already completed. Early investment in establishing a
coordinated, multi-agency framework is essential, coupled
with policy consultations regarding harmonization of legal
mandates.
2. Post-release requirements: Towards the final stages of the
regulatory review process, post-release requirements are
being considered related to, among other things, product
labeling, product liability, co-existence, monitoring and
surveillance. These concepts are in many cases not yet
implemented and tested in African countries, associated
expertise is low, and enforcement will be problematic. In
the early phases of regulatory framework definition in Africa,
strict post-release requirements were usually formulated and
only later it is realized that these will form an impractical
impediment to technology deployment.
3. High-level political will wavers: Finally, in the final stages of
the decision-making process, government authorities get
hesitant to fully authorize commercial cultivation of a GM
crop particularly when this involves a GM food crop. The
expected political/electoral consequences of such decisions,
including the potential for public controversy, often affect
such decisions. It also affects the decision-making regarding
required policy reforms, as seen in the cases of (i) the
continuation of a de facto GMO import ban in Kenya
(Mukonyo, 2019), and (ii) the refusal by the President of
Uganda to assent to a biosafety act that was passed twice by
the Parliament of Uganda (Afedraru, 2019).
These hurdles have resulted in the current emphasis on
primarily conducting CFTs with only slow progress towards
general release and commercial cultivation, except for a non-
food crop such as GM cotton. With the recent decision in Nigeria
to authorize general release of GM cowpea, and its imminent
registration as a commercial variety, this situation might change
in the near future.Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 7132PLANT SCIENCE MOVING AHEAD:
APPLICATION OF GENOME EDITING FOR
IMPROVEMENT OF STAPLE CROPS IN
AFRICA—THE CASE OF BANANA AND
CASSAVA
While the R&D pipeline in Africa and, worldwide, adoption of
GM crops steadily grows—in 2018, a total of 192 million hectares
were planted with GM crops in 26 countries (ISAAA, 2018)—the
emerging “new breeding techniques” (NBTs) are the latest
addition to the plant breeder's toolbox as they offer the
possibility of making genetic changes more precisely by
targeting them to specific sites in the genome3. Especially the
new tools for genome editing, like ODM (oligonucleotide
mutagenesis) or CRISPR/Cas9 provide mechanisms to not just
randomly increase genetic variation, as done by radiation or
chemical mutagenesis, but also to precisely introduce mutations
in genes of known functions to either impair or improve their
function. NBTs have the potential to reduce the cost and time of
bringing new products to the market since, compared with
conventional breeding techniques, they can reduce the number
of unwanted traits that might be co-transferred during the
breeding process and that subsequently need to be removed.
The greatest potential advantages of NBTs are their relative ease,
precision, speed, and low cost, allowing breeders to focus more
on the local growing conditions and to react more quickly to the
changing needs and wants of growers and consumers.
With specific reference to sub-Sahara Africa, this precise genome
editing has potential to revolutionize crop improvement. Notably,
CRISPR/Cas9 has emerged as a powerful genome editing tool that
can be used efficiently to induce targeted mutations in the genomes
of plants species to produce improved varieties. CRISPR/Cas9
technology has been successfully applied in many organisms,
including several plant species (Scheben et al., 2017). It has not
only been established for model plants like Arabidopsis and
Nicotiana banthemiana but also for complex crops like rice,
wheat, maize, sorghum, tomato, soybean, apple, citrus, poplar,
coffee (Ricroch et al., 2017; Breitler et al., 2018).
As in previous episodes of rapid changes in agricultural
technology, the international centers that are part of the
Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR) are at the forefront of incorporating NBTs in their
research portfolio, in collaboration with national research
organizations in sub-Sahara Africa. As a case in point, the
International Center for Improvement of Maize and Wheat
(CIMMYT, its acronym in Spanish), the Kenya Agriculture
and Livestock Research Organisation (KALRO) and Corteva
(formerly, DuPont Pioneer) have joined hands to exploit the
gene editing (CRISPR-Cas) technology to improve maize and
wheat germplasm. A specific example where this technology will
be employed is to address maize lethal necrosis (MLN), aMarch 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 130
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countries of East Africa since it was first detected in Kenya.
CIMMYT identified a strong source of resistance against MLN,
have fine-mapped it to a 1 MB region of chromosome 6, and
expect to isolate the gene that confers resistance. Among the first
targets for gene editing will be the parents of long-standing
commercial hybrids in East Africa that were developed before the
appearance of MLN and have since become susceptible to the
disease. The International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
(IITA), one of the CGIAR is on the forefront of applying NBT
for improvement of banana for developing resistance to diseases
(Tripathi L. et al., 2019; Tripathi J.N. et al., 2019; Maxmen, 2019).
Details are provided below.
While most of the CRISPR/Cas9 based genome editing is
reported in seed crops, recently it is also reported in vegetatively
propagated crops like banana, cassava and potato (Butler
et al., 2016; Odipio et al., 2017; Kaur et al., 2017; Naim et al.,
2018; Ntui et al., 2019). Genome editing provides enormous
opportunities for improvement of economically important
traits of, polyploid, heterozygous and vegetatively propagated
crops such as banana and cassava. Illustrative examples are
summarized below.
Banana and cassava are among the important staple food and
income generating crops for resource-poor farmers in Africa.
Their contributions in the African diet are comparable to wheat,
rice, maize, or potatoes in other parts of the world. The banana
and plantain grown in Africa, is a starchy staple and the major
source of carbohydrates to millions of poor people. Similarly,
cassava is the most important primary food staple in several
African countries. However, there are important biotic and
abiotic constraints shattering the production of these
important crops in Africa. Therefore, improvement of banana
and cassava for economically important traits is critical to fulfill
the food demand.
Tackling Banana Diseases Through
CRISPR
Recently, CRISPR-based genome editing of banana has been
demonstrated through knocking out the marker gene phytoene
desaturase (PDS) leading to albino phenotype, however, the
achieved mutation efficiency of 59% was quite low for practical
application (Kaur et al., 2017). Further, higher efficiency (100%)
of genome editing was reported for dessert banana with using
CRIPSR construct with polycistronic gRNAs targeting PDS gene
(Naim et al., 2018). Similarly, high mutation efficiency was also
reported by IITA using PDS gene as target (Ntui et al., 2019;
Tripathi L. et al., 2019). Once the efficient protocol for CRISPR/
Cas9-based genome editing was established, this technology was
utilized to inactivate the endogenous Banana streak virus (eBSV)
integrated in the host genome, overcoming a major challenge in
banana breeding (Tripathi J.N. et al., 2019).
BSV is a prevalent virus pathogen developing disease
symptoms as chlorotic streaks on leaves and advancement of
disease leads to killing of the plant. BSV belong to
pararetroviruses, integrated into the host genome and known
as endogenous BSV (eBSV). The viral sequences of eBSV are
integrated in the B genome derived from Musa balbisiana.Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 8133Cultivated varieties of banana are polyploid (AA, BB, AAA,
AAB, ABB) descended from wild progenitors Musa accuminata
(A genome) or/and Musa balbisiana (B genome). Plantain
(AAB), one of the economically important sub-groups of
banana, contains one B genome. It is an important staple food
crop in Africa. During BSV infection, multiple copies of eBSV
sequences integrates at a single locus in the B genome of the host
as direct, inverted and tandem repeats (Chabannes et al., 2013).
These proviruses can be reactivated into the infectious episomal
BSV under several environmental stress conditions. When the
infected banana plants are stressed, a functional episomal BSV
genome and infectious viral particles are created through
recombination of integrated sequences of eBSV, leading to
development of disease symptoms in plants. Micropropagation
for multiplication of plants through tissue culture and
conventional breeding may also trigger activation of eBSV.
Hence, the main cause of major epidemics of BSV is not the
natural transmission of virus through insect vectors or use of
infected seed materials, but instead due to reactivation of
integrated eBSV under unfavorable stress conditions. As a
result, BSV has become one of the key constraints in genetic
improvement of plantain through conventional breeding and
also deployment of plantain hybrids.
The diploid progenitor Musa balbisiana (BB) or several
genotypes with at least one B genome have tolerance to biotic
and abiotic stresses and good agronomic traits, still cannot
be used as parents in breeding programs. Tripathi J.N. et al.
(2019) demonstrated that the endogenous eBSV can be
inactivated through targeted knockout of viral sequences from
the host plant genome through CRISPR/Cas9 based genome
editing and reports a strategy for inactivation of even other
endogenous viral genomes from the host plants. The genome-
edited events of plantain ‘Gonja Manjaya' with targeted
mutations in the viral genome prevented proper transcription
or/and translational into infectious viral proteins. The
inactivation of eBSV into infectious viral particles was
confirmed by testing the potted plants of these edited events
under water stress conditions in the glasshouse. Seventy five
percent of the tested plants remained asymptomatic under stress
conditions, whereas all the non-edited control plants showed
BSV disease symptoma. This is the first report of generation of
genome-edited crop in Africa and lay the foundation for editing
of banana for important traits such as disease resistance. The
International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA, Nigeria) is
also developing banana varieties resistant to bacterial wilt and
fusarium wilt diseases using CRISPR/Cas9 technology.
Improving Cassava Virus Resistance
and Quality
Genome editing of cassava was established using the CRISPR/
Cas9 technology for knocking out the Phytoene desaturase
(MePDS) gene (Odipio et al., 2017). This technology was
further utilized for developing cassava varieties with enhance
resistance to the cassava brown streak disease (CBSD), caused by
two species of Ipomovirus: Cassava brown streak virus (CBSV)
and Ugandan cassava brown streak virus (UCBSV) (Gomez
et al., 2018). CBSD is a major viral disease of cassava affectingMarch 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 130
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reported that targeted mutations in cassava translation initiation
factor 4E (eIF4E) isoforms nCBP-1 and nCBP-2 reduces CBSD
disease severity as demonstrated with low degree of disease
symptoms and virus accumulation in storage tuberous roots
upon glasshouse challenge of edited cassava lines with CBSV.
Simultaneous mutations in the nCBP-1 and nCBP-2 genes
conferred significantly higher resistance to CBSD, however
complete resistance to CBSD was not obtained in this study.
Therefore, authors recommended that improved varieties of
cassava with complete resistance to CBSD can be developed by
stacking this approach of disrupting eIF4E isoforms with other
resistance strategy such as RNAi.
Further, researchers has attempted to apply this technology to
develop enhance resistance to African cassava mosaic virus
(ACMV), a geminivirus (Mehta et al., 2019). However, the
effective resistance to ACMV was not achieved in the
glasshouse challenge experiments. The authors linked this to
the evolution of editing-resistant geminiviruses in edited cassava.
CRISPR/Cas9-based genome editing can be coupled to
genetic improvements in cassava for traits such as starch
improvement and early flowering. Bull et al. (2018) reported
genome-editing of cassava for manipulating starch biosynthesis
and improving the starch quality in the storage roots. They
generated the edited cassava with mutations in two genes
[PROTEIN TARGETING TO STARCH (PTST1) or
GRANULE BOUND STARCH SYNTHASE (GBSS)] involved
in amylose biosynthesis, leading to reduction or elimination of
amylose content and finally improving the quality of in starch in
cassava roots. The authors also demonstrated accelerated
breeding by transferring Arabidopsis FLOWERING LOCUS T
gene in the genome-editing events of cassava for early flowering.
They further demonstrated edited cassava with modified starch
can be segregated in greenhouse to produce transgene-free
progeny with improved trait.
In order to meet the increasing demand of food with limited
or same resources, better and effective ways to produce food are
required. As summarized above, one option is to utilize new
breeding tools like genome editing for crop improvement.
Currently, severe endeavors are underway to enhance yields of
banana and cassava—among a range of other crops—through
generating improved varieties with resistance/tolerance to
biotic stresses.
A major question to be addressed, from a regulatory
perspective, will the products of NBTs be classified under the
current definitions of genetic modification, or not? Over the last
three decades, a patchwork of (draft) biosafety laws and
regulations has emerged affecting the development and release
of improved crops and resulting in trade issues when approvals
are “asynchronous”4. In recent years, given the rapid advances in
genome editing, there is increased regulatory attention and4Asynchronous approval refers to the situation in which there is a delay in the
moment when a GM event is allowed to be used in one country in comparison to
another country. A notable case in point illustrating the trade disruptions from
asynchronous GMO approvals concern the use of GM plant varieties that are
approved in countries which export them to the EU, mainly in the form of animal
feed (maize, soybeans), before these are actually approved by the EU.
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 9134debate around these applications. Salient developments are
outlined below; it should be emphasized that while an
increasing number of regulatory authorities have provided
clarity regarding their approach to genome edited crops, the
jury is still out in major economic blocs such as the
European Union.EMERGING REGULATORY APPROACHES
TO GENOME EDITING, WITH REFERENCE
TO AFRICA
Considering the above sketched situation, where differences in
GMO regulation are exacerbated by specific challenges posed by
NBTs, different countries are responding in different ways to the
question of how applications of NBTs should be classified, as
regulated GM material or not. The key point here is that specific
applications, e.g., when genome editing is used to create a loss of
function of a target gene, result in an event that contains no
“foreign DNA”, i.e., no novel combination of genetic material
and therefore cannot be distinguished from a product of
conventional mutagenesis (which is commonly exempt from
GM regulation).Summary of Global Developments
As early as 2013, the European Academies Science Advisory
Council (EASAC), a body of national science academies of the EU
Member States, argued that products of NBTs should not fall
under GMO legislation when they do not contain “foreign DNA”.
The EASAC advisors noted that in some cases the product cannot
be distinguished from one generated by conventional techniques,
and also argued that the new techniques allowmuch more precise
and targeted changes compared with mutagenesis used in
conventional breeding, where changes in the genome are
induced by chemicals or radiation, creating multiple, unknown,
and unintended mutations (EASAC, 2013).
Regulatory authorities in a range of countries follow this same
EASAC conclusion that genome editing, in cases where no novel
combinations of genetic material have been created, should be no
more regulated than a product of conventional mutagenesis. An
often-cited case in point is Argentina, where in 2015 a new
regulation was issued aimed at clarifying the regulatory status of
products from NBTs. The regulation allows applicants to consult
with the competent authority early-on in the R&D stage (“design
stage”) to determine if a product developed using gene editing is
a GMO or not. The prime decision-making factor here is if the
product has a novel combination of genetic material or not.
Preliminary consultations are then followed by a final
determination based on a full information package describing
the gene editing procedure and resulting changes in the genomic
sequences of the end product (Lema, 2019). So far, this approach
has resulted in regulatory exemptions for several genome edited
crops in Argentina. Importantly, South American countries such
as Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Paraguay have followed
Argentina's lead and will regulate genome edited products on aMarch 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 130
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when there is no novel combination of genetic material. Similar
approaches can be cited from major economies such as the USA,
Japan and Australia. Such decisions regarding NBTs generally
followed a thorough review of scientific evidence and existing
regulations so that these remain fit for purpose in times of rapid
technological development.
By contrast, in a major agricultural trading bloc like the EU
there is still uncertainty as to how products from NBTs will be
regulated. While EU bodies recognized the potential of NBTs
early on, as evidenced by a range of studies and projects
conducted with EU support, to date there has been no clear-
cut policy decision or statement from the European
Commission. So far its actions were limited to, among other
things, requesting advisory notes from the EU Scientific
Advisory Mechanism (SAM) and awaiting a legal opinion from
the EU Court of Justice (CJEU). This wait-and-see approach has
greatly complicated matters.
On 25 July 2018, the CJEU advised that organisms obtained
by new mutagenesis techniques are considered as GMOs, within
the meaning of the EU's Directive 2001/18/EC on the release of
GMOs into the environment (the “GMO Directive”), and that
they are subject to the obligations laid down by the GMO
Directive (Curia Press and Information, 2018). Thus, the ruling
considers genome edited organisms as GMOs, which do not fall
under the existing exemption under the Directive for organisms
resulting from conventional mutagenesis. The ruling adopts a
strict legal interpretation of what constitutes a GMO and does
not consider the principle of “novel combination of genetic
material” as applied in other jurisdictions – as summarized
above. It should be noted that the Court ignored this principle
while the GMO Directive includes, in its definition of a GMO,
the phrase “has been altered in a way that does not occur
naturally by mating and or natural recombination”. This
misunderstanding implies that organisms that have been edited
but that can or do occur naturally, will have to follow the same
European regulatory procedures as GMOs, including a detailed
analysis of possible risks.
The Court ruling has been widely debated since its publication,
which will not be summarized here. A clear analysis of its
implications was issued by the European Commission's Group of
Scientific Advisors (2018). The Group concludes that:Fronti“[ … ] meeting the obligations of the GMO Directive
implies cost- and labour-intensive pre-market
evaluations and a long duration of the approval
process, which are difficult and onerous to bear,
particularly by small and medium enterprises. This
may diminish incentives for investment, negatively
affect research and innovation in this field, and limit
the commercialisation of gene edited products.” (EC-
SAM, 2018)In particular, it is noted that:“It is a concern that countries in the developing world
exporting feed and food to the EU might not benefiters in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 1035from gene edited crops if they follow the EU
authorisation practices, as some of them currently do.
No single breeding technique alone can provide a magic
bullet for solving the problem of unsustainable food
production and food scarcity in the world. However,
gene- editing has the potential to contribute to food
security, which is particularly relevant given the
growing world population and climate change.” (EC-
SAM, 2018)A critical challenge, also emphasized by EC-SAM (2018), to
the EU decision-making process will be the fact that enforcement
of obligations imposed by the GMO Directive, on traceability
and labeling of GMOs entering the EU will be near-impossible.
Due to the absence of a novel combination of genetic material,
seeds and commodities developed with NBTs are identical to
those developed through unregulated plant breeding or naturally
occurring variations. As a result, the detection, identification and
quantification of genome edited products will be a major
challenge. This fact will become more problematic when
exporting countries authorize the cultivation of genome edited
crops that will not be regulated as GMOs.
In order to address this situation, EC-SAM recommends
amending the EU's GMO Directive to reflect the growing track
record of safe use and consumption and associated scientific
evidence, in particular on genome editing and established
techniques of genetic modification, considering the obligation for
GMO legislation to be: “[C]lear, evidence-based, implementable,
proportionate and flexible enough to cope with future advances in
science and technology in this area” (EC-SAM, 2018).
Emerging Regulatory Approaches
in Sub-Sahara Africa
Considering the situation sketched above, and the important
influence the EU has in shaping regulatory policies in Africa due
to trade relations and historical ties, it is encouraging to note that
sub-Sahara African governments have started defining their own
regulatory approaches to GMOs and, increasingly, applications
of NBTs. Based on growing expertise worldwide and in-country
with safety reviews and decision-making on GMOs, including
general releases of GM insect-resistant cotton and cowpea,
regulatory authorities are now getting ready for NBTs and
genome editing. Apart from global regulatory developments in
other parts of the world, there are several important drivers
behind regulatory policy formulation in Africa, including:
1. Rapid technological developments resulting in the first
contained-use applications involving NBTs being recently
submitted to regulatory authorities in Africa, for example, in
Kenya by international research centers.
2. Discussions as part of the CBD's bi-annual inter-
governmental meetings regarding synthetic biology, gene
drives, genome editing, among other items, which often
take a highly precautionary view on emerging technologies
generally and NBTs in particular, including the calling for
moratoriums (Callaway, 2016), which were refuted by a
majority of African delegates.March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 130
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Union, proposing more enabling and science-based
approaches to emerging technologies such as gene drives
and genome editing. While the Union's work on genome
editing started only recently, its report on gene drives clearly
embraces the technology as a realistic option for effective
disease control (AU-NEPAD, 2018).
Spurred by these developments, a few governments are
considering the inclusion of NBTs and other emerging
technologies in their regulatory frameworks. A case in point is
Nigeria, where, in August 2019, an amended biosafety act for
Nigeria was published in the government gazette following
assent by the country's President. The amendments broaden
the scope of the act to wider “biosecurity” concerns, not just
biosafety, and to include applications of genome editing, gene
drives and synthetic biology as regulated technologies along with
GMOs. At this stage, no specific assessment criteria and
procedures were defined, nor criteria for possible exemptions.
This approach may be effective as it brings the new tools and
technologies under the purview of a functional regulatory
agency; however, it may open the door for regulating genome
editing innovations as if they are GMOs. Further work will be
undertaken by Nigeria's National Biosafety Management Agency
(NBMA), which would lead to a science-based guideline that
would help implement the amended Act by including clear
regulatory triggers for genome edited organisms.
Rather than amending its biosafety act, in Kenya the National
Biosafety Authority (NBA) opted to develop a guideline on genome
editing. Guideline development was deemed to be a suitable
approach as it allows for flexibility, in a rapidly evolving field, and
consultations with scientists and regulatory agencies in the
agricultural and environmental sectors. Following initial
consultations, NBA organized a technical meeting in April 2019
analyzing advances in genome editing, and relevant regulations in
Kenya as well as other countries. Currently, the authority is drafting
a guideline that aspires to be practical and science-based, and which
allows for case-by-case reviews and exemptions from biosafety
review for products that do not have a novel genetic combination.
Thus, the proposed approach for Kenya essentially follows those
adopted in Argentina and other South American countries.
It is expected that other countries that embrace agricultural
biotechnology will soon follow Nigeria's and Kenya's lead and
devise policy and regulatory approaches to NBTs and other
emerging technologies.WAY FORWARD AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
In this article, we have pointed to several important recent
developments in sub-Sahara Africa regarding the regulation
and adoption of GM crops, as well as the continuing politicalFrontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 1136challenges that hamper further progress. Regulatory authorities
in select case study countries have gone through a period of rapid
capacity development, as shown by the increasing number and
scope of GMO environmental releases including CFTs and
general releases and have shown flexibility in their decision-
making processes. A major driving factor in this process
constitute the more progressive agricultural and development
policies as formulated by national governments. Recent capacity
development will provide a foundation for the formulation and
implementation of science-based regulations for novel breeding
techniques such as genome editing.
While recent progress is encouraging, we fully acknowledge the
fact that political challenges remain. A critical challenge involves the
need to sustain the political will and current momentum that
provides scientists with leeway to operate. While not discussed
extensively in this article, it is generally recognized that
controversies exist around the adoption of GM crops and that,
despite a safety track record of over two decades, public opinion on
this topic remains divided. These controversies are sometimes
reflected in government decisions in sub-Sahara Africa, when
decision-makers call for moratoriums on CFTs or bans on GM
commodity imports. Such calls are influenced by activist groups
who campaign against modern agricultural technologies generally,
and against GMOs in particular. Recently, these campaigns have
also resulted in court cases challenging biosafety decisions by
national competent authorities. Despite this, progress in Africa
continues but it involves a careful balancing act.
Governments and development partners will have to continue
investing in the development of knowledge, skills and capacities
required to regulate and adopt GM crops; and, in due course, the
products emanating from genome editing applications—as
introduced in this article. Emerging best practices from, e.g.,
Argentina, provide critical guidance. Capacity development
should include outreach and awareness initiatives to ensure
public debates and policy consultations are well informed and
incorporating the best available science.
A special case is made here for enhanced regional and sub-
regional collaboration. Increasingly, regulatory authorities in
Africa are exchanging expertise and data regarding biosafety
decisions, including the acceptance of data generated in
neighboring countries. This collaboration would provide the
basis for harmonization efforts in regional economic
communities such as the Common Market for East and
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC). Each of these regional bodies have initiated
processes and guideline development towards sub-regional
harmonization in the recent past but none have been adopted
and implemented so far. A constructive development at the
regional level involves the recent policy statements by the
African Union (AU) regarding genome editing and gene drives
for human health purposes, which have impacted discussions in
AU member states. Such supportive statements will continue to be
important to bolster the current momentum.March 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 130
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The recent Regulation (EU) 2019/1381, published on the 6th September 2019, aims to
improve the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain
by amending the General Food Law Regulation (EC 178/2002) and a number of other
regulations related to the food sector. This Regulation is introduced as a response to
the Fitness Check of the General Food Law Regulation as well as a response to public
concerns expressed by a European Citizens’ Initiative on glyphosate and pesticides.
This article evaluates the amendments introduced by Regulation 2019/1381with respect
to the institutional and regulatory environment in the food chain and more specifically
concerning the risk assessment procedure. For this purpose, we perform a comparison
of the institutional and organizational characteristics of the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) and European Medicines Agency (EMA) in relation to the processes
of risk assessment and risk evaluation, especially the processes surrounding genetically
modified foods and pesticides, and how these characteristics affect the politicization
of these processes. We conclude that the risk assessment process followed by EFSA
would have benefitted and become more effective and less politicized, if the recent
Regulation 2019/1381 had introduced some of EMA’s institutional structures and
methods on risk evaluation.
Keywords: risk, assessment, food, regulatory, governance
INTRODUCTION
In the past, food policy was within the competence of the Member States in the European
Union (EU). Following a series of crises in the late 1990s [the Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis
(BSE) crisis, E. coli etc.], the Member States transferred the food policy competences, particularly
with respect to food safety, to the EU institutions in the early 2000s. This transfer resulted in
institutional and legislative changes and introduced a number of Regulations, Directives and
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 1 April 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 349139
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decisions. The Prodi Commission (1999–2003) created the
Directorate General SANTE1 and the General Food Law (GFL,
Regulation 178/2002) established the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) (Chatzopoulou, 2019b). These developments
reflected the need for an integrated policy at the supranational
level that could lead to harmonization of food and feed safety
rules and marked the Europeanization of food policy across
the EU Member States (Alemanno, 2006; Chatzopoulou, 2015,
2019a). European people received this food policy transition
mostly positively (Eurobarometer2, 2019, p. 28). However, EFSA
has been criticized for lack of effectiveness particularly with
respect to risk analysis, selection of data and information, risk
communication; lack of transparency and broad representation
of the available scientific knowledge (Chatzopoulou, 2015);
and the long duration risk assessment processes3, which also
created delays in the subsequent authorization of applications
(EuropaBio, 2016; Wesseler and Kalaitzandonakes, 2019). These
concerns about transparency resulted in some degree of public
dissatisfaction and contestation of EFSA’s work. Moreover,
concerns about conflict of interest among EFSA’s experts led
the European Parliament to withhold EFSA’s budget resulting in
stricter administrative rules (Chatzopoulou, 2015).
Following the adoption of the European Citizens’ Initiative
(ECI) Regulation in 20104, but before it entered into force,
Greenpeace claimed to have collected 1 million signatures calling
for a moratorium on genetically modified (GM) crops. During
2014–2018, the Commission launched the Fitness Check of
the GFL Regulation, which also identified various concerns
regarding the risk assessment of GM organisms (GMOs) and
the governance of EFSA. In addition, following a series of
critiques by various non-governmental organizations, an ECI,
that had collected 1,070,865 signatories5, to “Ban Glyphosate and
Protect People and the Environment from Toxic Pesticides”6 was
presented to the Commission on the 23rd of October 2017. This
initiative raised concerns on the transparency and sustainability
of EFSA’s risk assessment processes in the food chain. A public
hearing was organized at the Parliament on 20 November
20177. Responding to these concerns, the European Commission
(EC) submitted on 11 April 2018 a regulation proposal to
the Council and the European Parliament (EP) that led to
Regulation 2019/1381. This Regulation introduced amendments
in Regulation (EC 178/2002) on general food law and a number
of Regulations related to GM food and feed (1829/2003) and















feed additives (1831/2003) along with eight legislative acts dealing
with specific sectors8 in the food chain9. Thus, the paper focuses
mainly on the regulated products GM and pesticides and not
on non-regulated ones (e.g., contaminants). The amendments
aim to improve the transparency, reliability and independence
of studies submitted to EFSA in order to support EFSA’s risk
assessment process.
The Regulation emphasizes the proactive and automatic
communication to the public, at an early stage of the risk
assessment, of all studies submitted to EFSA for risk assessments
via EFSA’s website thereby strengthening the transparency and
underpinning EFSA’s assessments while protecting legitimate
confidential business information10. Moreover, the Regulation
introduces a greater involvement of the Member States in the
Management Board in line with the inter-institutional “Common
Approach on EU decentralized agencies11,” as it is in the case
of the European Medicines Agency (EMA). For instance, the
Member States are encouraged to be active in the nomination
of scientific panel experts for risk assessment. Such a change is
expected to broaden the number and type of experts with respect
to disciplines and geographical distribution.
Taking stock on the existing literature on risk governance, this
paper addresses the overall question: to what extent will the recent
Regulation, on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk
assessment in the food chain, improve the risk assessment process
in EFSA and increase trust among the European people?
To address this question, this paper links the amendments
made by the Regulation, in the governance of risk analysis for
EFSA, to the corresponding ones in EMA. This comparison
is relevant in understanding the governance of risk assessment
because EFSA and EMA belong to the same cluster of agencies,
both are under DG SANTE and their areas of expertize
are connected, both agencies consider aspects of health and
environment and perform risk assessment for products that
will be introduced to the market12. The foundation of both
agencies, aimed to ensure that risk assessment processes, are
based on objective scientific knowledge. However, the governance
of risk assessment of food and feed biotechnology in EFSA has
been highly contested, in comparison to medical biotechnology
in EMA. This contestation is also accompanied by a low
acceptance of food and feed biotechnology. For example, the
acceptance of genetic modification by society differs among the
two sectors, e.g., food and agriculture and health and medicine
(Olynk Widmar et al., 2017).
The paper is structured as follows: After presenting the
competences and governance structures of EFSA and EMA, the
8These are GMOs, smoke flavorings, food contact materials, food additives, food







12We did not compare EFSA to EEA or ECDC, for example, because these two
agencies do not perform risk assessment of products for the market. We did not
chose EEA and ECHA because they do not directly provide scientific opinions to
DG SANTE as both EFSA and EMA do.
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following section discusses the real problem that raises criticisms,
over time, in relation to the governance of risk assessment in
EFSA. A description of the policy process is also presented,
followed by the discussion of the results.
THE MAIN CRITICAL ISSUE:
BACKDROPS OF RISK MANAGEMENT
PROCESS
The founding of EFSA and EMA aimed to support the
Commission’s work by providing scientific based opinions based
on risk assessment and risk evaluation processes respectively.
However, EFSA’s risk assessment opinions on food and feed
biotechnology have been criticized, especially with respect to
transparency (publication of studies used for the assessment13)
and demonstrated politicization elements (Löfstedt, 2004;
Chatzopoulou, 2015). EMA, on the other side, does not face such
critiques concerning biomedicine and genetic medicine. This
article suggests that this difference is related to the dissimilar
governance of risk assessment in these two agencies, implicating
directly the risk management processes. One contrasting
difference is the role of the member states in the risk assessment
process. The member states’ involvement matters as it shapes, as
it would be expected, the governments’ attitudes and possibly also
the public opinion. Regulatory systems and ad hoc decisions are
not only a response to public attitudes but they also contribute to
forming public attitudes in a significant way (Qaim, 2016, p. 117).
Olynk Widmar et al. (2017) demonstrate that GM acceptance
in the society differs among sectors, e.g., it depends on if GM
food and feed are used and associated with human health or
with plant biotechnology. These studies show that GMOs used
in pharmaceutical production do not face the same contestation
as GMOs used directly for food or food processing (Qaim, 2016).
For example, a series of scientific controversies among member
states created delays during the risk management processes in
the case of maize14 (Qaim, 2016; Eriksson and Chatzopoulou,
2017). Following the risk assessment process by EFSA, the
disagreements emerge in the comitology that consists of civil
servants from all Member States and oversees the Commission’s
use of delegated powers. When qualified majority voting (QMV)
cannot be reached in this committee, then the Appeal Committee
can overrule the Commission by QMV. Most often, the Appeal
Committee ends up with no decisions and then the Commission
has the final responsibility15 (Christiansen, 2019, p. 111). In the
great majority of cases, this results in (1) a favorable scientific
opinion by EFSA, (2) no opinion through comitology, or (3)
threats of court cases of inaction (ibid). In the case of medicines
registration by EMA, there is no comitology procedure. Formally,
the Commission’s decision is based on EFSA’s risk assessment




15Please see Eriksson et al. (2019) and Lehrman (2014) for a detailed presentation
of the authorization process in the comitology procedure.
applications in the past years for food and feed use, these
decisions were not for cultivation. If the decision would have
only been based on EFSA’s risk assessment, several additional GM
products for food and feed, or also for cultivation might have
been approved by the EC. Consequently, it can be argued that
in practice there is still a moratorium on the approval of GMOs
for cultivation, as the only GM crop that has been authorized
for cultivation in recent years (the Amflora potato) had its
authorization annulled in 2013. The EU Court argued that there
was a procedural error in the approval process (General Court of
the European Union, 2013) due to insufficient involvement of the
Member States in the standing committee by the Commission.
In other words, the final rejection of the Amflora potato was
based on national politics and interests and not on EFSA’s science
based risk assessment. Although the EU introduced an opt-
out mechanism (Directive EU 2015/412) in 2015 which allowed
member states to restrict or prohibit cultivation of authorized
GM crops in their territory, this did not resolve these issues
(Eriksson et al., 2019).
Such incidents reflect a broader uncertainty with respect
to the risk management at the Commission level (following
EFSA’s risk assessment), which the existing decision-making and
governance processes have not been able to address adequately.
These incidents also demonstrate the importance of the national
views and interests in the decision-making, which seem not
to be based on EFSA’s scientific risk assessment on safety
for health and the environment (Qaim, 2016, p. 116). Thus,
politicization is leading to outcomes that are not based on
scientific knowledge, affecting the legitimacy and reputation of
the governance of risk assessment processes and the role of EU
institutions, namely EFSA.
In light of these arguments, this paper analyses to what
extent the current development with the Regulation 2019/1381
will be able to address effectively issues on the governance
of EU risk management. For this purpose, we compare the
institutional and organizational characteristics of EFSA and EMA
with respect to the risk assessment process, which constitutes the
basis of risk management by the Commission. This comparison
is expected to allow us to unfold and understand the necessary
changes in the EU institutional and regulatory environment
with respect to risk assessment and the risk management
procedure on food biotechnology. Such changes can potentially
contribute to elimination of delays and promote innovation in
food biotechnology in a responsible manner.
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND
RISK ASSESSMENT IN EFSA AND EMA
Despite their similarities, the two agencies, EFSA and EMA,
follow different governance structures, which affect their
functioning, reputation, and legitimacy. Governance provisions
and structures determine the control mechanisms used by the
agencies’ principals (the Commission and the Member States).
EFSA is the most recently founded of the two agencies, and
as above mentioned, it was established in 2002. Furthermore,
while the risk evaluation of medicines has been harmonized
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BOX 1 | The three interconnected components of risk analysis according to
the EU General Food Law, Regulation 178/2002 (L31/7, L31/8).
9. “Risk” means a function of the probability of an adverse health effect
and the severity of that effect, consequential to a hazard;
10. “Risk analysis” means a process consisting of three interconnected
components: risk assessment, risk management and risk
communication;
11. “Risk assessment” means a scientifically based process consisting of
four steps: hazard identification, hazard characterization, exposure
assessment and risk characterization;
The risk assessment must be undertaken in an independent, objective
and transparent manner based on the best available science.
12. “Risk management” means the process, distinct from risk
assessment, of weighing policy alternatives in consultation with
interested parties, considering risk assessment and other legitimate
factors, and, if need be, selecting appropriate prevention and control
options; (Regulation 178/2002:7.
13. “Risk communication” means the interactive exchange of information
and opinions throughout the risk analysis process as regards hazards
and risks, risk-related factors and risk perceptions, among risk
assessors, risk managers, consumers, feed and food businesses, the
academic community and other interested parties, including the
explanation of risk assessment findings and the basis of risk
management decisions;’ (Regulation 178/2002:8).
more at the global level, in the case of certain food aspects,
such as GMOs, there is significant divergence concerning risk
assessment processes (e.g., process versus product based)16.
EFSA’s establishment aimed to provide independent scientific
advice and clear communication on existing and emerging risks
in the area of food and feed safety, animal health and welfare as
well as plant health (European Food Safety Authority, 2014).
The GFL (Regulation 178/2002)17 defined the rules for the
entry of new food and/or feed products into the EU market,
established EFSA, and set out certain procedures related to food
safety. The GFL provides four measures: (1) the establishment
of the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), (2)
the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed
(PAFF), (3) the adoption of emergency measures, and (4)
the establishment of a general plan for crisis management.
In addition, it includes three inter-related components of
risk analysis: risk assessment, risk management and risk
communication (Box 1).
The GFL also defined the principles of EFSA governance.
Taking into account the opinion of the EP, the Commission
proposes EFSA’s 14-member Management Board. The selection
is based on the members’ experience and expertize and not on
nationality (European Food Safety Authority, 2011), but it should
secure the broadest possible geographic distribution within the
Union (Reg. 178/2002, Art. 25). This process constituted an
innovation in the EU agencies’ governance, since until then
territorial representation in the agencies Management Board
was important. Additionally, four of the Management Board
members should represent organizations such as consumers
16Point suggested by one of the reviewers.
17https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
32002R0178&from=EN.
and other interests in the food chain (European Food Safety
Authority, 2011).
The Management Board appoints an Executive Director who
is responsible for the implementation of the financial rules
of the Authority and has to ensure the adequate organization
of the legality of transactions (European Court of Auditors,
2011). The Executive Director also has the responsibility for
the day-to-day management of EFSA and is supported by the
Heads of department, Heads of unit, the Chief Scientist and the
Senior Policy Adviser18. A Scientific Committee and 10 Scientific
Panels (corresponding to different policy areas19) and their
working groups supports EFSA’s risk assessment work. According
to the existing legislation, the Scientific Committee20 and the
scientific panels provide the Authority’s scientific opinions to
the Commission, each within their own spheres of competence
(Commission Regulation (EU), 2017). The Scientific Committee
consists of the chairs of the Scientific Panels complemented by
six independent scientific experts who do not belong to any of the
Scientific Panels and focuses on the coordination and consistency
of the scientific opinion procedure (Reg. 178/2002). The scientific
panels are composed of independent scientific experts who
carry out scientific assessments, organize public hearings where
necessary, and develop related assessment methodologies. These
are appointed for 3-year periods, similar to the ones in EMA.
However, they do not secure the geographic representation of all
member states as it occurs in EMA’s scientific committees.
When EFSA receives a market application first validates its
completeness or if it needs more information to proceed. Then
EFSA’s relevant Panel establishes a working group that develops a
draft and submits it to the Panel for discussion and often to public
consultations. For example, for the GMO Panel, there are three
permanent working groups: molecular data, food and feed, and
environmental risks). The working group consists of members
of the relevant Panel and a number of additional scientists
from specialist fields. This working group assesses the available
scientific information from the Member States, research institutes
or companies. EFSA may request more data directly from the
applicant. An important aspect is the defining of a timetable of
the process from the beginning, which depends on each case.
The adoption of the assessment, usually a scientific opinion (it
can also be a Statement, Guidance Document or another type of
output), is based on majority in the relevant Panel at a plenary
meeting21.
Based on EFSA’s risk assessment, the Standing Committee
on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed (PAFF)22 under the
Commission decides the final authorization of the product.
18http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/people/operationalmanagement.
19Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW), Panel on Biological Hazards
(BIOHAZ), Panel on Food Contact Materials, Enzymes and Processing Aids
(CEP), Panel on Contaminants in the Food Chain (CONTAM), Panel on Food
Additives and Flavorings (FAF, Panel on Additives and Products or Substances
used in Animal Feed (FEEDAP), Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms
(GMO), Panel on Nutrition, Novel Foods and Food Allergens (NDA), Panel on
Plant Health (PLH) and PPR.
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The PAFF is an intergovernmental committee composed of
representatives of all Member States and is chaired by a European
Commission representative that also exemplifies the networked
characterization of the EU agencification23. Its mandate covers
the entire food supply chain – from animal health issues on
the farm to the product on the consumer’s table. The PAFF
plays a key role ensuring that the EU measures on food and
feed safety, animal health and welfare, and plant health are
practical and effective. The PAFF delivers opinions on draft
measures that the Commission, who is responsible for the risk
management, intends to adopt. This is the first committee where
all the member states are represented in the risk analysis process.
But, this Committee constitutes part of the risk management not
the risk assessment (scientific level) and constitutes a significant
difference when compared to EMA.
Similarly to EFSA, EMA consists of scientific committees,
seven of them, and a number of working parties and
related groups, which conduct the scientific work. The EU
pharmaceutical legislation was introduced in 1965 as a reaction
to the thalidomide scandal (malformation effects on babies
by the medicine for pregnant women). EMA was founded
in 1993 by merging the pre-existing Committee for Human
Medicinal Products (CHMP) former CPMP (Committee for
Proprietary Medicinal Products) and the Committee for
Veterinary Medicinal Products (CVMP). This merger initially
created the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products (EMEA) that was renamed as European Medicines
Agency (EMA) in 200424. EMA’s was expected to further the
efficient and flexible implementation of EU legislation on
pharmaceuticals, and ensure rapid access of new products to the
Community market (Sauer, 1996, p. 23, as cited Groenleer, 2009,
p. 145). In order for a medicinal product to be placed on the
EU market, it has to follow the core pharmaceutical regulation,
namely the marketing authorization requirement. There are three
different procedures for authorizing medicines: the centralized
procedure, the mutual recognition/decentralized procedure and
the national procedure (Wirtz, 2017). For certain biotechnology-
derived and high tech products the centralized procedure is
mandatory. While the marketing authorization is granted by the
EU Commission, the scientific assessment of the application is
carried out by the EMA.
Each of the EMA committees follows its own rules of
procedure. Each committee appoints a rapporteur who prepares
an assessment report, which the committee will consider
and eventually adopt as part of a scientific opinion or
recommendation. For certain procedures, a “co-rapporteur” also
prepares an assessment independently from the rapporteur25. The
work of the rapporteur and co-rapporteur is supported with
23For a detailed description of the process (see Lehrman et al., 2014, p. 69–
70), https://www.slu.se/globalassets/ew/org/centrb/mbiot/publikationer/
shapingourfood_mistrabiotech_web_140625.pdf.
24REGULATION (EC) No 726/2004 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL of 31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the
authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use
and establishing a European Medicines Agency (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ L
136, 30.4.2004, p. 1).
25https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/committees/how-committees-work.
resources and expertize by an assessment team with necessary
expertize and resources. In addition, the EMA secretariat
provides technical, scientific and administrative support for each
assessment. In order to mobilize the best expertize for medicines
evaluation, regardless of where experts are geographically based,
rapporteurs and co-rapporteurs can establish multinational
assessment teams by including experts from other Member States
as well as their own. The EMA committees try to reach their
conclusions by consensus whenever possible, but if not the
committee holds a vote, which follows specific procedures and
rules26. For this purpose, Member States have to liaise with the
Management Board and the EC in order to ensure that the
final composition of the Committees covers the scientific areas
relevant to its tasks. The committee considers the final assessment
report and eventually adopts it as part of a scientific opinion
or recommendation.
Since 2004, CHMP carries out the assessment and evaluation.
This Committee often consults the Pharmacovigilance Risk
Assessment Committee (PRAC) in relation to risk assessment.
Directive 2001/83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 lay
down specific rules concerning the pharmacovigilance of
medicinal products for human use and set up the PRAC.
Accordingly, the PRAC is responsible for the risk management of
the use of medicinal products for human use including detection,
assessment, minimization and communication related to the risk
of adverse reactions, design and evaluation of post-authorization
safety studies and pharmacovigilance audit.
Both the CHMO and PRAC committees consist of a Chair
and one member and one alternate member appointed by each
of the EU Member States and one member and one alternate
member appointed by each of the EEA-EFTA States. The EC
also appoints several representatives. Two experts (one member
and an alternate) on clinical pharmacology and pharmaco-
epidemiology to ensure that the relevant expertize is available
within PRAC, other two (one member and one alternate), to
represent healthcare professionals; and finally two more (one
member and one alternate) to represent patient organizations.
All members, except those appointed by EU and EEA-EFTA
states, are appointed based on a public call for expressions of
interest and after consulting the EP based on their relevant
expertize in pharmacovigilance matters and risk assessment
of medicinal products for human use. The members and the
alternates of the Committees are appointed for a term of 3 years,
which may be prolonged once. The aim is to guarantee the
highest levels of specialist qualifications and a broad spectrum
of relevant expertize. Since all Member States are involved in
the risk evaluation as part of the scientific committees for
pharmaceuticals, scientific differences in national opinions are
resolved before the EMA provides its scientific opinion to the
Commission, who then mostly rubberstamps EMA’s opinions.
When concerns over the safety or benefit-risk balance of a
medicine or class of medicines are raised, a referral procedure,
which can be started by the EC, a Member State or the
company that markets the medicine, is used to resolve such
26https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/committees/how-committees-work;
https://www.ema.europa.eu/documents/other/prac-rules-procedure_en.pdf.
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issues. In a referral, the medicine, or class of medicines, is
“referred” to EMA so that it can conduct a scientific assessment
on behalf of the EU and then make a recommendation for
harmonized position across the EU. There are a number of
reasons why a referral may be started, ranging from concerns
over the safety to disagreements among Member States on the
use of the medicine. Safety-related referrals are assessed by
the PRAC and then either by the CHMP or, for nationally
authorized medicines, by the Coordination Group for Mutual
Recognition and Decentralized Procedures-Human (CMDh). All
other referrals on human medicines are assessed by the CHMP
only. For most referrals, the EC issues a decision to all Member
States reflecting the measures to take to implement the Agency’s
recommendation27.
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Figure 1 presents a chronological record of events since the
GFL founding in 2002 until the submission of the legislative
proposal by the Commission to the EP and the Council in
April 2018. In December 2010, Greenpeace and Avaaz submitted
a pilot ECI with one million signatures in accordance with
the rules established by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. This first
pilot ECI responded to the first authorization in 12 years by
the Commission in March 2010, for the cultivation of a GM
crop in Europe28. The 2010 ECI called for a moratorium on all
new authorizations and a review of the GM approval process,
claiming that the existing authorization raised serious health and
environmental concerns. As the ECI process was not formally
implemented at this point, the EU institutions did not have
to take action. Years later, in March 2015, in disagreement
with EFSA’s scientific opinion, the International Association
for Research Cancer (WHO, IARC) “classified glyphosate as
‘probably carcinogenic to humans’ (Group 2A),” which triggered
a lot of concern about the objectivity of science in the society.
Between 23/10/2017 until 17/01/2018, a most recent ECI “Ban
glyphosate and protect people and the environment from toxic
pesticides” was launched, which indicated concerns on the
transparency in the risk management process by EFSA. This
recent ECI became one of the four successful ECIs since the
Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 Article 11(4) of the Treaty of
the European Union was put into practice in 201229 and the
Commission responded according to the Lisbon Treaty rules.
Furthermore, during 2014–2018, the Commission launched
a Fitness Check in order to address if the existing GFL is
still “fit for purpose” regarding its relevance and effectiveness,
efficiency, coherence, and whether it should be simplified so
that it can become less costly. The Fitness Check recognized
the positive outcomes of the EU food and feed safety policy,
but it also acknowledged that there is space for improvement
in “the implementation of the functional separation of the risk





Regulation”30. In addition, the Commission received feedback
20/12/2017-17/01/2018 and started an Open Consultation
23/1/2018-20/3/2018. Moreover, this was discussed at various
fora with different actors, namely the Advisory Group on the
Food Chain and Animal and Plant Health31; the EFSA Advisory
Forum (national food safety authorities on 6th February 2018);
the Commission Expert Group on General Food Law32 (5th
March, 2018) and finally the Scientific Committee of EFSA33 (14
and 15/02/2018). This demonstrates a long process that involved
a variety of public and private actors, before the Commission
formulated its legislative proposal on 11/04/2018.
CHANGES INTRODUCED BY THE
RECENT COMMISSION REGULATION
2019/1381 ON THE TRANSPARENCY
AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE EU RISK
ASSESSMENT IN THE FOOD CHAIN
On 11 April 2018, the Commission submitted a proposal
to the Council and the Parliament for a regulation on the
transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the
food chain. This proposal regulation aimed to amend the GFL
Regulation (EC 178/2002) and a number of other regulations
related to, amongst others, GM crop cultivation, food and feed
uses (1829/2003), and food and feed additives (1831/2003). The
recent Reg. 2019/1381 addresses aspects of governance and by
introducing a change in the composition of the Management
Board, in a way, recognizing the importance of the representation
of all member states, as it is the case in EMA:
“It is thus appropriate to include representatives of all Member
States of the European Parliament and of the Commission as well
as of civil society and industry organizations in the Management
Board, while providing that those representatives should have
experience and expertize not only in the fields of food chain
law and policy, including risk assessment, but also in the fields
of managerial, administrative, financial and legal matters and




31The Advisory Group on Animal and Plant Health discussed the Commission’s
proposal on transparency and sustainability of the EU food and feed safety risk
assessment model on 5 February 2018.
32REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment
in the food chain amending Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (on general food
law), Directive 2001/18/EC (on the deliberate release into the environment of
GMOs), Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (on GM food and feed), Regulation
(EC) No 1831/2003 (on feed additives), Regulation (EC) No 2065/2003 (on
smoke flavorings), Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 (on food contact materials),
Regulation (EC) No 1331/2008 (on the common authorization procedure for food
additives, food enzymes and food flavorings), Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 ([on
plant protection products) and Regulation (EU) No 2015/2283 (on novel foods)
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-179-F1-
EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF.
33Fifteen trade and business associations, four Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), one Member State (MS), and one citizen submitted feedback. 471 people
participated in the OPC, 318 citizens and 153 stakeholders.
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FIGURE 1 | Timeline of events in relation to the Commission’s legislative proposal for GFL until the EC submitted its proposal to EP and Counsil.
Responding to the shortcomings in the Authority’s high level
expertize identified by the Fitness Check (Art. 16, L231/3),
the new Regulation emphasizes the importance of greater
involvement of the Member States in the Management Board
by nominating scientific panel experts for risk assessment.
This change would be more in line with the inter-institutional
Common Approach on Union Decentralized Agencies in the
effort to increase the consistency of the EU agencies’ management
board model. Such a change is expected to broaden the number
and type of experts with respect to disciplines, number, and
geographical distribution. In order to do so, it is suggested
to provide better financial compensation, which is currently
considered low, in order to attract highly qualified experts.
However, expansion of the Management Board (Reg. 2019/1381)
and the number of candidates does not adequately address the
problems in the actual structure of the risk assessment process,
which is directly linked to the expertize of the Authority’s
scientific panels. Neither, “a more active role to ensure that
a sufficient pool of experts is available to meet the needs
of the Union risk assessment system” of the Management
Board or the member states in the appointment of the
scientific panels’ members would be sufficient (Reg. 2019/1381).
This change does not describe precisely what is an “active
role” and how this could ensure “high level of scientific
expertize, independence and multidisciplinary expertize.” While
the national scientific organizations are involved “in drafting
preparatory scientific opinions to be peer-reviewed and adopted”
(Art. 18) by the scientific panels they are not represented in the
preparation phase (ibid).
Regulation 2019/1381 focuses significantly on risk
communication through: (1) Automatic publication of all
studies and supporting information submitted to EFSA for
risk assessment, in an electronic format that would be publicly
available and easily accessible; (2) Stakeholders would be
consulted on submitted studies, and confidentiality would be
protected in justified circumstances; (3) A specific procedure
would be implemented for renewals of substances already
authorized; and (4) The Commission would, via delegated
act, adopt a general plan for risk communications in the
agrifood chain (Comitology Newsletter #52, 2018). While this
is important, it raises concerns in the industry concerning
confidentiality and property rights with implications on
research and innovation in the sector34. Most importantly,
these changes do not tackle the identified concerns on the
risk assessment process adequately as they concentrate on the
risk communication.
When the EP received the proposal from the Commission,
the Special Committee on the EU authorization procedure for
pesticides (PEST) was established and held 12 meetings during
2018. In the EP the Environment, Public Health and Food
Safety Committee (ENVI) has been assigned the responsibility
to write the report. The first Rapporteur was Renate Sommer
(EPP, DE), who suggested in its draft report that the EP would
prefer to align the EFSA rules with those of other EU agencies
(e.g., the EMA) as much as possible, but ensure that confidential
information does not become available at the time the application
is submitted but when EFSA adopts its final opinion35. Early
publication of information could jeopardize innovation and jobs
creation as the industry would be reluctant to invest in EU
countries. Renate Sommer resigned36 in protest at the final
shape of her report, when the plenary voted by 427 in favor
(172 against, 67 abstentions) of amendments37 to the draft
EFSA reform on 11 December 2018. Mrs Sommer characterized
the decision a “populist” move that will harm innovation and
“endanger the whole food chain.” The Spanish MEP Pilar Ayuso
González took over the representation in trilogues, despite her
vote against the final EP report. The Council reached an internal
position in December.
During the process, there were many disagreements in the
Council. For example, the Dutch government criticized several
elements, in particular the notion of granting EFSA more









37The EP suggested 112 amendments (see amendments at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0417_EN.html?redirect).
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FIGURE 2 | Procedure on Commission’s legislative proposal after it was submitted to EP and Council.
recount of events since the submission of the Commission’s
proposal to the Council and the EP38 until the adoption of
a new regulation on the transparency and sustainability of
the EU risk assessment in the food chain by the Council on
13 June 2019. The Parliament finalized its position by a vote
and agreement in the Plenary (11/12/2018) followed by the
adoption by the Council (12/12/2018). A provisional agreement
was reached at the third trilogue meeting (11/02/2019), and was
endorsed in the ENVI committee (20/02/2019). “The provisional
agreement sets out that: supporting data and information linked
to an application for authorization will be made public by the
EFSA after the assessment of the validity of the application unless
the applicant proves that this could significantly harm its interest
and requests confidential treatment by EFSA. The applicant will
be able to file a confirmatory request if s/he disagrees with EFSA’s
assessment of confidentiality. In this case, the information cannot
be made public until a final word is said. The Commission
will be able to request EFSA to commission its own verification
studies in exceptional controversial cases of high importance
for the society and member states will have a more active role
in helping EFSA attract more and the best scientists to participate
in Scientific Panels. Risk communication among all actors – the
Commission, EFSA, member states and public stakeholders –
will be improved to ensure a more coherent, transparent and
continuous flow of information throughout the risk assessment
process39.” The Parliament approved the agreement (17/04/2019)
and the Council has formally adopted a new Regulation40 on
the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment
in the food chain on June 13, 2019 based on the Commission’s
proposal41.
The new Regulation amends the GFL Regulation and eight
legislative acts dealing with specific sectors of the food chain:
GMOs (cultivation and for Food/Feed uses), feed additives,
smoke flavorings, food contact materials, food additives, food









foods42. Following its entry into force 20 days after publication,
September 6, 2019, it will become applicable 18 months later
thus by the end of March 2021. The Regulation introduced
one important change with respect to the role of the Member
States in the governance of EFSA. When the Regulation will
apply, each Member State will nominate a representative to
the Management Board, increasing their role and level of
responsibility in supporting EFSA and ensuring an increased
scientific cooperation. The selection of the Member States’
representatives in the new Management Board will be based on
specific requirements such as relevant experience and expertize
in the field of the food chain legislation and policy, including risk
assessment. The strict criteria of independence will also have to
be fulfilled (ibid).
DISCUSSION
The EU divides the feed and food risk analysis in risk
assessment, risk management, and risk communication, where
EFSA is responsible for risk assessment, the Commission for risk
management and they share risk communication depending if
it is an assessment or management issue. This division was a
response to the mismanagement of the BSE crisis and the high
degree of politicization on food policy, which is today reflected
in the rationale behind the governance of EFSA where both the
Commission and the Member States instated a “police patrol”
type of control. However, this division of competences did not
decrease the politicization; at the contrary, it complicated the
process by distinguishing the two different levels, one scientific
(EFSA) and one political (EC). The scientific committees of
EFSA have been criticized for not representing broadly the
available scientific knowledge. The agency’s work depends on its
capacity to combine expertize from the Member States. National
scientific organizations contribute to EFSA’s work through their
participation as experts to EFSA’s scientific panels, and by
providing EFSA with scientific data and studies.
However, the representation of all Member States in the
scientific panels is not required. This was not changed by the
recent amendments by Regulation 2019/1381. As a result, only
a small number of Member States (six) provide more than two
42https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-19-1031_en.htm.
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thirds of the experts on EFSA’s ten scientific panels that can
have maximum 21 members43. In the last round that started
in June 1st, 2018 6 member states (France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom) provide 109 out of the
168 experts in the 10 scientific panels of EFSA. Some countries
have no representative at any panel, and there are increasing
difficulties in attracting enough new candidates to work in them.
Here the first difference from EMA that has more financial
and human resources and all Member States are represented
in the scientific committees. Consequently, the risk assessment
process in EFSA by the independent scientists of the scientific
committees does not involve all Member States. In praxis, the
Member states’ different views and interests are expressed and
negotiated during the voting in the Standing Committee on
the Food Chain and Animal Health under the EC. As a result,
although the scientific opinion provided by EFSA constitutes
the point of departure for the decisions on the authorization of
food and feed, these decisions are strongly affected by national
politics and views. When it comes to a highly contentious field
such as GMOs and their derived products, the PAFF almost
never reach a common decision. There are always a number
of EU member states that vote against authorization, despite
a favorable scientific recommendation by EFSA (Smart et al.,
2015). Looking at the composition specifically of the EFSA GMO
panel over the years since its inception, it is obvious that there
is a lack of representation from several countries. The panel has
had 16–21 experts appointed for 3-year periods. In total, over
the periods since 2003 and until the most recent (2018–2021),
there has been an accumulated 117 appointments and 72% of
these come from only eight countries (Figure 3). When this is
compared to the voting behavior of these countries in 2003–
2015, five of them (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
and United Kingdom) are characterized by a strong inclination
to vote in favor of authorization and thus following EFSA’s
scientific recommendation. Two of them (France and Italy) have
a tendency to abstain from voting and occasionally vote either
for or against authorization. Several countries that tend to always
vote against authorization of GMOs have never been represented
in the EFSA GMO panel, such as Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania
and Luxembourg, or represented very few times, such as Austria,
Hungary and Poland.
It may be argued that EU Member countries without
representation can still be active during the decision making
process by submitting their comments and then getting a point-
by-point reply afterward in annex to EFSA’s opinion. However,
the possibility of giving comments does not really compensate for
their lack of representation. In fact, this has only created delays,
instead of contributing to effectiveness, as countries lacking
representation tend to present their own scientific evidence at late
stages making the process to start again. In contrast, differences
in national opinions regarding the approval of pharmaceutical
products are resolved before the EMA provides its scientific
opinion to the EC given that all Member States are involved in
the risk evaluation as part of EMA’s scientific committees.
43https://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/event/mb180321/mb180321-i1.
pdf.
Any differences in national scientific opinions regarding the
approval of pharmaceutical products are resolved before the
EMA provides its scientific opinion to the EC given that all
Member States are represented in the risk evaluation as part
of EMA’s scientific committees. Consequently, it is not the
long-term credible commitment for common regulation based
on scientific evidence, instead, the Member States’ short-term
interests and politics, which ultimately determine the food
regulatory framework. Here the second and biggest dissimilarity.
We want to emphasize though that it is important that
EFSA remains politically independent and autonomous. Our
recommendations do not suggest that EFSA should become
politicized. Nor do we suggest that EFSA’s scientists should act
on behalf of their governments, but rather that representation
in EFSA increases the chance that member state being properly
and scientifically informed. If an expert from a particular country
is member of an EFSA panel, then we believe that the chances
increase that the scientific conclusions reach that country’s
decision makers in a more direct manner (e.g., through personal
communications with that expert) and that this will influence the
voting behavior in the PAFF, similar to what happens at EMA. At
EFSA, the lack of representation is creating a politicized situation
in comitology. With the appropriate representation from all
Member States all scientific differences in national opinions
would be resolved before EFSA provides its scientific opinion to
the Commission, who will then basically approve EFSA’s opinion
as it happens with EMA’s opinions.
Moreover, “the regulation of foodstuff mainly has to rely on
post-marketing control” because the foodstuff market is much
more fragmented with the exception of food additives, as well
as novel foods and food ingredients, especially products derived
from GMOs, which need to be authorized before they get access
to the Single Market44 (Krapohl, 2004). In contrast, the specific
rules for the relatively homogeneous pharmaceuticals products
that are produced by large companies allow the premarket45
evaluation and regulation46 (Krapohl, 2004), which is another
difference in the rules governing the two agencies.
High autonomy and low political influence is what should
characterize a regulatory agency. This is relevant for initiatives
and collaborations with other regulatory authorities or the
industry because the higher the autonomy and the lower the
role of politics the more attractive the agency is to collaborate
with. However, as explained, the current absence of a long-term
credible commitment for common regulation based on scientific
evidence is making EFSA a vulnerable target to political interests.
If the wish is to have an independent agency able to provide
advice based on sound science, several changes have to be made
in the organization of the agency.
In the effort to improve citizens and stakeholders confidence
in transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment, the
Commission introduced changes in the legal framework on GFL
44Sebastian Krapohl, “Credible Commitment in Non-Independent Regulatory
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the European Agencies for Pharmaceuticals
and Foodstuffs,” (2004) ELJ 5 518, 519.
45A post-market control also applies for pharmaceuticals (Pharmacovigiliance),
but this works just as a subsequent fire-alarm control.
46Krapohl, supra note 42, 519.
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FIGURE 3 | Composition of the EFSA-GMO panels by the EU member states from 2003 to 2021.
BOX 2 | The four main elements of the New Regulation agreement aim at:
• Ensuring more transparency: Citizens will have automatic access to
all studies and information submitted by industry during the risk
assessment process. Stakeholders and the general public will also be
consulted on submitted studies. At the same time, the agreement will
guarantee confidentiality, in duly justified circumstances, by setting out
the type of information that may be considered significantly harmful for
commercial interests and therefore cannot be disclosed.
• Increasing the independence of studies: The European Food
Safety Authority will be notified of all commissioned studies to
guarantee that companies applying for authorizations submit all
relevant information and do not hold back unfavourable studies. The
Authority will also provide general advice to applicants, in particular
SMEs, prior to the submission of the dossier. Commission may ask the
Authority to commission additional studies for verification purposes
and may perform fact-finding missions to verify the compliance of
laboratories/studies with standards.
• Strengthening the governance and the scientific
cooperation: Member States, civil society and European Parliament
will be involved in the governance of the Authority by being duly
represented in its Management Board. Member States will foster the
Authority’s scientific capacity and engage the best independent
experts into its work.
• Developing comprehensive risk communication: A general plan
for risk communication will be adopted and will ensure a coherent risk
communication strategy throughout the risk analysis process,
combined with open dialogue amongst all interested parties.
Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1030_en.htm
and recently adopted a new regulation based on Art. 43, 114,
and 168 (4) (b) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European
Union. The new regulation emphasizes the need for transparency
and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain.
The regulation aims to harmonize the procedures followed in
the functioning of EFSA with these followed by other scientific
agencies such as European Chemical Agency (ECHA) and EMA,
since the governance of EFSA is not in line with the Common
Approach on decentralized agencies, such as the composition of
the Management Board. The specific changes in the functioning
of EFSA introduced by the new regulation are going in the right
direction (Box 2) (points 1, 2, and 4). They can contribute to
a more open and qualified communication on risks, which can
decrease fear by providing clear information about real versus
perceived risks. However, there is space for improvement.
Point 1 on ensuring more transparency: The access of the
public to information related to the risk assessment at early
stage while ensuring duly justified confidentiality is significant
and also relevant to Point 2 on increasing the independence of
studies. However, this change combined with the proposed pre-
submission procedure, which can be useful especially for small
and medium size companies, would require more financial and
human resources by EFSA. Another challenge concerns the way
it will be justified what requires confidentiality and what not so
that it will not threaten innovation and business property.
Point 3 indicates that the new Regulation introduces changes
in the governance of EFSA by increasing the involvement
of the Member States in the Management Board, and in
the nomination of members of the scientific panels, §14 and
§15. However, this change focuses on the Management Board
that is involved in the administration of finances but not
directly in the risk assessment. Besides, this change might
increase the number of available qualified risk assessors but
it does not address the representation of the member states
scientific divergences at an early stage. Consequently, this
change does not allow deliberation on scientific divergences
among the member states at an early stage, on scientific basis,
as it happens in EMA during the risk evaluation. One of
the great challenges is how to ensure scientific clarity. This
can only happen by having an extended pool of independent
scientific evidence and strong collaboration among most, if
not all, Member States and the EFSA, which is relevant to
Point 2. The need for available tools to support cooperation
among between EFSA and the Member States is emphasized
by a significant number of respondents47 (40% of citizens
and stakeholders).
Point 4 concerns changes in governance. The main changes
linked to the risk assessment process are introduced in
Art. 25, Art. 28 (5) and Art.32. Nevertheless, these changes
can improve the communication with the public about the
relevant scientific evidence used in the risk assessment process,
scientific evidence still has important role to play for dispelling
widespread misconceptions, so the communication should be
science-based and more in a form of public debates as previously
47https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=21019&langId.
Frontiers in Plant Science | www.frontiersin.org 10 April 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 34948
fpls-11-00349 April 6, 2020 Time: 15:51 # 11
Chatzopoulou et al. Improved Risk Assessment in EFSA
suggested (Qaim, 2016, p. 115). Therefore, there is a need
for improvement and simplification of the communication
with the public. Better and simpler information by legitimate
actors based on scientific facts and democratic principles can
shape public opinion positively, beyond biased information
and prejudices. It is important for the public to understand
how technology can contribute to food safety, food security,
and sustainable agriculture development, hence it needs to
be utilized and expanded. Biased information and prejudices
distorts public opinion.
Unfortunately, the changes introduced by the Regulation
do not generate any significant changes with respect to the
risk assessment process and the representation of scientists
from all the member states, which is crucial for creating trust
in public opinion among the member states people. Instead,
the amendments mostly focus on increasing and improving
communication and openness of the process. Consequently,
it is not clear if the new Regulation is able to overcome
the existing backdrops, as the governance processes and
organization differences are which determine the Commission’s
final authorization decision.
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